



colon'ial, /kə'lōnēəl/ (n) The inhabitant of a colony; (a) characteristic of a colony or colonialism, (n) The policy or partial political control occupying it with settlement. **colonist**, /'kālənist/, (n) The inhabitant of a colony. **coloniza'tion**, the act of colonizing; the establishment of colonies; "the British colonization of Africa". **colonize**, (v) 1. (of a country or its citizens) settle in (a place) and establish political control.

The African Union Ten Years After

Solving African Problems with Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance

Edited by Mammo Muchie, Phindile Lukhele-Olorunju and Oghenerobor Akpor

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Edited by Mammo Muchie, Phindile Lukhele-Olorunju and Oghenerobor Akpor



**Africa Institute
of South Africa**

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Preface

Mammo Muchie, Phindile Lukhele-Olorunju and Oghenerobor Akpor

This is the second in a series of books that we intend to produce every year by holding annual Africa liberation conferences to promote pan-Africanism and the African renaissance in order to make Africa its own leader in the 21st Century. The first book on 'The African World; from Fragmentation to Unity' was produced last year, 2012. This year we will launch this second book that deals with 'The Africa Union Ten Years After: Putting Africa First is Putting Humanity First'. The series of books will follow subsequently by producing at least one book every year. We had a large number of scientific papers and we selected those that have been peer-reviewed for inclusion in this book.

Many Africans from every part of the world came to Pretoria in South Africa on the tenth anniversary of the African Union and deliberated on how to position Africa to emerge as its own leader in the 21st Century. This followed from the first Africa Liberation Conference we held in 2010 in Pretoria and produced both the book *The Africana World: From Fragmentation to Unity and Renaissance* (Africa Institute of South Africa, 2011) and the 'First Tshwane Declaration'. The delegates, who hailed from Africa and the rest of the world, were inspiring: they were exchanging knowledge, research findings, experiences, and building networks to maintain and sustain continuity and a dialogue that has been vigorous in order to accelerate the unity of Africa and the full realisation of the visions of pan-Africanism and the African renaissance in the 21st Century.

The African Union must first and foremost be the expression of African agency to end all varieties of coloniality for good. It becomes the full realisation that there can be no room for divide and rule, and that all African states must prioritise the African interests above everything else, including their own self-interest. Africans must prize their unity to be able to deal with the global challenges and respond to them with full agency, self-worth, dignity, self-reliance, independence and freedom.

Africans must learn to compete without breaking their unity and running into conflict, and by promoting collaborative agency; they must learn to unite to enhance their knowledge, values, skills and capabilities to move ahead. Learning to collaborate with competition and learning to compete without breaking collaboration must guide the African leadership style and approach to transform Africa structurally and sustainably.

There is recognition and acknowledgement that pan-Africanism was founded by Ethiopianism in the 16th Century. In 1829, African-Americans declared the Ethiopian Manifesto to realise full African pride and dignity, long before Karl

Marx declared the Communist Manifesto to realise the dignity of workers of the world. (*The Ethiopian Manifesto, Issued in Defence of the Blackman's Rights, in the scale of Universal Freedom*, New York City, February, 1829.)

Later the unity of Ethiopians was strengthened by the African liberation triple helix: the pan-African Movement that began in 1897 and was launched in 1900; the Adwa Victory in 1896 as the definitive African Victory over world empire; and the emergence of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa as the first pan-African liberation movement combining both spiritual and political disobedience to both theological and political oppression against Africans. Together these movements, the Pan-African Congresses (1900), the Adwa Victory (1896), and the ANC (1912) forged the new direction for realising and achieving the long journey to freedom and independence and African voice, agenda and agency.

The ideas of pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance must not be simply slogans, they must have meaning at various levels from the epistemic to the political that Africans must eradicate the colonial imposition on the African personality. It must be nothing else but the restitution of the African personhood with the values of *ubuntu* and freedom from domination. The de-colonising imagination must prevail, to use Franz Fanon's admonition.

One of the outcomes of this conference to prevent any Second Scramble for Africa recurring is the Second Tshwane Declaration (see Appendix). In this year, that the African Union Commission declared as the Year (2013-2014), there should be serious education to involve all African people to facilitate the creation of African agency for full freedom and independence. Community education on Africa should be spread, and knowledge that facilitates all Africans to feel, think, be, act, vote, and value first and foremost their African identity. Their African-ness must first be diffused to the village level, and from there to the rest of Africa. This 'OAU/AU@50' time must be filled with the vision of the African Renaissance Manifesto to spread and diffuse education to reach a billion Africans without fail.

We trust this book will add interest, identity and fresh thinking on how Africans can move far – forwards and upwards together – by promoting and translating pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance into practice in order to enter a post-colonial era where policies and actions are determined not by the kindness of strangers but by the united agency of free Africans the world over.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACALAN	African Academy of Languages
ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
ACPA	African Climate Policy Centre
ADB	African Development Bank
AD	African Diaspora
AFREC	Africa Energy Commission
AMCOST	African Ministerial Council on Science and Technology
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COMEDAF	Conference of Ministers of Education of the African Union
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
EC	European Commission
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOSOC	Economic Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GNSED	Global Network for Sustainable Energy Development
HID	Human Development Index
IAK	Indigenous African Knowledge
ICD	Independent Complaints Directorate
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa
ICD	Independent Complaints Directorate

ILO	International Labour Organisation
IPI	International Peace Institute
IPID	Independent Police Investigative Directorate
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NEEDS	National Economic Empowerment Programme Strategy
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OA	Organic Agriculture
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PIDA	Programme on Infrastructure Development in Africa
PSC	Peace and Security Council
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SAP	South African Police
SARPCCO	Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation
SIT	Social Identity Theory
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
TNCs	Transnational Corporations
UNCAC	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UNCTAD	United Nations Centre for Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHDI	UN Human Development Index
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNTOC	UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USGS	US Geological Survey
WADU	World African Diaspora Union
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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The African Union Ten Years After

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INSPIRATION

'Dead, living, free, or in prison on the orders of the colonialists, it is not I who counts. It is the Congo, it is our people for whom independence has been transformed into a cage where we are regarded from the outside... History will one day have its say, but it will not be the history that Brussels, Paris, Washington, or the United Nations will teach, but that which they will teach in the countries emancipated from colonialism and its puppets... a history of glory and dignity.'

Patrice Lumumba

'To free the people still under colonial rule, let us all accept to die a little or even completely so that "African unity" doesn't become mere words.'

Ahmed Ben Bella

INTRODUCTION

The Scramble for Africa series of conferences started in 2010. We are now going into the third Scramble for Africa conference. We continue to use this theme since Africa continues to suffer from the unfair treatment that has been forced upon her for over half a millennia. This subjugation still remains unabated and it must end now. But we are confronted with the threat that Africa may be yet be open for a new surprise – a new scramble for Africa. Why these threats are real is because African countries are still too fragmented and remain largely influenced by external actors who do not have Africa's interests at heart. Africa can invite strangers, but they must not invite themselves to exploit its rich resources. Africa must stop relying on donor aid and must unite to attain a self-reliant agency. Africa must not depend on the kindness of donors. Vast awareness and education

are needed to better articulate the vision of Africans in their struggle to realise their full humanity, well-being, self-worth, pride, confidence, liberation and dignity.

The description and degradation of the human race by colour has been employed to enforce and justify slavery, colonialism, apartheid and imperialism. Africa has suffered the most from this injustice; the humanity of the African people has been rejected, and they have been commoditised for sale and purchase as chattels. This inflicted the dehumanising degradation of the African personality that has not been fully overcome to this day. The self-worth, confidence, self-reliance and dignity of all Africans have yet to be fully restored. The African personality has to be restored. Today, it is through the movement of pan-Africanism, African renaissance and accelerated African peoples unity that all Africans can be cured of the historical blight of colonialism and neo-colonialism and their current more sophisticated and subtler forms of expression.

It is by uniting Africans as Africans first that their own humanity can be re-claimed. The misinterpretation of the striving of Africans to create a united African nation as misplaced is failure to acknowledge the need for Africans to attain full confidence and make a break from the legacy of dehumanising commodification that was imposed on their being and personality. The Africa nation is waiting to be forged. Its formation and foundation of African civic identity first promotes rather than hinder the best expression of the variety of diverse and different races, colours, languages, ethnic groups, religions and regions. All settlers and those who originated from African soil can realise the full consciousness of African civic identity.

We take the opportunity of the OAU/AU Jubilee year and propose that the remaining challenges that draw Africa back into coloniality must end for good, and a sustainable post-colonial era with integration, unity, and renaissance must be sustained so that all Africans should be able to enjoy full well-being, including those at the bottom of the bottom. The OAU/AU Jubilee has rightly timed 2013 as the year to advance pan-Africanism and the African renaissance precisely by making the case for Africa to move out of coloniality and neo-colonialism, into a definitive and sustainable era of post-coloniality.

The launch of the African Union (AU) in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002 heralded significant advances in shifting the paradigm from not only continuing to struggle against the after-effects of colonialism and apartheid, but also for building a strong African Union by integrating the African people, economy, space and society, and by making being African or African-ness a means to open the opportunity for the variety of communities in Africa to self-express, self-define, self-organise and self-determine by prioritising their development and well-being with both freedom and

dignity at the same time. Until the formal end of apartheid in 1994, Africa was engaged in dismantling and removing colonialism and apartheid. The formal end of apartheid in 1994 brought democracy to South Africa and vigorously revived the vision of pan-Africanism and African renaissance. With the dawn of a new liberated South Africa, a new history and a new era of Africa has begun to unfold.

The AU has now received the baton and has adopted the philosophy of 'Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance' as its centrepiece. The establishment of the AU marks a new phase of African history to make Africans enter into the era of post-coloniality. It symbolises the opening of the construction phase of African political, economic, social, scientific, engineering and technological unity. Whilst the OAU was established mainly for bringing an end to colonialism and apartheid, the AU explicitly seeks to achieve the building and realisation of full African integration by deploying 'African solutions to African problems' under the rubric of pan-Africanism and African renaissance.

The AU is thus for pan-Africanism and African renaissance, as the OAU was for the struggle against colonialism and apartheid. The AU thus affirmed the logo, the spirit, hope, and the imagination that pan-African integration is possible, desirable and necessary after the formal demise of colonialism and apartheid. The AU represents Africa's freedom and determination to take independent action in pursuit of the opportunities emergent in completing Africa's renascent and integrated economy. It affirms the willingness of African states to join a renaissance and unity project and take responsibility to chart their own destiny. As Mandela reminds us:

The time has come for Africa to take full responsibility for her woes and use the immense collective wisdom it possesses to make a reality of the ideal of the African renaissance, whose time has come. ¹

When the heads of states gathered and decided to form the AU by dissolving the OAU, one would and should expect or demand, that they must have had ideas of how the new union can accomplish challenges that the OAU was not able to overcome. Indeed the AU must not be the OAU with a different name just as the EU is not the EEC by another name. There must be a qualitative difference in the tasks, aims, structures and directions between OAU and AU. Unless the African Union takes on the challenges that the Organisation of African Unity failed to tackle, there would be no real *raison d'être* for it. Despite the narratives and catalogues of failures, the OAU has been at the forefront in helping and highlighting that all African states must be free from colonial domination. Given the global context of a vicious Cold War, it has done well on the whole by staying

alive and realising fully the need to bring about the complete political independence of the entire continent.

Looking back at the troubled decades of the OAU, one may indeed come up with a list of shortcomings. However, it would suffice to say that what the OAU was able to do including the extracting of South Africa from the fists of apartheid is of enormous historical significance. The transformation of the OAU into the AU is not to be read merely by looking at the name change. This has to be observed by the work and the investment to build the 'unity and renaissance capital' that has been both legally and morally anchored to accomplish and solve together problems that affect Africa as a whole. It must, at the minimum, bring the deepest possible integration of the continent socially, economically, militarily, culturally and politically.

The question is: has the AU laid the foundation over the last ten years to do this? If the AU is to be judged by the number of protocols it produced, it would not fail any assessment. The number of protocols after the AU came into being is staggering as can be seen from the table below showing samples of the protocols.

1. Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament Sirte, Libya, 2 March 2001.
2. The Convention of the African Energy Commission Lusaka, Zambia, 11 July 2001.
3. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union Durban, South Africa, 10 July 2002.
4. African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Revised Version) Maputo, Mozambique, 11 July 2003.
5. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa Maputo, Mozambique, 11 July 2003.
6. Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union Maputo, Mozambique, 11 July 2003.
7. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption Maputo, Mozambique, 11 July 2003.
8. Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 08 July 2004.
9. The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact Abuja, Nigeria, 31 January 2005.
10. African Youth Charter Adopted by The Seventh Ordinary Session of The Assembly, held In Banjul, The Gambia On 2 nd July 2006.
11. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance Adopted by The Eighth Ordinary Session of The Assembly, held In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia On 30th January 2007.

12. Charter for African Cultural Renaissance Adopted by The Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held In Khartoum, Sudan, 24 January 2006.
13. Protocol on the Statue of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights Adopted by the Eleventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, 1st July 2008.
14. Law Adopted by the 12th Ordinary Session of the Assembly held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1–4 February 2009.
15. African Charter on Statistics Adopted by the twelfth ordinary session of the assembly, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 4 February 2009.
16. Protocol on the African Investment Bank Adopted by the twelfth ordinary session of the assembly, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 4 February 2009.
17. African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) Adopted by the Special Summit of the Union held in Kampala, Uganda 22–23 October 2009.
18. Constitution of the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC) Adopted on 23 October 2009.

More protocols are no doubt likely to be added as the years go by. There is wide disparity between adopting protocols and implementing them. While the numbers of protocols keeps on rising, the real union in practice amongst African states has still a long way to go. What is critically important is to build the mechanism of effective implementation. Both the OAU and the AU have been excellent in producing protocols. What is more challenging is action on the ground to develop a sustained practice whereby the protocols can be revised and adapted continuously to realise the project of creating full African unity. Is the unity of African states taking place at all? Are the people of Africa uniting too? Where is Africa today with regards to forging real unity in the sense of attaining the capacity to respond to and deal with all kinds of challenges that require a collective response?

The AU must bolster African independence of thought and action. It must make Africa self-reliant. Africa was forced to experience a public policy vacuum for two decades owing to the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions ranging from structural adjustment programmes to poverty reduction strategic papers. The AU should insulate African states from experiencing such embarrassment ever again.

It must assist them to stand free and independent to pursue any policy trajectory they deem necessary to build their own society. The AU must be anchored on the concept of a free Africa that will have its place as a real player in world affairs. Unless the AU can resist the invasive policy ideas

from the external world, the AU will turn out to be part of Africa's problem rather than the solution.

It is a rare coincidence that the 10 years of AU, the 50 years of the OAU, and the 100 years of Africa's first liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and 117 years of the Adwa Victory, largely recognised as symbolising a definitive African victory over world empire, are all falling around the same time. This provides an opportunity to make linkages and spread education widely to cover the entire Africana World. We must construct the linkages and spread education even where it appears evident that linkages can be seen immediately. We need to dig deeper and find out what is shared and similar rather than always clamouring about diversity and differences echoing very much the anthropologist gaze on Africa that missionaries and colonialists employed to extend the divide and rule curse over Africa.

The papers in this book originate from the 2nd Scramble for Africa Conference held in Pretoria in May, 2012. The conference was held with the full support of the South African government, which also hosted the Diaspora Summit around the same time. The papers were thoroughly discussed at the various sessions of the conference and the authors were immensely inspired by the reactions they got from the participants. The conference, though focused on the Scramble for Africa, was richly interdisciplinary with contributors drawn from various backgrounds.

The papers presented in the conference are grouped in five pillars. While the theme of some of the papers cannot lend itself to easy categorisation, an attempt has been made to put together those papers having more or less common thematic concerns. It is to be noted that the pillars are more for the purpose of convenience rather than a strict differentiation of the papers. The papers are after all dealing with one big umbrella issue under the main topic of the African Union and the governing concepts of pan-Africanism and African renaissance.

In the first pillar, 'From the OAU to the African Union: State, Nation, Society and Good Governance' in Africa, the authors review and discuss recent events relating to the establishment of the AU and emerging issues on pan-African education.

The first paper in this pillar by Rotimi Ajayi and Segun Oshewolo is entitled 'Ghaddafi and the African Union: The End of an Era?' It discusses the formation of the African Union in July 2002, following the tenacity and contributions – material, financial and ideological – of its major proponents including Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya. The authors argue that the Libyan strongman vigorously expressed his belief in an amalgamation of African states that would truncate all colonial boundaries and existing political institutions. Even though the erstwhile Organisation of African Unity

metamorphosed into the African Union, what the leviathan Ghaddafi and his likes envisaged has remained a mirage. However, in a unique way, the body emerged at a particular historical juncture to fill a gap in Africa's political evolution, its numerous contradictions and shortfalls notwithstanding. The authors discuss the impact of the exit of Ghaddafi from Africa's political scene on this 'pan-African' body.

The paper by John Gasu, 'African Union and the Democratic Project: Examining the Challenges for Task Accomplishment' explores whether the African Union promotes democratic governance on the continent by examining the Constitutive Act and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. He probes into the issue whether new changes have appeared by breaking with the emblematic authoritarian governance that defined the era of the Organisation of African Unity. The author looks into the political developments that have exposed the inadequacy of power behind the AU's resolve to maintain democratic governance and examines the challenges that the pan-African body faces in accomplishing its task of ensuring a democratic continent. It is acknowledged that internal institutional weaknesses, which are associated with political cultures that are hardly conducive for democracy constitutes the bane of the governance system. It concludes, among other things, that the AU should move away from the fire-fighting approach in troubled spots, and proactively engage with the African grassroots about the essence of fostering democratic governance.

The next paper by Baba Amani Olubanjo Buntu, entitled 'Know Thy Self: African Union and the Need for African-Centred Education' draws attention to the critical folly made by all African states in designing their education system. The failure to establish an African national education system continues to cost Africa dearly. Copied education curriculums imposed from outside rather than developing an internally contextualised and centred curriculum was the preferred education choice. Education, as a liberating process towards empowerment, must be measured by its ability to provide identity, transmit legacy, create resilience and develop a shared vision. Largely, in post-colonial Africa, education has become appropriation of information centred in realities outside the continent. Few countries have embarked on teaching methods and material that cover African history, culture and philosophy. The African Union (AU), in its quest to unify the continent, has a critical role to play in advancing education rooted in Africa's rich past, challenging the present and a future of many possibilities. The author highlights the opportunity for the AU to see education as a transmission process – where new knowledge is derived from indigenous knowledge – particularly in light of African advancement. It is important to emphasise the role of traditional African education and its objective to transmit not only knowledge, but also cultural awareness, practical skills, preservation

of values and a holistic literacy. The author argues that African-centred education and Afrikological scholarship represent a much needed epistemological foundation for a continent-focused philosophy of education. The idiom of Ancient Kemet (Egypt) – Know Thy Self – is an essential reminder of the need to locate educational processes towards in self-knowledge.

Further on the topic of education is the work entitled ‘The Impact of Model C Schooling on Africanisation of Potential African Intellectuals’, Leepo Modise focuses on the drawbacks of the Euro-centric education system. Firstly, the impact of globalisation on the potential African intellectuals (learners) due to the Euro-centric educational system in South Africa will be discussed. Secondly, the author will present the importance of language as a vehicle that transmits culture. In most cases, the educational system does not use African languages as a medium of instruction. This on its own creates a problem for potential African intellectuals to know their identity and culture. In this sense, the European culture is still considered to be positive (beautiful, intelligent, rational, objective), hence the ‘Model C’ schooling system is considered the best. However, by training and hard work, some blacks can be made to abandon their culture (which is considered to be ugly, irrational and subjective) and acquire good European qualities and virtues. Thirdly, a case is made for the regeneration of holistic awareness and African consciousness amongst African intellectuals and elites to deconstruct the social construction that Western culture and education, which de-Africanised potential African intellectuals, is the best and credible. Fourthly, recommendations are made for the multi-faceted training of potential African intellectuals (learners at primary and secondary schools) to empower them with multi-lingual and multi-cultural knowledge and skills through a multi-dimensional educational model as an African compromising stance. Modise’s paper analyses the impact of utilising the global language as a medium of instruction in African children’s education and the impact of globalisation on the potential African intellectual.

In the second pillar, the contributions concentrate on the themes of governance, conflict and security. The paper by Mpho M Matlala and Ingrid Sinclair explores the dilemma South Africa has faced in dealing with police brutality and dehumanising practices in policing. Brutal police tactics are mainly responsible for the dehumanised style of policing used in South Africa and this has been further exacerbated through failure by senior managers to lay a solid basis for changes that can promote the inculcation of indigenous epistemologies with community policing. The dehumanised style of policing seen in South Africa has to inculcate social justice into policing and to integrate African values into policing and this has impacted the way in which the police view the community and how they deal with individuals. The authors used qualitative content analysis of news articles,

police reports, a literature review and their personal experiences about policing to suggest that re-aligning the policing curriculum at basic training to accommodate African values like *ubuntu*, could reinforce humane practices in police work.

The chapter by Treveor Budhram examines elite corruption in the private and public sectors and addresses its impact on economic growth and human well-being. Elite corruption in Africa is widespread and its impact results in widespread poverty and socio-economic inequalities. Citizens watch with anger as corrupt leaders amass immense fortunes and enjoy a luxurious lifestyle while their own people toil to scrape a living and are denied the most basic of services. The author argues that the private sector causes just as much damage through unethical and illegal behaviour as corrupt public servants.

The issue of corruption and poverty is also taken up by the next paper by Adelaja Odukoya who examines the issue within the Nigerian context. Corruption accounts largely for the prevalence of poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria. The oil political economy and the material crisis of the dominant classes in Nigeria foisted state capitalism and the use of the state as a mechanism for consolidating political power through corrupt enrichment. The ongoing neo-liberal market reforms, it has been argued, are to promote a new regime of accumulation that negates elite corruption and inefficiency in resource allocation. However, the elite has perverted and exploited the reform process using it as a new mechanism for primitive capital accumulation. Drawing on empirical evidence from the power and banking sectors reform, the author argues that reform, rather than cure corruption and primitive capital accumulation, has become a victim of this twin evil it was meant to terminate. The author draws the conclusion that market reform is an inappropriate mechanism for poverty eradication and combating the crisis of underdevelopment in Africa. The author calls for radical structural transformation of the state, ideological correctness and African-centred orientation, development cooperation and ideas.

The second half of the second pillar has conflict, peace and security as its theme. The chapters deal with conflict resolution experiences in general and the specific case of the two-state Sudan.

The chapter by Azeez Olaniyan argues that the 'Panel of the Wise' set up by the AU is one of the most critical and innovative in terms of *raison d'être*, philosophy and potentials. Deriving essentially from rich African culture of elderly intervention in societal affairs, the Panel of the Wise, comprising five elderly African statesmen, seeks to independently facilitate conflict resolution; it also offers a unique methodology of conflict prevention and mediation in Africa via a combination of shuttle diplomacy, interpersonal contact, repertoire of wisdom and subtle employment of moral persuasion.

Respect for old age constitutes an integral feature of African tradition, and this has been effectively employed in the traditional African conflict resolution, particularly at the micro societal level. Thus, the use of a style deriving from the people's culture offers, on the one hand, a wise recourse to rich tradition and on the other, a major paradigm shift in the art of conflict resolution. Although the achievements of the panel have been somewhat modest since its formation a decade ago, the paper argues that it holds the potential for conflict resolution in Africa. Using a combination of historical and empirical references, the paper engages in analysis of effective ways of utilising elderly wisdom in conflict resolution for the purpose of improving the operational relevance of the AU's Panel of the Wise.

The AU's Panel of the Wise is a translation of the 'African solutions for African problems' principle into action. Developing this principle, the next chapter by Valery Ferim offers background on its ascendance into prominence in relation to conflict resolution. Ferim argues that African leaders and scholars alike have expressed concerns over foreign intervention in the internal affairs of African countries. They have decried humanitarian intervention as a neo-colonialist agenda propelled by self-interest, condemned world judicial bodies such as the international criminal court for unfairly targeting African leaders and at the same time, watched seemingly helplessly, as atrocities such as the genocide in Rwanda were perpetrated, with apparent nonchalance from the international community. It is amidst these realities and verities of African politics that the paradigm of 'African solutions to African problems' was born. It was in acknowledgement of the hypothesis that the solutions provided by the West for over 200 years of domination, have not worked and that African peoples should play a leading role in addressing the challenges facing the continent. This paper questions the feasibility of 'African solutions to African problems.' The paper explores some shortcomings of this paradigm within the context of conflict management and resolution, given the continent's *status quo*. Among the challenges identified are: inadequate capacity and political will to address conflict, absence of a hegemonic power, disrespect for national constitutions and disunity. The paper recommends that there is a need for African states to capacitate and empower institutions such as the African Union to address conflict; a need for powerful states such as South Africa to play a more practical role on the continent; and also the need for African leaders to involve the international community in conflict resolution mechanisms on the continent.

Staying with the topic of conflict resolution, the next chapter by Wilfred Iyekolo discusses the emergence of South Sudan and how the independence of the Republic of South Sudan has terminated the regime of Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). While there are reasons for citizens

of the new state to jubilate, there have emerged new complexities and challenges with the CPA, having serious implications for future stability of the two-state Sudan. Mainstream discussions on the subject have indicated that complexities around oil, Abyei status, water, border demarcation and citizenship in the post-CPA era have the potential to cut short the newfound stability almost instantly. In an attempt to interrogate and conceptualise these new found problems, this article raises the following questions: Why is the CPA central to the looming return of hostilities? To what extent has the CPA delivered its objectives? The paper concludes that the fundamental problem in the two-state Sudan is a political economy of who gets what, when and how, and that the nature of the agreement at Machakos, not Naivasha, is responsible for the rise of complexities in the post-CPA era.

In the third pillar on Africa's trade, development, science, technology and innovation, topical issues discussed range from the danger of Africa's relegation to the inhospitable side of the nano-divide in the trails of the digital divide to the danger of missing the targets as laid out in the MDGs, from the provision of drinking water to the exploitation of natural resources, from the role of women in poverty alleviation to the pan-African response to the challenge of climate change.

The first paper by Hailemichael T. Demissie and Mammo Muchie discusses the concept of 'nano-divide', defining it as the epitome of existing and emerging technological divides. The paper argues that it is likely to enlarge and consolidate the 'digital divide' – a challenge which humanity has not yet resolved. Africa cannot afford to miss out this time for the consequences of the nano-divide are likely to be worse than the slave trade or the worst manifestations of colonialism. Africa cannot also afford to wait for the technology to arrive at its doorsteps according to what is conventionally held as the normal course of technology diffusion with market forces determining the rate of diffusion. The warning is that if the nano-divide materialises, the question will not be limited to the issues of simply losing out on comfortable lifestyles. The paper offers an overview of some of the issues relating to the temporal dimensions and the normative aspects of the nano-divide. Given the relatively new discourse on the nano-divide, these themes are yet to be adequately researched. The paper seeks to contribute to the discourse by drawing attention to these relatively neglected perspectives of the nano-divide.

In the next chapter, PhindileLukhele-Olorunju examines the persistent issue of poverty and taking a gender perspective in poverty eradication. She states that close to 1.7 billion people are estimated to live in absolute poverty today. Poverty is not only lack of enough income but also deprivation from basic education, health care, water and all other basic amenities. Some of the many causes of poverty in Africa are linked to social, economic and poor

governance policies. Women produce food and carry a lot of responsibilities for the survival of mankind and the alleviation of poverty in Africa. About 80% of farming in Africa is done by women and 60% of the world's poorest are women. African women in countries like Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa and Swaziland have found ways to be productive through cooperatives that bring about dignity to womanhood. Agriculture is one of the sectors where women are involved in job creation for the purposes of poverty alleviation and food security. The paper analyses the causes and impact of poverty in Africa and the role women play to mitigate poverty, and also provides policy recommendations to support women's efforts.

One of the tasks usually identified as women's role is fetching water. Improved drinking water provision will certainly lift a big burden off women's shoulders. The paper by Oghenerobor B. Akpor, Maxwell K. Boakye and Mammo Muchie is on improved drinking water supply and sanitation. Despite the many benefits of the provision of improved drinking water and sanitation, available reports have indicated that most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are unlikely to meet the drinking water and sanitation Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) targets. This paper is aimed at reviewing the progress and challenges in meeting the MDG targets on improved drinking water and sanitation in Africa, using Nigeria and Ghana as case studies. Several factors, such as financial difficulties, institutional problems, inadequate human resources, lack of sector coordination, lack of political commitment, insufficient community involvement and lack of hygiene education are identified as potential constraints to the development of the water supply and sanitation sector in both countries. Despite the challenges, it was observed that both countries have made some concerted efforts in addressing them, which is laudable, although several aspects of implementation still remain a concern. Given the importance of safe drinking water and sanitation in a country, the paper recommends the inclusion of a water and sanitation service development plan in the economic development plan of a nation.

A critical analysis and discussion of the MDGs is what the paper by Eliakim Owino and George Chacha sets out to do. The authors emphasise that over the past decades blind adoption of systems and processes, especially from the West, without due consideration to Africa's rich culture, customs and traditions has led to severe consequences in the continent of Africa. While not all traditions support Africa's desired move towards achieving the Millennium Goals and the integration of the continent, discarding all traditional systems without critical analysis – evidence of a skewed acculturation where Africa's rich culture, customs and traditions are projected as inferior – will lead to a stunted progress. At the same time, a *carte blanche* adoption of alternative 'transoceanic modernity' before proper evaluation

research is done to establish its suitability and complementarity could lead to resource mismanagement and time wastage – since by the time it is realised that it was not workable a lot of efforts shall have been dedicated in vain. The chapter seeks to highlight Africa's core traditions necessary for its transformation, evaluate the relevance of modernity to Africa and flesh out the possible selection criteria for modernity choices which hold the potential to transform Africa.

The next paper by Shingirirai Mutanga provides an overview of the role played by the African Union (AU) on renewable energy and development in Africa, with emphasis on African Union Commission's infrastructure and energy portfolio, and the specialised technical committees. Apart from African Union, there are other actors such as RECs, in particular SADC Policy Initiative, West African Initiative, NEPAD and Africa's Science and Technology Action 21 which have played a significant role in driving the transition to renewable energy in Africa over the last decade. Despite these efforts, the paper identifies a number of challenges including, among others, lack of coordination which saw various ministerial conferences on energy being organised by different institutions on an adhoc basis without clear pattern and focus, inconsistency commitment from investors who are largely influenced by the global dynamics and perceptions beyond Africa's control.

The paper by Pophiwa Nedson also explores the need for engagement by the AU and its member states in addressing yet another challenge – organic farming in Africa. Organic farming in Africa has remained largely a social movement promoted by non-state actors like Western aided non-profit organisations and inter-governmental organisations. A continental-level intervention by the African Union (AU) is necessary to convince African governments to adopt organic agricultural policies and support smallholder farmers. Following a decision by the AU in 2011 calling on member states to support the Commission and its international partners on the establishment of an African organic farming platform, the chapter examines implications this has for stakeholders to participate in the continent's agricultural economy and possibly improve food security and rural livelihoods of all farmers involved. Multi-level governance theory is applied in understanding how the AU engages with these stakeholders to mainstream organic agriculture within their agriculture planning processes.

The challenge of climate change and the need for a pan-African response is the theme of the paper in this pillar. KasaySentime, in the paper 'Pan-African Unity a Pre-Requisite for Pro-Active Response to Climate Change', argues for a pan-African response to the current politics and realities of climate change. This is important because climate change (and its impacts) cannot be mitigated in a haphazard and disjointed manner since it affects the entire continent. A clear and decisive look on the climate change issue

needs tied effort and pluri-versality of knowledges. As yet, there is no clear use of other epistemologies use in diagnosing first the core cause of climate change and second the prescription of germane mitigation strategies if necessary. Hence this paper seeks to emphasise the need for pan-African initiatives that take the issues of climate change into account. This is necessary because the intricacy of climate change and its associated impacts in one region can be felt and manifested in other places and generate different scenarios spatially and timely, with different scales. Due to unequal economic development and the vulnerability of the continent to global imperial designs, the African continent is at high risk of being adversely affected by climate change. The current politic climate change has become a major issue that deserves a pan-African response. It focuses on different initiatives put in place by the African Union (AU) in terms of approaches to mitigate climate change and assesses how these initiatives should take cognisance of indigenous knowledge on the preservation/conservation of the environment and ecological sustainability. It presents a strong case for mobilising the Pan-African force and for the deployment of local indigenous African knowledge as part of the pan-African mitigation strategy.

Closely linked to the pan-African response to the climate change challenge is the question of the extent to which such a response can be informed by Africa's own environmental protection traditions and practices. Taking up this issue is Kimani Nehusi's paper 'Humanity and the Environment in Africa: Environmentalism before the Environmentalists'. Nehusi argues that there was environmentalism in Africa millennia before the environmentalists. The presence of a specific concept of the environment, as well as a specific concept of the way in which humanity should interact with the environment, are clearly demonstrated in the deepest traditions of Africa. The notion of *Maat* and the ways in which this grand idea was articulated in daily life of Africa, including fundamental values, attitudes and behaviour patterns revealed by the idea of the future and the approach to it, the possession of numerous earth divinities, the libation ritual and totemic names, show that Africans have long held ideas and practises which amount to the earliest statement and elaboration of the concept that is today known as environmentalism. The full recovery and interrogation of all of these concepts and practises now appear necessary in view of Africa's own need – and hopefully its desire also – to develop a full and accurate social history of itself, from its own perspectives, as an unavoidable basis of its own rehabilitation and progress. The world's current preoccupation with the threat of environmental degradation provides an additional context in which to raise important questions about the suitability and sustainability of this aspect of African indigenous scientific knowledge and practice. The results of this trans-disciplinary reconstruction, analysis and evaluation are not merely

revelatory about African self-organisation and progress before foreign destabilisation, they also hold significant implications for scholarship, social renewal, unity and progress in Africa.

The papers in the fourth pillar mainly focus on mineral and natural resources and how Africa fares in the world trading system. In the first paper of the pillar, Alexis Habiyaemye takes stock of the Sino-American geo-strategic rivalry and its impact on African development through the exploitation of natural resources. The simultaneous increase in the interest for African oil and strategic minerals by both US and China has resulted in a geo-strategic race for the control of access to these resources, in which the US responded to the growing presence of Chinese companies by stepping up its military involvement on the continent. This rivalry has implied an enhanced demand for African oil and mineral exports, which created new development opportunities for resource-rich countries but also raised serious concerns about the appropriation of the resource benefits. Based on a comparative analysis of the engagements of the two economic giants in the African resource market, the author examines the role that Africa's natural resources can play in the African structural transformation process.

The next paper in this pillar is by Takalani Samuel Mashau and Nomusa Raphesu who pose the provocative question: 'Are Mineral Resources in Africa Enriching Africans?'. Africa has abundance of natural resources. Mineral resources are, however, a major source of conflict amongst Africans and between Africans and foreigners. These minerals were supposed to advance Africans. With these kinds of resources, Africa was supposed to be amongst first world countries. And yet, the continent is still lagging far behind many continents without similar resources. The paper examines why mineral resources which are in abundance are not serving or enriching Africans.

The paper by Martin Kaggwa takes us to the wider issue of economic partnerships. The paper entitled 'The Financing of EU's Economic Partnership Agreements in Africa: Implications of alternative funding initiatives', argues that even if the contribution of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) to Africa's development was not in contention, for African countries to take advantage of the agreements, they have to undertake costly institutional changes and will have to forego revenue that they have hitherto been receiving as import duties on imports from the EU. The coming into effect of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union (EU) with 26 African countries is almost certain. The merits and demerits of the EPAs has been widely debated given the fact that the agreements introduce reciprocal preferential trade relationship between unequal parties. African countries party to the EPAs ought to find means to fund institutional changes needed to take advantage of the EPAs. There should also be ways to compensate for resultant national revenue loss, at least in the

short term. Against this background, the paper assesses the efficacy of Aid for Trade, European Development Fund (EDF) and EU Budget funding initiatives to meet EPA implementation costs as proposed by the EU. The author argues that since all these initiatives were conceived before and outside the realm of EPAs, they fall short of addressing the implementation challenges of the EPAs. Moreover, accessing funds from these initiatives is conditional and discretionary. The paper recommends that a non-discretionary funding initiative tailor-made to address EPAs implementation challenges and costs be put in place and made part of the final EPA agreement.

The contributions to the fourth pillar of the book : Afro-politicism, Afro-centricity, pan-Africanism and African renaissance raise wide ranging issues. The first paper by Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'Decolonial Epistemic Perspective and Pan-African Unity in the 21st Century', explores the invisible global imperial designs which continue to cast a long shadow and surveillance over any initiatives aimed at implementing the overdue and urgent pan-African unity. Pan-Africanism is a counter force to the global imperial designs in place since conquest. Global imperial designs operate through colonial matrices of power that maintain the hegemony of the Euro-American world over the African continent in particular and the global South in general. The divide and rule strategy constitutes one of the long standing ways through which global imperial designs dilute, confuse, and destroy any counter initiatives aimed at humanising and democratising the current unequal world order in favour of Africa. But what is often ignored by pan-Africanists is epistemic surveillance that subsists on invasion of imagination and colonisation of the minds of Africans. Since the emergence of pan-Africanism in the Diaspora, it has been one of the most monitored initiatives from Africa that is consistently put under Euro-American surveillance because of its potential to produce a strong continent capable of defending its resources from external plunder. The author seeks to highlight the importance of taking seriously the invisible operations of Euro-American epistemology that hinder the realisation of pan-African unity. This dangerous phenomenon can only be dealt with effectively if pan-Africanists fully armed themselves with decolonial epistemic perspective as a survival kit. Global imperial designs are today hidden in institutions, carried in seemingly noble discourses like those of development and democracy as well as epistemology that pretends to be neutral, objective, and universal while at the same time quietly facilitating epistemicides in Africa. The author elaborates on its core arguments through revisiting the 'Kwame Nkrumah-Julius Nyerere curse' of the 1960's that polarized the initiatives towards pan-Africanism into 'immediatists' and 'gradualists'. Up to today, this curse hangs over the minds of current pan-Africanists like a nightmare, with serious consequences for the pace of achieving pan-African unity.

Tendayi Sithole, in the work on Fanonian ‘Thought and Implications for pan-African Unity’, is relevant to the idea of pan-African unity. However, Fanon did not engage in the notion of pan-African unity directly but envisioned a human society where consciousness is *a priori*. It is consciousness that provides pointers to what Fanon would have engaged pan-African unity. The argument here is that the application of Fanon’s thought indicates a clear articulation of pan-African unity and this can be seen in Fanon’s warning of Africa after it has assumed independence. This prophetic warning is evident in his notion of the pitfalls of national consciousness and it is from this notion that the route and possibility of pan-African unity can be diagnosed and prescribed. For pan-African unity to materialise there needs to be thorough decolonisation, as Fanon’s thought suggests, and there should be the imagination of politics of possibility. It is through such an effort that pan-African unity will be resurrected from irrelevancy and this is possible if there is a pursuit of politics of liberation, as opposed to politics of emancipation. Emancipation is what has pervaded the post-colonial Africa, and liberation is yet to be born – the necessary condition for pan-African unity. Fanon highlights that pan-African unity must be a new expression of new beings in the world, and as such, such new beings must be their own political directors who should not be spoken for, and acted upon.

David L. Horne in his ‘21st Century Pan Africanism: Legitimising the African Diaspora 6th Region’ explores pan-Africanism as the dominant current theory of the 21st Century. Pan-Africanism Africa can, will and should transcend and transform that existence to political, economic and cultural control of its own destiny through the African-centred approaches and consistent progressive efforts of succeeding generations of African people. Africa will undergo several stages of transformation, some very ugly and vicious, but it will eventually rise to higher, victorious ground. All analyses of current African conditions should include an understanding that such conditions are transitional states, not permanent arrangements. Within this explanatory perspective lies the African Diaspora (AD), recently identified as a living, breathing mass entity by the African Union’s (AU) Article 3(q) of the Constitutive Act and invited to join the party being formed to accomplish tangible Pan-African unification of the continent. The African Diaspora has been designated as an essential part of Africa’s transformation from neo-colonial, dependent status to self-reliant new behemoth in international affairs. Conceptualised by some in the African Union (specifically, the Executive Council, the second decision-making body of the AU) as the Diaspora Sixth Region, in order to accept the AU’s invitation and to play an influential role in Africa’s future, the African Diaspora (an amorphous body of over 250 million folk scattered over 50,000 miles inside and outside of at least 90 countries) must be organised, it must be credible, and it must be legitimate. The credible

organisation of the Diaspora – governmental, NGO, and financial -into an effective operational status is an integral component of the character of 21st Century pan-Africanism. Assessing the African Union's first ten years should include an evaluation of the maturation of the AU-African Diaspora relationship, and this paper provides an initial analysis of that dynamic.

The paper by Hunter Havlin Adams III, 'Reframing Trans-Atlantic Slavery as *Humanicide*: Resolving Hidden Wounds and Prioritising a New Vision of African Humanity' focuses reflection in elevating and evolving our humanity or *Ubuntu*, as the most primordial of the priorities in which Africans are engaged globally. This includes resolving the legacy of colonialism and the trans-generational after effects of Trans-Atlantic 'slavery' – the egregious enterprise aimed at destroying the humanity of an entire 'race' – Africans – while decriminalising European perpetrators' actions and ill-gotten gains. Words like 'slave', 'slavery', 'slave trade', and colonialism operate as pretexts to de-signify, de-contextualise and delimit the scale, scope and severity of the atrocities Africans endured. Alternative appellations, like genocide, *Maafa*, African Holocaust, and 'crimes against humanity' are reviewed. A corrective construct – *Humanicide* – is presented. African ideals of humanity are explored beyond 'human rights'. Putting African humanity first requires developing potent narratives for healing hidden wounds, thus enabling an African renaissance.

The paper by Oscar Braithwaite, 'Breaking the Cycle of Colonialism and Dependency in Africa: The Role of the African Diaspora' argues that only a unified Africa will be strong enough to withstand and triumph over the onslaught of Europeans unbridled rampage and unquenchable thirst for exploiting Africa's resources, and marginalising Africans globally. African countries have been preyed upon, by powerful nations, for many centuries. It is on this premise that pan-African leaders beseeched Diaspora Africans to become involved in Africa's advancement and development by contributing their talents, skills and resources. The author argues that Africa and Africans worldwide would benefit from mutual collaboration; and that a liberated and unified Africa would not be intimidated by threats from outside entities, including the WTO, IMF, WB, ICC and NATO. He discusses strategies to effectively utilise the talents, skills and resources in the Diaspora, and bridge the chasm between Continental Africans and Diaspora Africans to advance Africa's development and unification.

Caroline Marks Madongo, in her paper 'Beyond Self-actualisation: Issues and Challenges Experienced by Young Africans Seeking Asylum in London and Building Resilience for a Way Forward' has examined the lives of four young African refugees who have lived in London since arriving and claiming asylum aged in their teens. She has investigated how they have been affected by stigma commonly associated with refugees in society and their experiences

demonstrate the extent to which labelling could affect self-actualisation. The research has found that where resilience was developed, the participants were able to rebuild their lives successfully despite the challenges that they faced. The author reflects on Africa's current refugee situation and questions whether the purpose of self-actualisation amongst Africa's young refugee populations should solely aid the integration process or stretch beyond that to serve as a foundation on which to build awareness of the cause of issues such as on-going conflict on the continent. It concludes by recommending that drop-in-centres focus on developing resilience amongst young refugees and that African students raise awareness on Africa Refugee Day to educate people about refugees' plight; partake in refugee-centred research; build a refugee knowledge-based economy and involve young refugees in dialogue on democracy building for Africa's future.

Almaz Negash in her work highlights what role the African Diaspora can play in ensuring the renaissance of the African continent. Specific emphasis is placed on members of the Diaspora who migrated to the United States from the 1970's to today and their role in fostering economic development in Africa. The paper addresses the following question: What are the means to harness the intellectual capacity of members of the African Diaspora in order to promote economic development? The underlying assumptions in this question, which will be further examined in this paper, is that Africa is an emerging economy and the Diaspora can play an important role in its emergence. Through participation in the continent's economic development, the African Diaspora can become an influential force both in growing regional economies and in supporting positive social change throughout the continent. The author highlights potential answers to the question, including discussing the roles and responsibilities of African governments and political leaders to create an environment that encourages the contributions of members of the African Diaspora in ways specific to the circumstances in their home countries. There is no denying the potential for Africans in the Diaspora to advance development on the continent, but the question of how welcome they are in their home country can impede their influence. Other potential means will be found to harness the intellectual capacity of members of the African Diaspora by utilising an on-line platform to create strategic partnerships and encouraging entrepreneurial opportunities for members of the African Diaspora.

In the paper 'African Union, Gender Equality and Women Empowerment in the Last Ten Years: Some Issues and Prospects for Consideration', Ama Biney explores the roles of women in all facets of life in Africa and elsewhere. This has equally attracted the attention of stakeholders as all major global commitments in recent times have addressed thematic issues bothering women. Within the African space, the African Union (AU) has played very active roles

in addressing gender equality and women issues, and their efforts in the last ten years are worthy of commendations. While one appreciates the roles of AU in addressing gender equality and empowerment in the last ten years, it might be interesting to explore the ways by which the union has addressed violent conflict from a women perspective. This becomes important as violent conflict becomes one of the major challenges bedevilling the African region, and women and girls are the major victims. Violent conflict has brought untold hardships on both young and old within the continent and not much has been done to address this challenge from women's perspective. The question one therefore asks is, in what ways has the union addressed this challenge, taking into consideration women who in most instances are victims? The traditional perception of women in conflict and post-conflict situations is as victims of war. However, the active role women play in such situations is gradually being recognised in some parts of the globe. Aside this, women often are relegated to reproductive tasks, but in conflict and emergency situations, they may also play an important role in productive activities. The author seeks to explore the activities of the AU as regards gender equality and women empowerment in the last ten years. The paper examines how the interventions of the union have incorporated women into addressing violent conflicts in the region and finally, it makes suggestion on how the union can improve on gender and women issues, especially as they relate to addressing conflict within the continent.

Finally, the papers together explore the challenges and opportunities for building a union of Africans to realise the vision of a strong Africa that emerges as a leader in the 21st Century. This is an important year. The year 2013 can be called 'the year of Africa' where every African must pause and reflect on how far Africa has come out of the woods of colonialism, and how far Africa has advanced the goals of pan-Africanism and the African renaissance, which are the surest ways to recover Africa's full dignity with its humanity. The AU can only be a hub for pan-Africanism and the African renaissance if, and only if, the people understand and own it. Vast education is needed to do this. African leadership is needed to make sure the people, and the people alone, own the African Union to advance Africa forward. Unity of the people is what the AU must promote first and foremost. In this year of the OAU/AU @50, nothing is more important than to pause and reflect, and to open the opportunities to bring the unity of the African people without any hesitation.

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Ghaddafi and the African Union

The End of an Era?

Rotimi Ajayi and Segun Oshewolo

INTRODUCTION

In the area of integration, Muammar Ghaddafi will be remembered as a colossus. In Africa's recent past, no one demonstrated greater commitment to regional integration efforts than him. From the legacy of Kwame Nkrumah whose dogged commitment to African unity eventually led to the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU); Ghaddafi, in a similar fashion, played a leading role in the formation of the African Union (AU). To him, integration represented the pathway to the realisation of Africa's destiny. The horrible experiences in Africa notwithstanding, Ghaddafi touted regional integration as a veritable mechanism for achieving political stability. Ghaddafi's vision of a united Africa transcended the idea of internationalism which the AU largely represents as his dream was to achieve an upward shift in sovereignty away from African states to regional structures. He, however, did not discount the usefulness of international cooperation as a vital instrument for achieving greater unity and solidarity among the peoples and countries of Africa.

In line with the spirit of pan-Africanism, other African leaders have also contributed in no small measure. African leaders have renewed their commitments to regional integration efforts to overcome the challenges that confront the continent and serve as the political architecture for peace, stability and a secured future. According to Olukoshi¹, this momentum has, in fact, become an integral part of the development agenda for the continent which the African Union, successor to the defunct OAU, has spearheaded and under whose overall auspices it is being fashioned out and implemented. This idea, however, is not novel. International integration has been a long standing continental idea in Africa. As a constant theme in Africa's political history, it does not only create the historical awareness of Africa's past efforts; from the concrete lessons garnered, specific policy deductions

can also be made regarding the future of Africa. Therefore, because of its historical utility in the African context, regional integration connects Africa's past experiences, present lessons and future policies. The paper painstakingly analyses the past experiences and present lessons to chart the course of a secured future for Africa.

In the broader context of the 21st Century pan-Africanism, Ghaddafi towered above his contemporaries in his contributions to the realisation of a secured future for Africa. He was a tower of strength not just to the AU but also to other African countries. Although the contributions of his key contemporaries most notably Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo are also commendable, the mesmeric impulse of Ghaddafi's ambition was unrivalled. To realise his ultimate ambition, Malone² observes that Ghaddafi's theatrics overshadowed the summits of African leaders for so long. As its most outspoken advocate, Ghaddafi channelled huge resources into the implementation of the objectives of the AU. Contrary to the reservations expressed by the realists and functionalists on the possibility of institutionalising a union government in Africa through a radical effort, Muammar Ghaddafi showed optimism in this direction. This optimism reflected in his financial contributions to the AU and some African neighbours.

His apparent doggedness notwithstanding, Ghaddafi's ambition has come under serious criticisms. The machinations employed by the Libyan leader to actualise his vision of a union government in Africa under a single president necessitate a deeper exploration of the idea.³ As conventional experiences suggest, a good union government is based on social and democratic accord. Participating states sign into the effort and pledge commitment to the realisation of the underlying ideological objectives of the accord. The evolution of the United States of America accurately falls within this frame. This accord usually does not make allowance for the emergence of an ambitious tyrant which the rhetoric of Ghaddafi represented. In the light of this, the paper analyses international integration theories to ascertain the desirability or otherwise of regional integration to achieving a secured future for Africa. Also, considering Ghaddafi's support to the project of a union government in Africa, financial aid to the AU and other African neighbours, the paper analyses the inevitable changes on the horizon and how they impact on Africa's future. To achieve these tasks, the paper is divided into four sections. While this introductory piece represents section one, the second section examines the historical and theoretical perspectives to international integration in Africa. The next section analyses the realities and illusions inherent in Ghaddafi's disposition to integration and the concluding section focuses on the measures to be taken to preserve Africa's destiny beyond Ghaddafi's integration rhetoric.

INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

International integration refers to the process by which supranational institutions replace national ones. It is the gradual shifting upward of sovereignty from state to regional or global structures.⁴ Integration connotes the task of increasing the quantity and quality of interconnections among states, at a minimum by harmonisation and cooperation in functional agencies; at the maximum through economic and political federation or union.⁵ The latter conception is relevant to our present study of African efforts at promoting international integration. Political events reveal that Africa has reached the minimum level of integration through the establishment of such a functional body as the AU. However, the maximum level of a federal union which Ghaddafi advocated is still unrealised.

The task here is to situate African integration in history and then dwell on the rich theoretical debates underpinning the possibilities and impossibilities relating to the achievement of a federal union in Africa. Pan-Africanism actually laid the foundation for African unity leading to the institutionalisation of the OAU and its transformation to the AU. This history has been overwhelmingly captured in the existing literature.⁶ Because a rich debate exists on regional integration in Africa⁷, it is therefore not necessary to belabour the point here. The point which the paper seeks to emphasise here is that decolonisation reinforced regional integration in Africa. Without the binding structure of the colonial administrations, Africa's newly independent states were confronted with the problem of disunity. The desire to correct this anomaly and collectivise efforts at promoting regional development was a motivation for integration. This accurately captures Ghaddafi's drive for a united Africa. He strongly advocated the breaking away of the continent from imperial powers that have largely been blamed for Africa's underdevelopment. This was also the ideological and revolutionary stance of other socialist pan-Africanists such as Walter Rodney and Kwame Nkrumah. In this regard, the AU is believed to be the inevitable historical maturation of the ideas of pan-Africanism which also gave rise to the establishment of the OAU.⁸ Next, the paper engages international integration theories to account for or make generalisations concerning the prospects of purposeful cooperation between African states or outright unity of these sovereign entities.

The ideal starting point is the exploration of the principle of internationalism in relation to African efforts. Internationalism refers to economic and political cooperation among nations for the benefit of all. As explained by Nolan⁹, it refers to belief systems or ideas that look to common interest beyond the nation or state. Internationalism has the liberal or communist dimensions. While the liberal connotation promotes the renunciation of

force as an instrument of national policy, human rights and faith in the existence of fundamental shared interests across all humanity; the communist connotation on the other hand promotes the universal interests of the proletariat as against the world capitalist system.¹⁰ A major issue in Africa that has affected, and is still affecting, regional integration efforts relates to the difficulty in situating these efforts within known practices of international integration. The African integration efforts have neither been liberal like the European Union (EU) nor communist. Although the goals of the AU tend toward the liberal democratic project, the manner of their implementation and other practical experiences point to the contrary. Even pan-Africanism which historically embodies Africa's path to unity has failed to discern a generally acceptable framework to achieve the goal of unity. The Casablanca stance on the socialist model was not shared by all. Therefore, until a clear political direction is negotiated with reference to regional integration, Africa may continue to find it difficult in addressing the myriads of challenges that confront the continent.

The ultimate expression of integration would be the merger of several states into a single state. Such a shift in sovereignty to the supranational level would necessarily entail some version of federalism in which states recognise the sovereignty of a central government while retaining certain powers for themselves.¹¹ This was the ambition of Muammar Ghaddafi in Africa. Like the other advocates before him, this ambition was unrealised for obvious reasons. In the history of supra-nationalism, the process of integration has failed to transcend the partial sharing of powers between states and supranational levels. States have been unwilling to give up their exclusive claim to sovereignty and have limited the power and authority of supranational institutions.¹² In Africa, immediately after decolonisation, the integration agenda polarised the continent into two broad camps. While the Casablanca bloc represented by Kwame Nkrumah wanted a politically united and economically integrated region, the Monrovia bloc wanted a functionalist and gradualist approach to unity and integration. This nature of ideological divide often constitutes an albatross to supra-nationalism. This situation also played out in the process leading to the formation of the AU. While Ghaddafi wanted to speed up this union, some other countries wanted to go slowly. Even though Ghaddafi won eventually, the debate still rages. This is a clear ideological obstacle to the emergence of a union government in Africa. A plausible reason why states prefer functional integration to the radical establishment of a union government is their unwillingness to submit their sovereignty to supranational bodies. This has historically been the case in Africa.

Putting the argument in perspective, African integration would be achieved either through the immediate establishment of a union government

or through functional evolution. To marshal this argument, the submissions of the federalist, realist and functionalist schools are put forward. The federalist school articulates the coming together of different states to create a central supranational unit. The states that want to form a union must be ready to relinquish their sovereignty. In the African context, proponents of this direct 'top-down approach' to integration argue that this will fast-track the timetable for addressing the most important political question of state sovereignty, which they view as an obstacle to intra-African cooperation.¹³ Given the legal construct of sovereignty, are the African leaders ready to relinquish their exclusive claim to sovereignty? The unwillingness of these leaders has always reflected in their attitude towards the establishment of a union government in Africa. They often claim public support for this goal but political intrigues reveal the opposite. As remarked by Wapmuk¹⁴, African leaders are confronted with the lack of political will to view national interests as federal interests. Accepting the difficulty involved, Adogamhe¹⁵ submits that if the federalist goal is eventually achieved, it must determine the degree of power and authority that should be transferred to a supranational body and whether such power and authority are revocable or irrevocable.

The realist school denounces the federalist option on the ground that each state always strives to protect its sovereignty and national interests. It is therefore impossible for states to relinquish their sovereignty, which represents their existential essence. Again, as observed by Wapmuk¹⁶, the realists have expressed serious reservations about Africa's ability to sustain one territorial jurisdiction because the institutional and physical infrastructure to support this kind of arrangement is lacking. From this perspective, it is almost impossible for Africa to achieve the object of supranationalism. However, recognising the importance of regional integration and the difficulty in creating a supranational structure articulated by the federalist school, the functionalist idea as a grand theory proposes the incremental approach to integration. Functionalism suggests focusing international organisations in the short-run on specific purposes and problems, but with a long-term view to ever greater integration across borders¹⁷. As connections become denser, functionalism predicts that states would be drawn together into stronger international structures.¹⁸ Africa has arguably reached this minimum level with the establishment of the AU. The existence of a functional body appeals more to African leaders than the creation of a federation. Many leaders also believe that functionalism should be the foundation for a federal supranational authority.

Considering the theoretical articulations above, the African integration agenda is largely anchored on functionalism, though with the optimism of a federal configuration in the end. Perhaps, the success recorded by the EU

has made many African leaders settle for the functionalist approach. On the other hand, Ghaddafi's ambition had an element of radicalism. Given his rhetoric and practical disposition, Ghaddafi appeared to belong to the federalist school. At different summits of African leaders, he enthused about the possibility of establishing a federal union on the continent. To him the United States of Africa should be modelled after the United States of America, with a single minister of defence to decide and supervise interventions and peace keeping activities, a minister of trade to negotiate with the main blocs in the name of a single African market, and a single leader with presidential powers to represent Africa on the world stage.¹⁹ But to achieve this ultimate goal, he did not reject entirely the incremental approach of functionalism. This assertion is clearly explained by his unparalleled commitment to the achievement of the objectives of the AU.

The theoretical scepticism of the realist school notwithstanding, it is argued here that integration in Africa represents a desired effort. The object of collectivism it carries hugely necessitates this line of thinking. In the face of overwhelming development and security challenges in the African region, integration strives to collectivise important continental measures to address such challenges. As argued by Soomer²⁰, integration promotes institutional building and strengthening, coordination of economic and social policies, harmonisation of external relations and institutionalisation of good governance. Also, integration of states has become a crucial instrument for achieving economic growth.²¹ For these reasons, the paper justifies regional integration efforts in Africa and also lauds Ghaddafi's contribution to this goal regardless of the inconsistencies in his quest for a union government in Africa. Admittedly, the unification of Africa may not be achieved easily; but the task could represent the exit strategy from the numerous challenges that confront the continent.

GHADDAFI'S CALL FOR INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: REALITIES AND ILLUSIONS

The emphasis now shifts to Ghaddafi's contributions to regional integration in Africa. Greater unity and solidarity among countries and peoples of Africa represented the long unrealised quest of Ghaddafi. Was Ghaddafi's call for integration in Africa a genuine cause or selfish ambition? The question on how to promote stronger political and economic integration in Africa has occupied the centre stage since the late 1990's.²² This question is significant because of the escalating crises on the continent. With regard to regional integration as an antidote, no African leader was able to equal Ghaddafi's commitment. He rose to the occasion at a time when Africa was

in dire need of a huge personality to lead the regional integration march. Since the mid-1990's, under the leadership of President Nelson Mandela and subsequently of President Thabo Mbeki, South Africa has been promoting African integration. However, it now seems more preoccupied with the Southern African region, primarily in the context of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Equally, Nigeria, under President Obasanjo, played an important role for a time, but no longer seems keen to assume a leadership role given the grave internal problems it now has to tackle²³. Despite the lack of credibility both in Africa and beyond, Libya under Ghaddafi assumed this leadership role.

More than four decades after the idea of unification of Africa was first suggested by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya re-tabled the proposal at the Extra-Ordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya on 9 September 1999.²⁴ The Sirte Declaration of 1999 by African leaders cleared the ground for the establishment of the AU in 2002 as the successor of the OAU. The primary drive was to put in place a new pan-African organisation in order to better confront the many challenges that confront the continent in a rapidly changing world.²⁵ Having a regional organisation such as the AU was desirable but was not the ultimate level of integration Ghaddafi envisioned for Africa. The proposal for the unification of Africa was therefore reaffirmed at the 4th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Abuja, Nigeria on 30 and 31 January 2005. The grand debate on the union government was later held at the 9th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Accra, Ghana, from 1 to 3 July 2007.²⁶ As the 2009 chairperson of the AU, Ghaddafi at a meeting of the African Heads of States and Governments in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in February 2009 also advanced the idea of having a union government in Africa. He advocated an African military to defend Africa, a single African currency, and an African passport to travel within Africa.²⁷

Again, although Ghaddafi was not the main instigator of the constitutional amendments and conferences that led to the inclusion of the Diaspora as the AU's sixth region (to supplement the five traditional regions, namely North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa), he was a great advocate and supporter of the African diaspora. Deciphering the African Diaspora as people of African heritage who migrated involuntarily through slave trade to North America, Europe, the Caribbean, Brazil, and Latin-America; and people of recent voluntary migration from Africa, Ghaddafi did not hide his affection for the integration of these people into the mainstream of African affairs. Like Jerry Rawlings, Abdoulaye Wade, Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki, he supported the idea that Diaspora Africans be made voting members on African affairs. He detested the

injustices suffered by Africans in the Diaspora especially in the hands of their hosts in Europe. He therefore canvassed for either a dignified life in Europe or a happy return home.²⁸

To realise this ambition, Ghaddafi committed enormous resources to the AU to accelerate the process of maximum integration in Africa and address the myriads of social, economic and political problems confronting the continent. Several African countries also benefitted from the generosity of Ghaddafi. Of the total member states' contributions to the AU budget of US\$122.6 million (excluding the International Partners' contributions of US\$134.15 million), Libya's official contribution was 15% (US\$18.39 million). Libya is therefore among the five biggest financial contributors to the AU. The others are South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria. Unofficially, Ghaddafi paid the arrears of several African states and continued to finance their AU contributions in order to win votes at the AU for his idea of a United States of Africa. Libya was also the eighth major contributor to the group of 77 shareholder nations in the African Development Bank (ADB) with US\$300 million. Ghaddafi owned hotels and investments in Burkina Faso, Zambia, Uganda, Togo and Gabon, among others, and he was generous to certain regimes in an attempt to build support within the AU decision-making structures and mitigate his international isolation.²⁹ Again, his strategies did not preclude revolutionary measures. During his four-decade rule, the man Ghaddafi strongly supported revolutions in African countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe. His financial, military and technical support was decisive in the dismantling of white rule in these countries. He maintained a strong revolutionary stance against white imperialism on African soil.

Judging by the above performance, the AU was under the shadow of Ghaddafi for a long time. Little wonder the AU was reluctant to condemn his regime amidst indigenous and global rejection. The AU, as a product of Ghaddafi's advocacies, is still reeling from his demise. Still not sure of what the outward policies of the new regime in Libya will be towards the AU, Ghaddafi's financial contributions will greatly be missed ditto several African neighbours who benefitted from his generosity. To demonstrate this, Allison³⁰ reports that Ghaddafi's fall has not only left the AU stranded in diplomatic no-man's land, it has also given the lumbering continental body a potential US\$40 million hole in its already strained budget. Addressing the issue of budgeting after the fall of Ghaddafi, the immediate past chairman of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping, stated that Ghaddafi's funding was important to the AU but not vital.³¹ This assertion is far from the truth. The statement appears to be made to diplomatically promote the idea that the AU was not solely dependent on Ghaddafi's money. Libya, alongside Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa represent the five major

contributors to the AU with 15% contribution each; but, in addition to Libya's contribution, Ghaddafi would cover the fees of a good number of other African countries who could not fulfil their financial obligations. This is why Ghaddafi's contribution was crucial to the financial stability of the AU. To fill this void, post-Ghaddafi African leaders must show a greater financial commitment to the AU.

In all, it would appear that Ghaddafi's commitment to integration in Africa represented a genuine attempt. However, this effort has been stridently waved aside by critical observers both within Africa and in other parts of the world. Ghaddafi's ranting about Africa as one united, borderless country standing up against the evil of Western powers was to see his emergence as leader. From this context, beyond regional integration, Ghaddafi possessed a greater drive situated in the quest for power. Upon his chairmanship of the AU in 2009, he ensured that the tribal chiefs crown him Africa's 'king of kings',³² confirming that he was on a personal power trip. This accounts for why the AU began to snub his advances, rejecting his plans to move the AU headquarters to his home in Sirte and refusing to allow him a second consecutive term as the African Union chairman.³³ Again, his financial generosity has been brought into question by the support he provided for various rebellions, including Charles Taylor's New Patriotic Front in Liberia, Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone and the Tuareg-led insurgencies in Northern Mali and Niger.³⁴ Also, to achieve the ultimate goal of political and economic integration in Africa, the AU designates the democratic path. This path promotes the institutionalisation of democracy, popular participation and good governance. Given Ghaddafi's poor democratic profile at home, his commitment to the realisation of the objectives of the AU was morally defective. His poor democratic credentials eventually led to his downfall. In all, as silvering as Ghaddafi's regional integration rhetoric appeared, the negative spots on his effort included his obsession with power, his romance with rebellious groups across the continent and his poor democratic credentials.

CONCLUSION: BEYOND GHADDAFI

Ghaddafi's commitment to the common goal of a united and strong Africa seemed unparalleled. The lofty objectives of the AU which are directed towards the achievement of this common goal of a united and strong Africa include the achievement of greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa; accelerating the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; promoting African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples; promoting

peace, security and stability on the continent; establishing the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations; and promoting co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of the African people among others. No doubt, the achievement of these objectives is a necessary precursor to promoting the unity and functional capacity of the region in the international community.

Ghaddafi's huge financial contributions to the achievement of these lofty objectives have been documented in the preceding section. To overcome the problems that led to the fall of the OAU, such as limited resources, virulent social situations and limited attention to domestic conditions and conflicts, Ghaddafi became radically and financially committed to the AU. Ghaddafi's Libya avidly fulfilled its full financial obligations to the AU and also financed the contributions of some African neighbours to the organisation. With this situation in mind, especially with the death of Ghaddafi, it would appear that both the AU and the African region are destined for difficult times ahead. The inconsistencies inherent in Ghaddafi's vision of a united Africa notwithstanding, the African integration march will not be the same without this colossus. How can Africa and the AU cope with the resulting inevitable changes, and fashion out practical instruments for securing the future of the continent. Although negotiating the path to the realisation of Africa's destiny may be difficult as a result of continent-wide challenges, some practical measures are offered here. The analysis of these measures and how they impact on the future of Africa is the modest attempt here.

The realisation of Africa's destiny goes beyond the cult of personality which the history of regional integration in Africa has promoted. From Nkrumah to Ghaddafi, personality cult has defined the African integration march. If this trend continues, in the long run, it may pulverise regional integration efforts as the death of these personalities may halt integration progress until another generation of leaders who share this vision emerges. Because the loyalty of the new regime in Libya may not be to the AU, the death of Ghaddafi has the capacity to throw the body into disarray if conscious steps are not immediately taken. Necessarily, these steps must be embedded in pan-African nationalism. National leaders must be committed to the vision of a strong and united Africa. To achieve this dream, these leaders must all take a cue from Ghaddafi by fulfilling their financial obligations to the budgets of the AU. This will enable the continental body to achieve its lofty objectives and programmes. This is also important given the astonishing fact that more than half of the AU's budget comes from international partners, thereby calling into question the ownership of the body's programmes. The first approach here is thus the strengthening of the AU by national leaders to promote the prospects of consolidating African

common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its people. This can only be achieved if the AU is not starved of funds to implement its programmes, as is the case with the EU and its member-states. As a matter of economic imperative member-states, driven by committed leaders, must incorporate financial contributions to the AU in their national budgetary programmes. The body should also devise legitimately lucrative means of generating funds outside members' contributions. The adoption of transparent and accountable practices is also very critical to financial growth.³⁵

The second approach relates to the promotion of democratic governance on a continental scale. Currently, Africa is still not fully in tune with democratic values. This state of affairs is hampering the democratic path to integration designated by the AU. Some states are still not immune from military usurpation of political power (Mali represents the most recent example of this vulnerability). Civilian leaders are deficient on the minimum scale of liberal democracy. Leaders still fancy the idea of sit-tightism even amidst popular calls to relinquish power, as revealed by the Ivorian, Senegalese and Libyan scenarios. In most countries in the region, election results do not reflect the wishes of the voters. Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Senegal are some examples. Adogamhe³⁶ rightly observes that correcting this democratic deficit requires attitudinal change on the part of African leaders especially a new orientation towards the consolidation of democracy, rule of law and good governance on the continent. As committed as Ghaddafi was to the AU, this democratic deficit and autocratic orientation worked against his vision of a united Africa. In Africa's political history, autocratic posture either in the shape of military dictatorship or its one-party variant has failed to advance the course of competitive democracy and development. The post-Ghaddafi generation of African leaders must therefore learn from this political error and institutionalise democratic governance in their respective states. The political space where the citizens operate needs to be fully liberalised to promote political pluralism, a strong public dialogue and participatory development. This is a necessary condition for democratic advancement. The successful future of the AU largely depends on the level of democratic entrenchment across the continent.

Again, instead of getting engrossed with the political machinations of an autocratic leader like Ghaddafi, several problems bordering on violent conflicts, underdevelopment and poor governance, amongst others, should serve as the rallying point for African leaders at this time.³⁷ Now that Ghaddafi is gone, addressing the problems that confront the continent should be the pre-occupation of post-Ghaddafi African leaders. Africa is ravaged by conflicts and poverty. A reason why these problems have persisted is the lack of capability on the part of national governments to address them. Defining state capability as the bundle of capacities or abilities that a state

has or requires to perform its functions effectively and efficiently³⁸, African leaders must work hard to build this capability through commitment to democracy and national development³⁹. While democratic entrenchment is necessary to build this capability, national development through industrialisation and wealth generation is equally important. To achieve this, African countries must diversify their economies to break away from mono-product orientation. The wealth generation and development potential of the other productive sectors of the economy must be tapped, and the additional revenue accruing from the productive engagement of these sectors will promote strong autonomous states capable of defending their economic sovereignty. Given that integration can only be achieved by politically and economically functional states, African leaders must begin to look in this direction. In addition, leaders need to pool their resources through the AU to be able to respond effectively to the challenges that confront the continent. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), as the planning and coordinating technical body of the AU, also needs to be strengthened. The whole idea of NEPAD is co-ordinated development, rather than the current haphazard country specific economic planning and development which has put Africa in a state of regression and underdevelopment.⁴⁰ The commitment of functional national governments in Africa to NEPAD will no doubt enhance rapid development.

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Know Thy Self; the African Union and the Need for African-Centred Education

Baba Amani Olubango Buntu

INTRODUCTION

Education in Africa is faced with many challenges. According to UNESCO's EFA Global Monitoring Reports, the main challenges include gender disparity, low enrolment rates for primary education, high numbers of illiteracy, shortage of qualified teachers, high drop-out rates and low teacher to student ratios.¹ Further we know that African primary school enrolment and literacy rates are among the lowest in the world, that many children do not have access to school, that many schools cannot provide education to facilitate even the most basic skills and that many children lose their teachers to AIDS. In addition, there are high percentages of skills flight, in which specialists get recruited to work outside their country of origin.

Largely, in post-colonial Africa education has meant the teaching of appropriated information which often is centred in core realities outside of the African continent. Few countries have embarked on teaching methods and developed material that extensively cover African history, culture, philosophy, science and development. The African Union, in its quest to unify the continent, has a critical role to play in advancing education rooted in Africa's rich past, challenging the present and offering a future of many possibilities.

This paper will look at the potential in seeing education as a transmission process – where new knowledge derives from indigenous knowledge – particularly in light of African advancement. In what way can African education draw directly from its own historical and cultural roots to ensure that education truly becomes a liberating process, both for the individual and the societies 'the educated' is supposed to serve? Noting that, traditionally, education in Africa used to be intrinsically interwoven with culture, spirituality and scientific knowledge, the paper will investigate some approaches to African centred education, as a means to return to an ancient principle articulated in the idiom 'Know Thy Self'.

THE PURPOSE OF EDUCATION AND KNOWLEDGE

‘Education is the key’. This has become a common phrase, but the question of what kind of door this proverbial key is supposed to open is often neglected. The question of challenges to education in Africa exposes a need to carefully examine the quality and relevance of contemporary education. Do educational institutions equip young women and men with skills to appropriately apply knowledge to find solutions to African problems? Does the current education system liberate the minds of young Africans and unveil the latent talents they harbour? Is the ideological focus of education centred in African realities?

Without getting into a lengthy deliberation about definitions, it will serve this discussion well to articulate what is meant by education and knowledge. Zulu has introduced a brief, functional definition which we will lean on here. He sees education as *‘the transmission of values and the accumulation of knowledge within a society’*.² This, in his view, positions education as an investment for the expansion of human culture. Knowledge, however, *‘is a state of knowing or understanding, gained or retained through experience or study’*.³ Both education and knowledge, therefore, impact on each other. What is known and understood in a society is essentially an outcome of education. And education will, in turn be an institutional tool for dissemination of what is known and understood. In a broad context, education is not only limited to theoretical knowledge and technology-related skills. It is also the transmission of values, communication, traditions and consciousness leading to human development.

Hence, education, within a society, serves critical functions. Dr Na’im Akbar has advanced four main functions of education, by which we can evaluate its effectiveness:

- To provide identity: as a process in which the individual is assisted in achieving full humanity
- To transmit a legacy of competence: as a process of self-affirming information for the individual to see her/his as part of a history of innovation and possibilities
- To transmit acquired immunities: as a process of resilience for the individual to adopt skills to be implemented when faced with threats, opposition and attack
- To develop a shared vision: as a process in which the individual is involved in a common destiny where she/he can achieve their highest potential as part of a community of excellence.⁴

Having been subjected to enslavement and colonialism with after-effects on all levels of society and human life, it becomes clear that African education must be able to accomplish several goals simultaneously:

- Resilience towards legacies of oppression, to rebuild and develop autonomous educational structures
- Access to – and implementation of – knowledge embedded in indigenous wisdom and science
- Dissemination and positioning of own pools of knowledge, to enable interaction with other systems of knowledge on equal terms.

This is an enormous challenge, as the foremost experience Africa has with external role players is domination and control. Domination might not be the only component in European culture, yet the presence of Europe in Africa has done little to challenge this. Enslavement and colonialism constitute a European cultural revolution in Africa, as this excerpt from a French colonial study clearly illustrates:

It is exceptional that a black accepts the need to carry out his effort beyond the simple task in order to increase his gains. For that to happen, it is necessary that he has been profoundly Europeanised, that he has adopted our motivations and accepted our own necessities. In a word, that he has retained nothing African except the colour.⁵

The dehumanisation of African people forms part of the background to which African education must respond. Not only as an emotive reaction, but as a strategic, well-planned effort towards building an empowered African continent. Many of the pyramids in ancient Egypt had the inscription ‘Know Thy Self’, which pointed to the centrality of self-knowledge in African culture: ‘...to be conscious was to be alive and to be human. The greater the consciousness the higher was the expression of one’s humanity’.⁶ This notion also carries with it an understanding that educational processes that fail to create consciousness and self-knowledge are detrimental to human development.

INDIGENOUS AFRICAN EDUCATION

As pointed out by Fafunwa and Aisiku, no study of education in Africa is complete without ‘...adequate knowledge of the traditional or indigenous educational system prevalent in Africa prior to the introduction of Islam and Christianity’.⁷ Studies of so-called ‘pre-colonial’ Africa has tended to describe a continent with few, if any, structures normally associated with civilisation; natural science, philosophy, systems of governance and educational institutions. A Euro-centric view that institutionalised education was brought into Africa from outside has become a norm, even within the African continent.

Thanks to the impressive academic work of many African scholars, Euro-centric views of Africa have not remained unchallenged. Through their work, light has been shed on the many African civilisations that flourished for thousands of years throughout the African continent: Ta-Seti, Kemet (Egypt), Kush, Axum, Nubia, Songhay, Ghana, Mali, Oyo, Benin, Congo, Carthage, the Swahili coast states and Great Zimbabwe.⁸ There is ample evidence that African civilisation dates back a good 10,000 years and more.⁹ It is increasingly accepted that Africa played a significant part in contributing to other world civilisations and laid a strong foundation for developments within sciences and philosophy.¹⁰

This is information of critical importance in enabling a better understanding of pedagogical activities in ancient Africa. Traditionally, education was a series of cultural activities taking place in close relationships between what might be described as formal and informal institutions, scientific analysis and metaphysical awareness, cultural cosmology and cultural expression. Applying a rather simplified definition of culture, we can, in the words of Nobles and Goddard, describe culture as *'a process which gives a people a general design for living and patterns for interpreting their reality'*.¹¹

Culture, of course, exists in all societies. But not all cultures are presented as equally important. It is popularly said that we live in a globalised world – in a global village – but, this does not necessarily mean a balanced representation of, or access to, cultures of the world. As noted by Connell, *'... European imperialism, global capitalism under USA. hegemony, and modern communications have brought all cultures into contact, obliterated many and marginalised most'*.¹² To fully appreciate the meaning of traditional education in Africa we also need to understand how learning has taken place within a cultural context.

Mosha has described the African worldview as follows:

- A firm belief and profound reverence in the eternal divine mystery, expressed through faith in a Supreme Being (God)
- Ongoing human formation, reformation and transformation through spiritual, moral and human improvement
- The intrinsic unity between individuals and communities, in a two-way process that balances the individual versus the collective
- A living, interconnected and interdependent universe with emphasis on holistic living.¹³

Armstrong also observes that in an African worldview, energy, rather than matter and dynamic, not static, being is the true nature of things.¹⁴ This view, however – as would be argued by Ani – fails to acknowledge that African epistemologies are rooted in a symbiotic duality between scientific

and metaphysical observations.¹⁵ Mbiti explains the universe of Africans to be deeply religious, to such an extent that *'to ignore these traditional beliefs, attitudes, practices and symbolic values can only lead to a lack of understanding of African behaviour and problems'*.¹⁶

Boateng views African culture to be of high educational value. The role of traditional education, he asserts, is to bridge the gap between the young and the old generation.¹⁷ Western education – which did not consider cultural transmission as a goal of the educative process – has, largely, been an obstacle to the process of cultural transmission and inter-generational communication. Further, Boateng sees African traditional education as inter-generational communication which refers to transmission and continuous preservation of the values and traditions of a society from one generation to another. This transmission ensures peaceful transition from youth to adulthood and creates understanding of the roles of each generation in the society.

Some common ways of facilitating this transmission include oral literature (fables, myths, legends, proverbs) and secret societies (initiation). With particular reference to initiation, several psychic and social challenges were addressed and responded to, such as gender identity, relation to parents, cognitive development and psychological grounding. Young women and men were guided from childhood to adulthood with a distinct way of leaving childish and irresponsible behaviour behind. The handing down of technical skills and know-how would also follow a similar, inter-generational pattern.

Several contemporary scholars have argued that revitalisation of indigenous knowledge is essential to African education. The work of Semali, who has focused on the interplay between indigenous knowledge and modern (Western) curriculum practices, suggests four ground pillars as central to African centred education:

- To position Indigenous African Knowledge (IAK) as a collective epistemological understanding and rationalisation of community
- To not only consider, but to fully validate and integrate, what 'local people' know and do, and what 'local communities' have been doing for generations
- To use community knowledge produced from local history to form literacy skills critical to survival in an African context
- To include the knowledge of 'local people' about their environment throughout the planning and implementation process of education.¹⁸

Semali's idea of indigenous literacy is particularly interesting as it combines knowledge components of language, communication, tradition and the collective social 'space' within which human knowledge in Africa is produced and maintained.

THE DANGERS OF MIS-EDUCATION

Nabudere asserts that the models for academic education Africa has adopted, have proved to be 'completely unsuitable for Africa's needs', as they have failed to respond to the particular challenges Africa is facing.¹⁹ An African-based epistemological foundation, according to Nabudere, is a pre-requisite to the production and development of knowledge.

The challenges impeding on education in Africa stem from the many waves and layers of invasion, domination, conquest, destruction and disempowerment. But, the problems also derive from the inability on the part of African nation states to build sustainable counter-structures with autonomous governing systems. A perpetual dependency on the West has been the typical scenario in African democracies since the 1960's. This has led to a sense of African pessimism and, possibly, great doubts as far as independent initiatives are concerned. Steve Biko encouraged Africans to reject Western values and, by doing so also:

...rejecting those things that are not only foreign to us but that seek to destroy the most cherished of our beliefs – that the corner-stone of society is man himself – not just welfare, not his material well-being but just man himself with all his ramifications.²⁰

The impact of domination is not only a thing of the past. Oppressive scenarios continue to determine and strangle African development. The examples are many:

- Claims of foreign NGOs being a front for Western policy development
- Gross amounts of debt inherited from unjust economic circumstances
- Modern day enslavement and trafficking
- The extraction of minerals, precious stone and oil for Western benefits
- Military occupation and terrorism
- Bio-piracy
- Western-based recruitment agencies headhunting top students from African universities
- Western multinational corporations with powers exceeding nation states
- The prevailing dependency syndrome suffered by African states, created through multilateral aid policies and unfair trade arrangements
- Western interference hindering African states in effective redistribution of land ownership
- The debate on whether Asia has the same 'right' to seek domination in Africa as Europe has enjoyed

- The negative presentation of Africa in world media and the incomplete recollection of Africa's history
- Corrupt African leadership sponsored by Western interests
- The perpetuation of seeing African languages, culture and philosophy as marginal and inferior.

The challenge for Africa to develop counter strategies also remains. This means that within the field of education, a strong commitment to empowerment is critical. In our quest for practical empowerment, we shall look at empowerment as a process by which latent resources and abilities represented in an individual or a group are strengthened, so as to enable improved capability to overcome challenges.²¹ To advance this argument we will look at some of the after-effects of historical oppression.

Scholars, such as psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, psychologist Dr Na'im Akbar, anthropologist Marimba Ani and literary critic Chinweizu have all convincingly demonstrated the mental effects of oppression on the African psyche, personality, behaviour and socialisation. Emphasising the importance of knowing one's history, Wilson has described the collective case of most Africans as being one suffering from amnesia; not remembering history, not remembering culture, not remembering a sense of self:

Amnesia means an undiscovered self, an emptiness, a self incapable of self-understanding its own motivations, a self incapable of self-direction and self-determination, a reactionary self, a self that does not understand others or the world in which it exists – a fatalistic externalised self. To rediscover one's history is not only an act of self-discovery; it is an act of self-creation – a resurrection from the dead, a tearing away of the veil, a revelation of the mystery.²²

It can be argued that an African response to oppression should be located in culture. Chinweizu, for example, has described culture as an immune system with an inherent defence mechanism against external destructive forces.²³ He states that the African has internalised a misconstrued understanding of self, which impacts on all social behaviour he/she engages in. Embedded within this analogy is a strong notion that perpetuated oppressive behaviour, (ex enslavement) in the case of Africans, has led to self-alienation and, on a deeper level, acceptance of its 'truth' (i.e. performing the role of the enslaved). This does not only pose a serious limitation on the African personality and purpose, but also separates the African from his/her potential to assert power. The African becomes inherently powerless because he/she believes this is his/her final destination.

Burrell advances a theory of how Black inferiority has been developed as a brand through a history laden with racism and colour-consciousness.

By ascribing to stereotypes of Black behaviour and a multitude of dysfunctional social institutions, in which violence and disintegration form an integral part, the self image of Black people has become so low that hatred of self and others have become a norm. This assertion is supported by DeGruy Leary, who in her book *Post-Traumatic Enslavement Syndrome* examines how injustices meted out against Africans over many generations during enslavement and colonialism manifest as a legacy of reproduced social ills.²⁴ As challenges confronting African development take place on several levels simultaneously – psychological, economical, political, social, cultural and spiritual levels to mention some – a picture emerges in which prolonged oppression can be said to have its own educational function. A learnt weakness, this is what Fanon has described as ‘traditional weakness, which is almost congenital to the national consciousness of under-developed countries’.²⁵

African-centred education must respond to these challenges and serve as a counter strategy. The intention of examining the results of oppression is not to close the discussion on a note of merely blaming external forces for Africa’s problems. The purpose is to locate the source of the problem and combine this with a reflection on why few counter-strategies to resolve the challenges have proved to be effective. There are many obstacles within African governance, political ideology and social attitudes that also pose serious difficulties to African education. As Fanon describes in *The Wretched of the Earth*²⁶, learnt weakness is not only a result of colonisation, it is also sustained by the intellectual laziness of a national middle class and, we may add, a political elite that benefits from the masses being oppressed.

As Semali points out, several difficulties to reviving African education manifest internally in African countries. He lists the following challenges to the development of education models based on African worldviews:²⁷

- A lack of political will to correct the contradictions of intent and practice which set unrealistic national goals
- Dependence on foreign fiscal planning
- Inappropriate macro planning
- inappropriate research methods
- A lack of formal African school teaching methodology
- The difficulty of obtaining donor support for research in indigenous education
- The alienation of many African intellectuals from their culture
- Negative attitudes towards the legacy of colonial education.

This outline of obstacles could also be turned around to be a plan for action-points that must be addressed. The gradual awakening to the importance

of Indigenous Knowledge Systems in African universities and some government structures indicates some hope for change.

TOWARDS AN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

In the introduction to this paper we observed that to 'know thy self', as an educational process towards consciousness, is the overall goal of African education. The impact of historical oppression and the many challenges confronting Africa calls for African education that revives lost knowledge, liberates humanity and empowers society at large. Afro-centric and Afrikological approaches can be advanced as relevant responses here.

Engraved in African epistemology is a strong emphasis on learning processes, in particular imparting of wisdom and skills from generation to generation. As Westernised modernity has reshaped and corrupted many of the cultural foundations of traditional society, important information and institutions for social cohesion have deteriorated. Afro-centricity – or social transformation rooted in African centrality – has gained momentum in Africa and the African diaspora as a tool for analysis and development of solutions to African problems.

Afro-centricity is an idea that grew out of opposition to a Euro-centric reality which was seen to dominate research, historiography and much of the field of knowledge.²⁸ Largely spearheaded by Dr Molefi Kete Asante, it has organised the tenants advanced in the philosophies of Garveyism, Negritude, Frantz Fanon's existentialism and Cheikh Anta Diop's historiography into a paradigm.

African-centred approaches represent a platform for multi-disciplinary research, discourse and applied knowledge. Afrikology, as articulated by Nabudere, positions this as an authentic platform with academic aspirations, drawing 'together all the strands achieved from all the different perspectives of the African worldview (...) and uses this to critique Euro-centric mystification'.²⁹ Afrikology as a term encapsulates both the gathering of data and the application of knowledge as a complementary process; a field of academic theory and practice which envisions:

...an Africa with scholars based on Afro-centric studies in socio-economics, philosophy, religion and spirituality, governance, technology and science – dedicated to the development and advancement of African people, and competent of representing and presenting Africa in forums of nations.³⁰

As argued by Ramose, the African tree of knowledge stems from the *Ubuntu* philosophy.³¹ *Ubuntu*, seen as a 'flow' within African existence

that constitutes wholeness, must not be fragmented. A view that sheds further light on this has been articulated by Tedla who sees African centred education as anchored in indigenous African thought.³² Central to such an educational process, she outlines the following key points that should characterise the efforts:

- African cultural heritage
- The transcending of ethnic and national blinders to appreciate the relatedness of the African world community experience
- The placement of Africa and African values at the centre of investigation
- The preparation of learners to contribute to society
- Five acquisitive goals concerning: cultural and academic excellence, spiritual development, community building, and physical fitness and health.³³

As demonstrated, an African educational institution should be able to provide opportunity for advanced education and, at the same time, be contextualised in African-based epistemology and methodology. As noted by Dani Nabudere, African education must be:

...a response to the cry of the African people for an African Renaissance and rebirth that can re-awaken and re-activate their genius and create an atmosphere for self-transformation and development to recover what has been lost and forgotten.³⁴

We can locate our aspiration for African centred education in philosophy. African philosophy has for too long been projected, and widely accepted, as lacking substance and presented as 'feel-good' life affirmations without deeper substance. This is not only wrong, it also carries a destructive and demeaning valour in great disrespect of the bodies of knowledge Africa has produced. African philosophies, Hountondji remind us, is that form of methodological inquiry which relies on rational justification and interpretive argumentation with the intent to bring about a critical transformation of African thought and practice.³⁵ Authenticity and purpose is central to this argument. African philosophy assists the educator in seeing education as a process of mediating through deliberative inquiry. Learning is not only to expose students to ready-made theory. Mediating learning requires that university teachers afford students with opportunities to systematically make university texts 'controversial', that is to say, to engage critically and reflexively with such texts.³⁶

In this way deliberative inquiry becomes a mode of philosophical activity which requires that one engages carefully with the other so as to arrive

at independent interpretive (rational) judgements, while at the same time one enters into controversy with other rival standpoints or articulations. Deliberative inquiry firstly demands that a text be read in a way whereby one sets out the range of possible interpretations of the text and identifies and evaluates the pre-suppositions of this or that particular argument in the text; and secondly, a text should be read in a such way that the reader places himself or herself in a position to question the text – systematic controversy.³⁷

All African centred activities, including education, should have a liberating focus, based on the analysis of the problems, structured along evaluation of possibilities and guided by the collective understanding of the ultimate goal.³⁸ The goal of transformation activities should be to develop a truly liberating culture (freedom from oppression and inner stress/conflict), install principles of responsibility and to respond creatively and constructively to the various problems experienced by the community.

Reverting to the definition of knowledge we employed earlier in this paper – as a ‘state of knowing or understanding, gained or retained through experience or study’³⁹ – it also is important to emphasise that for knowledge to be relevant it must be able to adapt to changes within the environment it is supposed to serve. As new phenomena enter the pool of human experiences, demands for new responses arise. In relation to African centred education, this constant development presents an opportunity for re-interpreting indigenous knowledge and applies it in accordance with contemporary needs. The need for traditional medicine, initiation processes, technological advancement and life cycle rituals are present in modern times, but might call for revisions and modifications in how they are applied, based on changing circumstances. It is when knowledge can respond to the changes and be presented as a process of ‘transmission of values and the accumulation of knowledge within a society’⁴⁰ that we can talk about having achieved African centred education, founded on new knowledge deriving from indigenous knowledge.

A truly African centred philosophy of education will demand commitment to detailed research, applied methodology and creative practices. The linear models for constructing thought and producing useable knowledge are limiting and will be rendered dysfunctional. A holistic approach to education – rooted in self-knowledge and consciousness – with focus on humanity, history, culture and economic production of the society, must be advanced.

WAY FORWARD – THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AFRICAN UNION

The African Union’s commitment to education as a concern has been demonstrated through a number of committees and commissions, such as

the Pan African Institute of Education for Development (IPED), the Centre International pour l'Education des Filles et des Femmes en Afrique (CIEFFA), New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Academy of Languages (ACALAN).⁴¹

Several meetings about research and higher education have also been convened by the Conference of Ministers of Education of the African Union (COMEDAF). As an outcome of this conference's commitment to observe 2006-2015 as a second decade for education in Africa (the first decade was 1997-2006), the Pan African University was launched in 2011.⁴² Main focus areas for the initiatives advanced are educational management information systems, gender, culture, teacher development, curriculum and teaching material and vocational education. Apart from a brief mention of the promotion of African education systems, there is little commitment to indigenous knowledge, traditional institutions and inclusion of cultural custodians.

Rolling out a radically new approach to education in Africa obviously has many factors working against it. Some of the challenges include funding, infrastructure, development of material and teacher training. An advantage, however, lies in that a body of substantial research on African centred information, knowledge and methodology has accumulated over the years and can be interrogated for strategic implementation. To the challenge on building a theoretical construct on policy level, Zulu makes the following suggestions for consideration:

- Investigate a theory of African education that moves beyond problematic analysis to a constructive critique of internal and external forces that impede progressive social change
- Apply a research methodology that will continuously include a study of how indigenous knowledge, education and learning techniques can inform modern social, economic and political reality
- The proposed new curriculum (or theoretical formation) should be instituted in Africa to maximise human resource potential to advance national and international development
- African policy makers should decide to create and sustain an independent think-tank to address common educational and social issues throughout the continent.⁴³

The lack of commitment to African centred education in the AU's policy framework is worrying. As a representative body of African nation states, the AU has a responsibility to advance and reposition the cultural legacies of the continent. This includes education policies, curriculum models, text books and teacher education in which this is a main focus. The AU must reposition the purpose of traditional African education articulated in 'Know

Thy Self' and dare to shape an educational ethos which might be seen as a threat to Western values. If classrooms around the continent continue to reproduce knowledge and views solely rooted in foreign worldviews, education will remain a mechanism to perpetuate dependency and underdevelopment. The saying 'education is the key' will then come to mean studies that only can open doors to further loss.

CONCLUSION

This paper has outlined some critical issues in the repositioning of a philosophy of education rooted in Africa. Having defined knowledge as a state of knowing through experience or study, and education as transmission of knowledge, we have highlighted the centrality of knowledge processes rooted in African culture and history. We have also noted that, given the many challenges Africa is facing in its political economy, resilience, indigenous knowledge and empowerment are key components in articulating necessary outcomes of African education.

We have asserted the possibility of re-awakening indigenous African knowledge through African centred and Afrikological approaches. The application of a critical African philosophy of education, with deliberative inquiry and systematic controversy, has been suggested as a pedagogical focus. Seeing education as a transmission process – where new knowledge derives from indigenous knowledge – Africa stands to gain immensely, both in terms of intellectual, cultural and economic empowerment. The AU has a particular responsibility in applying an African centred approach on all levels of education. Large volumes of research on African centred knowledge are available; the process will not have to start from scratch.

A total educational reform will be a process with many challenges and obstacles. However, to neglect its importance will be to sustain learnt weakness and perpetual servitude. Only through meticulous efforts to establish African centred education that revives, liberates and empowers can the ancient idiom of 'Know Thy Self' return to its rightful place: at the centre of human life.

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The African Union and the Democratic Project

Examining the Challenges for Task Accomplishment

John Gasu

INTRODUCTION

The establishment of the African Union (AU) in Durban in July 2002 was particularly geared towards transcending the weaknesses of its antecedent body – the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).¹ The character that the OAU assumed was very much influenced by the conjuncture of factors that pulled together to shape the immediate post-World War II era. In Africa this was mostly manifested through concerns for decolonisation and the global ideological rivalry which defined the Cold War period. In this context, the African continent became the theatre for anti-colonial struggles, and also the grounds for proxy Cold War contests. In combating colonialism, the OAU provided the required platform for mobilising global conscience and forces against what was perceived as an obnoxious rule. However, the vigour with which the OAU applied itself to fighting colonialism was hardly extended to ensuring that there was democracy and good governance in its member states. Obviously the focus, at the time, was on the removal of the colonialists. And once that was done and the trappings of statehood installed, what happened thereafter in terms of quality of governance within the respective countries was largely ignored. In fact, the OAU insulated its members from the prying eyes of the international community through the provisions of Article III (b) of the OAU Charter which specifically invoked the principle of ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of States.’² This principle became a convenient carapace for all manner of dictatorial tendencies to gestate in Africa; under the watch of the OAU.

The political system upon which independence was granted actually created a paradoxical political situation in the newly independent African states. This was so because even though the colonial system itself was authoritarian, there was an invariable effort by the retreating colonial authorities that those who took over power from them did so through victory

at competitive elections.³ In this regard, multi-party systems were given lease; and as such political parties featured prominently as the instruments for political recruitment. But such efforts at democratisation were highly ephemeral. The pluralist democratic project was quickly jettisoned. What gained ground instead was political obscurantism as a way of rationalising an emerging cabalist power monopolisation; which was nonetheless presented to the rest of the world as an African democracy.⁴

In the ensuing haste to install the so-called African democracy, the African leaders veritably transformed themselves into demolishing squads that razed the embryonic democratic structures upon which independence was granted.⁵ The defining character of the immediate post-colonial African democratic genus was an imposition of single party systems that was to ensure the quiescence of the opposition. It was this mindset among African leaders, in the period that preceded the 1990s, that underscored their insouciance towards the institutionalisation of undemocratic monolithic governance systems across the continent. The power monopolisation by military and civilian autocrats meant in actuality that the public sphere was constrained, as civil society was asphyxiated. The kind of political closure which occurred was tantamount to what Elizabeth Jelin described as a collective denial of citizenship through mass disenfranchisement.⁶ The population was thus reduced to being mere 'subjects of law' as they were disconnected from the existing political discourse⁷. The corollary of the disconnection of the people from the governance process reflected most in the poverty of governance policies that were rolled out in the period to address developmental issues. The policies tended therefore to be ineffectual in dealing with the continent's challenges. The policy failures culminated in the arrest of the continent's development.

This situation persisted, almost without exception, till the late 1980s when the global ideological antagonism began to thaw. This unleashed strong currents against dictatorships as evinced in Eastern Europe, Latin America and parts of Asia. The global political momentum, in this era of democratic revivalism, is described by Samuel Huntington as the third democratic wave.⁸ The upheavals that were directed at authoritarian regimes elsewhere soon began to produce a contagion of demonstration effects across Africa. The effects of this were soon evidenced on the streets of African cities, as the people rose to demand new systems of governance in which the *demos* would be a part.⁹ The net outcome of these political developments was a seismic re-definition of the African political landscape, as the autocrats were obviously overwhelmed by the unremitting pro-democracy waves. The situation as it was, therefore, constrained the space of manoeuvrability for the dictators; and this led to mass political conversions to democracy.¹⁰ To anchor the new fervour for democracy, new constitutions were drawn to reflect the ethos of

individual and social liberties. It was also found necessary to insert provisions that restrained the re-emergence of personal rule and life-presidencies; and hence measures were taken to adopt the American precept of limiting presidential tenure to two terms. Certainly, these efforts were meant to make a break with the insalubrious past, as a new beginning was sought.

These political developments in consequence swept away many of the authoritarian *ancient regimes*. The image of Africa, thereafter, began to witness some rehabilitation as a new crop of democratically elected leaders assumed power. As the international community was no longer tolerant of authoritarianism, it became imperative for the OAU to engage in introspection so as to re-focus. This was necessary if the OAU as a body was not to lose its relevancy in the emerging neo-liberal global village. Realising the weight of opprobrium that Africa had carried over the years, measures were taken in the closing years of the 1990s to reconstruct the pan-African edifice to reflect the contemporary realities.¹¹

While there was no doubt that in the 1990s the political landscape of Africa was awash with democratic revivalism, the tempo in some of the polities began to wane after the foundational elections.¹² Many polities thereon virtually became stranded in what Thomas Carothers describes as the *grey zone* (italics mine).¹³ This grey zone phenomenon in which countries have their democratisation processes atrophied along the line is also described by Richard Sandbrook as being transitions without consolidation.¹⁴ These unsummated democratisations are mostly caused by institutional hollowness which is associated with political cultures that are not particularly apposite for democratic crystallisation.¹⁵ The consequence of this is that many African countries continue to project an image which Samuel Finer describes as a façade democracy.¹⁶ While an image of multi-party system exists, these systems have been bastardised by ruling parties to keep themselves in power. Elections and their outcomes are seen as zero-sum contests; and hence elections tend to have the character of a covert declaration of civil war. Thus, instead of being a vehicle for a civilised mode of political recruitment and a choice between contending ideological options, African elections have sadly turned into monsters that haunt respective countries. The disturbing cases of electoral violence that happened in Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast amply testify to the fact that all is not well with African democratic processes.¹⁷

These political developments throw big challenges to the AU about what has to be done so as to achieve the declared goal of a democratic Africa. It is in the light of these drawbacks that the chapter examines the challenges that the AU faces in safeguarding democracy on the continent; even as the Constitutive Act and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance documents are overly optimistic in their objectification of democracy and good governance as being desirable for the continent.

THE AFRICAN UNION AND INSTITUTIONAL RECONFIGURATION

The framers of the AU's Constitutive Act were in no doubt at all about their mission of institutionalising democratic governance in Africa.¹⁸ The drive towards this goal was borne out of the need to respond to the global trend of democratisation so as to shed off the 'dictators club' image that was associated with the OAU.¹⁹ To achieve this, the institutional structure of the AU was re-designed to meet the democratic governance aspirations of the new millennium. The preamble of the Constitutive Act lucidly recognised the change in the dynamics of the geo-political environment that had given birth to the AU.²⁰ However, the spring-board role played in this respect by its antecedent body was acknowledged with an indication in the preamble that the OAU:

...played a determining and invaluable role in the liberation of the continent, the affirmation of a common identity and provided a unique framework for collective action in Africa and our relations with the rest of the world.²¹

While recognising the vital role played by the OAU in creating the platform for Africa's liberation and identity, the framers of the Constitutive Act in subtlety moved away from the unenviable governance legacy, by indicating also in the preamble that the AU is:

Determined to promote and protect human and peoples' rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and rule of law.²²

The objectives of the AU for establishing a democratic project whereby rule of law and good governance would be institutionalised are spelt out in Article 3 (g and h) respectively:

- Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, and good governances
- Promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.

The principles that are to be followed for the actualisation of the objectives are stated in Article 4 which upholds *inter alia*:

- Respect for gender equality
- Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance

- Respect for the sanctity of human life, and condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities
- Condemnation of and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments.²³

It is clear from the foregoing that the Constitutive Act is unambiguous about charting the course for good democratic governance, respect for human and peoples' rights and the rejection of unconstitutional change of governments. The AU was also poised to putting an end to discrimination along gender lines.

The democratic project that the framers of the Constitutive Act had in mind demanded, among other things, that the institutions of the new pan-African body should be reconfigured to capacitate them for the performance of their expected tasks. In any case, the institutions that were to superintend the democratic project were to be people-oriented and people-centred in their structure. The structures of such AU institutions as the Economic Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) were thus engineered to either directly engage with civil society or to present a forum for the continent's elected representatives.

The ECOSOCC is particularly designed to provide a platform where Africa's plethora of civil society organisations (CSOs) would interface with the pan-African body. The ECOSOCC is thereby charged to:

- Promote continuous dialogue between segments of African people on issues concerning Africa and its future
- Forge strong partnership between governments and all segments of the civil society in particular women, the youth, children, the Diaspora, organised labour, the private sector and professional groups
- Promote the participation of African civil society in the implementation of the policies and programmes of the Union
- Promote and defend the culture of good governance, democratic principles and institutions of popular participation, human rights and freedoms as well as social justice
- Promote, advocate and defend a culture of gender equality
- Promote and strengthen the institutional, human and operational capacities of the African civil society.²⁴

These enumerated functions of the ECOSOCC provide the conduit through which the CSOs can input into the affairs of the AU and thereby influence the continent's integration process from bottom up. Of course, this is a marked departure from the inter-governmental tradition of top down

that had characterised the OAU. The role of the non-state actors in the corpus of the AU certainly emanates from the increasing liberalisation of the political space that is associated with the democratising post Cold War Africa.

In launching the Permanent General Assembly of the ECOSOCC in 2008, President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania in his key note address, brought home this fact by stating that 'with the establishment of ECOSOCC we are creating a people-oriented, people-centred and people-driven community in the African Union in which all stakeholders are effectively represented'. He added further that 'Africa therefore, has given the values of democratisation and inclusiveness a more holistic and enduring meaning and significance.'²⁵ The ECOSOCC's engagement with civil society organisations have significantly contributed towards the sense of belonging and the peoples' ownership of the AU.

Given its democratic intents, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) is yet another institution of the AU that reflects such objectives. The PAP is the most advanced institution in terms of the representation it provides the people. By its mode of composition, the PAP institution obviously reflects the contemporary faith in parliamentary democracy across the continent. Currently, the PAP consists of 265 members who are elected representatives from the various national parliaments in Africa. The composition of the PAP is a tacit endorsement of democratic processes for constituting national parliaments. The PAP has advisory and consultative powers to the Commission and the Assembly. It may not be far-fetched to think that given the democratic locus of the AU, the PAP in the near future would have supra-national powers to legislate for the continent.

Aside of the mainstream AU institutional structures that are purposefully designed to meet its democratic goals, the AU's role is supplemented by such adjunct bodies as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).²⁶ Even though the focus of NEPAD is primarily located in ensuring socio-economic development of the continent, its objectives and principles are built on the conviction that such developments can only occur within the realm of democracy and good governance.²⁷ The foundation of NEPAD is built on the fact that it is only in a democracy that an appropriate mix of the African and the international private sectors would be created for development.²⁸ It is in this respect that NEPAD creates the platform for its members to voluntarily submit themselves to the peer review mechanism. The indicators for such review processes are essentially based on examining the extent of democratisation, and that of good governance. With these mechanisms in place, African countries are expected to do well in consolidating democracy and governance systems that are based on universal best practices.

THE DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE

Notwithstanding the democratisation vim and subsequent democratic goal-setting by the AU, the outcome of the third democratic wave on the continent turns out to be a mixed one.²⁹ While, some African polities like Ghana, South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius and Benin Republic have substantially progressed toward democratic consolidation, others like Ivory Coast, Gabon, Guinea, Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe have flawed. The mixed democratisation results are not to imply that Africa has generically not moved away from its characterisation as a barren ground for democracy. The differentials in the nature of the political transitions have to do with country-specific contingencies and the ingenuity in dealing with such situations.³⁰ What has remained important is the existence and the persistence of a critical core mass of pro-democracy movements that takes advantage of the liberalisation in the public sphere to push for a fuller realisation of the multi-party elective principles in a democratic Africa. The determination of the AU and the regional economic communities (RECs) to foster democratic governance and the existence of pro-democracy civil society organisations have served in making the difference between what is happening in Africa today and what was the case in the authoritarian era.³¹

The mixed results chalked in terms of democratic advancement are also due the differentials in country-specific contingencies and the efficacy of measures taken to deal with the emergent challenges. How to deal with the polities with unimpressive democratisation outcomes remains the perplexing challenge for the AU. We will now turn to examine how this is reflected in the provisions of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.

THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE DEMOCRATIC AGENDA

The coming into force of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance has accentuated the resolve of the AU to promoting democratic culture, practice and governance in Africa.³² Though it took five years to get the required number of 15 ratifications to kick-start its implementation, it can be seen as a bolster to the AU's democratic agenda. Because the African Charter is such a copious manual on democracy, it is worth the while spending some time examining it.

The African Charter addresses itself to the African political and social situation. The preamble is a long recital of what all Africans crave for in terms of governance system. The preamble in part states that they are:

...inspired by the objectives and principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union particularly Articles 3 and 4 which emphasise the significance of good governance, popular participation, the rule of law and human rights.

The Charter thereby commits the AU 'to promote the universal values and principles of democracy, good governance and the right to development'. The African Charter makes the following its objectives in Article 2:

1. Promote adherence, by each State Party, to the Universal values and principles of democracy and respect for human rights
2. Promote and enhance the adherence to the principles of rule of law premised upon the respect for, and the supremacy of the Constitution and constitutionalism in the political arrangement of the State Parties
3. Promote the holding of regular, free and fair elections to institutionalise legitimate authority of representative as well as democratic change of government
4. Prohibit, reject and condemn unconstitutional change of government in any Member State as a serious threat to stability, peace, security and development
5. Promote and protect the independence of the judiciary
6. Nurture, support and consolidate good governance by promoting democratic culture and practice, building on strengthening governance institutions and implementing governance and inculcating democratic pluralism
7. Encourage effective coordination and harmonisation of governance policies among State Parties with the aim of promoting regional and continental integration
8. Promoting State Parties' sustainable development and human security
9. Promote the fight against corruption in conformity with the provisions of the AU Convention on Prevention and Combating Corruption adopted in Maputo, Mozambique in 2003
10. Promote the establishment of the necessary conditions to foster citizen participation, transparency, access to information, freedom the press and accountability in the management of public affairs
11. Promote gender balance and equality in the governance and development processes
12. Enhance cooperation between the Union, Regional Economic Communities and International Community on democracy, elections and governance
13. Promote best practices in the management of elections for purposes of political stability and good governance.

The long list of objectives represents the gamut of things that must be realised for an effective democratic governance system in Africa to be in place. It is expected of the states to implement the African Charter along the following principles listed in Article 3:

1. Respect for human rights and democratic principles
2. Access to and exercise of state power in accordance with in accordance with the constitution of the State Party and the principle of rule of law
3. Promotion of a system of government that is representative
4. Holding of regular, transparent, free and fair elections
5. Separation of powers
6. Promotion of gender equality in public and private institutions
7. Effective participation of citizens in democratic and development processes and in governance in public affairs
8. Transparency, fairness in the management of public affairs
9. Condemnation and rejection of acts of corruption, related offenses and impunity
10. Condemnation and total rejection of unconstitutional change of government
11. Strengthening political pluralism and recognising the role, rights and responsibilities of legally constituted political parties, including opposition political parties, which be given a status under national law.

By its objectives and principles, the African Charter certainly did not reinvent the wheel. But the provisions of the Charter are the most audacious expression of the aspirations and guidelines for the realisation of democracy and good governance in Africa. The Charter apparently redeems the limitations of the brevity of the Constitutive Act by providing in unmistakable detail the institutionalisation of democracy in Africa.

The framers of the African Charter were obviously informed by the drawbacks of democratisation in Africa and the contexts within which those things did happen. The desire not to fall back to the bad days led to the systematic identification of the issues and their proposed remedies. In this regard they attempted to put in measures that would seal off the re-emergence of old practices that had negated democracy in Africa. For instance, to avoid the curtailment of citizenry rights the African Charter in Article 6 requested that all 'State parties shall ensure that citizens enjoy fundamental freedoms and human rights taking into account their universality, inter-dependence and indivisibility'. Ordinarily, this provision should have been just a mundane one on a continent that made capital out of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948) to push for

political independence. But the penchant of African leaders for violating the rights of their people had actually been proverbial, for the greater part of the post-colonial era. Since lots of human rights violations had to do with social discriminations of various sorts, the African Charter in Article 8 demanded that 'State parties shall eliminate all forms of discrimination, especially those based on political opinions, gender, religion and racial grounds as well as any other form of intolerance'.

It is, however, recognised that the protection of human rights would not be feasible if democratic culture is not institutionalised. To realise this, Article 12 of the African Charter provides an elaborate, step-by-step list of measures that should be taken. It stipulates that:

State parties undertake to implement programmes and carry out activities designed to promote domestic programmes and practices as well as consolidate a culture of democracy and peace.

To this end State parties shall:

1. Promote good governance in ensuing transparent and accountable administration
2. Strengthen political institutions to entrench a culture of democracy and peace
3. Create conducive conditions for civil society organisations to exist and operate within the law
4. Integrate civic education in their educational curricula and develop appropriate programmes and activities.

The importance that is attached to institutionalising democratic culture was laudable especially as it is its dearth among the state managers that led to the committing of untold atrocities against the people of Africa. The provision that education on democratic culture should be made part of the educational curricula is remarkable as it would help in ensuring that elected leaders run their full term. It was the paucity of democratic culture that translated into the flourishing of praetorian instincts among the weapon-wielding uniformed men of the state that demagogues were quick to exploit. To reverse that, the African Charter in Article 14 stated that 'State parties shall strengthen and institutionalise constitutional civilian control over armed and security forces to ensure the consolidation of democracy and constitutional order'. The control of civilian leadership over the military is important not only in minimising the occurrence of coups but such arrangements are also vital in the avoidance of what O'Donnell referred to as *democradura*.³³ This refers to the installation of civilian

governments under military sovereignty. One of the classic cases in Africa was in February 2005 when the Togolese military, at a lightening pace, orchestrated the succession of the deceased Togolese dictator Gyassingbe Eyadema by his son Faure Gyassingbe. This act was purely in violation of the Togolese constitution which stipulated that the speaker should take over in the interregnum. The military imposition held grounds in spite of oppositionist protests. It was not until May 2005 when the pressure from both the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU led to a farcical election that was organised to legitimise the dynastic succession in Togo.³⁴

Perhaps the biggest threat to Africa's fledgling democracy is one that relates to election management. Even though many African political systems are multi-party in nature, electoral outcomes are nevertheless guided by zero-sum calculus. The ultimate prize for taking control over an African state is high; such that the political classes of all hues enter political contests with singular expectation of a huge prize. Due to this peculiarity, the political classes on both sides of the divide are driven by the same instinct to attempt to manipulate the electoral system to their advantage.³⁵ The African Charter has therefore devoted Chapter 7 to democratic elections, and states in Article 17 that 'State parties shall re-affirm their commitment to regularly holding transparent, free and fair elections in accordance with the Union's Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa. To this end, State parties shall:

1. Establish and strengthen independent and impartial national electoral bodies for the management of elections
2. Establish and strengthen national mechanisms that redress election-related disputes in a timely manner
3. Ensure fair and equitable access by contesting parties and candidates to state controlled media during elections
4. Ensure that there is a binding code of conduct governing legally recognised political stakeholders, governments and other actors prior, during and after elections. The code shall include a commitment by political stakeholders to accept the results of the election or challenge exclusively through legal means.

Thus the African Charter has put in place measures to deal with the chronic problem of electoral mismanagement. But the measures are rather textbook prescriptions that wrongly assume that political actors would be driven by some benign considerations to resort to legal means of resolving electoral disputes. This has not been the case many a time; as the recent electoral violence in Nigeria and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) show.

In the case of the 28 November 2011 presidential elections in DR Congo the opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, who felt perennially cheated by the national electoral commission, declared himself the winner. Violence broke out when the incumbent Joseph Kabila was declared the winner and sworn into office.

THE AU DEMOCRATIC GOALS AND INSTITUTIONAL POWER DEFICIT

While the commitment of the AU towards the establishment of a democratic project in Africa has never been in doubt, the results on the ground belie this effort. The lavishness of the provisions of the Constitutive Act and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, together with the institutional reconfiguration, have not produced all the results. In fact, the most grotesque forms of democratic abortion through coups d'état and armed rebellions do still exist in Africa as was the case in Guinea, Mauritania, Madagascar, Libya and Mali.³⁶

The more subtle cases of power usurpation, as happened in Togo, DR Congo and Gabon, also linger on. A new phenomenon also developed in which incumbents refused to hand over power in the face of defeat in general elections, as was the case in Ivory Coast when the incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo declined to hand over power to the victor Alassane Ouattara. This rendered the country ungovernable until the French army and the rebel groups captured Laurent Gbagbo.³⁷

Another conspicuous democratic deficit in the current circumstances has to do with manipulation of national constitutions to obviate the two term limitations placed on presidents. In Uganda and Burkina Faso pliant legislative arms of government collaborated with overweening presidents to get rid of such limitations. These developments rather project an ominous return of life presidencies; albeit in a disguised form.

In the face of these political developments, one needs to ask whether the AU and its institutions are in fact capable of carrying out the democracy project they had assigned themselves. The answer is not an easy one. Perhaps the starting point is to understand the power domain in which the AU and its institutions operate. The current institutional structure of the AU is loaded with ambiguous relations that hold back its effectiveness in dealing head-on with vital issues. It should be said that the AU is not a supra-national body, even though there are some inklings towards that. The combination of some elements of inter-governmentalism with supra-national tendencies only makes institutional definitions murky. Recalcitrant member states recognise this fact, and exploit it to the embarrassment of the pan-African body that has designed for itself ambitious goals.

Several African states, notwithstanding their ratification of the AU's Constitutive Act and many other protocols that demand an adherence to democracy and good governance, have chosen to do otherwise. Of course the motive to violate the AU is attributable to the perception of that body as impotent. But this perception is not absolutely true since the AU has been able to suspend some of its members that had engaged in unconstitutional changes of government. The suspension of Mali, Niger, Guinea and Madagascar after unconstitutional changes of government is a pointer to the Union's ability to bite.

But that does not exonerate the AU. It has often been accused of being engaged in a selective approach to sanctioning. The AU's whip is cracked harder on the weaker members than is the case for bigger members. For instance, the AU is obviously confused in dealing with the impunity of President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. He changed the electoral rules in ways that frustrate the opposition in that country. The AU also looked on without any adequate response when the rebels in Libya took advantage of the Arab Spring to overthrow and kill Muammar Gaddafi. The AU mediator in the Libyan crisis, President Jacob Zuma, was ignored by the rebels when he travelled to Libya to resolve the differences. The emerging pattern of the inadequacy of the AU in dealing with the challenges to democracy was very much in evidence in the Ivorian electoral crisis of 2010. In this case the AU seemed to have no clue in dealing with the defiance of the defeated President Laurent Gbagbo when he failed to hand over power. The impunity of Laurent Gbagbo grew as the AU was locked up in a protracted debate on how to deal with the Ivorian case. It was the colonial power France that utilised the veneer provided by the rebellious group, the New Forces, to capture Gbagbo and push him aside. The arrest of Gbagbo eventuated in paving the way for the restoration of a national government in Ivory Coast.

The challenges that the AU face in carrying out its tasks of realising democracy and good governance in Africa, it must be said, largely emanate from the underdevelopment status of its members. The prevalence of pan-handling diplomacy with the donor community weakens the commitment of the members to the cause of pan-Africanism.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It must be said in conclusion that the AU, since its launch, has given a high level of attention to rebranding Africa through its commitment to democracy and good governance. This effort has generically moved its people out of the state of despondency and has given hope and voice to civil society. The provisions of the Constitutive Act, the African Charter on Democracy,

Elections and Governance together with those of the NEPAD and APRM have collectively committed Africa to democratic ideals and values. As these set of values are consistent with the global ones, the AU's drive in this direction is a welcome one.

To operationalise the democratic goals, institutional re-configuration was undertaken to help accomplish the task. But this task accomplishment is becoming a tedious one. However, the political developments on the continent show cases of differential outcomes of the democratic transitions. Some of the countries have clearly experienced bumpy movements and reversals that create a worrisome situation for advocates of democracy. But this has not wiped away the substantial movement from the horrors of bad governance that existed before the early 1990s. Perhaps, it is good to admit that democratic projects everywhere are work-in-progress. This is the case also in Africa; where the AU and its institutions have assigned to themselves the task of enhancing democracy and good governance on the continent.

Given the paucity of democratic culture and the fact of economic underdevelopment the challenges that the AU faces have become more daunting. While the objectives of the AU's democratic project are ambitious, the institutional capacity for delivery is rather inadequate. This is largely due to the fact that the AU is essentially a 'club of the poor', and as such many of its members are extroverts in their foreign relations. This negates the influence of the pan-African body especially when a given interest of the AU does not coincide with that of external donors.

The weakness of the AU in facing up to the challenges on the continent has undermined its ability to intervene in member states to deal with gross human rights abuses. This is because member states would rather stay away from bearing such costs, when they can hardly feed their own citizens. The continent, however, cannot continue on this path, if its claim of the 21st century is to be realised. To address the issue of democratic sustainability in Africa, the following recommendations are made:

1. To deal with the lack of power by the AU to effectively solve African issues, it is recommended that the PAP should have its members directly elected by African citizens
2. In addition, the PAP should have supra-national powers to make legislations that should take precedence over those of the member states
3. Democracy can only work when there are democrats. To make this possible in Africa, it is also recommended that a common political educational curriculum should be developed to educate school children in Africa on democratic values and practices

4. Finally it is recommended that regional electoral management bodies be set up. These bodies, which should be multilateral institutions in character, should be resourced adequately to work professionally to dispel suspicions of complicity during elections.

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The Impact of Model 'C' Schooling on Africanisation of Potential African Intellectuals

Leepo Modise

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of apartheid, the people of South Africa have witnessed significant political, economic and educational development with far-reaching consequences for global order. For instance, since the apartheid era, South Africa has benefited from the triumph of globalisation, whereas African languages, the indigenous knowledge system and African culture have been harmed. In today's environment, education provides individuals with a better chance of employment, which, in turn, leads to a better lifestyle, power and status. The commodification of knowledge as intellectual property has occurred particularly with regard to connecting the intellectual work of universities with community, business, and government interests and priorities. While such a tendency is often welcomed by so-called applied disciplines, it causes tension between the more profitable applied subjects of science and technology, and those of basic theoretical enquiry, particularly in the arts and humanities. It also creates institutional winners (dominant members) and losers (subordinate members). These institutional winners force the global language (English) onto African people.

African people in Africa and the Diaspora have historically been required to learn English in order to participate in the wider political and commercial aspects of society. The English-only requirement has not been imposed without social consequences. Myron Lustig and Jolene Koester argue that members of dominant cultures will often devalue the language styles of subordinate cultural members and judge the 'correctness' of their use of preferred speech patterns. In some cases, members of the subordinate cultures will try to accommodate or adapt their speech to that of the dominant culture. In other circumstances, they will very deliberately emphasise their group's unique speech characteristics when they are in the presence of people of the dominant culture.¹ Through that imposition of

English, Africans in Africa and the Diaspora have opted for assimilation into Western education and culture. Through this process of assimilation, most African intellectuals send their children to Model C schools, where these children are not really recognised as equals to European children. Through actions and words, they are continuously reminded that the history, culture, scholarship and everything else are the Westerners' history, culture and scholarship without any African contribution.

This paper will focus on the role played by the language used in the educational system in South Africa to de-Africanise potential African intellectuals. The first observation is a simple one: there simply seems to be a lack of African consciousness and awareness amongst the African intellectuals when they choose schools for their children and lacuna within the educational system in South Africa to redress the existing lacuna on African languages, culture and identification. Furthermore, African intellectuals themselves seem to be unaware that there is a lack of African awareness and consciousness within the contents of learning areas taught and learned in preferred Western-oriented schools (Model C schools). Myron Lustig and Jolene Koester argue that in the United States, the patterns associated with the European-American culture have tended to dominate educational systems, often making it difficult for learners and parents from other cultures to participate effectively in schools. The same patterns are found in South African Western-oriented schools; hence recommendations will be made on the multi-faceted training of potential African intellectuals to be empowered with multi-lingual and multi-cultural knowledge and skills through a multi-dimensional educational model as an African compromising stance. This paper analyses the impact of utilising the global language as a medium of instruction in the educational system in South Africa.

THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ON POTENTIAL AFRICAN INTELLECTUALS

Globalisation reflects the effect on culture and brings about a new form of cultural imperialism. The rise of a new cultural imperialism is shaping potential African intellectuals, the future citizens of the world, into 'global de-Africanised citizens', intelligent people with a broad range of skills and knowledge to apply to a competitive, information-based society. The future of countries often lies in their ability to compete in a global market where industry-based economies are giving way to knowledge-based industries, realising the importance of 'knowledge, skills and the intellectual capacity to meet the challenges of accelerated change and uncertainty'. Education is becoming a lifelong learning and training process developing transferable

skills and knowledge that can be applied to competitive markets where knowledge and information are being traded as a commodity.²

Globalisation and technological advancements are delivering and increasing access to the world and subsequently subjects should reflect this global outlook.³ It is most unfortunate that the very global outlook suppresses the African outlook and impacts negatively on potential African intellectuals. When potential African intellectuals are globalised, the process of kenosis occurs. During this process there is a degradation of African standards, norms, culture and values through the Western-oriented educational system. Myron Lustig and Jolene Koester argue that members of the dominant group are likely to retain the special characteristics of their language, including preferences for certain words, accents, and linguistic patterns and may therefore devalue the linguistic patterns of others. They may be excessively influential in determining the conversational topics that are regarded as socially relevant, the societal issues that are deemed important enough to be worthy of public attention, and the proper language for expressing one's views in social discussions. Individuals who do not belong to the dominant group are often silenced by a lack of opportunities to express their experiences, perceptions, world-views and culture. Globalisation has its own culture that is expressed through its language.

Most people in the world are forced by globalisation to change their culture and language in order to fit into the global village. The promotion of engagement and globalisation is nurtured and sustained by the economic interdependence of today's world. Economic interdependence, in turn, is linked to the rapid communication systems that now connect people virtually in real time, as events are displayed instantaneously through a variety of powerful technological innovations namely television, film, videos, music and the internet. These technological innovations are not innocent in suppressing other languages and cultures as well as promoting the colonial language (English). Myron Lustig and Jolene Koester argue that in the United States educational systems offer classes only in English, television and radio programmes are exclusively in English, and the work of government and business also requires English. The same situation prevails in the South African context where schools offer their classes in English and government work and business require English.

THE DEMAND FOR A GLOBAL LANGUAGE (ENGLISH)

The importance cultures attribute to language has been well established. In fact, some would argue that the very heart of a culture is its language and that a culture dies if its language dies. For the global culture to spread

throughout the world, it is important that the global language should overpower the other languages. Likewise, for African culture to grow and spread throughout the world it is important for African languages to be promoted. Because language differences are powerful factors that influence the relationships between ethnic and cultural groups who live next to and with one another in communities and countries, I will examine the variations between the African languages and the global language. I begin by considering the role of language in maintaining globalisation and the relationship between language and the cognitive development of the potential African intellectual.

The equation between African languages and English is influenced by the conception that English is the global language and that the acquisition of English is useful for international communication. Many high school textbooks include a topic on English as a useful tool for international communication. This reflects a discourse that legitimises the global spread of English as natural, neutral and beneficial⁴ and a discourse of colonialism that elevates English to the status of a marvellous tongue.⁵ The symbolic power attached to English as the global language reinforces the perceived superiority of English over other languages. The superiority of the masters' language taken for granted supposedly confers to it the monopoly of universality. By teaching his or her language, prosperity is implanted purely and simply in his or her, language. A language deprived of literature does not prove much in favour of a civilised or globalised status. While there are many factors involved in delivering quality basic education, language is clearly the key to communication and understanding in the classroom. Many developing countries are characterised by individual as well as societal multi-lingualism, yet continue to allow a single foreign language to dominate the educational sector. Instruction through a language potential African intellectuals do not speak has been called 'submersion'.⁶

It is the duty of African intellectuals to train and develop potential African intellectuals towards being aware of the importance of their own languages. The challenge faced by African intellectuals in fulfilling this noble calling is that the students cannot cope with the high demand of the academic scope as compared to their European counterparts. The language is a challenging factor in early childhood cognitive development. The global language is assumed to have a higher status in developing potential African intellectuals cognitively. Chumbow disagrees with the notion that English brings about the cognitive development of children. He argues that linguists, psycho-linguists and anthropological linguists agree that the use of the child's 'mother tongue' as the medium of instruction in the school system has significant advantages over the use of a foreign language, where 'mother tongue' is defined as 'the language in which the child first

learns to express his ideas about himself/herself and about the world in which he lives'.⁷

Most potential African intellectuals find themselves in this dilemma due to the pressure of globalisation and the demand for fluency in the economic-international language. This global pressure forces the African intellectuals and elites to compromise their children to be de-Africanised through assimilation into Western-oriented education that emphasises the global language at the expense of indigenous languages. Furthermore, Chumbow indicates that it is axiomatic that a child learns better and develops faster cognitively and intellectually if, at the infancy stage, it is taught in his or her mother tongue continuously over a period of time than when taught in a foreign language.⁸ This means that the educational system that favours the use of the child's mother tongue in the teaching process is more likely to maximise the child's intellectual potentiality than an educational system that uses an alien medium of instruction. Thus, in Africa, for example, African languages should be potentially better than the English language currently used. Language does not determine people's ability to sense the physical-organic-economic world, nor does the language first learned create modes of thinking from which there is no escape. However, language shapes and influences our thoughts and behaviours. The vocabulary of a language reflects what you need to know to cope with the environment and the patterns of your culture:

The influence of a particular language is something one can escape; it is possible to translate to or interact in a second language. But as the categories for coding or sorting the world are provided primarily by one's language, one is pre-disposed towards perceiving the world in a particular way, and the reality one creates is different from the reality created by those who use other languages with other categories. Being an educator and a senior lecturer, I have experienced the impact of language at different levels. For example, a national Grade 12 results analysis every year shows that Afrikaans-speaking learners who are instructed in Afrikaans from Grade 1 to Grade 12 perform better than Sotho-speaking learners who are instructed in English. Jansen states that the one system consists of a small group of former white schools that are increasingly de-racialised, at least as far as potential African intellectuals are concerned, and that that factor accounts for the large percentage pass rate nationally and in provinces where such schools are dominant, such as in the Western Cape.⁹ The other system consists of the large majority of schools, all black, which together account for the fact that about one-third of students fail this high-stakes examination. Jansen did not provide the reason why, except for resources, black learners fail compared to their white counterparts. Based on my observation as an educator of seventeen years in secondary

schools, I say that the offering of classes in Afrikaans is to the advantage of the Afrikaans-speaking learners, while the Sotho-speaking learners are disadvantaged by English.

The likelihood is strong that the very same learner will be admitted to an Afrikaans-dominated university and that he or she will perform well. As a senior lecturer in Systematic Theology, I have realised that students who used their own language to answer questions in assignments and examinations performed better than African students who respond in English. From the above one can deduct that language impacts positively on the thinking capacity of learners when they are taught in their mother tongue. The reason for such performance is that learners will think and write in their mother tongue. Chumbow argues that children who attended schools in which African languages are used as the medium of instruction at the beginning of their school programme will be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their counterparts who learn in English or French from the onset, particularly where the latter is the language of higher education and the language that guarantees access to job opportunities.¹⁰ This assertion does not carry substance if a programme of mother tongue medium is organised as proposed by UNESCO. According to UNESCO, the mother tongue should be used as a medium of instruction in the early phase of the child's education, while subsequently, introducing the foreign language as a subject, gradually intensifying the latter with a gradual reduction in the use of the mother tongue as the medium of instruction. This method has been successfully tried in the six-year Primary Project at Ife (Nigeria) and has yielded positive results. The impact of the demand for the global language is to promote the global language and devalue the other languages.

Language is a carrier of cultural norms, values and standards. The model C schooling system is in line with job opportunities and the globalisation demands and does not take the learners' mother tongue into consideration. The cultural norms, values and standards are lost. This system of education promotes the global fluency and competitiveness of the global language (English) for economic networking at the expense of personal identity and African social formation. KI-Zerbo challenges African intellectuals to re-think by saying: 'In our opinion, this role will entail adopting the identity option, which consists in the knowing oneself and first of all, building oneself up forging a personality – that is, a role in the world today. This calls for active resistance to the neo-liberal globalisation ideology imposed by international financial institutions'.¹¹ Now, if there is a social group that should play the role of immune defences to prevent Africa from sinking into the AIDS of structural underdevelopment, it is surely and foremost the intellectuals who are sons and daughters of this continent.

DE-AFRICANISING THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

It seems that globalisation with its educational system and language has managed to de-Africanise African people by stripping them of their language, culture, values and identity. Coetzee indicates: 'Identity is one critical theme in post-colonial African philosophy, and discourses on identity have taken the form of deconstruction of ideologically inflated Euro-centric representation of the colonised Africans as the "other" representation widely held to sit at the root of the African's preoccupation with reconstruction'.¹² In the era of globalisation, transformation also creates cultural problems in Africa. More and more educated Africans are realising that this transformation has alienated them from their traditional cultural roots without giving them a satisfactory substitute.¹³ It is difficult to determine the exact degree of importance language has for someone who identifies with a particular group because there are so many factors that affect the strength of that identification. For example, people are more likely to have a strong sense of ethnic and linguistic identity if members of other important cultural groups acknowledge their languages in some way.

A language will remain vital and strong if groups of people who live near one another use the language regularly. The sheer numbers of people who identify with a particular language and distribution within a particular region have a definite effect on the vigour of a language. It is important to note that when people are rarely able to speak the language of their culture, the centrality of the language and the cultural or ethnic identity that goes with it are certainly diminished. The inability to use the language results in lost opportunities to express their identification with the culture it symbolises. The extent to which a culture maintains a powerful sense of identification with a particular language is known as ethno-linguistic vitality, which refers to the individual's subjective perception of the status, demographic characteristics, and institutional support of the language community. In this section, I will focus on how the educational system de-Africanises potential African intellectuals through the over-emphasis of English as the global language. The loss of African identity and consciousness and a lack of an indigenous knowledge system within the educational curriculum will be highlighted.

THE LOSS OF AFRICAN IDENTITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF POTENTIAL AFRICAN INTELLECTUALS

The educational system in South Africa in the globalisation era and the revival of African intellectualism play a major role in de-Africanising African

children. The emphasis on English as the medium of instruction and core learning area does a great deal to inculcate Western culture into African children. It is well known that each and every language is a carrier of culture of the original people of that language. The way one sings a Western song will be different from the way one sings an African song. The way one speaks a Western language is different from the way one speaks an African language. The way one speaks, sings, walks, relates and thinks reflects one's identity.

The Western philosophers that have pioneered Western thinking have constructed cultural and social images of Africans as 'others' who have no references other than the West's colonising intentions, and have created the need to confront generalisation as a discourse method.¹⁴ Furthermore, Fanon concurs with Coetzee that every colonised people, in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality, finds itself face to face with the language of the civilising nation; that is, with the culture of the mother country.¹⁵ The colonised is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country's cultural standards. He becomes more European as he or she renounces his or her Africanness, his or her jungle. The same mentality is still prevailing among the so-called best Model C schools' educators and administrators, because the Western philosophy of identifying Africans as 'others' is more in the blood than in the mind, hence for potential African intellectuals to avoid being the 'others' amongst Europeans they opt to empty themselves and become second-class Europeans. This misdirection or victimisation, brought about by the postulation of an erroneous sense of identity is symptomatic of the neo-colonial hegemony of Europe over Africa which reinforces the false reality of the African identity constructed out of notions of a subjectless unity, the unanimity and sameness of all Africans.

If one observes the potential African intellectuals that are products of the Model C schools, one pities them due to the double-personality character of these little ones, and due to the loss of their African identity and lack of African consciousness. The impact of these schools on our potential African intellectuals has done more harm than good. The African person is completely baffled; the African intellectual has made himself just as knowledgeable. With him/her this game cannot be played; he or she is a complete replica of the European man or woman. So there is nothing to do but to give in. After all that has just been said, it will be understood that the first impulse of an African man/woman is to say no to those who attempt to build a definition of himself/herself. It is understandable that the first action of an African is reaction, and since the African person is appraised in terms of the extent of his assimilation, it is also understandable why the

newcomers express themselves only in English or French. It is because they want to emphasise the rupture that has now occurred. They are incarnating a new type of man or woman which they impose on their associates and their family. And so their old mother can no longer understand them when they talk to her. In every country of the world there are climbers, 'the ones who forget who they are', and, in contrast to them, 'the ones who remember where they came from'.¹⁶ In simpler terms, the African identity is lost and gone with the European language and culture. To speak a language is to take on a world, a culture. Africans who want to be Europeans will be more European as they gain greater mastery of the cultural tool that language is. At the bottom they are Europeans.

This paper challenges many African intellectuals and elites to realise that African identity and consciousness are gone. This realisation has to produce an increasing search for African culture from the traditional solidarity, but make attempts to bring it into the picture of the globalisation world. This attempt to rediscover the African identity shows itself in various ways such as Negritude, the African personality and a revival of interest in traditional music, dance and folklore. At the same time, African artists are consciously attempting to create art, drama, poetry, novels and music that are peculiarly African and yet set in the modern world. All that is mentioned above is attainable through a proper educational system that has an African character.

THE LACK OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEM

Chumbow states that an indigenous knowledge system in science and technology is practised by local people in rural areas like villages, homes, farms and small-scale industries such as pottery, carving and weaving. Methods of food conservation discovered out of necessity are transmitted from generation to generation. The curative powers of various herbs are well known to village herbalists.¹⁷ From Chumbow one can see that an indigenous knowledge system permeates every aspect of life in the African traditional society. Furthermore, he states that the African indigenous knowledge systems' potential remains largely untapped. One of the reasons is the myth of the inferiority of African culture and African knowledge, which has led to a condescending attitude towards indigenous knowledge in general.¹⁸ In the South African context the strong vehicle that moves very fast and carefully to instil this attitude is the Model C schools that emphasise Western culture at the expense of African indigenous knowledge.

The medium of instruction and the lack of African languages as the core or elective learning areas in this type of school bring about a lack of

indigenous knowledge among potential African intellectuals. Indigenous knowledge is transmitted well through an indigenous language. Chumbow affirms that through language indigenous knowledge, science and technology, have been demonstrated, and that it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that indigenous languages, which are vectors or carriers of indigenous science and culture are the most appropriate media to express indigenous knowledge in all its vibrancy and dynamism. Indigenous languages constitute the best media for harnessing this knowledge, in its riches, for ultimate translation into a global language.¹⁹ As has already been alluded to, to kill the language is to kill the culture of these people, and to kill the language is to kill indigenous knowledge.

Chinnammai indicates that Western education has, in fact, replaced indigenous forms of education throughout the world and focuses on preparing potential African intellectuals exclusively for an urban existence. He also claims that through this process, people are losing their indigenous language knowledge, by which he means 'the knowledge that people have of their places', that is a loss of their cultural worth. He also believes that 'our potential African intellectuals will be trained, above all, to keep the wheels of the global economy turning. But the Western style of education is inadequate as it focuses largely on the creation of money whilst paying no attention to the preserving of cultures and the indigenous knowledge system.'²⁰ This newly urbanised African population is not able to speak for themselves and this renders them powerless which, in turn, weakens their relationship with urban cultures. So, important problems arise, especially in the emergence of the second generation of African intellectuals, who are deprived of their traditional culture and yet remain distanced from the new intellectual arena (Western education) and urban culture. It is unfortunate for us as African intellectuals that we have opted to use schools that do not take this knowledge into consideration and therefore our potential African intellectuals suffer a lack of indigenous knowledge system due to the lack of knowledge of an indigenous language.

THE IMPLICATION FOR THE PRESENT CONTEXT

In most cases potential African intellectuals who are in these schools become more confused, when fusing the European culture into the African culture. The result of such confusion is hybrid human beings that are half-African and half-European. It is difficult to have these learners, Africans and Europeans, being equal partners. This is seen during social activities, sports and recreational activities. Biko once said the idea that blacks and whites can participate as equal partners in an organisation is being questioned

even by the most ardent black supporters of non-racialism. These people now realise that a lot of time and strength is wasted in maintaining artificial and token non-racialism at student level – artificial not in the sense that it is natural to segregate but rather because even those involved in it have certain prejudices they cannot get rid of, and are therefore basically dishonest to themselves, to their black counterparts and to the community of black people who are called upon to have faith in such people.²¹

The present situation of the potential African intellectuals is that they cannot participate as equal partners in this schooling model due to the law of nature that black and white colour cannot be mixed. Once black mixes with white, black dominates and the whites resist domination by blacks. At present, African intellectuals have accepted their inferiority in terms of their own public schools and their own products in public schools (educators whom they feel are inferior). In this sense they opt for assimilation into European schools without trying to improve their own public schools and to raise them to the level of Model C schools.

The products of these Model C schools, in everything they do – the way they walk, talk, laugh, think, etc – reject their own culture and adapt to the foreign Western culture. When one reads the statements of Afro-European intellectuals like Van der Walt, one feels insulted and undermined as a pan-African intellectual. Van der Walt states that it was soon realised that the black people opting for assimilation into Western culture – in spite of the fact that some even succeeded in marrying white women – were not really recognised as equals in the white world. They were continuously reminded that the history, culture, scholarship – everything – were whites' history, culture, scholarship without any black contribution.²² As an African one should not simply become 'a black man in a white mask'. The impossible was expected: to become a 'white skin and soul', one had to completely denounce one's culture and art and think completely 'white'.

Van der Walter argues that this situation brings cultural, educational and personal confusion rather than fusion of culture, education and personality of Africans and Europeans. Only African intellectuals and elites move towards the Europeans while Europeans are constantly moving away from African initiations. This is seen through establishment of Christian Education Schools (Afrikaner-orientated) to counter the multiracial schools that formerly used to cater for Afrikaners only. The potential African intellectuals who are the products of these schools are blacks in white masks in the way they think, speak, walk, dance and perform to meet the global demands at the expense of their own African identity in terms of thinking and performing at all levels of life.

In the present situation, due to globalisation and the influence of the Model C school curriculum in response to the global demands, potential

African intellectuals are flocking to Science, Technology, and Management Sciences while ignoring other disciplines like Education, Law, Nursing, African Studies, etc. Based on this observation, these key disciplines which provide essential services will eventually disappear into thin air like in Britain, the United States of America, Saudi Arabia, and other countries that are highly affected by globalisation.

The final implication is that globalisation and its means like Model C schools do not provide the necessary skills to create a better life for the majority of Africans. Freund posits that Model C schools, which are permitted to sustain a far higher quality of education perpetuating parental communities, teach a significant number of blacks as well as white learners, but inevitably only cater to a relatively small minority and perpetuate the painful inequality of the past in a form only questionably less stark. As a result, only a very thin trickle of potential intellectuals coming out of these systems have the skills or mentality that will allow them to operate effectively in the kind of career, administrative and technical situations which can carry not only the country but also themselves and their families forward.²³

The other important aspect is that we are re-awakening Africa and African intellectuals, but on the other hand, globalisation challenges our adventure. The demand for English as a global language has impacted very negatively on important disciplines for development of African intellectuals. According to my observation of most universities in South Africa, the enrolment of students in African studies is fast declining due to the influence of globalisation and its demands for the Western way of living and thinking. It is evident enough, for example, at the University of South Africa that student enrolment is declining in this discipline.

THE REMEDY TO THE PROBLEM: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

During this period of delivery, it is of paramount importance that African intellectuals rethink, restructure and reconstruct basic education for potential African intellectuals to obtain education that will reflect African mental emancipation and de-colonisation. This act of rethinking, restructuring and reconstruction of the basic educational system, which is in line with African culture and philosophy, will be paving a way to freedom for potential African intellectuals rather than re-colonisation and de-Africanisation of them through an Euro-centric educational system. What should be done to rectify this situation? It is the duty of African intellectuals to re-structure and reconstruct the educational system in such a way that they are more accommodative to African thinking, culture and philosophy (assimilation). This is the compromising stance. The radical stance will

be the introduction of the pan-African educational system that will be catering for African children in such a way that they identify themselves with African thinking, culture and philosophy, and at the same time do not lag behind economic development. In this model there will be very limited compromise for the European culture. The African world should close ranks and fight to regain its past glory, own culture, philosophy and political independence.²⁴

In this paper, the argument for restructuring education is more in favour of the multi-dimensional approach where the Model C schools will be restructured and the public schools will be reformed and transformed to be at the same level as their counterpart Model C schools. Van der Walt indicates that a multi- or trans-cultural consciousness is the last option in the modern development of African consciousness. It tries to transcend all the other options like assimilation, rehabilitation and exclusivism. It wants to get rid of the imperialistic tendencies in both Western and African culture. Due to technological and economical imbalance and numerous ethnic and other conflicts, this viewpoint has, however, not yet firmly taken root.²⁵ There is a need for a remedial process for this system to change in order to accommodate indigenous knowledge and language. The next section will address ways and means for African intellectuals to facilitate the process of reconstruction and restructuring of the Model C school system.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTI-CULTURAL EDUCATION AS A COMPROMISING STANCE

One system of education consists of a small group of former white schools which have been increasingly de-racialised, at least as far as learners are concerned, and not as far as Africanisation is concerned, as well as producing pan-African intellectuals. That accounts for the large percentage pass nationally and provincially where such schools are dominant, for example in the Western Cape, where such schools produce more advanced socio-techno-economic intellectuals. These intellectuals can compete exceptionally well locally and globally but suffer a lack of African philosophy, culture and identity. Africans that are in such schools are faced with a very serious challenge of resisting re-colonisation and pushing for Africanisation within these schools. There is very little room within the policy and planning to reshape these schools in line with African identity, philosophy and culture. The policy just mentions the importance of the indigenous knowledge system within the educational system in general, but there is no means to see to it that potential African intellectuals are led out of the re-colonisation process in democratic South Africa.²⁶

The other system consists of the large majority of schools, all black, which together account for the fact that about one-third of potential African intellectuals fail this high stakes examination. The fact that individual potential African intellectuals (black learners) sometimes appear in the top ten or twenty achievers in a province, or that individual black schools 'turn around' their performance from one year to the next makes no difference to the *systemic* picture: black schools are in a serious dilemma and there is little in policy or planning that suggests that this national pattern of two school systems is about to be disturbed.²⁷

There is a need for a remedial process that will change this system of education in order to create enough room for an indigenous knowledge system, African languages, culture and philosophy. The best way to engage in this process of re-structuring and overhauling the Model C schools is to introduce and implement a multi-cultural and multi-lingual educational system where these schools will operate to become more accommodative in terms of the Africanisation of learners.

THE STAGE OF RESTRUCTURING MODEL C SCHOOLS

According to Bigelow, Christensen and Karp, implementation usually happens in stages, because there is much resistance to change in schools. It is unreasonable to expect to move straight from a mono-cultural school to a multi-cultural school.²⁸

First, there is a surface stage during which people change a few cultural expressions in the school. They make welcome signs in several languages, and have a variety of foods and festivals. The problem is not that they start here, but that they stop here. Instead, what needs to happen is that they have to move very fast and steadily to transform the entire curriculum.

The second stage is the structural stage. Ultimately, what is at the centre of the curriculum is that the Western or Euro-centric curriculum becomes inclusive. For example, on civilisations instead of just focusing on the Western civilisation as is demanded by globalisation, the African intellectual or educator begins to draw on what potential African intellectuals need to know about Africa, India, China, etc. In mathematics, instead of studying statistics with sports and weather numbers only, why not look at employment in the light of ethnicity?

The third, social change stage is when the curriculum assists in leading changes outside the school. People actually go out and change the nature of the community they live in. This is a long way from having some dinner and dances that represent an 'exotic' form of life. In anti-racist multi-cultural

education, knowledge should be used to empower people and change their lives without emptying them of their cultural identity.

When trying to transform the Model C schools, we need to take these stages into consideration. We need to attempt to build bridges between the learners' cultural experiences and the curriculum by utilising a variety of instructional and assessment strategies. When transforming the Model C schools, we need to make educators and school governing bodies of such schools aware that culturally responsive pedagogy is anchored on the four foundational pillars of practice:

- Educator attitudes and expectations
- Cultural communication in the classroom
- Culturally diverse content in the curriculum
- Culturally congruent instructional strategies.²⁹

THE GUIDELINES TO INTEGRATE CONTENT IN MULTI-CULTURAL ENVIRONMENTS

Jacobs, Vakalisa and Gawe provide guidelines that need to be followed by educators when implementing multi-cultural education in schools to address Model C schools' problem of de-Africanising potential African intellectuals. The following are some guidelines to assist educators in Model C schools to integrate content about ethnic groups into the school curriculum and to teach effectively in a multi-cultural environment that needs to be established within the system of education in the South African context.

- i. Educators are an extremely important variable in the teaching of ethnic content. If one has the necessary knowledge, attitudes and skills, one can use these contexts to teach important lessons about the experiences of the ethnic groups in South Africa when one encounters racist content in material or in the statements and behaviour of learners.
- ii. Knowledge about ethnic groups is needed to teach ethnic content effectively.
- iii. One should make sure that one's classroom conveys positive images of various ethnic groups. One can do this by displaying bulletin boards, posters and calendars that show the racial and ethnic diversity within South African society.
- iv. Be sensitive to the racial and ethnic attitudes of your learners and do not accept the belief that children do not see colour. According to research, young people are aware of racial differences and they

tend to accept the evaluations of various racial groups that are normative within wider society. Do not try to ignore the racial and ethnic differences that one see – try to respond to these differences positively and sensitively.

- v. Be judicious in your choice and use of teaching materials. Some materials contain both subtle and blatant stereotypes of ethnic groups. When an ethnic group is stereotyped, point it out to learners. Utilise books, films, videotapes and recordings to present the perspectives of ethnic groups to learners.
- vi. Be aware of your own cultural and ethnic heritage. Sharing your ethnic and cultural story with your learners will create a climate for sharing in the classroom, and will assist to motivate learners in researching their own ethnic and cultural roots, which will result in powerful learning for learners.
- vii. View black learners as winners. Many black learners have high academic and career goals. They need educators who believe that they can be successful and are willing to help them succeed.
- viii. Keep in mind that most black parents are very interested in education and want their children to be successful academically even though the parents may be alienated from school. Try to gain the support of these parents and enlist them as partners in the education of their children.
- ix. Use cooperative learning techniques and group work to promote racial and ethnic integration in the school and classroom. Research indicates that when learning groups are racially integrated, learners develop more friends from other racial groups and race relations in the school improve.
- x. Make sure that school plays, pageants, cheerleading squads, school publications, and other formal and informal groups are racially integrated. Also make sure that various ethnic and racial groups have equal status in the school performances and presentations.³⁰

These ten guidelines of Jacobs et al. do not address the problem of de-Africanising potential African intellectuals; they provide room for two or three ethnic groups to have space to learn in one school. In essence, they put a plaster over a crack (they do not deal with the knowledge in the blood). Knowledge in the blood is described by Jansen as ‘knowledge embedded in the emotional, psychic, spiritual, social, economic, political, and psychological lives of a community...It is not, therefore, knowledge that simply dissipates like the morning mist under the pressing sunshine of a new regime of truth’. He compares this to the trauma of the Holocaust, which is borne by subsequent generations who bear witness to the terror long after it was actually experienced.³¹

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the researcher has investigated literature and used his observations as an educator, a faith consultant and an academic to analyse the role language plays in the educational system in South Africa to de-Africanise potential African intellectuals. From that investigation it was found that there is a lack of African consciousness and awareness amongst the African intellectuals when they choose schools for their children. Furthermore, there is a lacuna within the educational system in South Africa to redress the existing inadequacy of the educational system to address the issue of African languages as a medium of instruction, culture and identity.

It was also found that the demand for a global language for the purpose of the international economy and job opportunities has played a major role in making potential African intellectuals behave and live like the dominant Western elites while losing their African language and identity. The patterns associated with Western culture have tended to dominate educational systems, often making it difficult for learners and parents from other cultures to participate effectively in such an educational system. It was found that these patterns dominated the South African educational system; hence it was recommended that there must be a paradigm shift from the Western and English-only dominated system to a multi-lingual and multi-cultural educational system that will bring African consciousness and African awareness to potential African intellectuals.

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Elite Corruption and the Impact on African Economic Growth and Human Well-being

Trevor Budhram

INTRODUCTION

Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organised crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish.¹ What makes corruption of serious concern is the fact that it is also practised by the elite. The elite hold a country's destiny in its hands because they control all factors of political control and economic production. Description of offenders categorised as elite reflect elements of status and respectability. Although it is difficult to define the concept elite persons precisely, it could be assumed to include offenders in the highest socio-economic status group such as owners of large firms, senior executives, high status civil servants or government ministers.² In Africa such persons have been labelled the Comprador class. The comprador bourgeoisie arose in the era of the formation of the imperialist colonial system. It was made up predominantly of the part of the native exploiting groups and classes that unconditionally submitted to foreign capital in both political and economic relations.³ Corruption takes many forms. The forms of corruption vary, but include bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft and embezzlement. While corruption may facilitate criminal enterprise such as drug trafficking, money laundering and human trafficking, it is not restricted to these activities.⁴ As argued by Mbaku, corruption in Africa is a consequence of poorly developed and inappropriate institutional arrangements.⁵ Most members of the public understand the word corruption much more broadly to include the abuse of resources, maladministration, theft and fraud.

While corruption is a feature of all societies to varying degrees, it is a particular concern for African countries because it undermines economic growth, discourages foreign investment and reduces the resources available

for infrastructure, human well-being, public services and anti-poverty programmes.⁶ Corruption has become an issue of major political and economic significance in recent years. The perception in an African context that democratisation and economic liberalisation offer potential routes in dealing with the scourge presents many challenges in that the secrecy of the crime allows for the elite, including government, to maintain monopolies, prevent entry and discourage innovation if expanding the ranks of the elite would expose existing corruption practices. Such distortions from corruption can discourage useful investments and growth.⁷ While economic liberalisation can help to reduce corruption by elites, there is a need for careful monitoring and regulation of the reforms to ensure that the benefits which accrue from this process, such as privatisation, are not appropriated by these same elites.⁸ This paper seeks to explore the impact of elite corruption on development, growth and human well-being in Africa and is based on a review of national and international literature.

THE CAUSES AND RESPONSES TO CORRUPTION

Mbaku⁹ states that the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) anti corruption measures is grouped into institutional and societal reforms. The main objective of institutional reforms is to make government more efficient and relevant to the needs of the society it serves. Societal reforms include measures to change people’s attitudes towards formal political processes and to mobilise the political will that is needed to launch and sustain an anti-corruption programme. The table below highlights the institutional and societal causes of corruption and how it should be addressed (USAID 1999).¹⁰

Institutional Causes	Institutional Responses
Wide authority	Limit authority: Example: privatisation, liberalisation, competitive procurement, competition in public service.
Minimal accountability	Improve accountability through: 1. Transparency (e.g., freedom of information legislation, financial disclosure, open budget process, financial management systems). 2. Oversight (e.g., audit offices, inspectors general: ombudsman/ anti-corruption agencies and whistle blower protection). 3. Sanctions (e.g., electoral, criminal and administrative sanctions, judicial reform).
Perverse incentives	Realign incentives (e.g., living wage, performance based incentives, professionalisation, ethics codes, eliminating redundant and ghost workers).

Societal Causes	Societal Responses
Anti-system attitudes	Raise awareness about the cost of corruption and mobilise political will for reforms (e.g., through surveys, public relations campaigns, investigative journalism, civic advocacy organisations, workshops and international pressure).

African countries are not the only countries that are grappling with strategies to combat and prevent corruption. It is a worldwide phenomenon. International recognition of the scale of the problem has recently led to a range of important international and regional conventions aimed at preventing corruption. Many African countries have signed and ratified the following agreements:

- The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)
- The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU Convention)
- The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention)
- The UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC)
- The Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (SADC Protocol)
- The Southern African Development Community Protocol on Combating Illicit Drugs (SADC Drugs protocol).

Despite a plethora of laws, many African countries still grapple with containing acts of corruption by elite persons.

THE CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF 'ELITE'

According to Ojukwo and Shopeju¹¹ the concept 'elite' gained a wider currency within the academia towards the end of the 19th and early 20th Centuries through the work of classical Italian political theorist Vilfredo (1935), Gaetano (1939) and Roberts (1911). Since then the existence and role of the elite and its activities has been widely recognised and discussed in Social Science literature. Ojukwo and Shopeju further state that according to Parry, (1976), Bottomore, (1976) and Nwanko, (1997) the term elite encompasses all those who through educational exposure, connection and talent are materially empowered, they also exercise considerable influence in the nation's political, economic, cultural, social and intellectual life. Ojukwo and Shopeju¹² cite an example in which the Johnson Matthey Bank

in London in collusion with Nigerian officials siphoned over six billion naira in fictitious imports. Although it is difficult to define the concept 'elite persons' precisely, it could be assumed to include offenders in the highest socio-economic status group such as owners of large firms, senior executives, high status civil servants or government ministers.¹³ Croall¹⁴ further states that elite crime is a term that is used in place of white collar crime, corporate crime or state crime that restricts its focus on the crimes of larger corporations, senior executives, politicians and state agencies.

Kotze and Masutha¹⁵ state that according to Anderson (1994), public policy is not determined by the demands and actions of the people but by a ruling 'elite' whose preferences are carried into effect by public officials and agencies. The concept elite is further described by Croall¹⁶ to include persons/offenders in the highest socio-economic status group such as owners of large firms, senior executives, high status civil servants or government ministers.

ELITE CORRUPTION

Corruption by its very nature is a difficult crime to detect and to prosecute. Alam¹⁷ sees corruption as a deviation from the norms or practices of modern practices. Mbaku¹⁸ explains that corruption is seen by most people in developing countries, especially in Africa, in more practical terms. They see it as theft of public resources by civil servants, illegal taxation of economic activity, nepotism in the distribution of public goods and services and employment in the public sector, embezzlement of public funds, the misuse of one's public office to extract extra illegal income and other benefits for the office holder, capricious and selective law enforcement of government regulations in an effort to benefit the regulator, and differential treatment of business owners in the expectation of a bribe.

The nature of corrupt transactions is such that sometimes the traditionally reactive measures of investigation are either fraught with difficulties or are simply inadequate. The offer or solicitation of a bribe or other advantage (act of corruption) will often be face to face between two parties, with no independent witnesses; so the only evidence is from a willing witness, for instance a party who has been solicited by an official who may be unreliable or tainted.¹⁹ Of serious concern is that the elite who engage in corrupt activities have a far greater impact on society, as opposed to a police official taking a bribe for a traffic offence. Bribes taken by a police official do not have impact on the economy when compared to a bribe taken by an elitist person in that the later often involves large sums of money which could be used to improve health care, education etc. The

elite not only control and dominate the economy, exercise legal monopoly over the means of coercion, dominate the structures and institutions of politics and economy but also shape the ideological and philosophical direction of society.²⁰


It is extremely difficult to determine from reports on crime statistics the exact percentage of corruption cases reported in the various African countries. It is therefore necessary to look for alternative indicators of the frequency of corruption in Africa. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index is an example of such an alternative yardstick. The 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)²¹ ranks countries according to their perceived levels of public-sector corruption, ranking countries on a scale from 0 (perceived to be highly corrupt) to 10 (perceived to have low levels of corruption). The CPI ranks countries based on how entrepreneurs, business executives, political and risk analysts, and the general public around the world perceive levels or the pervasiveness of corruption in these countries. The 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index shows that public frustration is well founded. No region or country in the world is immune to the damages of public-sector corruption which often includes the elite as the prime perpetrators. Ten African countries participated in 2011 survey out of a total of 183 countries internationally. The findings are illustrated in the graph below in which Botswana is the least corrupt whilst Liberia and Zambia are rated as the most corrupt countries in Africa.

THE DIFFERENT CATEGORY OF OFFENDERS OF ELITE CORRUPTION

The major offenders in elite corruption include individuals such as government officials (politicians and senior civil servants) and senior corporate officials (CEO's and managing directors) who enter into corrupt and secret deals involving large sums of money with local and international organisations, companies and individual businesses who practise massive embezzlement of public or corporate funds. This is done by bribery and kick backs, collusion to defraud the public, large scale embezzlement and misappropriation through public tender and disposal of public property, economic privileges accorded to special interest and large political donations and bribes.²²

POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND HIGH RANKING CIVIL SERVANTS

In *Shield Africa's wealth from self-serving political elites*, Moeletsi Mbeki, a political analyst, observes that: 'At the root of Africa's problems is the

Figure 1 The Corruption Perception Index 2011

ruling elite that has misused the economic surplus generated over the past 40 years'.²³ African political elites have exploited their position in order to:

- Bolster their standard of living to Western levels; this statement is, however, misleading in that the elite in Africa has very high standards of living equal to any elite in the Western world. In addition, painting all political elites as corrupt is factually incorrect in that honest politicians and executives of corporate companies receive huge salaries that do allow them to attain high standards of living.
- Undertake money-losing industrialisation projects that were not supported by the necessary technical, managerial and educational developments.
- Transfer vast amounts of money from agriculture and mineral extractions to overseas private bank accounts, while borrowing vast amounts from developed countries.²⁴

Political corruption has been a persistent phenomenon throughout history. Numerous scholars concur that it has afflicted all forms of government and remains one of the most important challenges to the moral basis of modern states.²⁵ In order for morality to be taken seriously it is important to acknowledge corruption as an ethical issue which must be based in the value systems of countries. Government and the elite must therefore have total commitment in adopting an ethical culture by adhering to the principles of

transparency, good governance, high moral values, decency, honesty and integrity if they are to change a polluted moral culture. Kotze & Masuthu,²⁶ further state that divergent sentiments have been expressed with regard to the prevalence of political corruption in South Africa. One study shows that the state may have been prejudiced by as much as R25 billion a year (Mail & Guardian 1996). This finding is echoed by the survey conducted by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) which shows that the African National Congress government is perceived by the general public as more corrupt than its predecessors, (Cape Times, 15 February 1996). Despite the efforts by government to uphold openness and accountability, reports of political corruption have persisted in recent years. None more so than the arms deal which still haunts the African National Congress government. Financial maladministration in the departments of health, welfare and justice are prominent in the media. Provincial governments did not escape the scourge either. Examples include the failure of the president's school feeding scheme in the Eastern Cape, the Eugene Nyathi scandal in Mpumalanga, the Malabana – Metsing scandal in the North West Province and the alleged R1 million housing schemes for members of the legislative assembly in Limpopo Province.²⁷

The defence review process in 1988 in South Africa provided for the review of the current defence force capabilities, which would result in procuring arms in the form of fighter jets and other defence capabilities required for the defence of the country. This, however, resulted in large scale corruption. For example, cases of alleged corruption involve improper inducements or bribes in the form of luxury motor vehicles to key decision-makers (Tony Yengeni et al) and corrupt interactions between private sector players (for example Schabir Shaik) with politicians to improperly influence public duties.²⁸ The prosecution of the former national police commissioner (Jackie Selebi) for corruption is further evidence of state officials abusing their powers for personal gain.

The independence of Nigeria in 1960 led many to believe that the country was destined for greatness on the world stage. Instead, more than 50 years on, the country still remains a crippled giant. Corruption has turned what should have been the country's strongest assets, namely its oil wealth, into a curse. Instead of improving people's lives, oil revenues have fuelled political violence, fraudulent elections, police abuses and human rights violations.²⁹ According to Nuhu Ribadu, the former chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, between independence and the end of military rule in 1999, more than US\$380 billion was lost to graft and mismanagement.³⁰ Examples of Nigerian political corruption date back as far as 1957, when the Justice Sutton report showed that Nnamdi Azakwe invested public funds in the African Continental Bank in which he had an

interest. Further, the Justice Coker report showed Chief Obafemi Awolowo diverting public funds to the tune of 7,200,000 pounds from the government coffers to those of his private firm.³¹ More recent examples include French investigations that showed bribes being paid to government officials to ease the award of a gas plant construction. Ojukwo and Shopeju³² state that according to Nwanko (1997) foreign firms and governments have colluded with the Nigerian political elite, military officers and bureaucrats to siphon money out of the country.

In Botswana the emergence of a series of corruption scandals in the early 1990's resulted in three Presidential Commissions of Inquiry set up to investigate the cases. They concluded that high-level politicians and civil servants had been involved. The three cases include violation of tender and financial regulations in the purchase of primary school textbooks in 1990 that led to a loss of state funds to the tune of US\$15 million. The abuses included the distribution of land in Mogoditshane, a suburb of Gaborone, and corruption in the Botswana Housing Corporation (BHC), a parastatal set up to provide housing for public sector employees.³³ In countries such as Nigeria and Cameroon where corruption has become endemic, state custodians have known to boldly and publically demand bribes from entrepreneurs and individuals seeking access to the government without any fear of penalties from the enforcement authorities.³⁴

CORPORATE CORRUPTION

Mbaku³⁵ states that in most post-independence Africa, the majority of corporates have spent a significant part of their resources finding ways to influence the political system and improve the profitability of their enterprises. Thus, instead of serving the market efficiently and providing consumers with the goods and services that they demand most, corporates have involved themselves primarily in rent seeking and other forms of opportunism. The culture of business in bribing members of civil service results in the reduction of the business transaction cost, secures monopoly positions for the entrepreneurs, and allows the business to earn an above normal rate of return on investment. Large multinational corporations and 'house hold' names clearly lie at the top of any hierarchy of organisational offenders. An example in South Africa includes the bread fixing and market allocation cartel in 2006 in which firms (Premier Foods (PTY) Ltd, et al) were involved in the bread cartel. These are the country's major wheat millers. Most notably these firms dominate the milling of wheat and maize, and the production of bread and maize meal. They had been colluding to set prices through regular meetings from at least 1994 up to 2007. This

anti-competitive conduct in this important food sector has impacted negatively on consumers and the ability of small and medium firms to enter and grow in these markets. Of more serious concern, this anti-competitive behaviour had a direct impact on the poor because maize is the staple diet. Further examples are cited from work done by the Asset Forfeiture Unit, an investigative body of the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa which include:

- David King: tax fraud (possibly R1 billion or more frozen; freezing orders in Guernsey and the UK)
- Jabulani Mabaso: Corruption (R191 million frozen)
- Andrew Phillips: Brothel Keeping (R65 million frozen).³⁶

Bracking³⁷ states that according to the World Bank (1992) once the elite or interest groups demonstrate to others the clear benefits from their corruption, it is likely to alter the typical ethical culture of an economy. The accumulation of private wealth by corrupt leaders often leads to a decline in the general attitude against corruption in practice.

The act of obtaining tenders through corrupt means also often breeds more corruption because tenders won this way are likely to lead to poor quality projects that are an economic drain on the country affected.³⁸ They further state that some contractors who acquire projects through corrupt deals may lack the technical capacity necessary for the satisfactory completion of the job and hence produce sub-standard jobs. Africa is crowded with roads that were constructed under the guidance of engineers who knew nothing about engineering.³⁹

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ELITE CORRUPTION

What impact does corruption have on society? According to Camerer⁴⁰ it is widely recognised that corruption has profoundly damaging political, social and economic consequences, particularly when considering its broader, long term effects (Clarke 1983, Rose-Ackerman 1996, Johnston 1982). Camerer⁴¹ states that according to Gould & Mukendi, (1989) the impact of political corruption is particularly damaging on the economy when the chief carnivores are the highest level of leadership. Large scale corruption in high places in government has been cited as being responsible for socio-economic deterioration and subsequent coups d'état in much of Africa. Of the 80 coups attempted in Africa in the period 1960–1982, almost all were justified as reaction to corruption, and as efforts to remove corrupt regimes.⁴² Even in countries where coup attempts are not frequent but where

political patronage allows regimes to forestall direct challenges, corruption remains a principal feature of political and economic underdevelopment blocking initiatives and frustrating the most ambitious change prospects.⁴³

Mulinge and Lesetedi⁴⁴ state that the World Bank (1997), Ayittey (2000), Hope (1997), Johnston (1998) all argue that most importantly elite corruption erodes economic growth and impairs economic efficiency through the stifling of local initiatives and enterprises; it discourages foreign investment, undermines the effectiveness of aid-funded development projects and weakens political support for development assistance in donor countries. Ayittey⁴⁵ further argues that the practice breeds wastage, aggravates budget deficit problems, reduces resources available for infrastructure, public services and anti-poverty programmes and serves as heavy tax upon investment. Further, corruption creates composite problems like 'brain drain' of educated people from developing countries.⁴⁶ This coupled with nepotism and favouritism makes it impossible for countries plagued with corruption to make the best use of their human resources. Corruption undermines the effective utilisation of natural resources leaving the affected countries vulnerable to and dependent on outside interest markets, resulting in huge challenges for these countries to implement effective development strategies of their own.⁴⁷

THE IMPACT ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND HUMAN WELL-BEING

Brempong⁴⁸ states that the objective of economic development is to increase the living standards and well-being of all citizens in a country. He further argues that improvements in the quality of life include widening its distribution, as well as expanding the range of choice available to all citizens. This, however, can only be achieved if governments and the citizenry commit to good governance, moral and ethical behaviour and denouncing acts of corruption by acting firmly against those who perpetrate corrupt activities by prosecution via the legal courts of the land. The crippling effects of corruption have resulted in citizens from all walks of life venting their dissatisfaction and anger by embarking on various campaigns, for example economic protests.

ECONOMIC PROTESTS

The impact of elite corruption on economic growth, human well-being and declining living standards has prompted students, civil servants, workers and professionals to regularly voice their opinions and dissatisfaction in

the form of strikes, demonstrations, marches and boycotts. According to a study titled 'Comparative Politics'⁴⁹ in Zimbabwe in October 1989 campus troubles broke out over the issue of elite corruption and quickly escalated into a critique of the government's use of state emergency powers to quell dissent. In Kenya, in February 1990, students complained about overcrowded educational facilities and soaring unemployment rates, protestors decried the alleged implication of government security forces in the murder of Foreign Minister Robert Ouko. In Zambia and Kenya, amongst other places, students catalysed workers and the self-employed to join the public condemnation of the corrosive effects of inflation on living standards.

HEALTH AND EDUCATION DISPARITIES

Economic inequalities have resulted in the elite living lives of luxury amidst the poverty that surround them. Across Africa, health, education, social welfare and many other aspects of human well-being are also marked by wide disparities. The wealthy receive the best schooling and medical care, while many of the poor simply do without. The poor education and health of those living in poverty in turn makes it harder for them or their children to advance their economic position. Harsch⁵⁰ (2006) states that a study by Florencia Castro-Leal and other World Bank researchers found that in Guinea, 48% of all people visiting hospitals and primary health facilities came from the richest fifth of the population. Those from the poorest fifth make up only 4% of patients. 'Education,' notes the DESA report 'is typically seen as a means of narrowing inequalities.' However, across sub-Saharan Africa, 37% of children did not go to primary school in 2001, the highest rate for any world region. Among females, the share was 41%. Almost all children out of school are from poor families. Social and economic inequalities also cut across gender lines. In Togo, 91% of women from the richest fifth of the population are attended by skilled health personnel during childbirth. Among women from the poorest fifth, that share drops to 25%. In Mauritania, that gap is even wider, at 93% and 15% respectively.⁵¹ I find these figures alarming, which begs the question; 'Why is this the case?' The answer undoubtedly is linked to corruption and its effects on economic growth and human well-being. Brempong⁵² argues that the economic effect of corruption may depend on cultural and institutional factors as well as low income levels. He further explains how the growth rate of income is affected by corruption, and provides an explanation in which a one point increase in corruption decreases the growth rates of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by between 0.75 and 0.9 percentage points per year and of per capita income growth rate by between 0.39 and

0.41 percentage points per year.⁵³ According to the Overseas Development Institute,⁵⁴ despite Nigeria's relative oil wealth, a significant proportion of Nigeria's population lives in poverty. Approximately 70 million people live on less than US\$1/day (World Bank and DFID, 2005: 8), 54% of Nigerians live below the poverty line (UNDP, 2006b) and over one third live in extreme poverty, defined as those who cannot afford 2900 calories per day (UNDP, 2006a). In recent decades, while Nigeria became a major exporter of oil, the proportion of people experiencing income poverty has increased. Annual per capita income fell to about US\$350 in 2003, well below the sub-Saharan Africa average of US\$450 (World Bank and DFID, 2005: 8). Disaggregated figures highlight the various dimensions of poverty: one in five children die before the age of five; 3 million people are living with HIV/AIDS; and 7 million children are not attending school (DFID, 2007). These alarming figures are a direct attribute of the effects of corruption on society. Ojukwu and Shopeju⁵⁵ state that corruption and disrespect for the rule of law remains the biggest impediment to Nigeria's quest for sustained growth, development, peace, stability and security. They further state that billions of dollars have been lost by Nigeria to corrupt leaders resulting in the livelihood of millions of people being stolen. The executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Anthonio Maria Costa, once remarked that Nigeria lost close to \$400 billion between 1960 and 1999 to corruption.⁵⁶

Absolute poverty and inequality are different concepts, notes the UN Development Programme (UNDP), 'but they are intimately related'. Disparities in life chances define prospects for escaping poverty. Inequalities in access to healthcare, education or political rights, says the UNDP's *Human Development Report 2005*, all make it much harder for people to struggle out of poverty. Among other elements contributing to inequality and poverty, notes the report, are two broad conditions that strongly affect people's incomes and access to social services. In most African countries, the urban-rural gap is especially wide. In Ghana, for example, the incidence of poverty in Accra, the capital, is only 2%, but in the dry rural savannah regions in the north, it is 70%. In Accra poverty has been declining, but in the savannah it has not budged. Unequal political power, adds the World Bank, 'leads to the formation of institutions that perpetuate inequalities in power, status and wealth'.⁵⁷

CONCLUSION

Elite corruption poses one of the greatest challenges in addressing economic inequalities, health, education, social welfare and many other aspects

of human well-being. Corruption has seriously impeded the growth and effective utilisation of Africa's vast economic potentials. The elite who continue to blatantly transgress country laws by engaging in corrupt practices continue to contribute to the poor bearing the brunt of their actions. To really address the problem of elite corruption in Africa, the issue of morality must be taken seriously. Elite corruption undermines public confidence and brings about lawlessness and mal-administration, and allows citizens who involve themselves in corrupt practices to justify their unlawful acts. The prevalence of elite corruption in African countries is of serious concern in that it undermines the development capacity of the state, distorts priorities and is a form of economic genocide wherein money reserved for those in poverty is distributed to the elite.

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Corruption and Poverty in Africa

Interrogating the Problematic of Reform Without Development in Nigeria

Adelaja Odukoya

INTRODUCTION

It is no exaggeration that Nigeria in many respects has not fulfilled its manifest mandate. Nigeria has become a dream betrayed. Rather than provide continental and global leadership as a pace-setter exemplifying the unlimited possibilities for development of Africa and the African Diaspora, Nigeria's claim to 'giant of Africa' finds symptomatic expression as a tragic Lilliputian. Despite Nigeria's natural endowments, oil, gas, and human capital, the country has been savagely mismanaged and violated under the watch of its own nationals. With over US\$400 billion in oil revenue since 1970, about two thirds of the country's population are living under US\$1 a day.¹ As Watts² succinctly notes, '85% of oil revenue accrue to 1% of the population; perhaps \$100 billion of the \$400 billion in revenues since 1970 have simply gone missing'. Thus Nigeria epitomises a sad case of apocalypse monumental fraud, and the paradox of abundance typified by the 'Dutch disease'.

For Adejugbe³, 'specifically, the Dutch disease describes the co-existence within the traded goods sector of progressing and declining, or booming and lagging sub-sector'. With respect to Nigeria therefore, the Dutch disease undermines productivity in the real sector and leads to currency depreciation through the incidence of oil rent. Some other consequences of the Dutch disease are capital flight, booming markets for cheaper foreign products, underdevelopment of productive forces, impossibility of productive accumulation, arrested development and mal-development.

Nigeria's embarrassing economic impoverishment, political bastardisation and mal-governance continuously resonate in global development indexes. While the UNDP's African Human Development Index (HDI) for 2011 is 0.463, Nigeria falls below the continent's average at 0.459, placing it at 156 out of 187 countries assessed.⁴ Less endowed African nations are

higher on the HDI than Nigeria. For instance, Gabon, Ghana, Angola and Cameroun have HDI of 0.674, 0.541, 0.486 and 0.482; placing 106, 135, 148 and 150 out of 187 countries with comparable data respectively⁵. Similarly, on the 2011 Ibrahim Index of African Governance with 41% Nigeria is placed 41st out of 53 nations, and is on the 45th position on the Ibrahim Human Development scale.⁶

At the core of Nigeria's development crisis is the problem of capital accumulation. The crisis of accumulation has both domestic and international complements, with both mutually reinforcing and interpenetrating. At the domestic level was the non-emergence from colonial rule of a patriotic national political elite committed to national development. As Ake⁷ perceptively argues, 'power is everything, and those who control the coercive resources use it freely to promote their interests, including the appropriation of surplus'.

At independence, the political struggles for hegemonic control over the levers of the state dove-tailed into and destroyed post-independence consensus imperative for accumulation. These divisive struggles ensure the over-politicisation of the state. This led to the neglect and mismanagement of the economy especially in the context of the institutionalisation of patronage politics and prebendal exchanges as a basis for state. The advance to predation has also been recognised.⁸

The appropriation of state power by and for individuals and groups in the context of neo-patrimonialism erode the basis of an inclusive economic development orientation which can facilitate capital accumulation. The pattern of accumulation that plays itself out and preferred by the Nigerian elite is deeply ingrained in the nation's colonial history and exploitation, which ensured a deliberate underdevelopment of domestic entrepreneurship⁸. This condition produced material poverty and desperation to use state power to redeem this condition which constitutes a threat to elite political power.

Internationally, colonial capitalism secured a dependent role for Nigeria in the world system, wherein she was made to specialise in commodity export which was concomitant with her underdevelopment and peripheralisation. This arrangement with the complimentary unequal exchange ensured massive pillage, plunder and mal-governance. The architecture of colonial rule by its very logic promoted and instituted corruption⁹. These conditions were aggravated by the crisis of global capitalism starting from the early 1970s in the context of a neo-colonial political economy. The crisis manifested in balance of payment crises, de-industrialisation, unemployment, under-employment, poverty, diseases, debt over-hang and authoritarian political regimes. Given its oil wealth, Nigeria's economic crisis distinguished it as a wasteful and rudderless nation, thus laying credence to the belief that the nation is an accident waiting to happen.

Economically, the recent withdrawal of 'fuel subsidy' by the admission of the Central Bank Governor, Lamido Sule Lamido, is the dawn of national bankruptcy long foretold. The nation's unenviable ascendancy on the corruption scale as captured by the 'Corruption Perception Index 2011' of Transparency International is indicative of the progressive rot in the body polity. From a position of 134 most corrupt nations in the world out of 178 in 2010, Nigeria rose to 143 most corrupt nations in the world of the 183 countries sampled for the 2011 report, with a score of 2.4 over 10 points¹⁰. Nigeria's notoriety for corruption also earned it the second position on the KPMG African Fraud Barometer 2011.¹¹

The crisis of the Nigerian economy exemplified by the unsustainable pattern of accumulation resulted in complications of huge and unserviceable foreign debts. The consequent paucity of foreign exchange for importation, production and sustenance of elite luxurious consumption challenged the survival instincts of the managers of the Nigerian economy. The result was a desperate search for quick fixed solutions to the economic quandary. Different ad hoc solutions, like 'low profile', 'austerity measures' and 'War Against Indiscipline' (WAI) between 1978 and 1985 (by the Olusegun Obasanjo, Alhaji Shehu Shagari and Mohammedu Buhari administrations respectively) proved inadequate to address the burgeoning crisis. This was especially so as these ill-digested reformist solutions scathed the surface of the problems and ignored the structural roots of the crisis.

It was under these conditions that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) became the financial undertakers on behalf of creditor nations. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was imposed with strict conditionality on Nigeria under the directive of the Washington Consensus with socialist and social welfare paths of development de-legitimised or criminalised¹². The market under neo-liberal ideology became the global categorical imperative and the only path through which development and national economic remediation is possible.

The economic, social and political conditions linked with elite economic and political survival made it compelling to follow the exploitative dictates of the Washington Consensus.

Despite noticeable hiccups with the reform under the military, under the administrations of president Olusegun Obasanjo and Musa Yar'Adua, reform resumed with vigour. Neo-liberal reform was advanced as a mechanism for reconstructing the malfeasance and debilitating conditions of accumulation and underdevelopment in Nigeria. Reform was expected to place Nigeria on a new path of sustained development, reduce poverty, and promote democracy, transparency, accountability and popular empowerment. It is against these promises of reform that the paper set for itself the objective of interrogating the nexus between reform and corruption, as well

as the extent to which the goals of reform in Nigeria was achieved. The rest of the paper is divided into three sections. The first section deals with conceptual framework of analysis. In the second section focus is on the perversion of reform, while the final section draws the curtain on the work with a conclusion.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Along with conflict, corruption and poverty stand as a trinity in the African development problematic. While the hierarchy of importance and degree of destructiveness of each of this phenomenon on Africa is an unsettled debate, together and in their interconnectedness, they combine and contribute to the negative perception of Africa and Africans. Similarly, debate is ongoing as to whether corruption causes poverty, or if it is poverty that engenders corruption.¹³

With respect to South Korea it is argued that there was positive coefficient between corruption and economic development, with market exchange maintained and recycled funds utilised for production within the state¹⁴. To many, corruption is largely one of the causes of underdevelopment and a curse in the Third World. The existence of an organic linkage between corruption and poverty as well as their mutually perpetuating and socially disempowering consequences is settled.

Corruption depletes collective wealth and promotes individual wealth of those engaged in anti-social activities. The effects of corruption on poverty mostly relate to its skewed and unequal distributional effects on social wealth. Furthermore, the public loses in terms of social welfare provisioning due to corruptive collusion by political, bureaucratic and business elite and foreign capital.

As Rose-Ackerman opines, 'a corrupt system of government service has the distributional disadvantage of benefiting unscrupulous people at the expense of law-abiding citizens who would be willing to purchase the services legally'.¹⁵ This results in the endemic nature of corruption as people see it as the best and easier way to become wealthy. Consequently, it becomes seemingly culturally sanctioned and the 'normal' behaviour. This makes delineation of the conceptual boundary of corruption a problem.

The universe of ideas, culture and political settings within which corruption and its discourse takes place make the task of conceptualising corruption no less controversial. As Moran succinctly notes, 'corruption is seen as a manifestation of a specific set of state-society relations, political system, developmental trajectory and types of external linkages'.¹⁶ These

controversies notwithstanding, what is common to all forms of corruption is the perversion of authority, both in the public and private spheres.

Corruption takes place in a framework where there is poor distinction and blurred demarcation between public and private interest.¹⁷ In every case of corruption there is a clash of interests with private and personal interests advantaged over the public and collective good. Corruption is unthinkable where authority figures do not misuse and/or betray the trust reposed by others for selfish interests. Hence this position that corruption is 'the misuse of public power for private gain'.¹⁸

The conceptual problematic of corruption flows from the definition that reduces its incidence to the public sector. Rather than the idea of *public qua public* emphasised in the corruption discourse, there is the *private-public* concern which should be integrated into the discourse. In this latter category, though not owned by the state, the private becomes public to the extent that such concerns transcend the household, giving it a collective and public character. This is of contextual importance for a useful analysis of Nigeria where the line between the public and private sectors is thin.

With the synergy of the public and private sectors, corruption becomes diffused and permeates the whole polity.¹⁹ This is made possible with the existence of weak and compromised institutions which whittle down state autonomy, especially the power to regulate market transactions. The underdevelopment of capitalist relations of production in Nigeria, for instance, contributes to the incidence of corruption which is traditionally an integral part of capitalism. This is, however, not a rationalisation for neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism opens Nigeria for renewed capitalist exploitation. For Slater²⁰ and Robinson,²¹ neo-liberalism is a hegemonic project of capital to promote and secure transnational capital accumulation. Moore²² also notes that 'neo-liberalism simultaneously accelerates and aggravates the uneven, destructive and creative route towards proletarianisation and private property'.

The difficulty of separating the public and private sectors in underdeveloped economies like Nigeria, where both the public and private sectors operate as one seamless network of accumulation, with the state as the core, makes relating the incidence of corruption exclusively to the public sector analytically deficient. The organic nexus between the public and private sector is also not too dissimilar in the advanced capitalist system. The public-private nexus of corruption is anchored on the state-society relations within which corruption manifests.

Good illustrations of the private-public orientation of corruption in the advanced capitalist countries were the Enron, Arthur Andersen and WorldCom scandals and the Mortgage bubble in America. These are evidence of corporate state capture.²³ These cases of abuse of office by private

actors had overwhelming implications not just for individual stockholders of these corporations but the concerned national economy in particular, and the global economy in general. Martin and Shohat²⁴ argue that: 'The Enron case suggests grander imbrications of public and private interest. Ken Lay, Enron's CEO, was one of President Bush's biggest financial backers, even lending private corporate jets to W's presidential campaign'. These Transnational corporations, Snamprogetti Netherlands BV, Eni SpA, Technip and Royal Dutch Shell PLC²⁵, Transocean, Noble Corp, Tidewater Inc., Murphy Shipping,²⁶ Halliburton and Willbros have been found guilty and fined of oiling corruption in Nigeria by courts in the USA. These transnational companies 'paid over three billion dollars (\$3.2b) in fines between 2010 and 2011 to the United States government and the National Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)'²⁷ as penalties.

The desire for transnational accumulation by all means possible has heightened the incidence of corporate corruption particularly in the developing countries, and seriously undermined governance and development. Also, the coincidence of weak governance institutions, political elite with fragile material bases and desperate need for economic resources to consolidate hold on state power made developing countries malleable and corrupt-prone in the face of the financial muscles and manipulation of global corporations.

Corruption is an intimate part of all market order.²⁸ Market fundamentalism, given its orientation for individualised prosperity and survival of the fittest, has increased the complexity of the international dimension of corruption through privatisation and techno-market dynamics of globalisation which evade states scrutiny, and permits illicit business transactions as a way of increased profitability. As Lewis²⁹ aptly notes, 'liberalisation contrasted traditional sources of rents and patronage while opening new areas of speculation, arbitrage and parallel activities, nearly all of which were mediated by political authorities'.

Specifically, imperialist accumulation is positively correlated with transnational corruption. This partly explains why there was two decades apart between America's criminalisation of corruption by American corporations abroad and the other leading capitalist states following on the example.³⁰ Therefore, the need for an integrating conceptual orientation of corruption commends the idea of a corruption complex, thus the conceptualisation of corruption as 'the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit'.³¹

The corruption complex entails a socio-political architecture encompassing multiplicities of actions that pervert the norm of market exchange through abuse of established processes and procedures such that undue advantages and benefits are gained. Actions that qualify as corruption within the corruption complex include 'nepotism, abuse of power, fraud,

embezzlement and various forms of misappropriation, influence-peddling, prevarication, insider trading and abuse of the public purse'.³²

As Nye³³ notes:

Corruption is behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses).

Corruption has been implicated in several respects. Endemic corruption engenders economic and political instability, rendering domestic investment unattractive. For Lipset and Lenz,³⁴ the associated risk of investment is increased because of corruption. The reduction of efficiency and investment where corruption thrives are therefore a logical outcome.³⁵ This is because wastages through misallocation of resources are closely associated with corruption. Timamy³⁶ notes that corruption destroys the basis of wealth creation and disconnects wealth from productivity.

While efficiency and development claims have been canvassed for corruption,³⁷ Carr³⁸ provides authoritative support for the linkage between corruption, poverty and underdevelopment in Africa. Corruption aggravates poverty due to its effects on the individual, society and the state. This finds expression in the implications of corruption for the disempowerment, pauperisation of individual citizens, and erosion of social capital and order in society.

With the cost of corruption in Africa put at \$10.9 billion in 2011³⁹, corruption hurts the poor greatly, while it benefits the powerful and well-connected few.⁴⁰ Corruption, for Timamy⁴¹ 'often involves the mass pauperisation of their 'subjects' and the deepening of their dependence on the patrimonial favours of the 'ruler'. The governor of the Central Bank in Nigeria, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, only recently claimed that the 'unequitable' revenue allocation between the states resulting in mass poverty is at the root of the Boko Haram menace.

Since corruption is implicated in the incidence of poverty, corruption and underdevelopment might not be too dissimilar. Lewis⁴² notes with regards to Nigeria that 'corruption has dissipated resources, obstructed growth, and stymied economic remediation'. For Kofi Annan⁴³:

Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government's ability to provide basic services,

feeding inequality and injustice and discouraging foreign aid and investment. Corruption is a key element in economic under performance, and a major obstacle to poverty eradication.

Corruption disrupts market exchange relations in a fundamental way, leaving economic relations and wealth regulated by personal rules rather than market exchange. Corruption not only transfers development resources from the state to individuals, the public are turned into welfare hostages of the powerful who have cornered state resources through budgetary capture. Budgetary capture⁴⁴ leads to resource misallocation, misuse and privatisation.

With illicit wealth deployed to further capture power, corruption is institutionalised in the state in a context of neo-patrimonialism, fraudulent elections, absence of rule of law and constitutionalism. Hence, Kaufmann⁴⁵ opines that 'corruption thrives where civil liberties, free press, transparency, and contestable politics are absent', reducing citizens' political efficacy. With political efficacy of citizens compromised by corruption, the fertile ground for the entrenchment and mutation of corruption is secured. All these engender the development quagmire.

Recent neo-liberal patronage and carousing by the intellectual arsenals of global capitalism is having the effect of promoting a false sense of well-being and development in Nigeria. Nigeria has been named as one of the 'Next 11' economies. The impression is given that the Nigerian economy is catching up, and reform bearing positive fruits. The opposite, however, is the case. While the Nigerian economy may have experienced some measure of growth, measured and analysed on critical development criteria, the economy has not escaped from its development dilemma. The high incidence of poverty, inequality and unemployment using Dudley Seers' parameters of development⁴⁶ is a certification of the underdevelopment state of Nigeria, and a confirmation that Nigeria is experiencing mal-development.

Development is a negation of poverty, unemployment and inequality.⁴⁷ Closely linked with development are empowerment, self-reliance, prosperity, education, and democratic citizenship expressed through political participation, and holding incumbents accountable and responsible to the commonwealth. This entails maintaining integrity and non-corruptibility of public office and trust. Development in both its qualitative and quantitative dimensions is about empowerment. The primary condition to engendering development is through change. For Lewis⁴⁸, 'economic development may be defined by three criteria: growth, structural transformation, and poverty reduction'. Though Lewis⁴⁹ specifies a 6% per annum growth as desirable for development, experience in most Third World nations, Nigeria included, has shown that growth is possible without development.

The structural condition of development involves transformation from primary product exports to production of capital products and manufacturing. The integration of agriculture and industry is an important structural change relevant to development that has been proven right over time. This makes for productive efficiency, global competitiveness, higher foreign exchange earnings and reduction of foreign dependency. With structural changes in the economy people get economically engaged and empowered such that the incidence of poverty is reduced.

THE REFORM OF PERVERSION: NOTES FROM THE BANKING AND POWER SECTOR REFORMS

The logic of reform in Nigeria was to re-orient the economy from primitive capital accumulation to capital accumulation through a renewed economic order rooted in production and democratised distributional access. This was to be achieved within the context of neo-liberalism.

Consistent with neo-liberalism, trade and financial liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation were the defining policy thrust of reform in Nigeria. This finds expression in withdrawal of subsidies, putting a cap on monopoly rents, cancellation of import licensing, dissolution of marketing and commodity boards, end to protectionist economic policies, introduction of floating interest rates regime, market determined exchange regimes, devaluation of the naira, labour rationalisation and reduction of the ubiquitous role of the state in economic management. At the structural level, there was a deliberate effort to promote agriculture and reduce dependency on oil.

There was, however, a clash between this new orientation for capital accumulation with the traditional orientation for primitive capital accumulation favoured by the Nigeria petty-bourgeois and comprador classes. In this clash the old order of primitive capital accumulation which allow for distributional access to state resources had the upper hand. This was achieved through the perversion of the reform towards primitive and unproductive accumulation in the interest of petty bourgeois and comprador classes. This signalled the failure of reform, worsened the crisis of underdevelopment and heightened poverty.

Specifically, policy somersaults, manipulation of exchange rates regime to privilege financial arbitrage, increased state manipulations of the economy through the activities of the Central Bank of Nigeria, especially under the military administrations of Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sanni Abacha, proliferation of banking and financial institutions, money laundering, privatisation, crony capitalism and direct looting of state resources were some of the ways in which the goals of reform were subverted. Given

the centrality of finance and energy for the development of the Nigerian economy, the paper used the banking and power sector reforms to illustrate the different malfeasance that undermined the reform in Nigeria.

The logic behind banking sector reforms in Nigeria flows from the theoretical underpinning of financial liberalisation which is rooted in the need to eliminate inefficiency which militates against productive investments in the financial market. Thus, financial liberalisation is meant to engender ease of capital accumulation for expanded production that would ensure capitalist development by freeing and reallocating hitherto redundant, mis-allocated but investible capital resources for a new cycle of capital formation.

Financial liberalisation as a mechanism for financial invigoration entails the strengthening of market forces in order for it to control and determine the allocation of resources in the credit and financial market under a new regime of financial intermediation.

However, there is a yawning gap between theory and practice as it has to do with financial liberalisation. Deregulation promotes the illusion of prosperity, with financial speculators reaping bountiful benefits which are not available to non-speculators in the financial markets. When every one joined in the rally, a false sense of prosperity sustains the illusion.⁵⁰ Furthermore, financial arbitrage through interest rates and foreign exchange manipulation, amongst other strategies, provided the basis of the new regime of primitive capital accumulation.⁵¹

Weak regulatory administration, the politicisation of financial matters evident in government continued intervention in the market despite deregulation, multiple foreign exchange rate system and the complicity of the state through its compromised autonomy were factors that worked in favour of the perversion of financial liberalisation as basis for primitive capital accumulation.

Given that the exchange rate in the open markets was always higher than the official exchange rate, the market was pervaded with opportunities for financial arbitrage with the privileged buying at lower rates from the official market and selling at higher rates in the open markets. It was those well connected to the state that mostly got their foreign exchange demands met from the official market. Thus, political influence and patronage, as opposed to forces of demand and supply, became the basis for the allocation of foreign exchange. Furthermore, with a weak and politically compromised regulatory regime, banks officials easily escaped scrutiny and perpetuated high-level financial illegalities.⁵²

Genuine users of foreign exchange were short-changed, as a result of which the cost of industrial production hit the roof. Many manufacturing concerns closed on the weight of scarcity and high cost of foreign exchange for the procurement of production inputs and technology. Banks went all

out to attract deposits at all cost, though these funds were in most cases mismanaged through unsecured insider's loans. One of the ways this was done was through self-lending. The financial effect of self-lending was that commercial banks transferred good liabilities (deposits) into bad assets (loans to their owners).⁵⁵ According to the NDIC⁵⁴ 'insider loans accounted for 65% of total loans of the four banks liquidated in Nigeria in 1995'. Thus, self-lending is a mechanism for PCA.

From 1st January, 1988, in the guise of administrative and structural reforms of the apex bank, General Babangida removed the autonomy of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and centralised its control in the presidency. This control of the CBN and its governor by the presidency became law with the 1991 CBN Decree.⁵⁵ Under this enforced anomaly, General Babangida took direct charge of the nation's monetary and banking matters, transforming the CBN into what has been aptly described by Enuenwosu⁵⁶ as the '... Central Bank of the president, a unit or department in the office of the president carrying out the president's bidding and directives on monetary and banking policy'.

General Babangida complemented the above source of primitive accumulation with the direct printing of the Naira, thus fuelling inflation with excess money in circulation. The political control of the CBN under General Babangida was a major mechanism of primitive accumulation and crony-capitalism. This seriously undermined the financial liberalisation programme. With the financial recklessness, uncontrolled accumulation and regulatory inertia, the nation experienced a bank crisis between 1992 and 1994 with many banks going under and depositors losing their deposits.

Following the return to civilian rule on May 29, 1999, under the presidency of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, the reform hitherto in limbo was re-invigorated. Chief Obasanjo put in place an economic management team made up of reputable apostles of neo-liberal orthodoxy under the leadership of Ngozi Nweala, who was brought straight from her job at the World Bank. The economic management team repackaged the reform with all the condiments of neo-liberal orthodoxy which defines the failed Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as a National Economic Empowerment Programme Strategy (NEEDS). A major component of NEEDS was the emphasis on due process and transparency. The opening of a due process office to check corruption associated with public sector procurement, monetisation policy, privatisation, pension reforms, power sector and banking reforms were pillars of the reform programme.

The appointment of Charles Soludo as the CBN governor following the re-election of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2003 provided the platform for policy reversal that was geared towards the re-invigoration of the Nigerian banks so that they could serve as engine of capitalist development. The

banking sector reform dubbed 'banking consolidation' started in 2004 with the increase capital base of banks from N2 billion to N25 billion. After the expiration of the eighteen months given to banks to consolidate, the total number of banks in Nigeria reduced from the pre-consolidation figure of 89 to 24 big banks. The other 65 banks had either merged with the successful banks or liquidated as a result of their inability to raise the required capital. Most of the banks sourced the funds for their consolidation through sale of shares to the Nigerian public on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.

With banks now exposed to opportunities for cheap funds from the Stock Market, post-consolidation resulted in the constant return of these banks to the Stock Market to raise fresh capital. The post-consolidation excess liquidity, rather than being given out as loans to the productive sectors, was loaned to customers to buy shares of the banks. The banks themselves bought and warehoused their own stocks creating artificial demands and increased price.

For instance, the CBN revealed that sacked directors of Intercontinental Banks Plc received N8 billion each in order to acquire 50 percent equity in the bank, just as Afribank lost N120 billion from trading in its own stocks⁵⁸. Mostly affected by the crash of the market was the banking sector. Since 2008 when the Stock Market crashed it is still comatose. *BusinessDay*⁵⁹ notes that 'as a result of loss of investor's confidence in the market, the all share index depreciated by 105.39 points or 0.4% to close on Friday, August 6, 2010 at 25,738.79. Market capitalisation closed lower at N6.3 trillion (from N15 trillion)'. This was aggravated in the banking sector by financial recklessness and bad corporate governance.

It was for this reason, amongst others, that the World Bank noted that 'as much as US\$10 billion or half of all Nigerian banks holdings were tied up to questionable assets'.⁶⁰ With respect to toxic assets, after the CBN examination of Oceanic Bank Plc, the CBN alleged that the managing director and CEO of the Bank, Mrs Cecilia Ibru, owned two private jets and had concluded arrangement to add two new private jets before she was removed. She was alleged to have paid her daughter's firm a sum of N825 million for a ten-year property lease.⁶¹ These toxic assets constitute a major mechanism for PCA by operators of Nigerian banks.

Contrary to the expectation that the increased capital base of Nigerian banks would be used for the finance of capitalist development through investment in industry and other productive sectors of the Nigerian economy, post-consolidation banks in Nigeria are more oriented towards speculative investments, explosive oil business and PCA. As a result, credit lines are either extended to oil and gas, share purchases or insider-related unsecured loans. While serious entrepreneurs are unable to obtain funds for their businesses from the banks, speculators and traders have funds literally

thrust on them by the banks. And given the low value-added and risky nature of the activities for which these funds are put, repayment of the loans is usually fraught with problems. Before the CBN hammer fell, banks kept doctoring their books to cover-up these toxic assets, declaring mouth-watering profits without making provisions for the bad loans in their books. Nemesis visited the banks for their sins, resulting in the CBN governor, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, sacking of the managing directors and executive directors of five seriously stressed banks, viz Intercontinental Bank Plc, Oceanic Bank Plc, Afribank Plc, Union Bank Plc, and FinBank Plc.⁶²

The 14th August 2009 CBN regulatory action which led to the sack of the chief executives of five banks was on account of money laundering, granting unsecured loans, self-lending, violation of regulatory guidelines of loans, falsification of accounts, and outright stealing/looting of depositors funds. All together, these five banks had N2.8 trillion loan exposure, out of which N1.1 trillion was classified by the CBN as non-performing loans. For instance, contrary to banking regulations, the sacked directors of Intercontinental Bank Plc gave themselves US\$10,000 each as holiday allowance.⁶³ According to the CBN, the Cecilia Ibru-led Oceanic Bank Plc granted N160.7 billion in loans to associates and cronies, just as Intercontinental Bank Plc under Erastus Adegbola gave loans to the tune of N32 billion to firms belonging to seven directors of the bank.⁶⁴ The effects of this, pertaining to the incidence of self-lending in Romania, is 'that commercial banks transformed good liabilities [deposits] into bad assets [loans to their owners]'.⁶⁵

POWER SECTOR REFORM

The power sector has been a major developmental problem in Nigeria. An estimated 60 million Nigerians own generating sets, making the average Nigerian household effectively a 'local government' and the country the largest generator-driven economy globally. Hence Nigerians are in support of any action that promises to alleviate the suffering from energy deficiency. However, priority actions to enable the privatisation of the electricity power sector set by the National Electricity Power Policy provided a major platform for corruption and PCA. The policies that provided windows for primitive capital accumulation were:

- i. improvement in supply of electricity through the conclusion of National Emergency Power Programme (NEPP) contacts
- ii. carrying out essential investments as proposed in the National Electricity Power Authority's (NEPA) Action Plan

- iii. repairing and upgrading the system control and communications facilities
- iv. priority strengthening of the transmission network to be able to support new contact markets for bulk power.⁶⁶

The Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) promised to privatise NEPA between July 2001 and December 2002. This is yet to be done. Contracts under the power sector reform were awarded to several non-existing companies. The House of Representatives announced that US\$6.2 billion was paid to contractors under the National Integrated Power Projects (NIPP) that have no record of registration with the CAC. The controversial sale of Egbin Power Plant built by Marubeni to Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) for US\$280 million by the BPE was one of the sore points of the privatisation drive in the Nigerian power sector, especially given that KEPCO was not one of the initial companies that expressed interest. More surprising was the fact that the plant was producing at the time of the sale to KEPCO. The Senior Staff Association and National Union of Electricity Workers (SSANUEW) queried 'why a plant presently producing 800 MW, with a recent US\$28 million contract awarded for rehabilitation of the exploded boilers that will add another 440 MW to the system besides the initial US\$50 million contract awarded for upgrade of the same plant, should be sold for a paltry US\$280 million'.⁶⁷

The power sector reform in Nigeria was also not freed from inefficiency and waste as the case of the US\$404 million eight gas turbines with a combined capacity of 902 MW imported by General Electric Corporation shows. Carrying these gas turbines from the port to where they would be used has proved to be a big problem due to lack of consideration of road conditions.

Undoubtedly, the neglected power sector received the needed attention under Olusegun Obasanjo. Several billion Naira was pumped into the power sector to deliver on the administration's promise to increase the generating capacity to 10,000 MW by 2007. Five years after, the available power generation capacity is still 5,700 MW with 'the base line of power generation in the country at 3,600 megawatts'.⁶⁸ However, 'about 135,000 megawatts of electricity was required to effectively power the nation's economy'.⁶⁹ Accusations of corruption dogged the power sector under Obasanjo.

Furthermore, the upgrading of the nation's transmission line for which a US\$100 million loan was obtained from the World Bank was not implemented. Similarly, the repairs of the generating units across the country were yet to be completed despite colossal amounts spent on them. With President Obasanjo sanctioning exclusion of power sector transactions from the due process protocol,⁷⁰ the power sector reform was characterised by lack of transparency and accountability.

President Olusegun Obasanjo was accused by the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) of awarding a contract for pre-paid meter to a Chinese company that was his front.⁷¹ The disappearance from site after misappropriating N4.5 billion of the N5.9 billion for the construction of the New-Haven-Ikot Ekpene 330kva Switching sub-Station by Paym Bargh and Carpalark Engineering Services was another case that shows how the reform of Nigeria's power sector has become a platform for indiscriminate accumulation for the politically connected.⁷² All that the company did for the N4.5 billion it collected was erect a fence! From the foregoing, it can be seen that the privatisation of the Nigerian power sector is positively correlated to PCA.

This development underscores the futility of neo-liberal privatisation for promoting a new circle of accumulation and capitalist development in Nigeria. It is thus clear that the crisis of accumulation and development in Nigeria cannot be disassociated from the crisis of peripheral and dependent capitalism which must be confronted as a condition for development.

CONCLUSION

We have argued that given the perversion of reform by the dominant class in Nigeria, reform has failed to achieve its objectives. Rather than addressing the problems of primitive capital accumulation as well as the crisis and contradictions of capitalist development, the reform has worsened it. We demonstrated how by using state power the comprador and petty bourgeois classes politically manipulated economic reform as a new platform for PCA, especially through financial liberalisation and privatisation.

The initial boast to agriculture at the inception of reform under General Babangida was short-lived and the essential forward-backward linkage between agriculture and industry which is indispensable for the structural transformation of the Nigerian economy was not achieved. The agricultural sector would have absorbed the thousands of Nigerians that were released into the unemployment market as a consequence of the failed reform in the banking sector and other sectors of the economy. Many Nigerians are yet to recover from the loss of their hard-earned money in the stock market burst occasioned by the crisis of financial market liberalisation and banking sector malfeasance. The failure of the power sector reforms has increased the impoverishment of the ordinary Nigerian who, with the withdrawal of state welfare provisioning, high cost of living, and being thrown out of jobs as a result of reforms, could not operate the informal businesses that served as an escape from poverty.

The energy crisis has led to a high cost of production and the migration of many companies from Nigeria to set up operations in neighbouring

countries with favourable production environments. Similarly, Nigeria continues to waste scarce foreign exchange on importation of generating sets despite the several billions of dollars that have gone down the drain in the name of power sector reform.

Corruption continues to promote wealth without productivity. The existence of high volume of unproductive capital in the Nigerian economy ensured the underdevelopment of productive forces, inflation, unemployment, diseases, illiteracy and mass impoverishment. These conditions have been complicated by group and elite crisis over primitive capital accumulation. A state building crisis is manifested across the country as ethno-religious crisis, resources control and electoral violence belied the assertion of the political integrative dimension of market corruption and patronage⁷³. Not only are non-network members of the corruption complex disadvantaged and excluded as a consequence of their being made outsiders to the accumulation process, they have become anti-system elements and increasingly threaten the stability of the state.

Corruption in the context of reform and crisis of accumulation continues to widen elite gaps in a context of 'competitive patronage'.⁷⁴ The state, rather than being a unifying institution representing and protecting the interest of all and sundry, ministers to the needs of the incumbent controllers – making it difficult to forge necessary consensus that can be leveraged for development. As against state coordination for collective accumulation, the elite compete for state capture as a basis of accumulation without productivity. This undermines the necessary synergy between democracy and development in Nigeria.

There is, thus, distrust between the state elite and private sector managers; yet their cooperation is indispensable for economic growth and development in a supposedly market oriented economy. And given the pseudo market profile of the Nigerian economy and the associated infrastructural decay and institutional weaknesses, especially in terms of sanctity of contracts and protection of private property – important desideratum of a capitalist system – the economy is not attractive to foreign capital, while those in the system are exiting in doves.

In a condition where the government is incapable of providing collective and welfare goods, and there are no incentives for domestic and foreign private production of these goods, the poverty of the majority of citizens is heightened. While corruption and rent-seeking do not necessarily always precluded productivity, as Lewis⁷⁵ notes, the political, policy and economic instability in Nigeria continues to make the elite paranoid about retaining and investing the stolen monies within the Nigerian economy for possible multiplier developmental effects. It is against this background that reform in Nigeria negates development and promotes poverty of many. The failure

of neo-liberal reform in Nigeria is associated with the nature of the reform itself, and its failure to factor into the equation the structural context of dependent capitalism in Nigeria, amongst other things.

Flowing from the above analysis, what is required in Nigeria is a radical re-engineering aimed at fundamental transformation of the state, with a genuine people-centred national development. Contrary to the ideology of reform, the state is an indispensable concomitant to development and poverty eradication in a context of zero-tolerance for corruption. However, there is urgent need to strengthen state institutions to fight corruption. Weak state institutions and capacity deficiencies of governance systems are the strongest correlates for the incubation of corruption.

Also, wherever government lacks integrity corruptions thrives. The impunity must be attacked by the judiciary and anti-corruption agencies, and the police must be empowered to tackle issues of corruption. Delays and encumbrances in the prosecution of corruption cases must be removed. Contrary to the prevailing kidglove treatment of corruption, heavy sanctions should be imposed on those found guilty of corruption to make it unattractive to others. This should be complemented with respect for the rule of law, due process and transparent governance.

However, it would be wishful thinking to believe that those in positions of power who profit from corruption would implement these policy changes. On the contrary, the Nigerian people must make it clear to those in authority that zero-tolerance of corruption is an irreducible minimum for governance at all levels. Nigerians should see it as their duty to expose people with questionable sources of wealth; irrespective of ethnic, religious, social and political connections. The international community, similarly, has an important role in taming transnational corruption exchanges by multinationals, ensure that all safe havens for proceeds of corruption are destroyed, as well as continue to penalise the corporations and individuals in the developed nations indicted of corruption in their dealings with Nigeria. Additionally, strengthening domestic capacity for timely investigation and securing the exposure and conviction of corrupt officials, corporations and individuals should be both a domestic and international concern.

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Panel of the Wise and the Future of Conflict Resolution in Africa

Azeez Olaniyan

INTRODUCTION

The transition of the African continental body from the OAU to AU seems to have ushered in a new way of re-thinking the African situation, particularly the myriad of challenges confronting it, one of which, undoubtedly, is security. Indeed, for a long time, one major challenge confronting the African states has been the lack of effective mechanism to manage the spate of dysfunctional and protracted socio-political conflicts prevailing on the continent.¹ Recognising the need to develop African capacity to respond to the security challenges plaguing the continent therefore, the newly emerging African Union put in place the Peace and Security Council (PSC) as a critical institutional mechanism to spearhead its role in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts across the continent.² What seems the master plan of the PSC in meeting its *raison d'être* of a peaceful Africa is codified in what is referred to as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). In essence, therefore, the putting in place of the Peace and Security Architecture represents, in a fundamental way, the re-engaging of the African security condition.

But the problem with Africa is not a dearth of initiative to address the myriad of conflict assailing it; for there exists, in the history of the continent, a plethora of initiatives for conflict management. As catalogued by Abdul Mohammed, Paulos Tesfagiorgis and Alex de Waal, such attempts include grassroots peace-building efforts such as the 'People to People' reconciliation process in Southern Sudan and numerous peace education workshops; specific programmes to curtail the trade in small arms and prevent 'blood diamonds' from reaching the market; special peace initiatives such as the Burundi peace process, and sub-regional country-specific efforts such as the IGAD Sudan Peace Secretariat, and the Ethio-Eritrean peace agreement; sub-regional mechanisms to monitor indicators of insecurity; the OAU's

Conflict Management Centre and the CSSDCA, and international efforts such as the African Crisis Response Initiative; a number of military interventions and peacekeeping forces, such as those in Sierra Leone and DRC; several livelihoods initiatives to rehabilitate war affected communities; efforts to demobilise child soldiers, and World Bank-sponsored post-conflict reconstruction programmes.³

The argument in the foregoing is that the Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union was not the first attempt at rescuing the continent from the vicious grip of violence. What then makes this new arrangement different? Perhaps, the answer lies in two fundamental reasons: the first is that the APSA represents a theoretical blueprint for how to move Africa from its current state in which armed conflict is widespread, to a condition of prevailing peace and security; for the previous attempts have been operating without a theoretical foundation.⁴ The second reason is the institutional pillars upon which the APSA is erected, which are basically five: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF) and a Special Peace Fund.

Of the five pillars, this study focuses on one – the Panel of the Wise – for close analysis. It seeks to examine the relevance, philosophical underpinning, prospects and problems of its operation as a peace and conflict resolution mechanism.

THE PANEL OF THE WISE

The Panel of the Wise is one of the critical pillars of the Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union. Article 11 (1) of the protocol establishing the PSC sets up a five-person panel of highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent with a task to support the efforts of PSC and those of the chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention. Article 11 (2) gave the chairperson the express permission to appoint the members in accordance with the general guidelines enunciated in Article (1) in the following words:

The Panel of the Wise shall be composed of five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made [an] outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent. They shall be selected by the Chairperson of the Commission after consultation with the Member States concerned, on the basis of regional representation and appointed by the Assembly to serve for a period of three years.

Specifically, modalities setting up the body were adopted by the Peace and Security Council at its 100th meeting held on 12th December 2007. The Panel was then inaugurated on 18th December 2007, with four main tasks: Conflict Prevention or Preventive Diplomacy (The Panel is charged with opening channels of communication that would prevent disputes from escalating into conflict); Early warnings (The Panel carries out fact finding missions where there is a danger of conflict either breaking out or seriously escalating); Conflict Resolution (The Panel encourages conflicting parties or belligerents to the negotiating table); Conflict Settlement (The Panel enhances the implementation of Peace Agreements). The Panel of the Wise, thus was established with the mandate to support the AU particularly as regards conflict prevention.

By January 2007, the chairperson exercised his power by selecting the following five personalities as the pioneer members of the panel, and so recommended their appointment to the General Assembly. They were:

- Brigalia Bam, former general secretary of the South African Council of Churches and current chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (representing the Southern Africa region)
- Ahmed Ben Bella, former president of Algeria (representing the North Africa region)
- Elisabeth Pognon, former president of the Constitutional Court of Benin (representing the West Africa region)
- Miguel Trovoada, former prime minister and president of São Tomé & Príncipe (representing the Central Africa region)
- Salim Ahmed Salim, former secretary-general of the OAU and former AU special envoy and chief mediator for the inter-Sudanese political talks on Darfur (representing the East Africa region).

CULTURAL UNDERPINNINGS

It must be emphasised that the establishment of the Panel of the Wise was never a case of happenstance. Rather, it was a deliberate creation whose philosophical underpinning derives strategically from African culture. In African culture, old age is synonymous with wisdom; making the aged to be seen as wise. In the analysis of George Ngwane:

The concept of 'Wise' in the traditional African point of view is linked to how age and experience relate to the ingredients of wisdom and counselling. Equipped with foresight, moral authority, respect, self-discipline and moderation, wise

connotes a high sense of maturity often attributed to the elderly and a high flavour of human glue needed to bond conflicting parties.⁵

Essentially, Africa places high value on age. In the analysis of Edoho, age is regarded as the fountain of wisdom, because it requires thoughtfulness and deliberation, which all have to do with experience, time and patience, and a high level of maturity.⁶ To Wiredu, age is simply the 'vital criterion for wisdom'.⁷ To survive to old age is often considered an accomplishment reflecting personal strength, resourcefulness, faith and the grace of God. It is in this regard that old age is accorded great respect in Africa. Elders are respected, obeyed and considered a source of wisdom. Africa, both in historical and contemporary practices, still values the elders, particularly for their experiences and wisdom, and this has been employed as conflict management mechanisms across time and space.

In a study by Mohammed Adan and Ruto Pkalya on traditional conflict resolution mechanisms as practised by the Pokot, Turkana, Samburu and Marakwet pastoralists and agro-pastoralists communities in Kenya, the researchers brought to the fore the central importance of the communities' elders in conflict management. According to the report, the elders in the three communities form a dominant component of the customary mechanisms of conflict management. The elders command authority that makes them effective in maintaining peaceful relationships and a community way of life. The authority held by the elders is derived from their position in society.⁸

Amongst the Kidepo communities of the Kidepo valley in Eastern Equatorial, Ofuho in his paper to the All-Africa Conference on African Principles of Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation which was held from the 8th until the 12th of November 1999 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, highlights the role of the elders in conflict management. According to him, Kidepo is a big forest that starts from Karenga Hills in the north-east of the border with Uganda and extends deep into South Sudan. To resolve conflict, the elders may resort to use of a curse to deter the young *mojirimots* from continuous raids. The curse of elders is believed to lead to mysterious death. The words of elders are bitter and those who have caused trouble often vanish from the society.⁹

The Kpelle people of Liberia of West Africa are known for their ad hoc local meetings called 'moots' or 'house palavers', where the conflicting parties arrive at mediated settlements through the use of experienced African elders.¹⁰

According to Bob-Manuel, among the Ndendeuli of Tanzania mediators, spearheaded by elders, play active roles in conflict solving by suggesting an agreement and can get as far as pressurising the parties into accepting it.¹¹

In traditional Somalia, there is the Gurti system of conflict resolution, which is basically a concert of clan leaders. It is made up of some lower

levels of traditional elders who are appointed in the local low-level clan council where most adult males participate. Stig Hansen reports that many of them have appointed themselves by making popular suggestions in the local council or by taking popular initiatives. Such elders are expected to be above board and might lose their role if their performance is perceived to be unsatisfactory by their 'electorate'. The clan system played, and still plays, a peace and reconciliation function in large meetings of clan elders (*Gurti*) who officiate as mediators between feuding clans or families. The clan elders come together and reach solutions through negotiations aimed at consensus.¹²

Brock-Utne reports that the Acholi people of Northern Uganda believe in leadership through consensus, allowing everyone in their localised clans to have a voice while the traditional head and elders of each clan rules by consent. According to him, a major function of the traditional chiefs and elders in the communities is to act as arbitrators and reconcilers when disputes occur in order to restore peace and maintain harmonious relations between families and clans.¹³

Chris Chapman and Alexander Kagaha also identified the role of elders in conflict resolution amongst the communities of Teso and Karamojog regions of Uganda. According to them, before the advent of contemporary conflict resolution mechanisms, pastoralist communities developed and refined, over time, their own mechanisms for resolving local level disputes, both within their communities and with others. These were based on solid traditional institutions such as mediation through a Council of Elders. These institutions were respected by community members and hence those affected generally complied with decisions, including punishment of offenders and compensation.¹⁴ In their analysis, they argued that both communities have a system of regulation of community rules led by a council of elders; in Karamoja, the Akiriket, and among the Iteso, the Arriget. This is a community governance mechanism used in a wide variety of contexts; it is, for example, traditionally used when major changes occur in the community or important decisions need to be taken, such as when an elder dies, a new member to the group is initiated, or at times of crisis involving grazing, disease or war. It is also used to discipline and sanction those who break community laws. It can be considered a form of conflict regulation, because it aims to ensure that tensions do not arise within the community due to members failing to respect rules – which, given the remoteness of the communities and the difficulty of gaining access to formal justice mechanisms – has the potential to cause serious outbreaks of violence.

In Ghana, there is the Abrewa/'Old Lady Model' of conflict resolution. The concept views the old lady as a custodian of wisdom which is crucial, and is often consulted in the time of crises. Thus, in the face of dispute

that is proving too difficult to settle, the old lady is consulted by a team of arbitrators, who often abide by the suggestions offered by the old woman.¹⁵

Using the Yoruba traditional system as a case study, Lawrence Bamikole identified the role of elderly intervention in conflict resolution by interrogating the concept of *agba*. To him, the concept of *agba* (elders) is a Yoruba socio-political model for conflict resolution, and it is the third party that is responsible for effective conflict resolution in indigenous Yoruba societies. In traditional Yoruba culture, *agba* were usually relied upon as arbitrators and agents of conflict resolution in view of certain qualities possessed by this category of human beings. *Agba* are respected individuals identified by age and other qualities, which mark them out in their families, communities, nations, regions and the world. To be identified as an *agba*, s/he must be a fearless person (*alakikanju*); s/he must be knowledgeable and wise but must be someone who gives room for criticisms (*ologbon, oloye, afimo ti elomiran se*); s/he must be tolerant (*alamumora*); s/he must be upright in all ways (*olotito, olododo*); s/he must not be selfish (*anikanjopon*).¹⁶ A combination of these attributes puts the elder on higher moral ground to mediate in a conflict and achieve a favourable outcome. In most cases, the elders have the final say because their pronouncements are respected and, thus, become binding.

The foregoing scenario is the philosophy upon which the Panel was founded. Perhaps the next question is to ask whether the Panel possesses the qualities and attributes contained in the foregoing samples. Perhaps such a question would have to be examined in the context of the nature and type of contemporary conflict regime on the African continent.

AFRICAN CONFLICT: TYPOLOGY AND CAUSALITY

The how, manner and extent of involvement of the Panel in conflict resolution would probably depend on the nature of conflict they are faced with. It then becomes important to know the types as well as the causality of conflict in Africa. In analysing types of conflict, there are six areas to focus on: complexity, duration, scale, violence level, legitimacy¹⁷ and pattern. In terms of the first, we have to look at the depth and inter-connectedness of the conflict for, as argued by Nwagiru,¹⁸ there are simple and complex types of conflicts in Africa, with the latter taking the lead.¹⁹

In respect of duration, some conflicts are short-lived while some are prolonged or protracted. Unfortunately, it is becoming clearer that most African conflicts are becoming protracted. Examples of short-lived conflicts will include the Nigerian civil war, the crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon over Bakassi Peninsular, the Rift Valley Conflict in Kenya in 1991-1992²⁰;

while the protracted conflicts will embrace samples like the Liberian civil war that lasted for over a decade, the Saharawi crises, the Tuareg insurrection in Northern Mali, the Sudanese crises and the age-long Somalia imbroglio. In Uganda, the armed rebellion took five years (1981-1986) and the Angolan and Mozambique civil wars lasted several decades and covered most of the countryside.²¹

In terms of scale, conflicts could be low-scale or large scale. Low scale would range from mere squabbles of domestic issues or to issues like land disputes between or amongst communities or inter-tribal attritions. In such cases, weapons of war could range from crude implements to light weapons. Low-scale conflicts, if not promptly attended to, could lead to large scale. Large-scale conflicts would be measured by the use of heavy weapons and the extent of the conflicts. There is prevalence of the two on the continent.

In explaining the necessity or legitimacy of conflicts, the fifth type, Mpagala, borrowing from Sekou Toure, argues that some conflicts are regarded as necessary and legitimate, others are unnecessary and illegitimate. While the former is mainly altruistic and concerned with struggles for liberation from an oppressive and exploitative regime, the latter is anchored on selfishness; mostly based either on competition for political power and economic resources, or, in several situations perpetrated by those in power to suppress the people or certain sections of the people in order to perpetuate their position of power for the advancement of their personal interests. Illegitimate conflicts are often characterised by divisive ideologies of ethnicity, racialism, regionalism and religious antagonism.²² After the end of the liberation struggles of the 1960's and 1970's, what remains in Africa is often a preponderance of conflicts that will fall under the unnecessary and illegitimate type.

In respect of the sixth type, conflicts could be internal, inter-state and internationalised. In the writings of Mpagala, purely internal conflicts are said to be few in Africa. There have been a good number of inter-state conflicts such as wars between Tanzania and Uganda in 1978/1979, Ethiopia and Somalia, and Ethiopia and Eritrea. Internationalised conflicts are the most common. These are conflicts, which in one way or another have involved other countries or affected neighbouring countries, such as the influx of refugees and their implications. Given this conception, most conflicts in Africa have been or are internationalised conflicts.²³

In relation to causality, studies have identified economic, political, ethnic, ideological, resources, and religious forces as major culprits²⁴ and in the contention of Mpagala, economic reasons, followed by political causes, have the highest ranking; while resources and ethnicity are ranked third and fourth respectively, and ideological and religious factors have the lowest ranking.

From the foregoing, two facts come to bold relief. The first is the changing contour of conflicts, and the second is the ubiquity of conflicts on the continent. At the first level, we see a trend away from the old order of conflict regime. The contemporary Africa has witnessed a sharp rise in sophisticated warfare with the deployment of weapons of mass murder, aided by external forces. At the second level is the preponderance of conflicts in virtually all regions of Africa. Since there is a major shift in the nature of conflict in Africa, to what extent can we rely on the Panel of the wise to employ old traditional techniques to these modern nuances? Put differently, can we still resort to the old style to confront the new problem? This shall be analysed in what follows.

THE PANEL OF THE WISE AND CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS RESOLUTION

Conflicts in Africa, as argued heretofore, are becoming complex, intense, protracted, large scale, illegitimate and internationalised, very different from the halcyon days of old. Yet, the fact remains that within the corpus of the old style lies the principles underlying the modern strategies such as round table negotiations, dialogue, mediation, arbitration, emissary and compromise. The basic ingredients of modern ways of conflict resolution have been derived largely from the old. The activities of the Panel have shown a remarkable adoption of the time-tested strategy.

Having existed for barely five years, the Panel has been able to record some modest achievements. In the first instance, it has crafted a vision based on Annual Thematic Reflections. In 2008, its theme was election-related conflict. Coming on the heels of the Kenyan election crisis in 2008, the Panel was obliged to consider this early warning factor by organising an international workshop with a cross section of the civil society and state actors in Africa in November 2008 in Nairobi, Kenya. This was a clear recognition of the role ‘pre-election management rather than post-election fire-fighting measures’ can play in the Panel’s mission of early warning signals.²⁵

It should be recalled that the Panel of the Wise of the African Union initiated a thematic reflection on ‘Women and Children in Armed Conflicts’ during its seventh meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in November 2009. Through this initiative, the Panel reaffirmed its own commitment, and that of the AU as a whole, to contribute to alleviating the plight of women and children in armed conflict in Africa. In order to implement this decision, the AU Peace and Security Department, on behalf of the Panel of the Wise, commissioned FAS and the International Peace Institute (IPI) to carry out a study and produce a report on mitigating vulnerabilities of women and children in armed conflicts in Africa.

In addition, the Panel undertook fact-finding missions to several African countries for the purpose of mediation.²⁶ It also issued several releases on the situation in Somalia. In essence, the Panel has been quite active in pursuing its mandate. However, its achievements have been rather modest. A number of factors are responsible for this, which shall be discussed in what follows.

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE PANEL OF THE WISE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Lofty and African-rooted as the philosophy behind the Panel of the Wise is, its efficacy is however limited by a number of fundamental challenges. In the first instance, the philosophy is based on the idea of a glorious African past; one that is egalitarian, peaceful and orderly. African Scholars such as Mamdani²⁷ Lewis²⁸ and Mama²⁹ have shown clearly that such a past was nothing but a utopia that never existed exactly as painted. Indeed, it has become fairly common knowledge that the African past was full of rights abuses, dictatorship and conflicts, in which the elders played major roles. Stories abound of dictatorial excesses of ancient kings and chiefs in the various empires and kingdoms. In a way, therefore, an argument for a total return to the past is fraught with shortcomings.

In the second instance, the Panel is based on the idea that old men are the real engine of change in Africa. This is also highly contestable. Both historical and contemporary evidence shows that the African youths are the real engine of change and liberators on the continent. While historical examples show that Chaka Zulu recorded his military fame in his prime years, Mai Idris Alooma, Mansa Kanka Musa of the old Songhai and Mali empires attained their fame in their youth. The contemporary examples also show young upstarts such as Thomas Sankara at 34 becoming the liberator of his country; Tom Mboya at 30 becoming an influential trade unionist and a real motivator of Kenyan independence; Kwame Nkrumah at 48 attaining not only the leadership of his country but also becoming a continental mover; Patrice Lumumba at 35 was a phenomenon; Nelson Mandela's fame as an icon and anti-apartheid crusader started when he was just 34. Ditto for Steve Biko, who became an influential Black Consciousness leader at just 22 years of age.³⁰ Also, Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria became a Head of State at 28 and went on to successfully prosecute a civil war and implemented an unprecedented policy of reconciliation after. Again, where the elders proved unable and collaborating, the youths have been known to take the bull by the horns as we see in the revolution that swept off dictatorial regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

Also, the idea of the Panel of the Wise was anchored on the assumption that old age is a harbinger of wisdom. This may not be the case all the

times. Evidence shows several African political personalities displaying much idiocy when they advance in age. Examples include Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana who, in spite of revolutionary tendencies in his youth, displayed dictatorial behaviour as President of Ghana, Eyadema of Togo, Mubarak of Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, Arap Moi of Kenya, Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, Omar Bongo of Gabon and several others. It is in the line of this that the Yoruba saying of '*Agba Iya*' (bad leaders) comes into relevance. The argument here is that there are several bad leaders in society, who despite their old age, have been known to contribute to societal problems.

In another dimension, the assumption of the Panel of the Wise on the use of moral persuasion may prove difficult in the face of the changing nature of conflict in Africa. As argued above, most of the prevalent conflicts in Africa are complex. The question then is: how do you intervene by personal contact? A good example here is the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, where the perpetrators are faceless and seem anonymous.

Generally, the issue of the Panel of the Wise opens the debate, once again, on the relevance or otherwise of African traditional institutions in managing contemporary African problems. There are two opposing perspectives. The first, described by Gyeke³¹ as 'cultural revivalism', locates African contending problems and the inability to solve them in the abandonment of the rich African culture by Africans as a result of colonialism. To this group, therefore, only a rejuvenation of the African cultural past, which will result in total independence of the souls and minds of Africans from the colonial/Western influence, will save Africa from the myriads of problems confronting it.³² The contrary view, the modernisation perspective, sees the real tragedy of Africa in the 'culture trap'. To this perspective, recourse to the African distant past is not only retrogressive but also very dangerous to the development aspirations of the continent.³³ Proponents of this perspective, a noted one of which is Pauline Hountondji, strongly believe that only a clean break from the past will help the continent surmount the mountain of contemporary problems facing it.³⁴ The basic argument here is that for progress to be achieved and problems solved, the only way Africa should be focusing is forward, and never to any distant past that was never glorious in the first instance. The perspective is premised on the notion that modernisation is concomitant to progress and as such, an ideal to pursue.³⁵

Perhaps, the basic question to ask then is which of the debates should be upheld by Africans? Do we hold on fast to the rope of culture, or throw it away as suggested by scholars like Hountondji, who strongly hold the belief that African culture is totally irrelevant to development? The best way to approach this conundrum is perhaps to borrow from the idea of Ciafa, who advocates a marriage of the two perspectives. According to him,

while there are several aspects of the African past that are repugnant to modern advancement, there are certain aspects that can be adopted and modified. Scholars like Amartya Sen have proved beyond reasonable doubt the imperative of culture in development. Also, when researches have located the catalysts for development in Asia in the cultural underpinning of the society, we cannot shy away from the positive role African culture can play in its march to development.³⁶ The task then is to look at some of these aspects and develop them. To discard African culture as suggested by the modernisation perspective in development and problem-solving discourse is to throw away the baby with the bathwater. In the same vein, to hold the belief of total return to the past is not only wishful thinking, it is equally retrogressive. The African past is not totally as egalitarian as often painted.

MAKING THE PANEL WORK: CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper, we have been able to establish the rationale for the establishment of the Panel of the Wise. It has been proven that respect for the old and aged formed part of African culture, which has been employed for conflict resolution in African traditional societies. However, the debate on the relevance of the African past has continued to dominate scholarly discourse. The discourse has been engaged in this paper and the position taken is that some aspects of the African past can still be modified and adapted to contemporary situations. One of them is the Panel of the Wise; in spite of the challenges highlighted above, the body can still be made a veritable tool for conflict resolution on the continent. However, for the Panel of the Wise to function optimally, there is the need to put some things in place. One of the ways to make the Panel relevant and fulfil its mandate is the regionalisation of the idea of the Council of Elders. It is important to know that the continent of Africa is too big for a five-man panel, given the ubiquity of conflicts on the continent. In essence, each region in Africa should have a Council of Elders that will mediate at the regional level, while the continental Panel of the Wise will serve as the overall mediator; that is, the regional council will serve as the immediate mediator before the Panel gets involved. This has been started by the ECOWAS body, from which the idea of the Panel of the Wise was copied.³⁷

In addition, the composition of the Panel must continue to reflect the founding philosophy: credible elderly Africans with track records of service to humanity. This becomes important given the fact that elderly intervention as practised in traditional African society was based on credible leadership and service to the community. It is on this that the Panel of the Wise holds the potential for acting as a catalyst for conflict resolution in Africa.

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Mashopeng Go a Boelwa

Revisiting Our Past as Imperative to Humanising
Law Enforcement in South Africa

Mpho M. Matlala and Ingrid Sinclair

INTRODUCTION

South Africa is an unequal and violent society where the police are sometimes attacked by protesting masses. During the attacks, the police are faced with the dilemma of having to use force against the community and sometimes with fatal consequences. The August 2012 incident at the Marikana mine where 78 people were wounded in clashes that resulted in the deaths of 2 police officials and more than 34 miners¹, attest to the complexity of the problems in policing. We submit that policing in a society that is riddled with enormous social inequalities is not an easy task. Police are caught between being humane and enforcing laws against their own communities during mass protestations. Recognising community frustrations and listening to their grievances might quell the violence that is mostly directed towards police officials, who are seen as the representatives of government.

The violence in South Africa has raised questions on whether the humanisation of policing is achievable. Prior to the Marikana incident, – the 2009 ‘shoot-to-kill’ statement by General Bheki Cele, the dismissed police commissioner, appeared to have endorsed aggressive behaviour by the police.² It is because of such public endorsements that practices in law enforcement have become brutal to a dehumanising point. We argue that such brutality could never suffice as an enduring solution in any developing and democratic state such as South Africa. A more humane approach aimed at aligning law enforcement with the ideals of democratic policing that resonate with an appropriate ethical code and good practice is required.

The police in any democracy should not be enforcing the law through inhumane and brutal force. In an attempt to find ways of humanising policing in South Africa, this article reflected on past lessons from an indigenous African perspective and proposes practical solutions to the current impasse

in which the police find themselves. This last mentioned reflection is also supported by a brief review of the humanistic and developmental theories that are applicable to law enforcement. The article also analyses some of the most prominent South African idioms which were suppressed by the de-Africanisation of the South African society through the colonial and apartheid rule, which idioms may play a role in humanising the police. One such idiom is '*mashopeng go a boelwa*', which implies that an individual needs to return to his or her old ruins. This last mentioned Sepedi idiom serves as a reminder to individuals of the importance of consulting with the ancestors and of honestly meditating on possible solutions to current or impending challenges. *Mashopeng go a boelwa* has throughout the ages been reiterated by the Bapedi fore-bearers, to remind society of the value of the traditional ways of dealing with problems, by reflecting on past best practices and drawing valuable lessons to take into the future.

BACKGROUND

The hidden knowledge contained in the idioms analysed in this research has served for ages as a reliable compass for good social behaviour in many African societies. Individuals in traditional African societies were raised to appreciate the community and they believed that the ancestors protected the community, as some still do to this day. The ancestors were also believed to be watching how individuals conduct themselves and how they related to other community members. Whoever went against the wishes of the ancestors or acted in bad faith against the community would be punished.³ A high value was placed on transparency and accountability in the community, which principle also forms the basis on which democratic and community policing are premised. We argue that by revisiting our past, philosophies such as *ubuntu* or *botho*, which promote humanness, could be incorporated into community policing. Community policing is the official approach to law enforcement in South Africa and the inculcation of philosophies such as *ubuntu*, could go a long way in terms of institutionalising the African values of humanness into police work.

Policing in South Africa is fraught with controversies and this is as a result of the country's history of social inequality and violence. Three hundred years of white colonial rule, aggravated by more than 30 years of apartheid, which involved racial segregation and the economic exploitation imposed on black South Africans,⁴ have perpetuated the de-Africanisation of many communities. This coercion has also affected the social behaviour of individuals and practices in all spheres of life, the policing domain included. Despite a successful transition into democracy, institutions like the

South African Police Service, the Municipality Police and the Metropolitan Police Departments, including private security firms, continue to be beleaguered by the shackles of a colonial and apartheid past. Colonialism and apartheid have forced the police to enforce inhumane laws by using brutal force to conserve an illegitimate state that had its foundations in the rule by the minority, over the majority of other citizens.⁵ The consequence of this type of policing was that the police became detached from the communities that they serve and their brutal conduct raised questions on their very legitimacy within a democratic dispensation.

LAW ENFORCEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

Law enforcement is crucial to how South Africans experience the freedoms of democracy. Peace and security are some of the freedoms that ought to be enjoyed in a democracy. The freedoms under democracy, which are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights and documented in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, also include the right to be policed in a humane and dignified fashion.⁶ The advent of democracy in South Africa during 1994, which was accompanied by promises of equal rights in the political, social and economic spheres, guaranteed the change of policing from a militaristic approach to a democratic police service that embraced community policing as a new philosophy. The unprecedented change to community policing offered civilians the hope that the police in South Africa would become more transparent and accountable for their actions. Community policing is a philosophy and organisational strategy that promotes the systematic involvement of communities through the promotion of partnerships and the use of problem-solving techniques to proactively address issues that threaten public safety and security.⁷

Crime, social disorder, and fear of crime are among some of the issues that have raised concerns over public safety. However, motivating the police to accept the community as equal partners in dealing with crime and crime problems was a huge challenge, as the police in South Africa had been trained to treat the community as 'the enemy' by the previous regime. Following the fall of apartheid, South Africa experienced major increases in crime. The twenty-one most serious and violent crimes reported increased from 2,022,899 in 1994, to 2,629,137 in 2002/2003, then declined in 2006/2007 to 2,125,227.⁸ Due to mounting pressure from communities and political leaders, police management reacted to the high crime figures by re-militarising the police. This reaction was among other things, prompted by the fact that the country's crime figures were still considered to be too high, despite having declined. The ripple effect caused by crime and the

public discourse since 1994 urged the police ‘to fight fire with fire’ and to act as a ‘rough force’, which placed huge amounts of pressure on the police who sometimes responded in a brutal way.

A PARADIGM SHIFT IN POLICE WORK

Police work requires a paradigm that can encourage deeper understanding of the contemporary issues within society. The ideal for effective policing can be attained by instilling democratic practices that inspire respect for human rights. One of the ways in which the police in South Africa can change their approach to law enforcement is not only by drawing from African indigenous knowledge, but by also employing visionary leaders that can use this indigenous knowledge productively and with synergy throughout all of the policing institutions. Indigenous knowledge can be described as the wisdom which is characteristic of a culture or a society that demonstrates ‘the common sense, ideas and thoughts and the values of people formed as a result of the sustained interactions of society, their nature and culture’.⁹ The use of indigenous knowledge in a way renounces colonial imposition and indicates the significance of problematising anything that is foreign and imposed.¹⁰

Understanding policing issues from an indigenous knowledge perspective is critical in the advancement of safety and security. Such an understanding also promotes a culture-sensitive style of policing, which could prove to be more acceptable to most individuals in many South African communities. Most current policing models that are operational in the African context have been imported from Western civilisations and do not fully address the policing problems in the African context. The same goes for community policing in South Africa. If the police in South Africa are to succeed in addressing problems within the African context, then they need to reflect on African philosophies and espouse these as a premise, particularly when trying to understand the dynamics that are inherent within our society. An approach that draws from African philosophies signifies a paradigm shift and a leaning towards promoting a culture of humanness, as well as a shared vision of attaining social justice values that are infused within the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

African philosophy serves as a theoretical framework from which policing in South Africa should draw, in order to humanise the approach and

practices in law enforcement. Humanising in this article refers to actions that are more consistent with humane treatment and are based on respect for human dignity.¹¹ We argue that humane treatment and respect for human dignity are values upon which African philosophy is also premised. It is believed that modern philosophy originated in Ancient Greece. The birth of philosophy laid the foundation for critical thinking and discourse throughout the ages.¹² African philosophy itself presents the collective world-view of the African people, their customs, folklore and folk-wisdom.¹³ African philosophy manifests in communal thought and uses emotions to appeal to people's responsiveness, in terms of their participation in solving problems within society. The Euro-centric models of policing emphasise individual rights and retributive justice. Such emphasis effectively institutionalised inhumane and person-delimiting values, while less attention was paid to affective responses to crime. The key feature of African philosophy is premised on identifying societal problems and the collective interrogation of ways to address issues.¹⁴ African philosophy therefore accepts that problems in policing are not unique from problems in the community.

THE IMPETUS FOR AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

The main driving force behind African philosophy, especially in post-colonial Africa, has been the relentless pursuit of self-definition and soul-searching.¹⁵ The Africanism philosophy is all about embarking on a journey of self-discovery and the reclaiming of lost indigenous knowledge that can be used in dealing with some of the problems encountered in modern times. For the police, a journey of self re-discovery could culminate in the promotion of values and behaviours that affirm social justice and compassion for the community. The adoption of an African philosophy to approaches in policing could in fact, go a long way in mitigating the de-Africanising effects, like the spiritual and moral bankruptcy caused by colonialism and apartheid.

In South African, the one philosophy that has been in existence and which is unreservedly African is *ubuntu* or *botho*. *Ubuntu* advocates reciprocity, care for others and literally translates to humanness. Within the philosophy of *ubuntu* an individual's identity is connected to a collective. Whilst recognising the uniqueness of individuals, the spiritual beliefs of communities are regarded as equally important as the material considerations and the emotional aspects of knowledge creation are epistemologically defensible. An understanding of the inter-connectedness between people, their spiritual beliefs and affective reactions, equally allows any African philosophy to understand the effects of Euro-centric world-views

on the psyche of the police. The police, particularly in South Africa, were wounded on various levels which include the emotional, physical and social spheres. Recognising the effects of foreign police models on the actions of our police officials provides the rationale for introducing an African philosophy to deal with the internalised and dehumanising effects that autocratic police practices have had on police officials in South Africa.

The philosophy of *ubuntu* or *botho* is, however, not restricted to the African continent alone because humanness is a universal concept. Such boundlessness implies that this philosophy is universalistic in its approach because it is in line with values that affirm human justice and compassion, which principles can be extended to humankind across the globe. Karsten and Illa¹⁶ noted that *ubuntu* is principled in 'a pervasive spirit of caring and community, harmony and hospitality, respect and the responsiveness that individuals and groups display for one another'. In the quest to humanise their practices, the police could benefit from adapting their thinking in line with many other African social philosophies and, in particular, with the values of *ubuntu*. In South Africa it is vital for police managers and their subordinates to align with the values of *ubuntu*. Such philosophical alignment is critical because the approaches and practices in policing also need to align with the political and social climate within a country. Mokgoba in Enslin and Horsthemke¹⁷ provides an ideal democratic model for *ubuntu* in South Africa and notes as follows:

South Africa, as part of Africa, has one big civilisation and one heritage; the African civilisation, underpinned by the philosophy of *ubuntu*. *Ubuntu* emphasises respect for the non-material order that exists in us and among us; it fosters man's respect for himself or herself, for others, and for the environment; it has spirituality; it has remained non-racial; it accommodates other cultures and it is the invisible force uniting Africans worldwide. Unlike Confucian or European philosophies, it transcends race and culture. *Ubuntu* seems logical in our situation because our democracy is unique in that it must evolve from the beginning in a multiracial and multicultural context. It must deliver freedom with opportunities while addressing values and cultural systems.

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN POLICING AND AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

One of the current challenges for African philosophy as it applies to principles in law enforcement is how to balance globalisation as an imperative, with the local and regional demands within the policing domain on the African continent. An area in law enforcement that continues to face serious challenges is the question of the professionalization of police agencies in Africa. In

this article, professionalization refers to the adoption of best practices from across the globe, but making them relevant to the African context. The adoption of best practices from other parts of the world is at present, facilitated through globalisation processes which tend to ignore the indigenisation of law enforcement in Africa. To this effect, adapting African philosophies and drawing from indigenous epistemologies could go a long way in balancing the globalisation and professionalization processes in policing in Africa.

African philosophy in essence underpins Africanism and its underlying assumptions. However, the fact that assumptions made by Africanism could be marred with political, moral and epistemic miscalculations¹⁸ presents a very serious challenge for many individuals and organisations alike. One such miscalculation relates to the divination of the will of the ancestors, which could present false permutations on how people behave, as a result of being misinformed. Of importance is that anything that is perceived to be the will of the ancestors needs to be tested against logic and anything that can be considered to be good or humane, before it is adopted. For the police in South Africa, the philosophical misconceptions have been mainly of an epistemic nature. For instance, while the democratic policing that has been espoused by police agencies in South Africa involves sensitivity to local context, its fundamental principles and tenets are primarily universal. The principles and tenets that underlie democratic policing fail to accentuate African doctrines and ways of life.

To accentuate African doctrines and ways of life, we need to acknowledge the contemporary issues in policing as well. Issues like re-adapting African philosophy to the basic training policing curriculum so that it fits in with the context within which policing in Africa is practised could come at a huge cost to police agencies, if the police ignored them. Some of the adverse impact that could emanate from ignoring the contemporary dilemmas that police face will include a broadened mistrust of the police by communities, which could result in the deterioration of the public image of the police. In the South African context, it is also vital to interrogate the perceived uniqueness of an African social philosophy such as *ubuntu* or *botho*, in order to interrogate its value and efficiency as a clear practical guide to policy and practices.

The philosophy of *ubuntu* needs to demonstrate the capacity to resolve conflict between the principles of community policing that underlie the policies and practices in policing, including the values in society, provided these values and principles are morally worthwhile.¹⁹ For police agencies in South Africa, the solution to balancing policy and law enforcement practices with the principles and values of *ubuntu* is embodied in revisiting programmes such as the basic training curriculum, as well as attempting to truly re-align on-going training programmes with African philosophies.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This article subscribes to the qualitative research paradigm. The information presented was generated using desktop research. An extensive review of the literature on policing and African indigenous knowledge systems was done. The literature review was undertaken to provide descriptions on the dehumanising nature of South Africa's law enforcement approach and practices. A content analysis of media and government reports on statistics relating to police brutality and other criminal acts committed by police officials also produced the data that was analysed and interpreted. While the conclusions reached in the research were limited to focusing on possible interventions that can be implemented in order to mitigate the escalation of the dehumanising effects of brutal police actions, the same conclusions also speak to the broader literature on Africanism and policing, the contextualised challenges linked with the attempts to humanise police work in South Africa, as well as the ethical codes from an African cultural perspective, which can serve as a compass to guide the behaviour of the police in a democratic and developing nation.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

There has not been much research conducted on humanistic approaches, particularly with specific reference to Africanising policing practices in recent times. A survey of the literature indicated that in general, studies on humanistic approaches to policing were last conducted during the early 1990's. In South Africa, studies on approaches in law enforcement were conducted towards the mid-2000's. Notable research includes a study by Woolpert²⁰ titled 'Humanising Law Enforcement: A New Paradigm' which research was published in 1980 in the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* and which deals with humanistic approaches to policing. Research by Honberger²¹ titled 'My Police – Your Police: The Informal Privatisation of the Police in the Inner City of Johannesburg', published in the *Journal of African Studies*, is also another seminal study that dealt with humanistic approaches to police work.

Exceptions found in the literature on humanising approaches to law enforcement included research by Greyer²² and by van der Spuy²³, which respectively focussed on structures, policies and practices relating to policing in post-conflict police reform in South Africa and the African continent. Research by van der Spuy and Rontsch²⁴, on police cooperation, politics and practicalities in the Southern African Development Community is also another exception. These last mentioned research projects are exceptions

as they were used to inform the research conducted and reported on in this article. It is our opinion that the approaches used in the research reported on in this section of the article did not necessarily focus on the African indigenous outlook to present day problems within policing, as examined by ourselves in this research.

Despite the exceptions, there is a dearth of information on African indigenous approaches to policing, which suggests that this topic requires more research in South Africa. This lack of information was unforeseen, given the intensity of the research on democracy and good governance, which has already been conducted in Africa. This perceived gap in knowledge about the influence of Africanism on policing also manifested itself in the state of policing in South Africa, which continues to be disconcerting. The police in South Africa are notorious for using tactics such as beatings, murder, kidnapping, coercion and torture.²⁵ The historical developments, the internalisation of Eurocentric values and the institutionalisation of inhumane practices, have adversely impacted on how the police have executed their work and how they have dealt with suspects and members of the society in general.

THE ORIGINS OF POLICE BRUTALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

During apartheid, the South African Police force (SAP) was a tyrannical, militarised and highly politicised institution.²⁶ Baker²⁷ argues that efforts by the apartheid regime to crush the struggle for democracy instigated the brutal tactics that were used by police officials during apartheid. Numerous examples of police brutality are reported on daily in the media and the following are some of the common cases:

- The December 2011 alleged rape of a woman who was driving home by two police officers in Sandton²⁸
- The 2012 shooting and killing of a teenager by a student constable, during a search of a house in Soweto.²⁹

Other examples of police brutality manifest in corruption and in the way in which the crime prevention and investigation functions are performed. The arrest of two police officers for corruption in February 2012, for an alleged R10 000 bribe in Melville³⁰ attest to the corruption that is rife. Corruption and the use of brutal force by the police commonly occurs when suspects are taken into custody, which often involves bribing the police to turn a blind eye to crime, at the expense of doing great injustice to the victims of crime. Sometimes when suspects are unable to pay money for bribery they

are assaulted by the police, mysteriously disappear or even get killed in police holding cells. The brutality examples outlined in this research beg the question of how police actions became so institutionalised that they are not able to be changed without a concerted efforts of introducing indigenous African epistemology that can change police agencies, including individual police officials.

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Despite all the brutalising and dehumanising incidents reported on in this research, the police in South Africa are well regulated in terms of how they should conduct themselves when dealing with suspects and members of the public. The police in South Africa are regulated and guided by their different codes of conduct, policy directives, national and provincial legislation, national instructions, as well as standing orders.³¹ The fact that the same police officials continue to act in a dehumanising fashion, despite being adequately regulated, is suggestive of that there is something that is morally wrong in terms of the way in which the police treat individuals. More detailed research could assist the police to identify and understand the problems that underlie the dehumanising approaches and practices they face.

From a global perspective, inhumane approaches and practices in law enforcement are outlawed through stipulations in Article 15 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane, Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The rules in this last named document on inhumane policing prohibit police officials from obtaining evidence by way of violating the fundamental and human rights of individuals who are suspected of having committed crimes.³² By producing this convention on preventing torture and other cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, the United Nations demonstrated the willingness, and an emphasis on humanising law enforcement approaches and practices at an international level.

South Africa is signatory to a number of international treaties. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter on the Prevention of Torture are among some of these treaties.³³ By virtue of the country's membership of the AU, the police in South Africa are also bound to observe some of the continental directives on law enforcement. However, Africa only began most of the cooperation processes in law enforcement after the replacement of the Organisation for African Unity by the AU³⁴, meaning that there are still teething problems. The fact that there is still no single constitution that outlines clear policing

guidelines for the AU or any of the regional bodies on the continent impedes the effectiveness of cross-border policing operations and their service delivery efforts.

At a regional level, the police in Southern Africa are also sanctioned by Southern African Development Community (SADC) protocols.³⁵ For the police in South Africa, not honouring the policies at a regional level amounts to a failure to carry out their official mandate of honouring their commitments to promoting regional police cooperation.³⁶ The establishment of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPPCO) attests to a joint approach to dealing with crime at a regional level. Such a joint strategic approach to law enforcement reflects the assumptions that underlie the essence of African philosophy. The continental and regional policies and protocols on police cooperation should be enforced and monitored by local states, to give credence to the Africanisation of law enforcement.

POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa boasts a constitution that has been benchmarked against the best in the world.³⁷ What is disconcerting, though, is that despite the fact that we have a liberal constitution and laws that regulate police work – including a police watchdog in the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) that investigates police misconduct³⁸ – police officials continue to brutalise suspects and members of the public. The escalating police brutality in a democracy attests to the fact that South Africa's past still effects the present. Bruce³⁹ notes that from April 1997 to March 2000, about 2,174 killings by the police in South Africa were reported. The police in South Africa are charged to act lawfully by laws such as the Criminal Procedure Act,⁴⁰ the Regulation of Gatherings Act⁴¹ and the South African Police Service Act.⁴² Any attempts to deal with issues that promote an environment where police brutality thrives require an increased political will and a change of philosophy accompanied by police practices that honour the philosophy of *ubuntu*. Inhumane police actions are non-compliant with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996)⁴³, which has effectively outlawed all forms of dehumanising and brutal practices by private and state institutions, law enforcement agencies included.

On the other hand, the operationalisation of South Africa's constitution and of other international set of laws like the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is not only limited to how the police deal with suspects of crime, but also protects every individual against any form of brutalisation

by police officials, in any kind of situation.⁴⁴ Police brutality is the epitome of dehumanised law enforcement and as such, its eradication needs to be prioritised by any country that faces a similar problem. The many media reports on the brutal actions by the police have in recent times served as a source of enormous embarrassment for both the South African public and the government.

The key to humanising practices in police work resides largely in police managers constantly perpetuating values that influence staff to strictly adhere to the country's constitution. Humanising practice in law enforcement can also be effectively attained if the negative organisational sub-cultures within the law enforcement agencies in South Africa are properly investigated and possible solutions to eradicating police brutality are mooted. It would not serve as an enduring solution if the discourse on humanising law enforcement were to be limited to police agencies alone, without engaging the public and stakeholders such as schools, businesses and community groups.⁴⁵ Joint approaches to dealing with societal problems form an integral part of the African philosophy of *ubuntu*. Broad engagement on solutions to dehumanised styles of policing could go a long way in terms of promoting the ideals of democratic and community policing, informing a culture-sensitive style of policing, as well as realising the ideal of placing human life above all else. The ideal of placing human life and dignity above all else, is also advocated through South Africa's constitution. In South Africa, however, the constitutional ideals of respect for human life and dignity have been to a large extent compromised through the brutal police actions.

THE EXTENT OF POLICE BRUTALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Brutality in South Africa is reflected in the many cases that have been reported against the police. In this article, the definition of 'police brutality' has been taken from Bruce⁴⁶, who notes that brutality manifests in the abuse of power through the use of excessive and violent acts by the police, in and outside of their work. Statistics by the defunct Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), a former police oversight body, provide a fairly reliable picture of the extent of the dehumanising policing in South Africa. The Independent Complaints Directorate noted that 5,869 cases were reported during 2010/2011. Of the total number of cases, 797 related to deaths in police custody and death as a result of police action. Although the number of deaths between 2009 and 2010 decreased by 7%, the rate of mortalities as a result of police actions was 68%. Of these last noted figures, 70% of the deaths were caused by police brutality, while allegations of torture by

the police tallied to 4%.⁴⁷ The ICD was replaced in 2011 by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), which does investigations relating to misconduct by the police, poor service delivery and death in custody or a result of police actions.⁴⁸

Independent Complaint Directorate statistics for 2010/2011 further showed a 5% increase in assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and a 9% increase in attempted murder cases committed by police personnel. There were also 2 493 allegations of other criminal offences and 2 477 misconduct cases reported against police officers.⁴⁹ The dehumanised nature of policing in South Africa was also noticeable in the 127 recommendations for death-related and 374 other criminal-related prosecutions recommended by the country's prosecution authority.⁵⁰ Misconduct by municipal and metro police officials, who deal mainly with traffic and the enforcement of by-laws, are also included in the ICD statistics for 2010/2011.

THE DIMENSIONS OF POLICE BRUTALITY

Police brutality occurs in different environments and in different proportions. The most adverse impact of brutal police actions is that not only do these actions promote inhumane practices in policing but they also damage relations between the police and the communities being served. Police brutality happens at institutional, psychological, physical and structural levels.⁵¹ For the police, the brutalisation mostly happens when they arrest suspects for crimes committed. The purpose of arresting a suspect is to secure his or her presence before court, so that prosecution and adjudication processes aimed at the administration of justice can take effect.⁵²

During arrests, police officials should not be taking the law into their own hands and brutalising suspects. Instead, police officials should be seen as protecting individual human rights and providing high-quality services in the most dignified of ways, as mandated by public policies and legislation.⁵³ Within the context of African indigenous knowledge, the idea of refraining from resorting to violence against arrested suspects is supported through another of the Sepedi idioms: *ngwana'a phosh'a dira ga a bolwawe*, which literally translates as: to ere is human. This last mentioned African idiom reinforces the non-brutalisation of individuals, irrespective of their transgressions. The fact that police officials should not be brutalising suspects does not, however, take responsibility for the crime away from the suspect, but makes police officials more responsive to the needs of the community, since a premise in the African world-view pre-supposes that crime inflicts serious harm on the community. Also, being responsive is indicative of realising the very ideals in community policing.

HUMANNESS AS IMPERATIVE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

An important principle of community policing concerns the relationship between the police and the community. This relationship is also emphasised in *ubuntu*, which entails a caring relationship between people. *Ubuntu* is a universal philosophy that is premised on respect for human dignity and is also central to South Africa's Bill of Rights.⁵⁴ However, it would be inappropriate if the introduction of *ubuntu* as a philosophy implied doing away with Euro-centric philosophies like community policing, because law enforcement needs to adapt to on-going changes within the global policing milieu, without losing sight of the context in which it is used. Instead, *ubuntu* as a philosophy could be revisited and be re-accentuated as a superlative rule to community policing. This re-emphasis of *ubuntu* could also facilitate progress towards a more culture-sensitive type of approach to law enforcement. We believe that the values that inform the *ubuntu* philosophy is what is truly missing from our current police practices. Mamphela Ramphele summarises the relationship between *ubuntu* or *botho* and other philosophies particularly foreign philosophies, as follows:

Ubuntu as a philosophical approach to social relationships must stand alongside other approaches and be judged on the value it can add to better human relations in our complex society...The refusal to acknowledge the similarity between *ubuntu* and other humanistic philosophical approaches is in part a reflection of the parochialism of South Africans and a refusal to learn from others...We have to have the humility to acknowledge that we are not inventing unique problems in this country, nor are we likely to invent entirely new solutions.⁵⁵

The philosophy of *ubuntu* distinctly advocates a belief that an individual's humanity is wrapped up in the humanity of others.⁵⁶ This assertion on humanity has, over time, also been articulated in another of the almost forgotten and currently non-practicalised Sepedi idiom which states: *motho ke motho ka batho*. This idiom implies that humans are inter-connected and South Africans should as a nation embrace one another's humanity and jointly search for solutions to current or impending problems. The apartheid policies spatially divided the nation into different races and ethnicities which are still evident in present-day South Africa. These artificial arrangements are also a challenge for integrating the value of inter-connectedness into policing. Connecting people who share the same values should be carried out by police agencies in partnership with the communities they serve. In the African context, the notion of partnerships and joint problem-solving initiatives was always expressed in the Setswana idiom, *kgetse ya tsie e kgonwa ke go tshwaraganelwa*, which is translated as: 'joint problem-solving yields better results'.

CHALLENGES LINKED WITH POLICING IN SOUTH AFRICA

Many of the challenges in humanising practices in police work originated from globalisation processes and the paradigmatic lenses through which many agencies selected and implemented their crime-combating programmes. Although the police in South Africa have adopted community policing as a philosophical and strategic vehicle,⁵⁷ it is important to note that community policing itself was imported from the Western world, where the same philosophy was used to extend policing in established democracies to include community participation. However, one of the paradoxes relating to the concept of *community* is that in the West, a community is characterised by a group of individuals who co-habit the same geographical area, rather than share common values. In Africa, the concept community refers to individuals who share a common reality at various levels of society such as the cultural, traditional and spiritual or religious levels. Bodunrin⁵⁸ argues that interactions with the Western world have brought challenges to the traditional world-views and belief systems in most of Africa. These challenges relate to the emphasis placed on the retributive nature of crime, whereas restorative principles form the basis of an African world-view on dealing with crime and linked problems.

South Africa's escalating crime and the rising exigency for quality services are some of the factors that have dictated the move towards a problem-solving approach in policing.⁵⁹ Attempts to stabilise crime have brought back the militaristic style of policing, which has encouraged aggressive and violent behaviour by the police in South Africa.⁶⁰ Such an approach has only delivered short-term solutions to crime problems in South Africa, reinforced inhumane policing practices and amplified the mistrust of the community in the police. One way to explore possible solutions to the dehumanising style of policing is by not only reflecting on how indigenous epistemologies can influence the approaches to policing, but doing so in a way that is reflective of South Africa's multi-cultural society. The police should be engaged in finding solutions to the current state of policing. Yet, modern-day police officials in South Africa do not seem to be engaging much in such reflections.

South Africa is ranked the highest in Africa, in terms of crime problems.⁶¹ Police statistics showed that between 2007 and 2008, crimes like robbery significantly increased.⁶² As a result of the ever-increasing crime rates the police have had to change their strategic approach to combating crime. The increases in crime rates have also brought about mounting pressure in both the internal and external policing environments. For example, the South African government's emphasis on economic growth aligns well with the policing mandate because of the police's role of creating a safe setting that is a significant requirement for any type of growth to happen. The

pressures of contributing towards the attainment of the broader country goals, and dealing with the crime issue as well as other internal organisational work pressures such as stress may have caused some police officers in South Africa to stray in their conduct, sometimes resulting in dehumanising practices. Mokgoba warns against over-emphasis on economic growth as a mark of a successful country and notes:

...over-emphasis on the economy as the standard of judging and evaluating recognition, respect, acceptance and success..., humans have lost dignity, status and respect. This has led to the moral and ethical decay that has reached crisis proportions in some democracies. In short, Western-style democracies have attained liberty but have lost humanism, and this imbalance has precipitated national crises as to how this model should evolve if it is to strike a harmonious balance.⁶⁵

Law enforcement agencies in South Africa can draw valuable lessons from how humanism has been lost in certain Western democracies. As a result of the diminished humanism, many South Africans have indeed come face to face with inefficient police officials that are dishonest, insensitive and disrespectful to people and their cultures.⁶⁴ This type of approach to law enforcement has also manifested in the excessive use of force during the policing of crowds. The shooting and killing of an unarmed man in Ficksburg, in the Free State, during the 2011 mass protestation for service delivery⁶⁵ is an example of the brutal force used by the police during mass protestations. The adoption of humanistic approaches could mitigate some of the overwhelming civil claims brought against the police, as a result of the excessive use of force by staff in the line of duty. For instance, during 2008 and 2009 unpaid civil claims against South African Police Service personnel tallied to R1, 8 billion.⁶⁶ These were claims that emanated from among other things, shootings and assaults as a result of police actions⁶⁷. This use of excessive force by the police disregards the value placed on human life and the inherent dignity of human beings.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Throughout history people have affirmed the inherent dignity of human beings and have spoken against any ideologies, beliefs and practices that may have suggested differently.⁶⁸ This kind of affirmation underscores the need for practices in law enforcement to value human life and dignity above all else. Humanising law enforcement forms part of research on humanistic approaches. Research on humanistic approaches began in response to concerns by therapists against the perceived limitations of psycho-dynamic

theories, especially in psycho-analysis.⁶⁹ Scholars such as Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow were of the opinion that existing psycho-dynamic theories failed to address issues like the meaning of behaviour and the nature of healthy growth. Despite the opinions of the last named scholars, the result in the psycho-dynamic theories were not simply new variations on psycho-dynamic theory, but were rather a fundamentally different and new approach.

There are two approaches to humanising law enforcement: the humanistic and conventional theories. These approaches are characterised by fundamental differences. The main divergence between the humanistic and conventional theories is that the conventional approach accentuates the voluntaristic and deterministic models of human nature, while the humanistic approaches heightens continued and experiential learning.⁷⁰ The focus of this article is mainly on the humanistic approach to practices in law enforcement. Applied to the current situation in policing in South Africa, the humanistic approach focuses on areas such as improving the approaches to management processes and the human resource capacity within police agencies. The humanistic approach also focuses on issues such as crisis intervention training, neighbourhood policing, human relations training and approaches to management, as imperatives in dealing with the dehumanised styles employed in police work.⁷¹

The public cares about what police officers do in their work, and how they do it. For this reason, police officials need to be at all times accountable in the performance of their work.⁷² When police conduct transcends what the public perceives to be humane, such perceptions become a problem for the state as well. The police are the foremost face of government⁷³ and being perceived as inhumane means that the conduct of officials will have a knock-on effect on the perceived ability of the state to control its organs and on the expected quality of governance. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has identified the quality of governance in South Africa as one of the issues that have adversely impacted on service delivery.⁷⁴ Such reviews will for example, also include issues like how the police handle suspects.

One of the issues that also continue to haunt present-day South Africa is the impact of efforts by the state to humanise the approach and practices in law enforcement. Humanising practices in law enforcement can without a doubt deepen South Africa's fledgling democracy, including the ideal of peace and security. When issues such as police brutality, poor service delivery, corruption and lack of accountability continue to haunt the present-day police, it means that the problems that must be dealt with in policing are very urgent, in both a realistic and a moral sense.⁷⁵ The humanistic approach offers a few explanations for, and solutions to, problems by proposing plans that can be implemented to integrate the control and

support functions, with the aim of humanising the very law enforcement approaches and practices in South Africa.

THE HUMANISTIC APPROACH TO LAW ENFORCEMENT

As a vehicle for humanising approaches and practices in law enforcement, the humanistic approach emphasises a team approach and the understanding of interactions and cooperative learning.⁷⁶ Interactions and cooperative learning in humanistic approaches is an employee-centred process that also promotes commitment to the job and encourage the recognition of the contributions of personnel by management.⁷⁷ For police personnel, the espousal of humanistic approaches could promote respect for the law, for one-self and for others; and more importantly the public, which is a vital ingredient in humanising practices in policing.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE HUMANISTIC APPROACH

As a point of departure humanistic approaches focus on security issues within the community, accentuate the importance of self-esteem and self-development and are also anchored in the belief that employees are a source of added value within an organisation.⁷⁸ The ideology behind the humanistic approach is that when employees are treated with respect, they could in turn treat other people with respect. For this reason, the espousal of such positive socialisation initiatives could mitigate the dehumanising practices within police agencies in South Africa. Some of the benefits that can arise from humanistic approaches have been noted in research by McGuire, O'Donnell and Cross⁷⁹, on human resource development as follows:

- Humanistic approaches promote a caring and considerate image of the organisation
- They present a softer and more responsive type of management
- They are ethically sound.

THE HUMANISTIC ROLE OF THE POLICE

The police operate as agents for both social control and support functions.⁸⁰ In this article, '*control*' refers to proactive and reactive strategies such as crime prevention and criminal investigation initiatives. On the other hand, '*support*' refers to those basic services offered by police agencies,

which services do not necessarily relate to their role of crime combating. An example of support services offered by the police would be mediation in disputes, with the aim of reconciling hostile parties. Woolpert argues that, historically, the function of control was always perceived to be primary, despite the fact that support always comprised the bulk of police work.⁸¹ Woolpert further notes that ‘... in the course of controlling one member of society, moreover, the policeman provides support to another’.⁸² In order to humanise the approach to and practices in law enforcement, the police need to also exercise their control function in a respectful fashion. Research has shown that humanistic approaches to law enforcement are innovative as they also promote ethnographic approaches that comprise investigations into how people live and what traditions are being practised.⁸³ For police agencies in South Africa, ethnographic studies could enable managers to understand some of the internal organisational cultures that contribute to the perpetuation of the dehumanising approaches and practices. Also, ethnographic studies could facilitate deeper understanding on African indigenous knowledge, which is ideal in attaining a culture-sensitive style of policing in Africa.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Policing in Africa needs further research on humanised approaches to law enforcement. Such research can help police agencies to identify problems and to re-align their processes with acceptable standards being practised in many democracies around the world. To achieve this goal, the police require visionary leaders who can drive an agenda aimed at Africanising and humanising practices in law enforcement. The same goes for the police agencies in South Africa, who in addition need to improve on their organisational culture so that it is well aligned to humane practices. The research described in this article added to the body of knowledge on humanistic approaches and practices in law enforcement. In the same way, the research described in this article contributed mainly to the current discourses relating to the nature and state of law enforcement within the African continent, the discourses on indigenous epistemologies, re-defining our identity, Africanism and on the on-going debate on de-Africanisation and re-Africanisation.

In an attempt to deal with the dehumanised style of policing in South Africa, we suggest that the inculcation of *ubuntu* into policing could go a long way in terms of positively influencing the social behaviour of individuals, police officials included. The values of *ubuntu* are embedded in the philosophy of Africanism and these values are practicalised through African indigenous idioms. The same African idioms would be useful for law

enforcement agencies to integrate into daily policing activities in order to humanise their approaches and practices. African indigenous idioms were used by the African fore-bearers as a moral compass, to inform humane social behaviour and interactions among individuals in society. African idioms generally contain suppositions that are in line with the principles that underlie the values enshrined in social justice, which values promote respect for human rights.

There is no single solution that promotes the humanisation of law enforcement approaches and practices in South Africa or anywhere in the world. Aligning law enforcement activities with African philosophies could go a long way in terms of encouraging an atmosphere of trust between both the police and the community.

- One of the strategies that might achieve success in humanising law enforcement is for law enforcement agencies to transform their entry-level basic training programmes. In South Africa, such an intervention requires that the policing curriculum at basic training level should inculcate social justice values, including policing communities in the context of an African paradigm. Adopting an African paradigm means that the basic training policing curriculum will also have to be infused with philosophies such as *ubuntu*.
- Not only must the policing curriculum in South Africa be Africanised, but we also need to introduce knowledge that has been created by African scholars themselves. Such knowledge should address issues of safety and security in a way that speaks to our current needs of policing within the African context.
- In addition to developing visionary and innovative leaders, we also need to look at best practices in policing beyond South Africa, in other African countries. On a practical level the police need to learn to speak the language of the community which they police to give more people access to justice.

The goal of transforming the police in South Africa cannot be attained through changes in training programmes and the curriculum alone. We need to have conversations with police officials at grassroots level about their African identity and change the way in which they respond to communities. We also need to be critical of the Westernised models of policing that do not really take the African context and its dynamics into account. In order for police agencies in South Africa to succeed in humanising the approaches to, and practices in law enforcement, they have to create favourable conditions for a solid and humanised internal organisational culture. A solid humanised culture will include, among other things, aspects such as:

- Recognising the men and women in blue for their good efforts
- Paying better salaries
- Improving promotion policies and processes
- Introducing and/or increasing performance incentives.

The rationale behind an internal and humanised type of culture is that employees are the most valuable resource in any organisation. For the police, treating personnel in a humane fashion could reinforce humanised approaches when dealing with members of the community. Treating personnel humanely is not only about values such as courage, self-respect, integrity, self-sacrifice and diversity, which sound nice on the surface. Treating personnel humanely is mostly about behaviours and skills that are valued by both police managers and subordinates in the workplace, which is likely to also pay-off in terms of realising the ideals of community policing.

Most police agencies around the world have adopted community policing as their official philosophy and approach to law enforcement and this includes agencies in South Africa. Despite such an espousal, the police in South Africa continued to be haunted by allegations of brutalisation and being insensitive to culture. Such allegations not only point to actions that are contrary to the underpinnings of community policing but also show disregard for basic and human rights. While community policing as both a philosophy and a strategic approach has been the best vehicle to transform the police from an autocratic force to a more democratic type of service, its implementation in South Africa has been problematic for a number of reasons, some of which have already been highlighted in the previous sections of this research. We need to really address the dehumanised style of policing that has been entrenched through apartheid laws at all levels of society, which in essence South Africans are still struggling to overcome. Such a feat could be realised through the decolonisation of African minds, which needs to happen through honest discussions at all levels of society, and a decision needs to be taken on how best we can begin to address the effects of the dehumanisation of the South African society.

In conclusion, what needs to be kept in mind is that most Western countries have used community policing to extend services and increase community participation in their democracies. In South Africa, this consultative approach has been implemented in a society that has a protracted history of undemocratic policing and structural violence, within a climate of political transition, where deep distrust of the police by the community has made the consultation process very difficult. As a result, the internalisation of the values required for this new ethos in policing has also proved to be difficult for police agencies. The socio-cultural and socio-political space within which policing in South Africa has been delivered has also been extremely

politicised and highly contested. In order to humanise policing, the police in South Africa need to draw from indigenous past best practices, including practices from other African states. Creating an environment where the police can learn about *ubuntu* and practicalise some of the indigenous idioms that are relevant to their work is one way to humanise practices in law enforcement. Failure to draw lessons from indigenous knowledge is tantamount to not practising professionalism and may have an adverse impact moving into the future. The assertion on failure to learn is also expressed in the isiZulu idiom, *isalakutshelwa sibona ngo mopho*, which literally means that a person who will not listen and learn shall reap the adverse effects.

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African Solutions to African Problems

The Fault line in Conflict Resolution in Africa

Valery Ferim

RATIONALE FOR 'AFRICAN SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS'

For over a decade now, there has been an increase in calls, notably by African leaders, for 'African solutions to African problems'. This has come in the wake of increasing concerns over foreign meddling in the internal affairs specifically of economically viable African countries. This slogan has gained popularity across the continent and is permeating deep into the strata of African communities. It is a noble idea, especially given the reluctance of Western powers to intervene specifically in poverty-stricken countries in Africa. The horrors of the genocide in Rwanda, for instance, could have been largely averted if African leaders had adopted a more proactive approach to conflict prevention. The international community stood by and watched with indifference as close to a million Tutsis were slaughtered in Rwanda within a hundred days.¹ In addition to this, a plethora of woes still plague the African continent. Civil strife, drought, poverty, diseases, illiteracy, corruption and bad governance remain rife. All these fuel a precarious movement of non-state combatants across national borders and create havens for international terrorist and criminal syndicates within failed or failing states.²

African leaders thus have to face the stark reality that there is no free meal in international politics. Western intervention in African issues could thus largely be explained by realists, who place self-interest as a central component of inter-state relations. Realists argue that states cannot depend on others for their protection and survival.³ The principle of 'African solutions to African problems' thus implies a resurgence of African renaissance and a zeal to combat the tyrannical forces of neo-colonialism. In addition, it indicates a commitment by Africa leaders to retake control of the continent and be instrumental in influencing the socio-political and economic affairs of the region.

Also, 'African solutions to African problems' is a recognition of the fact that African societies are different – their colonial history is unique, its societies heterogeneous, and its challenges daunting. Hence, there is (or at least there should be) an African model for development that is different from the Western path. Besides, regional and sub-regional actors often have a better understanding of their regions, the established cultures, the peoples, and their idiosyncrasies. This attribute becomes all the more important in conflict situations where an interlocutor's comprehension of the people, as well as the underlying issues of the conflict often go a long way to determine the success of conflict resolution.⁴

It is against this backdrop that African leaders and scholars alike have repeatedly castigated Western intervention in African politics. The intervention by France in the conflict in Ivory Coast in 2011 that helped depose Laurent Gbagbo and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's intervention in Libya in 2011 that saw the overthrow of the long-time dictator Muammar Gaddafi were largely condemned by African leaders. Similarly, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe has incessantly opposed what he considers Western imperialism in Africa.⁵ He has persistently maintained that Western powers cannot dictate their policies on Zimbabwe. Similarly, according to former South African president Thabo Mbeki, 'It's critically important that the African continent should deal with these conflict situations.... We have not asked for anybody outside of the African continent to deploy troops in Darfur. It's an African responsibility, and we can do it.'⁶ It is against this backdrop that African leaders have incessantly reiterated that the problems in Africa should be solved by Africans themselves. The growth of African renaissance over the past few decades thus ignited dreams that the continent shall overcome the perception and reality of Africa being a dark continent. However, the persistence of the continent's darkness manifested in bad governance, corruption, underdevelopment, dependency, HIV/AIDS and violent conflict, prompts the assumption that something seems to be wrong with African solutions. The question that arises is: what is the problem with African solutions to African problems?

A CRITIQUE OF AFRICAN SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS

The protracted nature of conflict in numerous states within the African continent questions the effectiveness of the peace and security architecture of the African Union (AU) and its numerous regional organisations and affiliates. Some of these include the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and even the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

Numerous conflict resolution attempts have been initiated by the AU in political hotspots on the continent such as Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Sudan. In spite of these, conflict within these countries remains persistent and recurrent. This in no way indicates the absence of protracted conflicts in other parts of the world. Countries such as Afghanistan, Columbia, Israel/Palestine and Sri Lanka, have witnessed protracted conflicts for decades. However, they do not reiterate regional solutions to their problems. This emerging African philosophy of 'African solutions to African problems' should go hand in glove with the capacity and will power of African states to address conflict on the continent. Thus, the question that arises is, do African states have the capacity and the will power to resolve conflict on the continent?

The AU Constitutive Act signed in Togo on 11 July 2000, was drafted 'conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent'. The body has thus taken several steps with regard to the promotion of democracy, including the adoption in 2007 of an 'African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance'. Section three of the Charter, for instance, upholds democratic principles of representative government, separation of powers, transparent and fair political processes, and the condemnation and total rejection of unconstitutional changes of government. The Charter specified mandatory penalties for illegitimate usurpers of power, including immediate suspension from AU activities. Other states are not only prohibited from supporting unconstitutional changes of government, but also from offering asylum to the usurpers. These are laudable principles as there is a strong correlation between unconstitutional changes of government, insecurity, instability and violent conflict in Africa.⁷

One of the major obstacles here, however, is Chapter VIII of the United Nations (UN) Charter. It explicitly confines the role of regional organisations to 'the pacific settlement of local disputes' as well as 'enforcement action' under Security Council authorisation. Should the AU decide to take action in the form of humanitarian intervention without a UN Security Council mandate, it would thus be illegal under international law, no matter how legitimate it would be. This legal technicality implies that all regional organisations on the continent cannot assume military action even against 'rogue' states without UN Security Council endorsement. To make matters worse, no African country has a permanent seat in the Security Council. A permanent seat comes along with the prerogative of veto powers. This power which is wielded by only five countries in the world (United States of America, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China) enables holders to prevent the adoption of any substantive draft Council resolution, regardless of the level of international support for the draft.⁸ It is an open secret that

the Council is a highly politicised body. It reflects the realities and verities of *realpolitik* in international relations. Veto-power states always wield this prerogative to achieve their own selfish aims. Events in Libya and Syria can attest to that. The absence of a veto power wielding state in Africa undermines the ability of the region to forge ahead with an African agenda with regard to peace and security through humanitarian intervention.

Regional groupings can be an instrumental path to political stability, economic growth, the consolidation of democracy and hence decrease the propensity for conflict. One of the guiding principles of NEPAD is to 'build the capacity of African institutions for early warning, as well as to enhance their capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts'.⁹ There are also numerous regional organisations on the continent. There is SADC and its organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. Among its objectives is to 'prevent, contain and resolve inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means'.¹⁰ Where peaceful means of resolving a conflict are unsuccessful, action may be taken against one or more of the disputant parties in accordance with Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, only with the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council.¹¹ Similarly, ECOWAS has a Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security. In spite of years of inactivity due to financial problems and conflict, the Economic Community of Central African States' Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX), entered into force in 2004.¹² Among the vision of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa (IGAD), is to 'promote peace and stability in the region and create mechanisms within the region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-State and intra-State conflicts through dialogue'. Other sub regional politico-economic organisations include: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Arab Maghreb Union, the Common Monetary Area, Southern African Customs Union and the East African Community.

African countries can rally behind these regional blocks to enhance sustainable development and counteract the marginalisation of the continent in the global political economy. In spite of this, African regional blocks have largely witnessed dismal failure. Part of the problem lies with the multiple, overlapping and sometimes even competing organisations. The Democratic Republic of Congo for instance is a member of both Economic Community of Central African States and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), while Tanzania is a member of both SADC and the East African Community. South Africa is a member of the SADC, Common Monetary Area, Southern African Customs Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development, G20, G77, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) group, etc. This poses problems with regard to increased cost of

membership, fragmented approaches to regional integration, duplicated efforts and unhealthy rivalry for donor funds.¹³ Other problems with regional integration on the continent include poor communication, transport systems and insecurity which creates distrust and undermines confidence building measures. This multiplicity of regional organisations poses a huge backlog to conflict resolution on the continent; hence African solutions to African problems still remain a white elephant project.

However, most of these African regional organisations, institutions and states alike have commendable guiding principles of good governance which could be instrumental in conflict prevention, management and resolution. The problem, however, is not with such provisions but with their implementation. Good governance is to be interpreted not in terms of the intentions of the rulers, which tend (at least professedly) to be excellent in most societies at most times, but rather in terms of the consequences of their rule for those over whom they rule.¹⁴ One of the most prevalent causes of conflict on the African continent has been disregard for constitutional provisions. This is because African leaders are usually of the conviction that the national interest can only be served through their perpetuation in power.¹⁵ This has resulted in constitutional blasphemy and long-serving rulers in countries like Angola, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The prioritisation by African leaders of state sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of countries has empowered dictators to act with impunity, thereby undermining African institutions and African solutions.

An important element in effective conflict resolution is state hegemony. Hegemony relates to military and political power and also to the ability to exercise unchallenged leadership. To this should be added the Gramscian notion that real power comes not so much from tangible resources as from the fact that the hegemon's ideology (its structure of values and understandings) is acceptable and unquestioned, and forms a consensual order that determines behaviour in its sphere of influence.¹⁶ Hegemony requires that one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing inter-state relations, and willing to do so. The essence of hegemony is the power to persuade. A hegemon is therefore a leader that follows its own enlightened interest, with positive spin-offs for others.¹⁷

Every hegemon has to be a pivotal state. Hegemons not only aspire to leadership and are not only endowed with military, economic and other resources. They have political and socio-economic visions about their trans-national environments, and a political willingness to implement those visions. If that vision relates to security, stability and development, as is often the case, then the hegemonic power sets out to pursue the implementation of these goals. Hegemonic powers do not necessarily act alone.

Though they usually have partners, they up the responsibility in the last instance to ensure that the features of their vision are operationalised in the region they see as their sphere of influence.¹⁸ These big countries are relied upon in times of conflict to provide the resources to maintain the vital lifeline of peace operations. The political and economic costs of constant intervention to meet crises are simply too high. The time needed to lobby for international support, rally troops and generate finance is usually too time-consuming.¹⁹

The problem with African countries is that they either lack the capacity or the will power to act as hegemons. Nigeria, which stands out as the most populous country on the continent with the third largest GDP, made significant inroads in conflict management through the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group.²⁰ However, with the increasing wave of terrorist attacks propagated by the Islamist militant organisation *Boko Haram*, the country cannot afford to sacrifice the resources needed for conflict resolution on the continent. Besides, corruption and unemployment are obstacles to the country's ability to project itself as a hegemon on the continent. Northern African countries such as Libya and Egypt are still reeling from waves of popular protests in the region. Besides, these northern African states are politically more aligned to the Arab League than to the African Union largely due to the former's religious component. Thus, they are generally not considered 'black' enough to represent the continent.²¹

One of the most economically viable and militarily potent countries that could act as a hegemon in Africa is South Africa. The problem is that there are impediments to South Africa's hegemony, which originate in the Mbeki government's foreign policy of quiet diplomacy. This probably explains why president Thabo Mbeki maintained in a speech to the South African Parliament on 18th February 2003 that:

'I... assure our neighbours and the peoples of the rest of Africa that the government we lead has no great power pretensions. We claim no right to impose our will on any independent country. We will not force anything on anybody...'

Hegemony requires a regional power which could be counted on to maintain local stability with its own diplomacy, prestige, and military power if necessary.²² Unfortunately, the Zuma administration has perpetuated the foreign policy objective of non-intervention and respect for state sovereignty. Besides, there is a general feeling among some South Africans that the country has its own problems which it must solve rather than be embroiled in conflicts outside its borders. The crisis in neighbouring Zimbabwe, state collapse in Somalia, inaction in the 2008 Kenyan and 2011 Ivorian post-elections violence and the persistent civil war in the Democratic Republic

of Congo, project the stark reality of the absence of a hegemonic power on the African continent. As evil prevails when powerful states do nothing, conflict remains rife in Africa.

The threat of the use or the actual use of force is a key component of effective conflict resolution. Summed up as 'the carrot' and 'the stick', power is the ability to make others do what you want with the threat or the actual use of force if need be. Power is 'the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis upon which this probability rests'.²³ Elements of state power which are critical in providing the leverage necessary for effective conflict resolution are military might, economic prowess, and technological knowhow. It is an open secret that international law without enforcement mechanisms is like a toothless bulldog. Power thus provides the reward and/or the punishment which is instrumental in influencing the behaviour of other actors in the international political system. The main drawbacks to conflict resolution in Africa are the absence of either the ability to punish or the capacity to reward or both.

African countries do not have adequate capacity to reward due to the dismal state of their economies. The availability of extensive mineral resources on the continent has not been translated into sustainable economic growth largely as a result of bad governance and conflict. Africa's share of world trade stands at below 4% of global trade.²⁴ Due to this, Africa still remains heavily dependent on developed countries for financial support. Structural adjustment programmes and debt relief schemes such as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative are still predominant on the continent. Sufficient, predictable funding thus remains the largest constraint on peacekeeping by the African Union. In practice, the financial costs of AU-led peace support operations have largely been funded by the international community while Africa has provided troops and substantial political leadership in the management and resolution of conflict.²⁵ Peace and security challenges on the continent are so dire that in 2008, almost three quarters of all United Nations peacekeeping troops were dedicated to the continent.²⁶ This economic incapacity has been the Achilles' heel of Africa's ability to provide the leverage necessary for effective conflict resolution on the continent. Relying on foreign donors to fund peace-keeping missions on the continent would be in fact subjecting African solutions to Western influence, for whoever pays the piper, calls the tune.

To make matters worse, African countries lack the will power to castigate injustices across the continent. African heads of state seem to have a tacit agreement among themselves that they should be allowed to run their respective countries the way they deem fit through the principle of reciprocity: 'stay out of my business and I will stay out of yours'. Open

condemnation for bad governance in African countries by African leaders thus remains almost non-existent. As a result, some scholars²⁷ argue that regional mediators may not always be objective, neutral and impartial, given that they may have vested interests in the resolution or course of a conflict in their region. It is an open secret that the slain former leader of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, had numerous African leaders on his payroll. The clicks and allies that most African leaders build among themselves over the years, have been a stumbling block to conflict resolution in Africa. Long serving African dictators such as Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Paul Biya of Cameroon have consolidated their grip on power to an extent that it becomes difficult for new African leaders to condemn their regimes. Such leaders are the 'dons' of African politics as they have mastered its inner workings. African solutions to African problems has thus degenerated to national solutions to national problems, as African leaders often reiterate slogans like 'the problems of Zimbabwe can only be solved by the people of Zimbabwe'. This has given dictators the leeway to act with impunity within their borders. State sovereignty on the continent thus seems to be a licence for leaders to kill. Sovereignty is a state responsibility and not just a privilege. It is a responsibility to cater for citizens. If a state is unable or unwilling to carry out that responsibility, it shifts to the international community.²⁸ If African states continuously prioritise their sovereignty at the detriment of the rights and freedom of their citizens, 'African solutions' will remain no more than what it is – a talk shop.

As a result of this lack of will power by African leaders to condemn their fellow leaders, principles of rule of law and constitutionalism which are delicate and important ingredients to peace and stability are undermined:

The most important application of the rule of law is the principle that governmental authority is legitimately exercised only in accordance with written, publicly disclosed laws adopted and enforced in accordance with established procedural steps that are referred to as due process. The principle is intended to be a safeguard against arbitrary governance, whether by a totalitarian leader or by mob rule. It is hostile both to dictatorship and to anarchy. It seeks to prevent arbitrary exercise of the executive power, preserves general and minority rights, and promotes stability and predictability. Thus, the rule of law provides the benchmark, trust and mutual understanding which are imperative to mitigate and/or prevent conflict.²⁹

Most of these features are either missing or are blatantly undermined by African leaders. Constitutional blasphemy and gerontocracy are common features in African politics and most African leaders refuse to step down from

power in spite of constitutional provisions, unpopularity, age, or even numerous political scandals. They seem to subscribe to the ideology that 'let him without sin cast the first stone'. They manipulate and change the constitution with impunity to perpetuate their stay in power. Some examples include former Tunisian president Ben Ali (2002) Former president of Gabon, Omar Bongo (2003), Togolese president Faure Gnassingbé (2005) and President Biya of Cameroon (2008). These leaders always profess to have a genuine concern for their people usually with disastrous consequences. African leaders put their selfish interests before that of the state – the tail is wagging the dog. As other African leaders silently watch on, injustices prevail. Any society where there are no consequences for bad leadership is doomed for failure. With such bad faith and selfishness inherent in African leadership, 'African solutions to African problems' becomes subject to a wanton principle.

In its fondness of criticising colonialism and defending the integrity of traditional African society, African political and economic thought has been trapped by its own myths. On the one hand, it has been misused by dictators in countries such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, Togo, Guinea and Cameroon, who claim that the rest of the world has no business criticising their human rights violations, stolen elections and culture of corruption. It is against this backdrop, coupled with the difficulty associated with establishing international criteria and consensus for intervention that the continent has witnessed the perils of non-intervention.³⁰

A key concern to the concept of the African renaissance is that it gives the false notion of a united continent that has the capacity to speak with one voice. It seems to imply that ethnic identities on the continent are an unfortunate residue of a pre-modern Africa, and they remain the accursed legacy of the divide-and-rule machinations of the colonial powers which can and should fade away. The reality, however, is that there is very little besides geography and, to some extent, history that is idiosyncratic to Africa. The fact that the continent hosts individuals of all races, religion, ethnic groups and all walks of life, makes the definition of an African ambiguous. Ethnicity in Africa is thus not a Western invention but an African reality. In the neo-liberal assault on African nationalism, 'Africans' were being demeaned as being victims of an African mentality. This is as the ideals of Pan-Africanism that were preached by the founding fathers of pan-African unity such as Kwame Nkrumah over 50 years ago still remain a dream. It is probably with this reality in mind that some scholars³¹ have questioned the relevance of the model 'African solutions to African problems'. Does it mean that all African countries have a special responsibility to help in solving problems anywhere on the continent simply as a function of their location? If there is nothing that can unite Africans besides geography, then African solutions are at best, idealistic.

CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD

People from outside an environment may be judged to be better mediators or interlocutors simply because they are not perceived to be stakeholders in the society. It is unlikely, for example, that member states of the Organisation of the American States would have a deeper interest in the resolution of conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia or in the Democratic Republic of Congo, than the African Union or other African sub-regional organisations. This is particularly the case in a post-Cold War era, where many states no longer have strategic importance for other countries or regional alliances.³²

However, 'African solutions to African problems' should not be misunderstood as calls to indigenise African political economy and shun 'Western' forms of government. Actions such as name changes and calls for the renaissance of African socialism should be restricted to the social and cultural spheres. In the light of the failure of African leaders to successfully introduce and implement an African form of government, the so-called Western-style liberal democracy remains the only viable route for sustainable development, peace and security on the continent. It is hardly possible to invent a desirable, viable and exclusively African form of government or economic system. Given the fact that we are living in a globalised world with universal principles of human rights, modernisation unfortunately has become synonymous to Westernisation. Besides, modernisation, hence Westernisation, is irreversible. Peace and security is a human problem, not just an African problem. African countries face the same problems that the rest of the developing countries including South America and Asia are facing. There is hardly any political and economic problem uniquely idiosyncratic to Africa. In as much as it is important to encourage and strengthen the capacity of African countries to respond to the problems that plague the continent, it is unrealistic to assert that solutions to these problems must be sought and implemented by African leaders. Hence we should look for 'solutions', and not just 'African solutions'.

The way forward, therefore, is not to abandon ideals of the African renaissance but to empower and/or strengthen the capacity of institutions on the continent to tackle conflict. However, African leaders need to incorporate existing African socialist and humanistic systems into global existing political and economic models in order to enhance development and prevent conflict. There is also a need to decentralise the highly centralised political systems on the continent in order to foster a communal spirit inherent in African indigenous communities.

Also, the African Union needs to be capacitated to tackle conflict. Funding for the organisation needs to be sourced largely from within the continent, and member states have to be urged to pay their dues. However,

intermittent assistance in the form of funding and foreign troops (preferably UN-authorised), should be welcomed as it will play a key role in addressing transnational crime.

The organisation also needs to act promptly to condemn and intervene in conflicts such as fraudulent elections, human rights violations and coups d'état. If African solutions are to be taken seriously, the African Union needs to send a strong message to African leaders to respect their country's constitutional provisions. This is the bedrock for peace and stability on the continent.

Africa also needs a dominant power which is willing to intervene militarily if need be, to restore law and order on conflict hot spots on the continent. A powerful state like South Africa can be instrumental in playing a hegemonic role. It can utilise its economic prowess and military capacity to pressurise dictators and long-serving rulers in countries like Zimbabwe and Cameroon to respect constitutional provisions and respect human rights.

Transparent independent and effective democratic institutions must be made a priority. The international community should continue to send out a clear message that tyrants and brutal dictators will no longer be supported or tolerated. By and large, it is through altruism and a strong political will that peace and security on the continent can be achieved. Besides, 'overcoming the complex challenges raised by war and conflict in Africa will be more likely if the search for African solutions is replaced by the search for effective solutions'.³⁵

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A Return of Hostilities?

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Future of a Two-State Sudan

Wilfred Iyekolo

INTRODUCTION

Post-independence South Sudan is perhaps lacking the enthusiasm of the referendum era, because the envisioned end of hostilities, eternal peace, transformational stability, political justice, economic prosperity and absolute control of resources has proven illusory. No doubt, this disappointment is a consequence of the seemingly unending conflict between the North and South Sudan states, which is just one version of the cacophony of frustration in the defunct country, where the perceived common aggressor has been the government in Khartoum against all 'others' with disparate leaning. Until now, the regime of domination in the Sudan has been by default, because the British-Egyptian colonial rule, on the eve of its exit, had created an asymmetric system of administration that bequeathed authority to the North.¹ Consequently, to consolidate its strangle-hold on power and control of commonwealth, and through machinations of identity: ethnicism, 'Arabizism', religiosity and Islamism, the anointed sect victimised and marginalised other perceived exclusive groups in the Sudan.²

In addressing the inequity, a series of peace and power sharing agreements were brokered in 2002, and finalised in 2005 with a Comprehensive Peace Agreement [CPA], through coordinated efforts of concerned neighbouring states and the international community. This agreement became the article of faith for the restoration of order, promotion of unity, justice and equity, and democratic transformation in the Sudan. Predominantly, it provided an opportunity for the aggrieved South Sudan to pursue self-recognition via a referendum. According to schedule, the agreement was implemented, and the referendum was held with overwhelming result in favour of secession.

Contrary to expectation of problem resolution, the CPA regime has brought new complexities and challenges to the contention in the North-South dialogue, having implications that threaten the future stability of the

two Sudanese countries. To validate this fear in the post-CPA era, it appears difficult issues around oil revenues between the divides, the centrality of Abyei, as well as attendant complexities on water, border demarcation and citizenship have potential to provoke a new cycle of conflict, depending on how the negotiation of these complexities is managed. Should negotiations between the divides breakdown, there would be a return of disorder, and the common Sudanese would be hardest hit. In turn, Africa would have one more distraction from her pursuit of stability, end of poverty, human rights, and economic prosperity; and the euphoria of the international community of putting out another conflict hotspot would extinguish in a jiffy. However valid this anxiety appears, it is a strong indication that much attention has not been accorded to the nature, intricacies and deficits in the negotiation of the peace agreement in question, because contentious issues from the exercise continue to feed the persistent complexities today even after its termination. It is, therefore, compelling to ask why the CPA is fundamental to the looming return of hostilities, and also what the pertinent issues are in the CPA negotiations responsible for a return of hostilities. In addition, did the CPA deliver its objectives? Are there reasons to doubt the CPA was ever a successful peace agreement?

While this study may not provide answers to all these critical issues, it makes a review of the CPA negotiations at Machakos, and the challenge of stability consolidation between the two Sudanese countries. I argue that the so-called fundamental problems of identity, marginalisation and victimisation in the Sudan were manifestations of the core problem of struggles for resource control, of rights and access. In essence, the underlining problem between the belligerent Sudanese states is a political economy of *who gets what, when and how*. Also, I argue that the nature of the agreement at Machakos, and not Naivasha, is responsible for the rise of complexities in the post-CPA era, and from such a standpoint, the quest for stability and democratic transformation is beyond the architecture and scope of the CPA.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Marxist society presents a basis for class struggle or group antagonism between proletariats and bourgeoisie over power and control of means of production.³ In contrast, Social Identity Theory (SIT), developed by Tajfel and Turner in 1979⁴, claims that negligible condition of social classification, group-self awareness or group 'we-feeling' is sufficient to lead members of a group (in-group) to discriminate against others (out-group) who do not belong to such exclusive social enclave. The perceived members of an 'in-group' probably might have nothing in common, in terms of shared heritage

and background; but, for the fact of group classification, a basis for group self-awareness is created. This is what they termed as '*minimal condition*' i.e., slightest condition not beneficial to any individual in a group, but capable of creating *in-group favouritism* against others.⁵

In the bid to understand the ethnic tension and identity conflict dimension, Alexander Haslam⁶ explained that the 'we-feeling' created by a self membership of an in-group creates group antagonism and social competition between an exclusive in-group and perceived out-group. Jacques Hymans⁷, with the liberal democracy theory, contended that mere stereotyping and classification is insufficient to create conflict between democratic regimes and non-democracies. He stressed that inequity of resource distribution or access to group benefit magnifies the unpremeditated tension between divided groups. He claimed that this is a core motivation for ethnic group conflict or struggles.

In *The Search for a Theory of Political Development*, Tunde Adeniran⁸ states that societies are ever in a constant state of transition and change. On the same idea, Samuel Huntington argued that increased political participation is a driver of that societal change, where institutions acquire value, stability and universalism.⁹ When this process becomes functional in a continuous fashion, change is generated and should be sustained, he advised. Adeniran emphasised the need for a sustainable process of change, and its stability that results in modernisation. He reasoned that to maintain the 'stability' of the system, rulers often disarm opposition and suppress freedom of opposition.¹⁰ In support, Steven Hood claimed that the utmost goal of authoritarian regimes is to stay in power, though the tool of self-preservation differs: some act through repressive means and others through exclusion and alienation strategies of a certain sect from political participation.¹¹ However, as dissatisfaction of the victimised mass grows, tension builds up; good will is destroyed, as groups and interests collide. The result is conflict, and in turn, a clamour for change, transformation, transition, democratisation, liberalisation or autonomy.

In the defunct Sudan, many canons depict the in-group and out-group tension, e.g., Muslim against Christian, Africans against Arabs, Dinka against Misseriya, North against South, NCP against SPLM, NCP against other political parties, etc. What accentuates the problems of this labelling is the preferential elevation of a sect 'in-group' above others, especially in the allocation of a commonwealth. The seed of enmity was already sown, because of inequity and exclusion of minority groups, in the South and elsewhere, from equal political participation and access to resource distribution. While the rise of Sharia also is a sign of institutional decay, it explains the rise of authoritarianism, their strategies to perpetually cling on to power, as well as the unyielding attitudes of the in-group to clamours for change and transformation.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

According to Stedman, J. S., Rothchild D., and Cousens E. M., modern civil conflicts often end either in *elimination or capitulation*.¹² When a faction is able to crush or eliminate the other, which is often the illusion of most belligerents, there would be no need for the rigour of peace negotiation or settlement. However, they pointed out that most civil conflicts have ended in '*capitulations*'. For our purpose, *capitulation* is understood as *tacit or intentional mutual surrender of belligerents*, as resources and motivation for continued prospects for war dwindle. Upon this understanding and as a point of departure, I present competing perspectives on peace agreements from *mediationalist* and *mutual vulnerability* schools.

I have created the *Mediationalist* school based on the work of such scholars as Barbara Walter, Barry Buzan and Olser Hampson, who advocate increased role for third party intervention, and emphasise power sharing between factions in civil conflict resolutions. Who is a third party and what is its role? Osler Hampson answered that they could be *international organisations, great powers, regional powers and group of small states* who have 'particular interest' in a civil conflict and they have the functions of *confidence and trust building, approaching parties to assess their interests, identifying missing groups, offering guarantees, drafting protocols, setting agendas and suggesting opinions and more*.¹³

From regional security complex thesis, Barry Buzan¹⁴ provides an entry point for interventions, due to spill-over tendencies and the anxiety of instability in a prevailing regional order or systemic equilibrium. Barbara Walter¹⁵ argued that most wars are a fight-to-finish in nature, except a third party intervenes, because of his security guarantees, capabilities and incentives; *when they do, peace processes always succeed regardless of the quest, ambition, ideology or ethnicity of the warring factions vice versa*. Walter stressed that Sudan's Anya Nya rebels delayed the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement until the credible intervention of Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie who guaranteed their safety. Mediationists, concerning peace agreements, believe that most peace agreements often contain the seed of their own destruction even at negotiation.¹⁶

On the other hand, the 'mutual vulnerability' school championed by Dorian Bekoe¹⁷ believes that it is possible for belligerents to break a well-written peace agreement, and renege on promises, in spite of a third party guarantee of security and incentives, except they perceive themselves as mutually vulnerable. Bekoe explained that when adversaries feel compelled to deliver on their promises and commitments, not only for positive gains from compliance, but also for negative repercussion from the opposition if they renege, a mutual vulnerability situation is created. With the use of

hostages and *mutual reliance*¹⁸ strategy, a mutually vulnerable condition is created when faction A gives off a particular advantage, exposing vulnerability because the opposition faction B is not disproportionately advantaged by such offer. Therefore, if both sides find themselves invulnerable, peace agreement implementation would stall. Bekoe gave expression to this perspective with the Mozambique peace agreement, where the proposal by Frelimo to Renamo to provide three advisors and civil service (hostages and mutual reliance) to the Frelimo governors in the zones under its control, resolved the rift between the belligerents.

The question then is: would adversaries just give off concessions? Who is to broker a ceasefire in the first place before issues of concession and issues of vulnerability can be leveraged? If conflict situations remain perpetually unregulated without a credible balancer or broker, there is no assurance that warring factions would ever reach a point of agreement. Even if they do, there is every tendency that such fragile stability is only a matter of time; violence would erupt in no time. However, the strength and potency of hostages and mutual reliance remain undoubted, because the strategy helps to elicit commitment and compliance to the underlining principle of accountability. The extent to which mutual vulnerability tradition tacitly agree with the proposal of the mediationalists on the need for a strong credible intervener remains a subject of debate.

THE MACHAKOS JUMBLE

The works of scholars in the *mediationalist* and *mutual vulnerability* schools, as well as Thomas Edwards, revealed that about four circumstances created a window of opportunity for the negotiation of Machakos protocol in 2002. These are *regional concerns*, *the readiness of international partners*, *ripeness of conflict* and *the systemic implication of September 11 terror attacks on the US*.¹⁹ On the one hand, ripeness of conflict speaks to the conditions of vulnerability, where attack is matched with resistance, and the prospects for war seemed to have reached a deadlock. The threat and fear of possible US invasion of the Sudan, following its initial romance with Osama bin Laden²⁰, could have revealed a level of vulnerability in the stiff position of the Government of Sudan. This event, I suppose, created opportunities for a quick settlement. On the other hand, regional concerns and the readiness of international partners constitute the hallmark of third party intervention in mediationalists thought.

According to an International Crisis Group report,²¹ the appointment of General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, as chief negotiator by former Kenyan President, Daniel Arap Moi in 2001, was a rallying point for settlement in Sudan.

Surprisingly, the belligerents agreed, as well as the international community. This acceptance is regardless of Kenyan unflinching support for South Sudan. In contrast, the mutual vulnerability school is likely to downplay this event with a shift of attention to the assessment of prospects for war. For this school, the appointment of a mediator and security support does not necessarily translate into the willingness of belligerents to ceasefire, or approach the negotiation table; rather, they emphasise the measurement of strength for continued hostilities, as the most significant factor in the process toward negotiation.²²

At Machakos negotiations, the major determinants of action were divergent visions of the objectives of the agreement and stiff basis of claims, which made sieving facts from fiction burdensome. Here, there are only two factional in-groups to the exclusion of other dissenting voices in the defunct Sudan; Government of Sudan (GOS) represented by the ruling NCP and the SPLM/A representing South Sudan. It is important to note that factional positions at the negotiations were clear from the onset. The narrow position of the NCP was the enactment of Sharia into Sudanese law for absolute control. For SPLM/A, it was the quest to acknowledge its right to self-determination to assuage its sufferings. These were the stiff positions at the negotiation table, marked by some 29 days of noise making between the negotiating teams, General Sumbeiywo noted.²³ The General recounted that he translated the Declaration of Principles²⁴ (DOP) document into text and zeroed-in on the two topical issues of disagreement.

It appeared the belligerents were not on different sides of a coin; their positions were inversely confrontational. In fact, each faction came with its own coin to the negotiations, and each wanted to maintain its positional agenda, to see it through as basis for negotiation. This type of negotiation is unique and not conventional, which is often characterised by conflicting positions, and then bargaining, or give-off. Machakos was devoid of this, because a belligerent was satisfied, as long as its position was contained in the final draft of the agreement. Where then is the compromise? From such a standpoint, Machakos protocol represented a lazy way-out, not really a negotiation of compromise, or shifting of grounds per se, but a fusion of the extreme positions. The agreement, with these divergent views, validates the '*own seed of destruction*' idea by Olser Hampson²⁵. I argue here that if each faction gets all it desires, there is a tendency that a split has already occurred. What is left is the dual actualisation of the two-ply objectives. Just as it turned out in the defunct Sudan, a separate two-state solution was not won at the 2011 referendum, in principle, it was indeed at Machakos. After all, the Machakos protocol may not be a product of clear-headed bargaining, but mere 'tolerant' acknowledgement of extreme views fused in a single agreement.

In brief, the Machakos protocol contains the following provisions: six-month pre-interim period followed by a six-year interim period of Transitional National Governance, and elections to make unity attractive. Article 6.3 of the protocol addressed the role of state and religion by a general agreement that the country is multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious. Consequently, governance would not be upon religious sentiments but citizenship. By contrast, Article 3.2.2 of the same protocol recognised the use of Sharia law as basis of national governance, except in the southern states of Sudan. Finally, Article 2.3 of the Machakos recognised the right of self-determination of southern people of Sudan with the option to choose secession or unity, if they so wish through an internationally monitored and approved referendum process after the tenure of the Transitional National Government and elections.

Certainly, mediationalists would not differ on this agreement whichever way it was reached. For this school, the recognition of self-determination is a potent power-sharing strategy in pacifying the aggrieved. The mutual vulnerability perspective may not oppose the peace agreement either, as it presents a version of their idea of *mutual reliance* and *hostages*. For unity's sake, the agreement tried to satisfy the yearnings of the factions. It gave Sharia and self-determination, but with a clause for secession. It is therefore highly surprising how a peace settlement could lump together options for unity and separation into a single agreement. As expected, the divergent objectives of the agreement were played out: Sharia in the North and possible secession of the South. Nowhere in the document was the seed of unity accurately promoted. I believe that the agreement should have contemplated the end of the divisive rule in Sudan to create a leeway for true transformation; unfortunately, it never did. There is a compelling reason to believe that belligerents were not unaware of the looming challenges that would ensue with such an unprecedented agreement, because both belligerents won without any concessions. Therefore, there was no commitment of each belligerent to pursue a cause in the interest of the other, and in awareness of the consequence of derailing. The version of hostages and mutual reliance at Machakos was not structured as mutual vulnerability suggested. Since multiple vision of objectives prevailed over the agreement, one cannot but expect that a myriad of other challenges would emerge which will eventually undermine the capability of the CPA to resolve the core problems in the defunct Sudan. Also, it is only normal that new challenges would arise, expressed in issues of power and wealth-sharing, and they eventually did. This is because the agreement had no mechanism to prevent the new issues of concern; even if the actors had envisaged them. In the end, subsequent years witnessed the negotiation of the power and wealth sharing protocol, which in principle reinforced the division of the defunct Sudan.

It is also important to note that the over-arching challenge of the CPA does not entirely rest on the content and quality of the agreement, but on the decadence behind the letters, largely expressed in deceptive emotion-laden attitudes of factions. Evident in the CPA implementation era, while the ruling NCP government sought to win elections at all cost, to consolidate its hold on power by blocking several other attempts to actualise equality and justice; the SPLM/A was only seeking its referendum joker-card for independence. From Machakos onward, the course for division and further instability had been negotiated. As argued in mainstream discussions, Sudan has reached a destination, but there are only two plausible implications for the chosen destinations. It is either a resort back to conflict or stability. Unfortunately, the tendency and potentials for stable peace and transformation is highly slim.

MACHAKOS DECEIT: BACK TO SQUARE ONE

Many opinions in mainstream debate, especially those of personalities such as the late John Garang, have described the fundamental problems of the Sudan as a blend of identity crisis expressed in 'ethnicism', 'Islamism', 'Arabism', victimisation and marginalisation. Against this opinion, I would like to contend that the so-called fundamental problems of identity are only manifestations of the core problem of struggles for resource control; of rights and access. I have selected precursors of the two civil wars in the defunct Sudan to explain this argument.

First, the repudiation of the 1947 Juba agreement,²⁶ which led to the first civil war, was upon the claim that Southern Sudan suffers alienation from political participation and perpetual domination of the North. Obviously, this was not just a clamour for inclusion, or struggles for political offices, but of accruable benefits from political and resource control. Again, the inception of the second civil war around 1982 is connected with the discovery of oil in the Sudan from 1978 to 1982.²⁷ This period also witnessed the re-grouping of the Anya Nya II to form the SPLM that was to champion the struggle from that period onward.²⁸ Is this a case of coincidence? There is the proclivity to think that, since oil was first struck in Bentiu and Heglig area of South Sudan,²⁹ the impetus for a vehement push for secession was established, such that, an independent South Sudan might eliminate its bullies and gain full control of this commonwealth. Once that vision is achieved, the region would land itself in untold fortune, and there would be an end to marginalisation and victimisation, after all, nature has blessed the aggrieved South with this resource. Yet, this illusion could not be achieved, except with vehemence and shedding of blood. In affirmation, Alazar K. said:

Oil is at the base of the sporadic bouts of armed conflicts and fear of future instability in Sudan. The physical concentration of oil fields (in Southern Sudan) breeds calls for secession as the lack of social benefits and environmental degradation of oil extraction foster grievances among local communities.³⁰

In the Sudan, from a social identity theory lens, a *minimal condition* for conflict has been stimulated by struggles for accruable group benefits from a commonwealth. This is to suggest that division along religious, ethnic and geo-political lines does exist, until an aggrieved sect realised that it could no longer suffer being short-changed in its access to commonwealth.

Regrettably, the Machakos protocol was not positioned to deal with the core problems of resource control but only its symptoms. It explains the rationale behind the push for Sharia and self-determination at Machakos. With Sharia in place, the idea is that it would be difficult to fight for rule of law, because Sharia does not allow for collegial debate but absolutism. Consequently, once Sharia is enthroned, and the country leavened with *Arabism*, access and control of resources will be secured. Also, the clamour for self-determination at Machakos was only to give autonomy and legitimise control over resources in the region to the Southern Sudanese. Predictably, the situation did not appear differently because of the dynamics of resource control – oil.

This is a reflection of the Machakos jumble, such that subsequent protocols that made up the comprehensive peace agreement only became add-ons to resolve the lapses and inadequacies of the initial. No thanks to the divergent views of the factions on the core objective of the CPA, during implementation, each of the factions raced to fulfil its parochial objective. This is because each had an illusion of a zero-sum victory to gain control over resources. For instance, while the NCP led-government won the 2010 general elections; SPLM/A decided not to dispute the results, even in the face of prevalent irregularities. SPLM did the same in South Sudan, because it had covert reasons to ensure its impending referendum was held on schedule. Therefore, it would not bring up unnecessary power struggle to destabilise the course of timelines, and ruin its secessionist grand plan. Finally, amid bickering and threat, the referendum was conducted with overwhelming results in its favour.³¹

Since secession has been achieved with the independence of South Sudan, the complexities around what is known today as *post-referendum issues*³² may not disappear any sooner. According to the UN and Jon Temin of USIP, there are about eight (8) post-referendum issues that becloud the future of the two Sudanese countries, which the belligerent divides have debated endlessly, and fiercely too. These issues are: border demarcation, Abyei, oil, water, citizenship, debts and assets, currency, international

agreements and security.³³ While security between and in the two countries remained volatile, the stability deliverables of independence has become a chimera. In fact, everyday between and within the new countries, there is at least an incidence of killings, as well as brewing tension of instability. It is therefore compelling to push forward that the complexities and new issues generated by misperceptions of the CPA has acute implications for transformation and a return of hostilities. I would demonstrate the validity of this assertion with current complexities around Abyei and oil between the two new Sudanese states.

ABYEI QUESTION

The agreement at Machakos deepened the gulf between North and South Sudan, because its provision created the need for border demarcation to determine the jurisdiction of authority for South Sudan, upon the 1956 independence ruling.³⁴ One implication of the provision was that borderline areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile remained part of Northern jurisdiction. Although residents of these three areas, as often called, were not ethnic Ngok Dinka except those in Abyei, they paid allegiance to SPLM. They had supported the rebels against the central government in the course of the war.³⁵ Consequently, when the declaration on jurisdiction was made, these areas never wanted to be under the leadership of the North, and the SPLM fought for a referendum for these areas to decide their future, either as part of North or South Sudan.³⁶ However, Abyei – a small parcel of land located in the North between north-south demarcations-became central in the conflict. In fact, the CPA described Abyei as the bridge between North and South Sudan.³⁷ One major reason for the centrality is that Abyei is resource endowed.³⁸

Abyei area is mostly occupied by Ngok Dinka ethnic group, but Misseriya ethnic group which lives around Kordofan usually migrates into Abyei around River Kiir once a year, in search of grazing for their cattle, because they are nomads.³⁹ Upon the implementation of limited autonomy for South Sudan, the borderline demarcation could not be implemented, because Abyei Ngok Dinka sect refused to be ceded to North Sudan, while Misseriya sect thought their rights to grazing would be jeopardised, should Abyei be ceded to South Sudan. Accordingly, Misseriya resented the clamour of the Ngok Dinka group, and then conflict broke out, because the belligerent divides suddenly occupied Abyei and made it a theatre of confrontation. In resolving the conflict, Article 2.1 of the Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict (2004), placed Abyei under a special administration, supervised by the central government, and promised a

referendum would be held, simultaneously with that of South Sudan, to determine their future. What followed were complex hostilities between the two ethnic groups who have once co-existed peacefully, but now are stooges of the divides. Though there are several allegations of support from North-South factions to kinsmen in Abyei, both factions have denied these vehemently.⁴⁰

A new ray of hope emerged at the conclusion of the Abyei Area Referendum Act of 2009. Article 4–5 in chapter II of the Act states: *'Abyei area residents shall exercise their right to determine their future administrative status through a referendum....And shall be conducted in the Abyei Area on 9 January 2011.'*⁴¹ Whatever the outcome of the said referendum, the Act guaranteed a perpetual grazing and movement rights to the Misseriya ethnic group.⁴² Up till the time of this write-up, there has been no referendum in Abyei, why? The complex issues around the accurate definition of the 'residents of Abyei', question of borderline demarcation and anxiety over rights to pastoral necessities have blocked the realisation of the referendum. While the CPA defined residents of Abyei to include the Misseriya who only come into the area once, every six months, the Abyei Area Referendum Act tacitly said nothing about this definition. So, the question of who should vote in the referendum has been pertinent to the end of hostilities.

In summarising the situation in Abyei today and casting a shadow of a return of hostilities on the two Sudanese states, as far back as 2007, an International Crisis Group report, credited to François Grignon, Africa Program Director, says:

What happens in Abyei is likely to determine whether Sudan consolidates the peace or returns to war.... Progress there would unlock a broader set of problems challenging CPA implementation, just as renewed violence would likely break the CPA – with tragic consequences.⁴³

In the same line of thought, analysis credited to Rebecca Hamilton described *how a residency dispute in one key town (Abyei) could lead Sudan back to war*.⁴⁴ It is clear that wherever Abyei falls eventually, if it ever does, the eternal seed of intermittent conflict is sown already. In fact, a statement released on 9 January 2012, by the Abyei Ngok Dinka to commemorate the failed referendum of Abyei reads:

'...being citizens of South Sudan as enshrined in our Transitional Constitution and convinced that Abyei Area is part and parcel of South Sudan; we plead to the leadership and peoples of our new state of South Sudan to remain focused on Abyei area until its inclusion within South Sudan is acknowledged by the Government of Sudan.'⁴⁵

In essence, this shows the determination of Abyei Ngok Dinka to actualise their dreams at any cost possible.

OIL DOOM

Oil exploration by Chevron in the areas designated by former president Nimeiri found nothing, according to Abel Alier, until the company went further south and discovered oil around Muglad and Melut area of Southern Sudan around 1975 and 1979.⁴⁶ This paper shares the opinion that oil, or more broadly resources control, is at the root of the problems in the defunct Sudan. One of the difficult issues at the rise of insurgence in 1982 stems from the discovery of oil. Negotiators at Machakos did not really identify issues around oil as critical to peace, until the agreement was signed, which in turn necessitated the protocol on wealth-sharing in 2004. However, the pursuit for absolute control, over this global commodity, is clearly inherent in the struggles for Sharia and self-determination. As at 2002, revenue from oil exploration and export contributed about 98% of the total income of the Sudan.⁴⁷ With Machakos and related protocols signed, 98% of income to South Sudan depended on its oil receipt, following the 50:50 sharing formula stipulated by the CPA, and about 75% for the Government of Sudan.⁴⁸

Complexities emerged as South Sudan continued to complain about its allocation from the central government, upon a suspicion of being short-changed of its share of the total revenue, because it was difficult to determine how many barrels of oil was explored per time and at what value. It was only rational for South Sudan that was aware of the vast deposits in its territory to envision the awaited referendum for independence as the only way to wrestle over the control of this resource from the Government of Sudan; on this cause, they have a basis to fight for absolute control. One major argument for this line of thought has been the asymmetric development in the country, where the Southerners live in abject penury, and Khartoum had suddenly transformed into a modern city in record time. Again in support of this cause, though oil is explored in South Sudan, the refinery has been located in Khartoum, hence the saying: *'In Sudan, oil flows northwards'*. Though the location of refinery makes some sense in reflecting even development, it made no economic sense.

Upon South Sudan independence, these complexities continued to receive attention at the Addis Ababa talks, led by the African Union High Level Implementation Panel, where oil is central.⁴⁹ The post-independence challenge over oil has two major arguments from the divides. For the Republic of South Sudan, the complaint is the transit fee charges of US\$36 per barrel by North Sudan for its use of the oil pipeline to Khartoum. The

fee is outrageously above the international standard of US\$1 per barrel, and since then, oil from South Sudan has been confiscated by the Government of Sudan to the tune of about US\$815 million.⁵⁰ The Government of Sudan charged back that South Sudan had defaulted in paying its share of oil revenue and transit fees. In the midst of this imbroglio, South Sudan decided to shut down oil production indefinitely, while it promised to continue negotiations in Addis Ababa.⁵¹ The course for the return of hostilities looms large, depending on whatever resolution comes out of the Addis Ababa negotiations. This is because North Sudan cannot afford to live with 75% of its income depleted. In fact, its 2012 budget is based on estimated revenues from oil-sharing and transit fees. There are indications that North Sudan would vehemently frustrate the construction of an alternative pipeline to route oil out of South Sudan. Anticipating this disappointment also, the Sudan president charged the army to get ready for a full-scale war,⁵² possibly in the event that negotiations in Addis Ababa turn out unfavourable. This ambition had met stiff caution from the military, which called for reforms and complained about corruption and the infiltration of the army with political conflict between Islamists and the NCP government.⁵³ The only source of its access to oil might be the Heglig fields in Abyei, and this brings us back to Abyei, because the area is about to experience the worst devastation from North Sudan, in its rootless bid to take control of the region and resources. Buttressing this anticipated return of hostilities, renowned scholar Eric Reeves wrote:

Since an already highly distressed northern economy would implode with the precipitous loss of all oil revenues from the South, economic woes of all sorts could be collectively blamed on a hostile and 'belligerent' South.... If war comes – and it almost daily appears more likely – it will be a war emerging from the indifference, foolishness, and cowardice of an international community that refuses to see the Khartoum regime for what it is, or even to speak honestly about what it has done and continues to do to the marginalised peoples of Darfur, Eastern Sudan, Abyei, Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and increasingly the border regions inside South Sudan. We have reached the brink of war.⁵⁴

Given the above, however comprehensive the CPA appeared, these were some complex issues it was not wired to anticipate, much less put under control. Over these complexities, the CPA had no clue of resolution, because the root problem of political economy was not the focus of conflict resolution at Machakos, not even at Naivasha. In consequence, the CPA had rather created new and complex issues with proven difficulties, setting a new stage for a continuation of the old conflict, or the beginning of new rounds of hostilities.

DID THE CPA TURN OUT SUCCESSFUL?

Since the independence of South Sudan terminated the CPA, there is a need to briefly appraise outcomes against expectations, so as to draw lessons for the future. The *mediationalists*, however fallible, have provided certain arguments which I have adopted as yardsticks. According to Christopher Mitchell⁵⁵, *success or failure* of a peace agreement is inherently relative in that while some agreements do not strike a ceasefire, some probably strike a ceasefire, but never see the light of implementation, while others collapse during implementation.

In most conflict situations, it appears sensible to hurriedly push for a ceasefire to bring the deteriorating condition under control. This anxiety blurs the success-failure point of any agreement. Osler Hampson helps us visualise this endpoint by creating two canons as criteria to observe; the '*minimalist*' and '*comprehensive*' criteria.⁵⁶ According to his postulations, a ceasefire and completion of a peace agreement document, often signalled by handshaking between belligerents at the signing of a peace document, represents a '*minimalist terms*' of success definition. For him, '*comprehensive terms*' could be represented by demobilisation of forces, arms surrender, restoration of political order, or establishment of participatory democratic political institutions.⁵⁷ In other words, Hampson and Mitchell agreed that a baseline indicator for success could be the surrender of arms between belligerents. Yet, this is often a difficult task even with the help of capable interveners. The establishment of 'transformational stability'⁵⁸ and the rise of civil society could be taken as indicators of comprehensive criteria. Nevertheless, whether signatories would abide by their agreements is often a difficult question to answer.

In our context, the CPA had a ceasefire arrangement that somewhat created a relative kind of order, but it is not easy to determine its success. Though there were many contravening forces that threatened to derail the process, it was implemented. But, it was an implementation strictly on the letters and divergent visions of the agreement. In minimalist terms, the CPA had too many handshakes and *too many agreements dishonored!*⁵⁹ Also, there was never a record of virtual arms surrender; for instance, shortly after negotiations in Machakos several counter-attacks were carried out by the factions.⁶⁰ In comprehensive terms, there are many reasons to doubt that the CPA ever recorded success. This is because demobilisation of forces and stability was hardly ever achieved, there is no trace of the rise of civil society, and political transformation was only an illusion despite a series of elections. With these yardsticks and current realities in the two Sudanese countries, the CPA may not be rated successful; rather it is a failure, because it has become a platform for future instability.

DID THE CPA ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES?

The question around CPA objectives is very crucial. In my opinion, there are two measurable objectives of the CPA; *belligerents' expectation* and *normative objectives*. While the normative objective sought peace and stability, the expectation of the belligerents is immediately spelt out in the provisions that made up the comprehensive peace agreement, but to be achieved through illusory and parochial strategies. It is compelling to say the CPA did achieve its provisions; however, there are many flaws over the normative objectives. For the provisions of the agreement: limited autonomy for South Sudan, implementation of interim periods to election, the enthronement of Sharia and referendum etc., it appeared there was no winner, no vanquished. This is because all the covert wishes of the agreement were carried out, however haphazardly. But the expected normative outcomes of unity, eternal peace, stability and security, cessation of conflict, end to religious and ethnic tension, end of victimisation, marginalisation and inequalities, resolution of Abyei question and issues in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states and democratic transformation have largely remained unsolvable.

To buttress this point with current affairs between and within the two countries, 29 January 2012 news reports said the President Al-Bashir and his defence minister charged the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to '*prepare for the possibility of a full-scale war with South Sudan*'. Interestingly, the SAF representatives rejected the call.⁶¹ In support of the war claims, on 27 January 2012, satellite images from the Sentinel project⁶² affirmed the SAF was moving military hardware into position in the borderline areas to contain the Nuba people from escaping into South Sudan, as routes for humanitarian assistance and rescue operations have been blocked. In North Sudan, amid soaring inflation, a poor economy due to scarce petro-dollar and corruption, there is a growing resentment and dissatisfaction with the NCP-led government. The ruling NCP keeps fighting to consolidate its strangle hold on power at all cost, as a way to escape the warrant of arrest issued by the ICC, on the grounds of war crimes in Darfur.⁶³ While the ripple effect of the Arab spring is perhaps taking its toll on the sit-tight leadership in Sudan, political tension from SPLM-North rebels, Islamist groups, other opposition, as well an army revolt might make North Sudan ungovernable for President Al-Bashir. In South Sudan, on 1 February 2012, the UN spokesman, Martin Nesirky, confirmed the killing of about 78 people, 68 wounded, nine missing and thousands displaced in then recent militia attacks in Warrap state.⁶⁴ Ethnic conflicts have continued in South Sudan between Lou Nuer and Murle in Jonglei state, while Lake State has levelled allegations of marginalisation against the government in Juba.⁶⁵

These are pointers to the failure of the agreement to achieve its normative objectives. To a substantial degree, the CPA has been more than disappointing to bring about democratic transformation, stability and an end to religious and ethnic strife. It has not orchestrated the improvement of humanitarian condition, especially in South Sudan and the border areas; rather there has been incessant loss of life, and security in the two countries has remained volatile. Even with the enthusiastic advent of independence, not much has changed with regards to sudden loss of life. If a peace agreement was meant to bring about meaningful change, in terms of transformation and increased livelihood opportunities, but the issues of threat of war and actual conflict persist, then to a very large extent, the CPA apparently has left much to be desired, because it succeeded in dividing the country instead of preserving its unity.

CONCLUSION

The question why the CPA is central to the return of hostilities between and within North-South Sudan is obvious, based on the arguments in the preceding sections. For clarity, the CPA has not been able to address the core problems in Sudan. While it was wired to address symptoms of victimisation, Islamisation, Arabisation and marginalisation, issues of political economy of resource control were neglected; that was why the Machakos protocol tried to appease each party equally, by ensuring they got their demands unscathed. Though the CPA fused options for unity and separation together, the appeal for separation was stronger.

Also, complexities arising from the fusion of contradictory options rendered the CPA ineffective in delivering democratic transformation as envisaged. Even the whole architecture of the CPA had no mechanism to prevent or tackle new conflicts; rather it created new problems with new dynamism. The new dynamism around oil, citizenship, Abyei, security, asset sharing, democratic transformation, authoritarianism, marginalisation, victimisation and struggles for control both within and between the two Sudan states has created a new anxiety and reasons to envision a return of hostilities. In the two countries, the only escape path is the enthronement of a government that takes a more inclusive approach and responsibility for collective equal participation; without this, a return of conflict is imminent.

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Africa and the Impending Nano-divide

An Overview on Temporal and Normative Perspectives

Hailemichael T. Demissie and Mammo Muchie

INTRODUCTION

In the same way as the respective ‘divides’ that previous technologies prompted, the ‘nano-divide’ is thought to be engendered by the disregard and violation of the demands of justice and its human rights standards. Nelson Mandela (1995) needed to reiterate this while entering his warning about the consequences of the deepening of the digital divide:

If more than half the world is denied access to the means of communication, the people of developing countries will not be fully part of the modern world. For in the 21st century, the capacity to communicate will almost certainly be a key human right.

The ‘digital divide’, while not a precise notion, has served valuable purposes as an important discursive tool. However, it remains an elusive concept that appropriates new meaning following the changes in the underlying technology. The phrase survived its variable referents owing to its dynamic use as a gateway notion for various social and technological divides.

Mandela (1995) underscored that the right to access the technologies is a human right and ‘their denial is made an instrument of repression’. With the ever more powerful information technology advancing ever more rapidly and converging with nanotechnology and other technologies, the topicality of Mandela’s take on the ‘digital divide’ is hardly affected by the change in the underlying technologies or the passage of time. The divide between the haves and have-nots manifested in the digital and other divides is now set to re-emerge as the ‘nano-divide’. Like the ‘digital divide’, the ‘nano-divide’ is not an exact term but it has gained the discursive status to serve the purpose that the notion of ‘digital divide’ has served so effectively. While not yet a distinct notion, it is nevertheless a very useful concept that captures

the fears and anxieties arising from the business-as-usual approach to the governance of nanotechnology and other emerging technologies.

Conceptualising the nano-divide does not require excessively imaginative and predictive analytical power. Some even consider it as an extension of the already existing technological divide ‘with “nano” in front of it’ (Sparrow, 2007, p.90). Accordingly, the nano-divide is said to be already here with us and finds expression in exclusionary proprietary rights. Nonetheless, the nano-divide remains a phenomenon with its own distinctive features and we need not be dissuaded by its conceptualisation as a continuation of existing divides. It certainly will enlarge and consolidate the ‘digital divide’ – a challenge which humanity has not yet resolved. Thus far, there has been remarkably little attention to the nano-divide despite the alarming rate of nanotechnology-led developments. (Miller, 2008, p.216).

The digital divide was measured often taking the distribution of computers or internet connectivity in Africa against same in other regions. Africa needs to vigorously engage the nanotechnology revolution to avoid a similar divide with respect to the benefits of nanotechnology; it cannot afford to miss out this time to find itself on the inhospitable side of the nano-divide, with unheard-of consequences. The present paper offers an overview of some of the issues relating to the temporal dimensions and the normative aspects of the nano-divide. Given the relatively new discourse on the nano-divide, these themes are at the moment under-researched. The paper seeks to contribute to the discourse by drawing attention to these relatively neglected perspectives of the nano-divide.

The paper is in three parts. In part I, it provides a background to the concept of the ‘nano-divide’ using resources on the relatively developed concept of the digital divide. It aims at identifying the parallels between the two notions and analyse the distinctive features that the concept of nano-divide introduces. Part II raises the issue on whether the concept of nano-divide will crystallise into a robust discursive tool to address the challenges that humanity faces. The paper argues that, notwithstanding its fuzziness, the concept should be retained and developed to capture these challenges and avert the horrid scenarios in which those missing out from the nanotechnology revolution will find themselves. Highlighting the normative connotations of the nano-divide, the paper reasons why its conceptualisation as a form of apartheid and the use of the more fitting term ‘nano-apartheid’ is justified. Part III further elaborates how the concept of the digital divide was used to mobilise resources and the possibility of emulating the ICT4D movement in the context of the nanotechnology revolution in convening the Nano4D movement. The paper argues that the Nano4D movement should draw the lessons from the ICT4D movement, especially by focusing on the temporal perspective of the movement. It should reflect the

current rate of technological progress while employing nanotechnology as an instrument of development.

FROM THE DIGITAL TO THE NANO-DIVIDE

THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: NOW YOU SEE IT, NOW YOU DON'T

The nano-divide may be taken as an updated version of the digital divide. The impassioned debate on the digital divide, which has been 'the theme of a dazzling outpouring of literature' in recent decades, has undergone a thorough transformation trying to keep abreast of the underlying technological changes and attendant governance regimes (Pieterse, 2005, p.12). Sceptics and enthusiasts make diverging evaluations of the digital divide. Optimistic enthusiasts capitalise on the gains made by way of bridging the digital divide. The optimists plead that we should be worrying less about the digital divide because it is narrowing and where it persists its effect is just benign.

The indicators pointing to the fact that the digital divide is no longer a yawning divide are commonplace. According to a Cisco forecast, there will be more mobile phones than humans on the planet in 2012 (BBC, 2012a). It is said that a Masai warrior with his cell phone today has access to more information than the president of the United States had twenty-five years ago (Diamandis and Kotler, 2012, p.9). Cell phones are inundating rural Africa; China just passed the milestone stage of half a billion 'netizens'. It is a fact that there is more internet accessibility and that it is on a steady rise with 200 million people accessing the internet for the first time every year (BBC, 2012b). These developments have immensely enhanced participation in many areas of economic and social life benefitting millions and millions of people across the globe.

While welcoming and celebrating these achievements, one should not lose sight of the need to remain vigilant not only in maintaining and bolstering the current momentum in efforts at bridging the existing gaps but also in paying attention to the new divides that are emerging at various levels. While China hitting the landmark population of half a billion internet users is another 'great leap forward', it is a mere 40% of its entire population – almost half the proportion in the developed world where 70-80 % are netizens (Simpson, 2012). With a third of Americans denied access to home broadband connectivity despite America boasting the world's most developed ICT infrastructure, the digital divide remains a drawback the developed world has yet to overcome (FCC, 2012). The challenge in Africa is visibly enormous and massively compounded by the many development

challenges peculiar to Africa including lack of infrastructure and investment. It is no wonder that Africa is used as the quasi-standard reference for measuring the digital divide.¹

The assessment that the digital divide is narrowing is perennially tentative. The narrowing of the digital divide is uncertain as it is constantly replaced by a 'new digital divide' that new capabilities create. No sooner is a gap patched up at one spot than another gap springs up somewhere else. It is in this sense that the digital divide is said to be deepening and not narrowing. These 'status divisions' may emerge when some are able to reap the benefits of the latest technology while others are excluded from the benefits even though they have access to existing capabilities that are quickly dating (Tranter and Willis, 2002). Such kind of divide amplifies the other existing divides in the ability to access computers and internet services.

It is proving difficult to distinguish between moments of inclusion and exclusion given the breathtaking developments in technology innovation that is geared towards the continual obsolescing of prior technologies. It is a truism of the competitive drive in technological innovation that new capabilities are developed with the purpose of undermining the advantages that accrued to adopters of earlier technologies. It has been rightly remarked that '[b]ridging the digital divide is mopping up with the tap open' (Pieterse, 2005, p.14). The divide is likely to deepen with disruptive technologies like nanotechnology and other technologies coalescing around it and overhauling the entire techno-science human endeavour.

The digital divide is understood not as a fixed notion but as 'a moving signifier' (Graham, 2011, p.213) serving as a gateway notion to refer to emerging gaps not only of access to technology but also societal discrepancies in socioeconomic terms. The digital divide is concerned not so much with technology as with its 'significant societal ramifications' (Carvin quoted in Gunkel, 2003, p.509). Having analysed the 'fundamental plurality' of the term, Gunkel (2003, p.516) concluded that:

... the term digital divide is originally equivocal, irreducibly plural, and constantly flexible. It names not one problem, but a changing constellation of different and not always related concerns.

However, the central idea predominantly referred to by the term relates to information and communication technologies (ICTs).

The debate has barely begun on whether the digital divide captures the changes brought about by the concurrent and convergent developments in ICT and nanotechnology and other emerging and converging technologies. Certainly, the digital divide debate will be revamped with the advent of these new technologies. What lessons are to be drawn from the digital

divide discourse for the debate on the nano-divide? Which arguments need revision and which need to be categorised as non-issues? These and similar questions will be among the defining issues of the discourse on nanotechnology in general and the nano-divide in particular.

THE NANO REVOLUTION AND THE NANO-DIVIDE – DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN

The synergistic convergence of ICTs and nanotechnology is likely to exacerbate existing socio-economic divides if the radical measures debated under the rubrics of the digital divide go unheeded. The convergence of ICTs and nanotechnology is part of the bigger technological convergence characteristic of contemporary techno-science. Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information technology and Cognitive Sciences are integrally fused and collectively treated as 'convergent technologies' under various acronyms: NBIC (Nano, Bio, Info, Cogno) (Roco and Bainbridge, 2002, p.1), BANG (Bits, Atoms, Neurons and Genes) (ETC Group, 2005), GNR (Genetics, Nanotechnology and Robotics) (Joy, 2000). In this convergence, nanotechnology 'occupies an elevated position' (Loveridge, 2004). The basis of this convergence is the very subject matter of nanotechnology research – *'the material unity at the nano-scale'* (Roco and Bainbridge, 2002, p.1). As the key technology in the convergence of technologies, nanotechnology is catalysing the revolution in other technologies.

The revolution unleashed by the convergence of technologies in which nanotechnology occupies a decisive position is 'a revolution of a kind never experienced before' (Loveridge, 2004); it is not just another scientific or social revolution but a 'meta-revolution' ushering in a fundamental paradigmatic shift (Hunt, 2006, p.44). The atom-by-atom manipulation of matter that is identified as the 'generic capability of malleability' of matter is a central feature of the revolutionary nature of nanotechnology (Moor, 2005, p.116).

With the advent of nanotechnology, it is time to re-examine the scepticism that ICT and, in general, technology is not a magic bullet, a holy grail or a panacea. This view has impacted technology innovation policy in developing countries until recent revisions that have put science and technology firmly on top of the development agenda (Secretariat of NEPAD and DST, 2003). However, there is still a massive under-appreciation and an undeserved modesty about the capabilities that technology can endow us with.

The ICT – nanotechnology convergence will equip us with the power to further shorten the road from bits to atoms to the extent of a practical

overlap of the virtual and the real whereby the atom by atom manipulation of matter is digitally mastered turning matter into 'digital matter'.² Digital technology pioneer, Nicholas Negroponte, distinguished bits from atoms to highlight the limits of the ICT revolution. Negroponte (1996, p.228) remarked that 'bits are not edible; in that sense they cannot stop hunger.'

The promise of nanotechnology may prove Negroponte's assumption wrong. As envisaged in the prescient sci-fi scenarios from Neal Stephenson's novel, *Diamond Age*, there is a veritable possibility of 'synthetic rice produced by matter compilers' – a central idea in nanotechnology. There is probably an answer to those who argue that sending rice to Africa is more important than sending laptops (BBC, 2007a). For now, thinking of a laptop that prints rice may sound incredibly sci-fi but the pointers indicate nowhere but in this direction. The merging of the PC (Personal Computer) and the MC (Matter Compiler), the computer and the 'chemputer', has earnestly begun as evidenced by the concepts of 'digital matter' and the now commonplace 3D printing that promises the printing of not only inanimate objects but also items like spare human organs and food (Euro News, 2011; Adams, 2012).

Arguments that technology is not a panacea, a magic bullet, or a holy grail – legacy arguments from the digital divide debate – will have to be examined in light of the developments in nanotechnology and the technologies that it is energising. Contemporary technology offers more than magic. Thus goes a famous quote by sci-fi writer Arthur C Clarke that has since been dubbed as Clarke's Law: 'Any sufficiently developed technology is indistinguishable from magic' (Quoted in Reynolds, 2007; See also Hall, 2005, p.16). It has now become 'difficult to over-estimate nanotechnology's likely implications for society' (Saxston, 2008, p.7).

Another sci-fi writer specifically speaks of nanotechnology and whether there will be anything that nanotechnology cannot do. Neal Stephenson (1995, p.31) portrays an age where 'the cultural role in deciding what should be done with it (nanotechnology) had become far more important than imagining what could be done with it'. This representation of nanotechnology is thoroughly endorsed by the sober social science research (Bruns, 2004; Millburn, 2002; Treder and Phoenix, 2007, p.316; Wood *et al*, 2007, p.17). The narrative bypasses the empirical question as to what nanotechnology can do while identifying the normative question as to what should be done with it as the foremost preoccupation.

While Stephenson envisioned the scenario for the sci-fi future, the issue is considered as the pressing ethical issue for the here and now – 'the bigger issue' according to Greenpeace UK's Doug Parr (2003). The issue is about the obstacles that may prevent the benefits from reaching everyone. Worried about humanity's readiness to effectively deal with the predatory

desire to withhold its benefits, others prod us to take Stephenson's sci-fi scenario seriously.

A technology that can be copied at will, and that can produce a wide range of valuable products out of nothing but information, energy, and simple raw materials, will naturally spread widely unless something or someone actively prevents it. A number of organisations will want to do just that. (Treder and Phoenix, 2007, p.316)

We are also urged not to be distracted by the futuristic aura that shrouds nanotechnology's promises: The threat of the withholding of the benefits of the technology is what is actually espoused as a business model and interrogating such a model is the task that we are confronted with today: 'This is the inflection point we stand upon: the balance between the great potential, liberating promise of the technology, and the threat this poses to established ways of doing business' (Koepsell, 2009, p.166).

It is for this reason that we need to stress the discursive status of the nano-divide in the development discourse. Now that there is little, if any, disagreement that science and technology are the critical engines of development, the sticking issue is about diffusion and access.

CONCEPTUALISING THE NANO-DIVIDE

In light of the developments thus far, using the 'digital divide' as a trope inclusive of the nano-divide entails an incredible overstretching of the term and is unlikely to facilitate discussion. The digital divide has been largely conceived as a divide between countries and regions as well as an intra-country divide. With the globalisation of technology, the inter-country divide is to be of less significance than an intra-country divide between communities having access to the respective technology and those denied access. The paper will not dwell much on the inter-country or inter-region nano-divide with its dubious configuration. While the nano-divide is initially thought as an extension of the traditional North-South divide, the accurate configuration is still being worked out: With the rise of countries like China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Singapore, and South Africa with their huge investments on nanotechnology research, there is a suggestion that there is now a 'South-South divide' (Wood et al, 2007, p.17).

The accuracy of the 'South-South divide' argument is contested and this demonstrates that the inter-country or inter-region divide is not as useful as it may be thought (ibid, p.18). It is multi- and cross-national networks and not the national systems as such that play the important role in

research and development. As will be discussed further in the next sections, the more important divide that will be in the limelight is the divide between geographically dispersed constellations of the technology haves and have-nots. Therefore, one of the reasons not to take the nano-divide simply as an extension of the digital divide is the new configuration of the divide that was not quite prominent with respect to ICT diffusion. The other reason to take the nano-divide as distinct from the digital divide is the nature of the changes that nanotechnology brings about. This is evident from some of the arguments that were advanced under the digital divide discourse but make little sense when applied to the nano-divide. Take, for example, the argument by Francis Fukuyama who advocated that the digital divide is often tolerable having merely benign effects (Fukuyama, 2003, p.180). With the convergence of technologies, Fukuyama's argument falls apart. Such argument was utterly invalid even before it is applied in the context of the nano-divide (Brownsword, 2004, p.205). It is no benign consequence if nanotechnology is deployed in such a way that it keeps on driving the wedges further down between the techno-elite and the rest of the world.

The other related argument nestled in the 'digital divide' discourse but cannot be scaled up to the 'nano-divide' discourse refers to the argument that ICT is not an 'unqualified human good' and the charge that the digital divide discourse has the inbuilt normative argument of technological determinism. Gunkel (2003, p.507) accuses those pushing for the narrowing of the digital divide as imagining those without the technology as 'deficient and lacking'. While acknowledging that this perception of the technology have-nots is 'arrogant and paternalistic' (ibid), it may also be necessary to recognise that this is not without some grain of truth even in respect of ICT diffusion and, for stronger reasons, with respect to nano- and bio-technology.

Commenting on the uneven deployment of the relatively benign ICT and its impact on Africa, Castells (1998, p.82) referred to the digital divide as 'the De-humanisation of Africa' using the expression in a more metaphorical sense. In the long run, in the event that humanity fails to avert the nano-divide, the 'de-humanisation' process could get another less metaphorical and more literal meaning. With the ever more powerful information technology advancing ever more rapidly and converging with nanotechnology and other technologies, radical human enhancement is on the horizon. Enhancement technologies may be accelerating the speciation within the human race that may culminate in the split of the species into 'the tall, slim, healthy, attractive, intelligent and creative' genetic upper-class and the 'dim-witted, ugly, squat goblin-like' underclass.³

On a similar score, as the renowned neuroscientist Baroness Greenfield, warned, if the nano-divide materialises, the question will not be limited

to the issues of simply losing out on comfortable lifestyles. The Baroness foresees a sombre scenario worse than anything humanity has ever seen:

[The vast majority] are in danger not only of being disenfranchised from a vastly more comfortable way of life but also of being exploited and abused in ways more sinister, pervasive and cruel than even witnessed by the worst excesses of the colonialist past (Greenfield, 2003, p.268).

She is obviously not alone in this dreary prognostication. The plots in many science fiction scenarios revolve around this split as does the scientific prose examining the scenario⁴ (Silver, 1997, p.282; Annas, 2005, p.51). What is more is that the danger has already been experienced by the developing world even with regard to the deployment of ICT. Philip Emeagwali, the Nigerian IT giant who invented a supercomputer in the 1980s, shares what the Baroness had to say. He warns of a repeat of the horrors of slavery and colonialism comparing ICT with the patently harmless compass that was instrumental in the operations to siphon away slaves. Emeagwali (2007) cites the example of outsourcing of software programming jobs for which the actual programmers work for a pittance while those outsourcing the job pocket the monies that the job brings. Such are the exploitative terms of the practice of outsourcing jobs under which workers at the call centres in developing countries work for firms from the North. As Pieterse (2005, p.13) observes, this is depressingly familiar and bears the hallmarks of the infamous sweatshops set-up in the developing world for export-oriented manufacturing.

It is not merely cheap labour that was subjected to ruthless exploitation as a result of the deployment of ICTs. Africa's tourism industry, an information-intensive industry, is losing its deserved revenues. The operators in the North having control of the information through their sophisticated information processing technologies have control of the business and 'the lion's share of the tourist's share of lions' (Castells, 1998, p.95). Likewise other resources have come under the control of international operators through the technology intensive management of information resulting in Africa's 'downward spiral of competitiveness' (ibid).

The 'nano-divide' phenomenon is perceived as a much deeper and wider divide than its precursors and it requires a matching discourse commensurate with the magnitude of the upheavals that it is poised to trigger. The evaluation that ICT is not an 'unqualified human good' unduly discounts the role of technology in general and the critical centrality of ICT and other emerging technologies. Hence, a re-examination of the digital divide in light of the critical role emerging and converging technologies play in global socio-economic development is long overdue. The term nano-divide has

been the preferred caption for the debate thus far. However, commentators have suggested using stronger terms to capture the emerging chasm clearly unsatisfied with the terms digital and nano-divide – terms somewhat barren of normative clouds. Does the phrase ‘nano-apartheid’ do the job?

PART II: FROM THE NANO-DIVIDE TO NANO-APARTHEID

Two decades on after the formal abolition of the social policy that it described, the word apartheid, ‘arguably one of the few political terms known throughout the world’ is still in very wide circulation (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, p.40). Even though the debate has not subsided on whether the legacy of racial inequality has ceased to have its bearing on current economic inequality, the term is not as racially-oriented as it used to be the case two decades ago. It is often employed to refer to economic inequality irrespective of race and it is increasingly used as a metaphor to capture any discriminatory conduct. From sports people to high clergy, from politicians to academicians, the term has found popularity in non-racial contexts.⁵

Commentators on technology diffusion have also adopted the term apartheid as their metaphor. Castells (1998, p.95), used the phrase ‘technological apartheid’ while discussing the effect of the digital divide on Africa while Pieterse (2005, p.18) chose to use the term ‘cyber/information apartheid’ to refer to those excluded from the information revolution. Referring to the digital divide in America as well as in the rest of the world, Colin Powel preferred the phrase ‘digital apartheid’. The word has also found its place in the latest of the divides – the ‘nano-divide’, alias, ‘knowledge apartheid’ according to the European Commission (2004).

‘Nano-apartheid’ is a more fitting expression to capture the scenarios represented by the term ‘nano-divide’. There is a difference in what the terms nano-divide and nano-apartheid stress. The term nano-divide does not sufficiently cater for the normative issues arising from the uneven diffusion of technology and its implementation as a means of domination. Like the digital divide, it can be interpreted as a value-neutral descriptive concept and as such its theme is ‘unusual because it is ordinary for new technology to spread unevenly’ (Pieterse, 2005, p.18). Technology is introduced to the market with the highest bidder having early access before the price goes down and the technology is made available to more adopters. No matter how it is corrected, the marketplace has always its winners and losers and a gap between them is a prerequisite for its functioning: ‘...this is just the way that things are’ as Weckert (2007, p.60) put it summarising this line of argument. Weckert(ibid) attributes prima facie plausibility to this line of argument saying that ‘there is something almost natural about

this.' The nano-divide simply describes what naturally happens and even tends to justify its occurrence: 'if we want improvements we have to put up with the costs'(ibid). The term nano-apartheid corrects this insidious suggestion that the nano-divide metaphor brings to the discourse.

Unlike the nano-divide, nano-apartheid conveys a clear normative message as to the intolerability of any discrimination should it materialise. It was with this purpose of conveying a clear message that Colin Powel (undated) insisted on using 'an even stronger term', 'digital apartheid', in place of the relatively weaker phrase 'digital divide'. The same logic has led the European Commission (2004) to adopt 'knowledge apartheid' as a moniker for the nano-divide.

Other critiques of the term digital divide also apply to the nano-divide discourse. The digital divide has come under rigorous analysis for its representation of the divide as a dichotomy rather than a continuum. Expressions like 'bridging the divide' paint a picture where there is a gulf over which a bridge has to be built so that the technology 'haves' and the technology 'have-nots' may meet or share some common ground. The problem with such imagery is in its obfuscation of the power of the technology 'haves' to reach the domain of the technology 'have-nots', to manipulate and exploit them. As far as the technology 'haves' are concerned there is no gulf to bridge and the technology divide makes little sense for them. It is not as much an issue of there being no bridge over the gulf as it is an issue of a one way bridge that disadvantages one group on one side of the divide while enabling the group on the other side to move in and out of the other's village.

While for the technology haves, the world has indeed turned into a 'global village', for the rest it has become a ghetto enclosure. This is reminiscent of the apartheid system of segregation that legislated 'a policy of political, social and cultural separation of racially defined communities for the exclusive benefit of one of these communities' (Christopher, 1994, p.1). The nano-divide and its precursors fail to bring out these discriminatory and repressive features of the respective divides. The digital divide has not deterred those with the technology from exploiting the resources of those communities lacking the technology. The digital divide could indeed be used as a means of exploitation which the technology haves may pride themselves with. It may be rightly defended as a competitive advantage. The digital divide discourse remains oblivious to the reality that the technology 'have-nots' are well integrated into the global market albeit at unfavourable terms that subject them to routines of exploitation.

On the other hand, from the side of the technology 'have-nots', as Mandela (1995) underscored, the right to access the technologies is a human right and 'their denial is made an instrument of repression'. Mandela's evaluation of the denial of ICTs as a means of repression finds new

significance and fully applies to the denial of access to emerging technologies. Commentators troubled by the unsettling speed of the advance of the technology and the continuing marginalisation of developing countries find the existing intellectual property regime as ‘an instrument of domination’ that retains and strengthens existing divides (Arya quoted in Maclurcan, 2009, p.147). While it is initially a technological divide, the divide the patenting system creates is held as an economic, social and also political divide simply because those developing the technology first will exploit their ‘prohibitive lead’ for economic, political and military domination and hegemony (ibid).

Such domination which may be rightly named as nano-apartheid is what the future holds for the vast majority if technology continues to be deployed in the same way as it has been deployed heretofore, i.e., as the rich man’s toy. By ‘toys for the rich’, Freeman Dyson (1997, p.197) refers to the literal meaning and to ‘the technological conveniences that are available only to a minority of people and make it harder for those excluded to take part in the economic and cultural life of the community’. It is important to recognise that nano-apartheid will not evolve as a racially-oriented discrepancy. Nor is it to feature mainly as a divide between countries or regions but as a chasm between the techno-elites and the rest of the world – *the vast majority* to use the phrase by Greenfield (2003, p.268).

The other label used to refer to the disenfranchised majority is the term ‘fourth world’ – a term that morphed from a label for countries that are the poorest of the poor to a term signifying ‘the new geography of social exclusion’ (Castells, 1998, p.164). The hungry in mega-cities, the sick suffering from orphan diseases, the marginalised in the rundown districts, prefectures, suburb ghettos, and yosebas of the first world may have more in common with their third world counterparts than with their upper-class countrymen and rightly belong to this non-geographic constellation (BBC, 2007b, Castells, 1998, p.130; Summers, 2009). It is to be noted, however, that Africans remain the major constituencies of the *vast majority* or the *fourth world*: 70% of the bottom billion by Paul Collier’s (2007, p.7) estimate. The identification of this constellation is critical in determining the terms of the debate on nano-apartheid which are set to occupy the central agenda on global development policy in the coming years and decades.

The fundamental issue that the debate around nano-apartheid needs to promote is the development and sustenance of a discourse that would be home for the issue. As technological progress further advances, the interests, agendas and potentials of the technology haves and the technology lacking will continue to diverge and the lack of a shared interest will prove a fundamental challenge. This is a major lesson to be drawn from apartheid proper. It is pointed out that ‘apartheid was a form of the politics

of difference in that it deliberately prevented the development of social cohesion and hindered the development of a shared moral discourse' (Morrow, 2007, p.7). The possibility of failure to develop a shared moral discourse is the anxiety that is animating the debate on nanotechnology. While the debate has begun with public participation and issues of fairness high on the agenda, there is no guarantee that it will proceed in such a way that it will lead to the interrogation of the established ways of business-as-usual with market-led technology diffusion and the uneven distribution of the benefits of technology.

The main concern in Africa is not that the market-led diffusion of nanotechnology does not add to its assets but its disruptive potential in removing the advantages Africa already has: the comparative advantages in the few primary products such as rubber, cotton, copper and diamond will diminish or vanish altogether (ETC Group, 2005). This was echoed by South Africa's former Minister of Science and Technology, Mosibudi Mangena, who warned of the impact of nanotechnology on Africa:

...with the increased investment in nanotechnology research and innovation, most traditional materials in specialised applications will, over time, be replaced by cheaper, functionally rich and stronger nano-materials. It is important to ensure that our natural resources do not become redundant, especially because our economy is still very much dependant on them. (Quoted in Miller, 2008, p.221)

The case of lab-manufactured diamond that began to shake the global diamond mining and trading industry is a compelling instance and an early taste of things to come.⁶ Mined African diamond is certainly to lose its privileged share of the market as purer diamonds 'cultured' in backyard garage workshops take over the market (Maney, 2005). Africa cannot rely on mining its diamonds and the already dwindling revenues it brings or on creating the niche market for 'organic diamonds'.

The impact of the nano-revolution on Africa is in no way limited to the loss of markets for certain commodities. The complete marginalisation and the eventual dumping of Africa into irrelevance cannot be ruled out unless there is an intervention that would reshape the current trends of uneven technology diffusion. Africa would not have the luxury of a choice of entities that will be willing to exploit its people and resources. Africa may find itself yearning for the old good days of arm-twisting by old and new powers whose interest in Africa's resources is set to diminish with the advance of emerging technologies. Africa should have its voice raised about the withholding of the benefits of technology which is capable of eliminating the major, if not all, obstacles to development.

PART III: THE NANO-DIVIDE AS A DEVELOPMENT DISCURSIVE TOOL

FROM ICT4D TO NANO4D, TO NANO4D2 (NANO FOR EXPONENTIAL DEVELOPMENT)

While the concept of digital divide was questioned on grounds of its integrity and the misleading solutions it suggests, its crucial role in the mobilisation of resources and in securing the requisite attention from various angles is acknowledged even by the most ardent critiques of the term (Warschauer, 2003, p.303). Pieterse (2005, p.12) noted that bridging the digital divide has become 'a keynote of development policy' that triggered a movement known by the acronym ICT4D. Like the 'digital divide', the 'nano-divide' is not an exact term but it has the potential to serve the purpose that the notion of 'digital divide' has served so effectively. While not yet a distinct notion, it is nevertheless a very useful concept that captures the fears and anxieties arising from the business-as-usual approach to the governance of nanotechnology.

The ICT4D movement has been the subject of much critiquing and its nanotechnology equivalent – nanotechnology for development (Nano4D), will have to address the issues that such critique has raised. The long standing tradition of promoting technology in the name of development and coming to the aid of the poor, the sick and the hungry should be put to scrutiny. The Nano4D movement would be a preordained failure if it fails to look into the reasons why earlier and existing technologies went flat against the promises made on their behalf.

Government policy documents, outputs of research institutions and particularly corporate marketing and PR literature are littered with such promises. As is usual in the marketing campaigns of biotech firms, Monsanto assumed the responsibility of voicing the needs of the poor and hungry masses. Its marketing manifesto for one of its products was generously entitled: 'Worrying about Starving Future Generations Won't Feed Them. Food Biotechnology Will.' (Quoted in Shiva, 2000, p.96)

Similarly, DuPont, which is now a biotechnology as well as a nanotechnology firm, has a manifesto very much like Monsanto now in the context of both technologies. DuPont chairman and CEO, Chad Holliday (2006), reminded everyone and shareholders in particular saying:

...our mission is sustainable growth – putting our science to work to develop sustainable, global solutions, not only for our customers but for *people everywhere.... But we never forget that we are a business, and our first job is to create value for our shareholders.* Sustainable growth means creating value for our shareholders and for society by developing products that the market demands – and which also are good for the environment and for the health, safety and well-being of people everywhere. (italics added)

Both firms retain the crucial proviso that they are not charities: 'Of course, we are primarily a business. We aim to make profits...' reads the Monsanto manifesto (in Shiva, 2000, p.96). This crucial proviso in effect deletes the lofty statements that appear as premises turning the whole syllogism into a specious argument. However, the firms do not shy away from the Good Samaritan images they have built suggesting that their mission is to help people 'everywhere' especially the poor by developing products for them. The poor and the sick were used as instruments for promoting biotech and pharmaceutical products.

A major criticism of the ICT4D movement was its subservience to the marketing ploys of technology developers; ICT4D is dubbed as 'digital capitalism looking South' (Pieterse, 2005, p.19). Public statements coming from the developed world speak of the opening up of markets and the need to firmly embed ICTs into the pro-competitive arrangements of the market-place (ibid). The poor of the developing world were perceived as vast market opportunities to plug into with the powerful capabilities ICTs afford.

As with biotechnology, the rallying cry of nanotechnology promoters appeals to the needs of the poor and the sick. The reality-check either with previous technologies or with nanotechnology as it has developed thus far does not corroborate the claim of reaching out to the poor. Existing technologies should have long eradicated extreme poverty. Even with the smashing capabilities of our existing technologies, the purpose of developing other technologies is often justified by the deprivation prevailing in technology-lacking communities. Calls to halt nano-research have been condemned as unethical since that would amount to slamming the 'windows of opportunity' on the face of the poor (Bond, 2003, p.17; Meaney, 2006, p.682; Niosi and Reid, 2007, p.437).

The stark irony and what is clearly unethical is the eventuality that technologies are initially developed in the name of the poor and the sick but do not reach them when they desperately need them. With respect to digital technologies, we need to take a pause to examine the ethics of the rapid growth in games and entertainment software and applications as opposed to the sluggish and sometimes stalled attempts to roll out educational and health applications for developing country use. Similarly, we need to interrogate nanotechnology growth in luxury items – cosmetics, sports and fitness equipment and entertainment appliances as opposed to the woe-fully slow progress in nanotechnology products relevant for the poor like water filters, life-saving medicines, food production and other necessities that have long ceased to be of concern in developed countries. The nano-inventory so far does not reflect the initial claims of a pro-poor technology. For those living in the bosom of poverty and yet in extreme proximity to nodes of prosperity in the globalised world, it is a long way before they can

say we had not had our name (mentioned in the marketing manifestoes) for nothing.

FROM NANO4D TO NANO4D² (NANO FOR EXPONENTIAL DEVELOPMENT)

The ICT4D movement grafted onto the market-led approach promises the eventual dripping of the benefits of technology to developing communities. The time dimension of technology diffusion is left for the market to decide. As mentioned above, the view that it is 'quite ordinary' for technology to diffuse unevenly is an entrenched view (Pieterse, 2005, p.18; Weckert, 2007, p.60). The technology will take its time to reach those who need it now. A remarkably speedy diffusion of technology is unlikely if the rate is to be decided by the vagaries of the market. Can the 'technology-hungry' afford another day? The answer to this question is a resounding negative and we only need to look at child and maternal mortality rates that could have been overturned even with the meagre stock of technological resources. By the latest estimates, a child is dying every five seconds (UNICEF, 2011, p.5) and that is a stark reminder that those who need the technologies for their survival cannot afford to wait until they can avail themselves of the technologies through the trickle-down mechanism of the market. What Africa should be after is not merely nanotechnology for development (Nano4D) that promises a drip-drop of benefits but 'nanotechnology for exponential development' conveniently abbreviated as Nano4D².

In the proposed Nano4D² acronym, 4D (for development) is also doubling for the 'fourth dimension' (4D) referring to the temporal component. Now that we have the capabilities in both 2D (digital) and 3D (digital and nanotechnological) it is time that the fourth dimension (4D), the temporal perspective, is seriously engaged. This brings us to the rate of contemporary technological progress and the mismatch with its diffusion.

HOW SOON, HOW FAST?

The realisation of the promises of nanotechnology is likely to take place sooner than might be expected. With the technology at hand, the rate of change itself has changed. What we have at the moment is a 'double' exponential growth where the exponent itself is changing. The rate at which computers are getting faster is increasing: 'Computers are getting faster *faster*' (Grossman, 2011). At the current rate of technological progress, what used to take a 100 years is only likely to happen in 25 years. A thorough revision is due on the validity of the view that in ICT diffusion 'it would take

Africa about a 100 years to reach the 1995 level of Ireland' (Ya'u quoted in Pieterse, 2005, p.14). Such time frame is not only contentious but its inaccuracy is also empirically verifiable. Since the notion was 'inherently spatial' (Graham, 2011, p.211), the temporal perspectives of the digital divide have not attracted much attention. However, as can be seen from the following remark, recent developments in technology diffusion have compelled a shift of focus on the temporal components of the notion of digital divide:

It is nearly always the case that very new technologies emerge first in wealthy countries (Dolly the sheep was cloned in Scotland, not Swaziland) – what is impressive with the history of ICTs is how fast, and how increasingly fast, developing countries begin to catch up. (Fink and Kenny, 2003).

The existing time frames certainly will have to be revised with the clear objective of reflecting the current exponential rate of progress.

The exponential progress should also be married to the idea of leapfrogging to address the massive discontinuities in technological progress that Africa and the developing world have yet to address. This would involve embracing some unworldly ideas. Africa should be opening up to new ideas however crazy they may sound. It is entered that '[t]rue innovation is trying crazy ideas that drive radical breakthroughs'.⁷ These ideas make sense more conveniently with respect to Africa than when they are discussed in the context of other regions. Such is the case of flying cars, for example.⁸

Flying cars will appeal to Africa because of the heavy burden Africa has to bear in building transport infrastructures due to Africa's over-reliance on imported materials often unsuitable for its tropical conditions and the high ecological costs involved (NEPAD Office of Science and Technology, 2006, p.33). Countries with massive transport infrastructures will have less incentive for flying cars than Africa that has much less investments to recoup from its barely developed transport network and the savings it can make by adopting such technological shortcuts. This is no eureka moment for Africa as it has already got the lesson from mobile telephony that removed the last mile problem with landlines. Similarly, Africa need not go through the process the developed world has passed. It need not excessively invest on building malls for retail, railway tracks for trains, or factories for manufacturing. It would make sense to look into the shortcuts the technological fixes are offering such as online retail, flying cars and desktop manufacturing.

The Nano4D movement is underway and it is fortunate to have the ground work done for it by the international decision setting out the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, the MDGs and their time frames are not sufficiently ambitious not because the goals are difficult to achieve but

because the goals themselves are modest.⁹ There is no pretence that poverty will be eradicated; the goal is only to eradicate *extreme* poverty and poverty of other degree is not yet on the radar. What is more is that it is not the total eradication of extreme poverty that is set as a goal but halving it by 2015. Achieving all the goals will be a challenge that would be there well beyond the 2015 rendezvous. UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon vented his disappointment at the progress being made which he said is 'unacceptably slow' (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2010, p.3).

The progress is indeed 'unacceptably slow' especially when seen against the backdrop of technological progress that is proceeding at a double exponential rate. A major task of the Nano4D movement will have to be on addressing the temporal dimension of the development and not whether nanotechnology provides a technological fix. It should be able to place the focus of attention on an accelerated rate of diffusion and the obstacles hindering or otherwise delaying such diffusion. As Al Gore pointed out in his pun on the adage 'justice delayed is justice denied', 'innovation delayed is innovation denied' (Gore, 1994, p.45).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The nano-divide, like its digital equivalent, is a potent tool that has to be deployed for convening and conducting the debate. The nano-divide, despite its fuzziness and shifting conceptions, should emulate the achievements of the digital divide discourse in mobilising resources. However, its instrumentality will be limited if it fails to bring forward the temporal perspectives and the normative aspects that are inherent in the current and upcoming nano-divide discourse. The paper has argued that the nano-divide discourse should duly reflect the time dimension of the current rate of exponential technological progress and the fact that the nano-divide is for all intents and purposes a form of apartheid that should be tackled head on.

Africa should put in place its own mechanisms to engage the nano-divide discourse and negotiate the deployment of the power of nanotechnology for economic development. This may fall under the declared 'overall objective' of 'bridging the technological divide between Africa and the rest of the world' (NEPAD Office of Science and Technology, 2006, p.11). However, setting a bespoke objective of addressing the nano-divide is an indispensable step.

The stake is higher for Africa as it hangs in the lowest rungs of the global economic ladder – a position which makes it not only vulnerable to unprecedented forms of exploitation but also has the potential of rendering

it totally irrelevant. One of the most in/famous dystopian polemics about the current march of technological progress is Bill Joy's article entitled '*Why the future doesn't need us*'. One may add an Orwellian twist to this: since some are 'more equal than others' and since we are not commencing our journey into the technological future on equal footing, there are some in us that the future may spare while disposing of the rest of us. Given the breathtaking exponential technological development, there is a clear danger if the world and Africa in particular fails to secure the debate now. It should avoid being caught napping while giving in to the temptation to dismiss such appeals as alarmist.

The purpose of this paper has not been one of issuing a definitive 'to do' list in averting the nano-divide impacting Africa. It is rather aimed at calling for an awakening and an end to the reticence and indisposition that is quite prevalent in African science, technology and innovation policy. In setting its visions, Africa has unduly limited itself to technologies that are being increasingly displaced by their nanotechnological versions.¹⁰ Africa's focus on biotechnology, for example, does not seem to have taken into account the inroads that nanotechnology is making in biotechnology and the symbiotic convergence that characterises biotechnology today. The AU-NEPAD documents list a rich array of technologies but fail to highlight or even mention nanotechnology as an important area of engagement. This is in stark contrast with other regions of the world where nanotechnology investments and initiatives are led by the highest echelons of political power. There is a clear need to quickly catch up with the advanced regions in establishing nanotechnology initiatives in the trails of the biosciences, laser technology, geo-science and similar AU-NEPAD initiatives. Africa should heed the reminder by President Yoweri Museveni, who is quoted for his remarks on the need to move on from the biotechnology debate that has 'gone on for a very long time while other parts of the world have moved to other technologies like nanotechnology' (Wamboga-Mugirya, 2008).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 See, for example, the comparisons Pieterse (2005, p.12) makes between Africa and Manhattan, and Africa and Tokyo.
- 2 The concept of 'digital matter' is quickly picking up momentum as the 'big-game changer'. As a leading nano-scientist predicts we may be having 'rudimentary molecular manufacturing' as early as 2020. 'Jim Von Ehr says Zyvex will Achieve Digital Matter from Building Blocks by 2015 and Rudimentary Molecular Manufacturing by 2020', 28 May 2010 Interview available at <http://nextbigfuture.com/2010/05/jim-von-ehr-founder-and-owner-of-zyvex.html>. This might mean an answer to Baroness Greenfield's 'big question' on nanotechnology: 'Whether nanotechnology will ever

deliver its potential and achieve this type of precision', i.e., to apply basic mechanics at the atomic level with a pile of atoms-linked to a computer. (Greenfield, 2003, p.174) The capability that is sought behind the concept of 'digital matter' is, as described in the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) website, 'computer-controlled chemistry at the single molecule level' and is hailed as representing 'arguably the most exciting and, to many, definitive example of the power and potential of nanotechnology.' See the description of Professor Philip Moriarty's project, titled 'Digital Matter? Towards Mechanised Mechanosynthesis,' at <http://gow.epsrc.ac.uk/ViewGrant.aspx?GrantRef=EP/G007837/1>.

- 3 The prediction is made by Dr Oliver Curry of the London School of Economics. 'Human species may split in two' at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6057734.stm>. The speciation is portrayed by some as leading to the imminent split between 'the Haves, who have superior intelligence and can live for hundreds of years, and the Have-Nots, who are hampered by their antiquated corporeal forms and beliefs.' Ashlee Vance, 'Merely Human? That's so Yesterday', 11 June 2010, *New York Times*, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/business/13sing.html?pagewanted=1&src=busln>.
- 4 Silver, L., 1997. *Remaking Eden: How Genetic Engineering and Cloning Will Transforming the American Family*. Avon Books.
- 5 Consider these sample headlines: 'Cardinal: failure to address climate change is 'moral apartheid' <http://www.catholicculture.org/news/headlines/index.cfm?storyid=12560>; 'SA is now worse than apartheid state, says Tutu', *Mail&Guardian Online* at <http://mg.co.za/article/2011-10-04-government-worse-than-apartheid-says-tutu/>; 'World Cup scheduling compared to slavery, apartheid', *Mail&Guardian Online* at <http://mg.co.za/article/2011-09-20-world-cup-scheduling-compared-to-slavery-apartheid/>.
- 6 'Cultured diamond' produced at negligible cost using nanotechnology concepts is purer than organic diamond and with made-to-order qualities. This comes as a nightmare for DeBeers, the cartel that dominated the global diamond trade for over a century. It should be more worrying for the countries whose economies have been dependent on the export of diamond for DeBeers is likely to veer towards a strategy to control and exploit the new technology rather than stay in the already strained relationship with exporting countries. For the behind-the-scene dealings for the distribution of the new artificial diamonds see Maney, 2005.
- 7 'X PRIZE's Peter Diamandis : Africa Will Surpass U.S. Innovation' Interview available at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kymmcnicholas/2011/10/21/x-prizes-peter-diamandis-africa-will-surpass-u-s-innovation/>.
- 8 The wait for flying cars has been long as they were among the earliest predictions in sci-fi novels and utopian forecasts. However, the concept is now more 'a work in progress' than a fabric of fantasy. Prototypes of flying cars are being developed by an Israeli company. (<http://www.euronews.net/2011/05/25/the-flying-car-and-home-knitted-scarf/>). The first street-legal flying car is licensed and is now on sale in the US. BBC, 2012, 'NY Auto Show: World's First Skyworthy Car', <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-17626818>. More interesting is the concept of 'matternet' (a word emulated from 'internet') where it is envisaged that an autonomous air vehicle that uses artificial intelligence, robotics and nanotechnology can be used to transport goods and, hence, the opportunity to skip the need for the construction of road and rail networks. See comments in the above Peter Diamandis' interview.
- 9 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are adopted by the UN Millennium Summit in 2000 and are enshrined in its Millennium Declaration. The eight goals are: eradicating

- extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality and empowering women, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing a global partnership for development. The progress towards the goals is measured through 21 targets and 60 indicators (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2010, p.74).
- 10 Among the priority areas in *Africa's Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action* (NEPAD Office of Science and Technology, 2006) are biotechnology and bioscience (nanobiotechnology is now the new brand), the laser technology (now the hot field is nanophotonics), material science (now the focus is on nanomaterials); and there is even a school of thought on nanobiogeoscience instead of the bare geo-science (p.11) that the Plan mentions.
 - 11 Adams, Tim., 2012. 'The "chemputer" that could print out any drug'. *The Guardian*, 21 July 2012., at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2012/jul/21/chemputer-that-prints-out-drugs>. [Accessed 10 August 2012.]
 - 12 Annas, G., 2005. *American Bioethics: Crossing Human Rights and Health Law Boundaries*. Oxford University Press.
 - 13 BBC, 2012a, 'More mobiles than humans in 2012, says Cisco'. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-17047406>. [Accessed 10 August 2012.]
 - 14 BBC, 2012b, 'Web economy in G20 set to double by 2016, Google says'. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16753902>. [Accessed 10 August 2012.]
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Examining the Role of Women in Alleviating Poverty

Phindile Lukhele-Olorunju

INTRODUCTION

Poverty has been categorised into income poverty and human poverty (UNDP Poverty Report cited by Weisfeld-Adams and Andrzejewski, 2008).¹ The UNDP Poverty Report further defines income poverty solely based on levels of monetary income and uses the criteria used by the World Bank which states that people living on less than US\$1 per day are living in extreme poverty, and people who earn less than US\$2 a day are in moderate poverty. About 1.7 billion people are estimated to live in absolute poverty today. Human poverty, on the other hand, has been defined as deprivation on both material and social levels such as lack of proper diet, clothing, shelter, employment, participation in social institutions (clinics, land for farming, credit facilities, etc) and education². It is from this definition that The Hunger Project reports:

Hunger and poverty are powerful but familiar terms. Everyone knows what they mean, yet, they evoke different images for everyone. Even major international organisations mandated to alleviate hunger and poverty use a variety of interpretations. Poverty causes hunger. Not every poor person is hungry, but almost all hungry people are poor. Millions live with hunger and malnourishment because they simply cannot afford to buy enough food, cannot afford nutritious foods or cannot afford the farming supplies they need to grow enough good food of their own. Hunger can be viewed as a dimension of extreme poverty. It is often called the most severe and critical manifestation of poverty.³

The United Nations Development Programme, has defined poverty by its characteristics or what they term poverty pointers: proportion of population below \$1 per day; poverty gap ratio; share of poorest quintile in national consumption; growth rate of GDP per person employed;

employment-to-population ratio; proportion of employed people living below \$1 (PPP) per day; proportion of own-account and contributing family workers in total employment; prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age, and proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption.⁴

From the above definitions it is clear that poverty is not only lack of enough income but also deprivation from basic education, lack of knowledge, health care, water and all other basic amenities. To alleviate poverty therefore requires strategies that attempt to address all the above. The heads of states of 33 African countries committed in 2000 to reducing extreme poverty and meeting certain targets by 2015.⁵ The African Union also declared 2010–2020 as the 'African Women's Decade' with the theme of 'a grassroots approach to gender equality and women's empowerment'. A core focus is agriculture and food security, and the objectives set out are to increase women's access to land, farm inputs, credit and technology, while improving access to markets. AU member states have signed up to the programme's goals and are, they claim, to be driving the policies at home.⁶ The role of governments, the private sector and NGOs can be to positively facilitate the designing of policies and programmes in a holistic fashion in promoting the role of women in solving national problems and addressing women's productive and reproductive roles relating to agriculture and food security.

This paper analyses the causes of poverty in Africa, its impact and the various attempts African women have made to mitigate this scourge. It concludes by arguing that the adoption of supportive national and local development policies that support cooperatives can enhance food security and alleviate poverty.

THE GENERAL CAUSES OF POVERTY

It is important for us to understand what the general causes of poverty are especially in Africa, a well resourced continent (Figure: 1). Poverty is caused by lack of productive employment and decent work; high food prices; vulnerability to climate change; weak institutional capacity in conflict and post conflict areas; rapid urbanisation; low agricultural production especially cereals and legumes; unequal distribution of property rights especially for women farmers (no level ground for production); poor/no link between research/ extension/ producers; colonialism and corruption; poor planning (no well defined policies, poor implementation of policies and plans; and lack of monitoring and evaluation of executed projects).^{7, 8, 9}

The United Nations Women (2011) reporting facts and figures on rural women reveal that estimates suggest that if women had the same access to


productive resources as men, they could increase yields on their farms by 20% to 30%, lifting 100–150 million out of hunger; equal access to resources would raise total agricultural output in developing countries by 2.5–4%, thereby contributing to both food security and economic growth; and that women constitute half of the agricultural labour force in least developed countries.¹⁰ The report shows that countries with the highest levels of hunger also have very high levels of gender inequality and that in sSub-Saharan Africa (Cameroon, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda and Zimbabwe) there are more than 120 women aged from 20 to 59 living in poor households for every 100 men.

THE CHALLENGES FACING AFRICAN WOMEN IN ALLEVIATING POVERTY AND ENSURING FOOD SECURITY

The majority of women are wives and caregivers or mothers, who take care of the home, provide for the family's special needs, and raise their own children and other children from relatives or community, as we know in the African culture everybody's child is your child. Women are expected to provide for the needs of the entire household and distant relatives, and be in a secular job to supplement the family income. Women have a life expectancy ranging from 42 to 79 years which is much higher than that of men (40–72 years): in Africa women tend to live longer than men¹², and carry more social responsibility.

Women play important roles in food security as food producers, keepers of traditional knowledge and preservers of biodiversity, food processors and preparers and food providers. Because of their multiple roles women are key players in overcoming food insecurity. Women produce and distribute food

Figure 1 Africa's Natural Wealth¹¹



within their homes; they participate in agricultural research & make better extension workers. Women are the main collectors, users & managers of water; and they work mostly in the Agricultural sector (58.6% in North Africa)¹³ playing a leading role in biodiversity conservation and sustainable land use. It is also true that women look for more part-time work and work longer hours, sacrificing valuable assets to ensure 'food first', take advantage of harvest season and preserve for tough times (leafy vegetables, tomatoes and store grains where possible). Low income earners join contribution schemes at work and collect enough food at the end of the year to last for up to six months in some households. The adult literacy indicators reveal that in most African countries men are more educated than women.¹⁴ In some countries, less than 20% of the women are educated and yet a lot is expected from them whereas in other countries more than 80% of women are educated. These statistics tell an important story as education is an asset in alleviating poverty in homes and within families.

From the above discussions it is obvious that women carry a lot of responsibilities in human survival and the alleviation of poverty in Africa. Some of the causes of poverty mentioned above include lack of productive employment and decent work especially for women as we know that when there is an economic crunch the first people to suffer are women. Women suffer from unequal distribution of property rights especially women farmers: women cannot own land in most African countries and this affects their ability and desire to adequately use the land, they do not earn equivalent salaries with men for the same work, and cannot access credit. Women are discriminated against especially in Agricultural inputs and services: they receive 7% of agricultural extension services, obtain less than 10% agricultural credit, own only 1% of land, do unpaid farm work, have poor access to markets, lack productive assets, and experience a lot of cultural barriers yet it has been reported that 80% of farming in Africa is done by women and 60% of the world's poorest are women (ILO, 2008).¹⁵

According to ILO (2008), in Kenya only 3% of women had access to the formal financial sector versus 44% of men and in most countries, poverty drove women to be sex workers (quite demeaning and exposing them to the high risk of HIV/AIDS). Inequality in accessing resources, education and stereotyped conceptions in the form of laws and culture including inheritance are all injustices suffered by women across the globe and especially in Africa.

FOOD SECURITY AS EVERYONE'S CONCERN

Food security refers to a state where everyone has access, all the time, to enough, safe and nutritious food. There is food insecurity in most African

countries. In South Africa, for instance, more than 10 million people are food insecure; more than 4 million go to bed hungry everyday as food prices are high because we do not produce our own food. The unemployed and elderly depend on Social grants of R6/700 per month which is not enough to sustain them. Food insecurity relates, not only to the amount, but also to the quality of food in terms of nutrition/ balanced diet.

Food security requires every government to be seriously involved in research which leads to improved crop production systems; development of new varieties; improved soil moisture conservation; optimal use of fertilizers and safe and efficient use of agricultural chemicals. Nutrition is available in African leafy vegetables such as 'Imbuya' (*Amaranthus*) and 'derere' (*Jute mallow*), African traditional legumes such as cowpeas 'tinhlumaya' (*Vigna inguiculata*), bambara groundnut 'tindlubu' (*Vigna subterranea*), green gram 'mngomeni' (*Vigna radiata*), just to mention a few, as well as cereals sorghum (*Sorghum bicolor*) 'amabele', and millet (*Panicum miliaceum*) 'gero'. The Agricultural Research Council of South Africa has researched on some of these crops, for example, leafy vegetables (Table 1) and the neglected legume, Cowpea, scientifically known as *Vigna inguiculata* (Table 2). Much research on these and many other crops has also been done for Africa by the International Institutes for Agricultural Research, under the Collaborative Group on International Agricultural Research, in collaboration with national research institutes. All we need to do is to request for the improved or appropriate varieties, select for adaptation to our own environments and adopt/release those varieties that have the agronomic characteristics we desire in order to ensure nutritional value of food.

Table 1: Nutritional value of Leafy Vegetables

ALVs	Protein (%)	Ca (mg)	Fe (mg)	β-carot. (mg)	Vitamin C (mg)
Amaranths	4.0	480	10	10.7	135
Spiderplant	5.1	262	19	8.7	144
Cowpeas	4.7	152	39	5.7	87
Nightshades	4.6	442	12	8.8	131
Jews Mallow	4.5	360	7.7	6.4	187
Exotic Vegetables					
Kale	–	187	32	7.3	93
Cabbage	1.4	44	–	1.2	33
Spinach	2.3	93	32	5.1	28

Source: FAO and WHO 2008.¹⁰

Table 2: Chemical composition of Cowpea¹⁷

	Seeds	Hay	Leaves
Carbohydrate	56–66		8
Protein	22–24		4.7
Water	11	18	85
Crude fibre	5.9–7.3	9.6	2
Ash	3.4–3.9	23.3	
Fat	1.3–1.5	11.3	0.3
Phosphorus	0.146	2.6	0.063
Calcium	0.104–0.076		0.256
Iron	0.005		0.005

Source Kay, 1979; Tindall, 1983; Quass, 1995.

The United Nations Population Fund (2011)¹⁸ states that the world’s population reached 1 billion in 1804; 2 billion in 1927; 3 billion in 1959; 4 billion in 1974; 5 billion in 1987 and 6 billion in 1998. Twelve years later, with roughly 75 million more births than deaths each year, the world will be inhabited by 7 billion people. Actually the article estimated that by end of October 2011 there will be 7 billion people on earth. The UN projects that the world population could reach 8 billion by 2025, 10 billion by 2083. In sub-Saharan Africa, the demographic news is mostly sobering as the region staggers under the double burden of the world’s highest birthrates and deepest poverty: the current population estimate for sub-Saharan Africa is 900 million and 1.1 billion for the whole of Africa (McKinsey Global Institute).¹⁹

What does all this mean for us? If the world’s population is growing at 200 people per minute and will reach 12 billion by 2050, the big task for the agricultural sector is to produce a large amount of food to provide for the hungry and poor. How is this going to happen? What innovations are taking place to alleviate poverty? What is the role of the State and the AU? What is the role of the Private sector/NGOs/CSOs? And what is the role of women in poverty alleviation, especially related to food security, on the African continent. Kanayo (2011)²⁰ says: ‘The report makes clear that it is time to look at poor smallholder farmers and rural entrepreneurs in a completely new way – not as charity cases but as people whose innovation, dynamism and hard work will bring prosperity to their communities and greater food security to the world in the decades ahead.’

THE CONTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN WOMEN TO THE AFRICAN ECONOMY

The African Union has shown will power and commitment in ensuring the participation of women in the economy, although women still continue to face insurmountable problems and hardships in contributing to the growth of African economies. The development of the AU Gender Policy²¹ as well as the adoption by African Heads of States of Article 4 (1) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union has enshrined the Parity Principle, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa. The AU Heads of State and Government Summit continues to champion gender equality and empowerment through subsequent decisions aimed at accelerating the implementation of their own commitments and Millennium Development Goals in general and, in particular, MDG 3 on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment.

The AU's commitment to gender equality is rooted in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. This commitment is reinforced by the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA)²² and the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development adopted by the Heads of State and Government in 2006.

In Africa, the contribution of African women to the economic activities is considerable, although much of it is informal and therefore not recorded. It is estimated that African women constitute 70% of the informal economy and according to the Food and Agricultural Organisation, Women of Africa are responsible for 70% of the crop production. However, the challenges for African women in participating in economic activities are twofold: for those involved in informal economic activities the challenge is to create access to more formal economic participation; for those who are educated and working in the formal sector the challenge is to move up the corporate ladder. Several reports indicate that the majority of working women in the rural sector work in Agriculture and they still face varying forms of discrimination. Women still receive considerably less money than man and they work longer hours and they continue to have more work burden, considering their roles as unpaid workers and family caregivers. Although Agricultural value chains can offer better wages than traditional agriculture, women are often temporary or casual workers who are given labour intensive unskilled tasks and receive lower wages than their male counterparts.

However, a focus on cooperatives in this paper demonstrates the strength and potential of women in the economy and shifting the emphasis of viewing women as victims but rather as resilient agents of change. Women-led cooperatives and self help groups in different countries have

contributed to rural women's resiliency and income earners as well as new business leaders. However, more support is needed to help rural women to participate in decision making in local, national and regional fora related to food security, agriculture, rural development and climate change. Science and technology should be benefiting rural women in the use of appropriate technologies and to upgrade women farmers' technical skills and increase their knowledge of sustainable agriculture. This can include methods such as improved irrigation methods, participating in seed production and agro-ecological methods of farming. The need to increase the pool of African women researchers in agricultural science so as to contribute effectively to poverty alleviation and food security in Africa is absolutely critical.

THE ROLE OF AFRICAN WOMEN IN SOCIETY: POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND FOOD SECURITY

African women, with the help of some organisations (such as ILO-SIDA and CoopAfrica) have to find ways to be productive, and one of these strategies is to form or be members of cooperatives. A cooperative has been defined by the International Labour Organisation as an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise (ILO Recommendation No. 193, (2002).²³ The ILO (2008)²⁴ reported that women have joined cooperatives because these are powerful vehicles of social inclusion and political and economic empowerment for their members: they ensure and promote gender equality, and as is part of their mandate, members have the benefit of joining forces with others; membership gives them status and voice, assists in job creation, financing projects, self empowerment and development and improved livelihoods. Cooperatives allow women to exercise their rights to participate in decision making at all levels and have equal access to and control of the benefits of development, including land.

The International Labour Organisation (2008) has reported on successful cooperatives where women have shown their potential. Some of the three success stories are in Tanzania; these include the Nronga Women Dairy Cooperative, Women and Youth Employment through improved Beekeepers' Cooperative-type Organisation and the Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO). In Uganda there is the Ugandan Private Midwife Association (SACCO), WOWOYA Savings & Credit Cooperative Society, and Uganda Cooperative Alliance. In Kenya one of the successful cooperatives is the Wamunyu FCS Ltd and Masii FCS Ltd Joint Milk Marketing Initiative. In Southern Africa a successful example is the Capacity Building for Women's

Cooperative Entrepreneurship in Swaziland, the Soweto Home-Based Care Givers Cooperative and the Seed Growers Service Cooperative (Limpopo Department of Agriculture) in South Africa. These are not the only successful cooperatives in Africa but have been chosen to illustrate how women, the state, private sector, and civil society organisations can work together to alleviate poverty and create jobs. Most of the following examples are paraphrased from the ILO report.²⁵

The Nronga Women Dairy Cooperative was supported by ILO-SIDA and CoopAfrica. They trained women to run businesses in much more efficient ways with a focus on profit. They were taught all business skills such as record keeping of production, sales and home consumption; understanding clients' needs and meeting them. This has helped the women to be bold business women who are able to start new business ventures and take risks. This cooperative has trained 400 women in entrepreneurship & business management in Nronga village – through the Start and Improve Your Business (SIYB) project.

The joint milk marketing initiative in Kenya is supported by CoopAfrica. The aim here was to strengthen a few small uneconomic dairy cooperatives. These cooperatives were facing challenges of production and marketing. This initiative, therefore, assisted in conducting value chain mapping, acquiring milk, processing and transport equipment that could be used by the groups. Pooling transport for market purposes would also reduce the cost and increase profits. This initiative consists of 47% Masii and 26% Wamunyu women. What we see here are small dairy cooperatives getting financial support and advice on how to work efficiently and profitably, hence the pooling and training on new farm technologies.

The Women and Youth Employment through Improved Beekeepers' Cooperative-type Organisation has trained women in modern methods of bee-keeping, honey processing, packaging, branding and marketing.

The WOWOYA Savings & Credit Cooperative Society Ltd, supported by the CoopAfrica Challenge Fund, empowered persons living with HIV/AIDS and commercially exploited young women (sex workers) through local poultry rearing. The chicken production project was based at Idudi town, Uganda, and involved a revolving chicken loan scheme (35 local chickens are given to each registered beneficiary and the loan is repaid to SACCO after six months in the form of 35 birds or cash with 2% interest). These women are trained and provided with start-up feeds, a poultry kit and chicken wire to help protect the birds from predators and diseases. The HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment services are integrated within this programme. Fifty HIV/AIDS patients and fifty sex workers were trained to be poultry farmers.

In East Africa, the Cooperative Bank and micro-finance providers have given loan products to women. The membership numbers in SACCO rose

from 85,994 in 2005 to 271,733 in 2008 (36% of total SACCO membership). This improved maternal and infant care and reproductive health; improved performance, governance and efficiency of private midwives and SACCO also led to the purchase of equipment and hiring more staff by the Uganda Private Midwives Association.

The Capacity Building for Women's Cooperative Entrepreneurship in Swaziland is a project funded by AGFUND and DFID –CoopAfrica. About 66% of Swaziland's population lives below the poverty line, 40% are unemployed and 38% of the adult population is HIV/AIDS infected. This project was established to create viable and sustainable cooperative organisations that create economic empowerment, job opportunities and reduction of women exposure to violence. It was also created to build capacity of cooperative trainers and field workers, develop systems and tools for cooperatives and female entrepreneurs.

The Seed Growers Service Cooperative (Limpopo Department of Agriculture) in South Africa is reported by Jeff Mukhari (personal interaction, 2011) of the Limpopo Department of Agriculture (LDA) as a venture that was based on the needs of the farmers to have improved affordable maize varieties. The state and other stakeholders came to the table and strategised. The result was that instead of the government giving them the varieties, it was agreed that the farmers get involved in the variety selection process; they were trained on how to produce seed and get it fit for commercial purposes and a cooperative (Seed Growers Service Cooperative) was later born and expanded to attract Seed Farmers Associations from the different villages. This LDA Seed project empowered women with agricultural and business skills in Limpopo. Seed security is important for food security. According to the report, the project has been replicated in Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu Natal and some Southern African Development Community countries (Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe). Twelve SADC countries have attended workshops organised by the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center to discuss this project.

What we observe above is a system that brings together the state, the private sector and the NGOs. The state has a responsibility to:

- Ensure food security through feeding schemes in schools and turn this into a sustainable project whereby all government schools have vegetable gardens that are used to provide the soup given to learners.
- Develop strategies to promote farming in prisons, correctional services and hospitals: these institutions should be able to have gardens or farms for their own supply of food.
- Promote farming systems: Crop/livestock systems for farmers in rural areas.

- Support farmers irrespective of gender: in South Africa, before 1994, farmers received support from the then government but now there is little support for upcoming farmers. Farming is not an easy or cheap profession but one that demands complete commitment and capacity.
- Support cooperatives by working together with other organisations (national and international).
- Ensure that there is joint efforts between departments (Agriculture, Rural Development, Social Development, Health, Education, and Defence): Food should be everyone's concern.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Seeing that agriculture is one of the sectors where women show their potential well and are able to create jobs that alleviate poverty, African governments can assist women in poverty alleviation and job creation by doing the following:

- Capacity building for farmers & farmer's organisations and National Agricultural Research Institutes
- Strengthening interest in agriculture & agricultural teaching in primary institutions
- Training in soft & hard systems skills needed for implementing innovation systems approaches
- Strengthening farmer organisation and other cooperatives to enable farmers to participate in setting the research and development agenda
- Researching on innovative financing of farmers, use of modern technologies and distance learning approaches
- Linking rural communities to markets through better information services
- Training extension officers in all agricultural disciplines which include: Crop and Animal Production, Cultivar Choice, Fertilisation Guidelines, Cultivation Practices, Weed and Pest Control, and Grading of Crops/ Quality Assessment.

CONCLUSION

All hope is not lost for Africa as long as African governments recognise the needs of the people and assist major players in priority projects that address the sustainable economic development of the state. Women have shown in many ways that they play an important role in poverty reduction,

job creation and food security. They have a crucial role to play in the fight against hunger: as mothers, farmers, teachers and entrepreneurs, they hold the key to building a future free of malnutrition (UN Women;_2011).²⁶ It is imperative, therefore, for African governments to adopt the above recommendations, recognise the crucial role played by women and increase the pool of African women researchers in Agricultural Science so as to contribute effectively to poverty alleviation and food security in Africa. Governments, private sectors and NGOs must serve as facilitators in solving national problems related to poverty and hunger.

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Renewable Energy and Development in Africa

Reflections on the role of the African Union

Shingirirai Mutanga

INTRODUCTION

Energy security is key to poverty reduction and the economic transformation of Africa. The continent is filled with energy security challenges; in particular access to energy, environmental concerns from the use of fossil fuels, and limited energy supply compounded with the volatile oil prices. Nonetheless, the continent is endowed with enormous renewable energy sources which are not optimally utilised. The nature and range of energy sources that the continent develops and uses will not only determine how well its natural environment is sustained, but also its social and economic development. In particular renewable energy can contribute towards increased agricultural productivity, provision of safe water, achieving of higher levels of industrialisation, and efficient use of information and communications technologies all of which are requirements for integration into the global economy. Therefore energy provides mobility, heat, and light and fuels the machinery that drives the global economy.^{1,2} Realising this potential is limited by a wide range of barriers which includes among others, technological, policy or legal, financial, economic, and social.³ This paper reflects the role played by the African Union and other initiatives to attain a sustainable energy future.

ENERGY INSECURITY IN AFRICA: DRIVERS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY

The combined effects of climate change^{4,5,6}, the continued volatility of fuel prices⁷, the recent food crisis, and global economic turbulence have triggered a sense of urgency among policy makers, industries and development practitioners to find suitable and viable options in bio fuels⁸ and other renewable energy options.⁹ Several scholars have acknowledged that the transition to renewable energy is inevitable^{10,11}, as most African countries

face various forms of energy insecurity. These include reliance on a narrow range of energy sources that are not environmentally sound, lack of efficient energy systems, and lack of access to reliable, affordable and socially acceptable energy services. Energy consumption is uneven between rural and urban areas in many countries. The majority of African countries rely on traditional fuel, mainly fuel-wood,¹² which has a chain of interrelated environmental drawbacks, poor effectiveness and incompatible with other user needs.¹³ Nonetheless one of the key drivers is the continent's rich renewable energy mix, as shown on figure 1.


The energy mix is characterised by three distinct regions with North Africa dominated by oil and gas, Southern Africa Coal and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa depending on biomass and numerous renewable energy sources. Despite these endowed advantages the African continent with a total population of more than 800 million generates same amount of energy as Spain with a population of 45 million.¹⁴ The uneven distribution of renewable energy across Africa therefore calls for regional cooperation and integration through energy pooling and cross-border interconnection of electricity grids and gas pipeline networks. Therefore the role of the African Union, Regional Economic Groupings (RECs), national governments and other non-state actors becomes crucial in ensuring successful implementation of clean energy technologies such as hydropower, solar, wind, natural gas and biomass. The African Ministerial Meeting on Energy adopted the following recommendations:

The importance of an effective institutional mechanism for the energy sector for Africa derives from a real need expressed over the years for strengthening coordination, consolidation and harmonisation of policies, strategies and programmes in the energy sector on the continent.

THE ROLE OF THE AU IN RENEWABLE ENERGY

The energy sector falls under the Commission's infrastructure and energy portfolio, a key organ playing a central role in the day-to-day management of the African Union. Among others, the AU Commission's major responsibility is to provide an overall political and policy leadership for the implementation of a Consolidated Plan of Action on renewable energy. It represents the Union and defends its interests; elaborates draft common positions of the Union; prepares strategic plans and studies for the consideration of the Executive Council; elaborates, promotes, coordinates and harmonises the programmes and policies of the Union with those of the RECs.¹⁵ Complementing this is the specialised technical committees meant to address sectoral issues at ministerial

Figure 1 Africa's Renewable Energy Mix



level and the relevant one to the subject matter is the Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment. The year 2003 saw the renaissance of the African Ministerial Council on Science and Technology (AMCOST) under the auspices of AU and NEPAD. As enshrined in the African Union's science and technology action plan, its specific roles are indicated in Table 1. This paper therefore reflects on the role played by either the Commission or the specialised technical committees.

THE AFRICAN UNION'S MILESTONES AND CHALLENGES

AFRICAN ENERGY COMMISSION (AFREC)

In 2001 during the Summit in Lusaka the OAU adapted the convention of the African Energy Commission. The role of the commission was to map energy development policies, strategies and plans based on sub-regional and continental development priorities and recommend their implementation. While this was an institutional mechanism for overseeing the implementation of Africa's energy policies by the year 2003, the convention setting up AFREC

had not as yet come into force due to the fact that the minimum number of member states, which was 15, had not as yet ratified the convention. One of the key roles was to design, create, and adapt a continental energy database that facilitates rapid dissemination of information and exchange of information among member states as well as RECs. At a convention in Maputo in 2003, Mr Bernard Zoba, the African Union Commissioner of Infrastructure and Energy called on the ministers of energy present to take all appropriate steps to ensure that their Governments sign the convention so as to enable AFREC to play its role in furthering Africa's energy policies.¹⁷

INITIATIVES, MEETINGS AND RESOLUTIONS ON RENEWABLE ENERGY

A plan of implementation was adopted During the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2002. This called upon the international community to take joint actions and to work together at all levels to improve access to reliable and affordable energy services for sustainable development.¹⁸ The African ministers of energy who attended the summit recognised the need to collaborate together to follow up this plan of implementation. The government of Uganda took the initiative of requesting the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to assist in organising a ministerial forum on energy. In 2003, 16 Heads of States convened in Nairobi to attend a meeting organised by the European Union focusing on its energy initiative for poverty eradication

Table 1 African Ministerial Council on Science and Technology's (AMCOST) Roles

Specific Role
Convening meetings of African Ministerial Council on Science and Technology AMCOST and ensuring that resolutions of such meetings are transmitted to the AU summits
Initiating policy processes that are aimed at addressing specific science, technology and innovation issues
Mobilising financial resources for the implementation of the Consolidated Plan of Action
Leading AU-NEPAD delegations to international processes and negotiations on science, technology and innovation issues
Providing a focal point for liaising with the United Nations agencies on matters pertaining to policy
Creating various schemes for /promoting science and technology, including engaging the African youth, Diaspora and women in the implementation of the Consolidated Plan of Action.

Source African Union 2012¹⁹


and sustainable development. Participants strongly supported the convening of a ministerial forum and requested UNEP to work with the government of Uganda and other partners to achieve this end.¹⁹

In 2004, the African Union, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development of Uganda, the Ministry of Energy of Kenya, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the secretariat of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and UNEP in collaboration with the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development of Germany, jointly organised another meeting of African ministers at UNEP headquarters in Nairobi. This was preceded by meetings of technical experts whose recommendations included a draft of the African statement on renewable energies which was submitted to the forthcoming International Conference for Renewable Energies scheduled for Bonn, Germany, from 1 to 4 June 2004.

SCALING UP RENEWABLE ENERGY

There has been an emerging focus in the international dialogue regarding scaling up renewable energy at both regional and global level. In 2008, the African Union developed an action plan for scaling up renewable energy. This was an outcome of the international conference on Renewable Energy in Africa held in Dakar, Senegal under the theme, 'Making Renewable Energy

Figure 2 Some of African Union's Milestones on Renewable Energy



Markets Work for Africa – Policies, Industries and Financing for Scaling Up'. This event was co-organised by the African Union, the Government of Senegal, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). The notion of scaling up emanated from the fact that success stories have largely tended to be localised, and therefore need to be scaled up if renewable energy technologies are to contribute significantly towards addressing Africa's energy challenges. Therefore the conference sought to mobilise political commitment to programmes and projects that would address existing barriers to market-based scaling up of renewable energy in Africa to increase both access to modern energy services and energy security for economic and social development.²⁰ The widespread deployment of renewables in the region has also been constrained by other factors that include: poor institutional frameworks and infrastructure; inadequate planning; the lack of coordination and linkage in national renewable programmes; pricing distortions that place renewable energy at a disadvantage; high initial capital costs; weak dissemination strategies; lack of skilled manpower; poor baseline information; and low maintenance capacity.²¹ These barriers were grouped according to sub clusters such as policy, capacity building, and financial constraints. Based on experience from different projects, it was envisaged that once these barriers are overcome, market forces will adequately support the widespread adoption of renewable energy technologies across Africa.²²

POLICY CLUSTER

The Dakar Declaration envisaged that conducive policies are central to the development of sustainable renewable energy generation and markets. Laws governing renewable energy development and supply cut across many sectors such as, forestry, agriculture, environment, water, industry, electricity, and petroleum, and hence they require institutional coordination – a complex challenge that is not easily overcome.²³ Renewable energy programmes must be mainstreamed and integrated in the broader development context otherwise they risk being marginalised, as key institutions focus on their core business/mainstream interests. Networks such as the Global Network for Sustainable Energy Development (GNSD) and institutions like the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) can play a significant role in the dissemination and sharing of information on Renewable Energy Technologies (RETs)²⁴. By providing practical advice, IRENA can support countries to improve their regulatory frameworks and build capacity. The African Union (AU) can make use of existing linkages of scientific and technical cooperation or create new platforms to spearhead knowledge sharing

and technology transfer. It may also be worthwhile to create ‘South-South’ partnerships between countries in Africa and those with relatively wide experience in promoting RETs such as China, India, and Brazil. Figure 3 shows the existing policy gaps, initiatives, activities and the anticipated key outputs.

FINANCIAL CLUSTER

Access to affordable finance is a major constraint. Renewable energy ventures often have high up-front cost, and many projects require government support in the initial start-up phases. Traditional banks are often unwilling to finance renewable energy projects due to market uncertainties and perceived high risks, such as high initial capital costs on a per kW basis; higher transaction costs in the case of smaller renewables; uncertainty of the resource base; limited number of developers with the skills to prepare financing packages that meet the requirements of financial institutions; price uncertainty in the market for final renewable energy service; and, lack of off-takers for renewable energy produced. The activities in this programme cluster will be geared towards increasing availability of information on renewable energy project investments, and enhancing collaboration between the various stakeholders, to ensure successful renewable energy project investments. Financing for RETs can be in the form of assets, venture capital, private equity, loans and grants, or multiple combinations of these. For example, almost all the renewable energy investment in China in 2006 (US\$ 4.5 billion) was in the form of asset finance while higher levels of private equity investment focused on expanding solar manufacturing capacity. Specifically, investment in Chinese solar companies totalled US\$ 1.1 billion in 2006, consisting of US\$ 638 million venture capital and private equity and US\$ 466 million public market fund raising (UNEP 2007).²⁵

The declaration’s financial cluster road map encapsulated the following in its programme: assistance to institutions and project developers in financial analysis of renewables investment to ensure optimal use of existing funds and financing mechanisms; development of a wide range of renewable energy financing options suitable for renewables development at informal, small, medium, and large-scale; assessment of the viability of establishing a Pan-African Fund for Renewable Energy financed by very modest levies (1–2%) on fossil fuel imports and exports; bundling of small and medium scale renewables energy investments for financing by major donors, regional development banks, and UN agencies; and support for the development of renewable projects that can tap the growing array of carbon finance instruments.²⁶

CAPACITY BUILDING AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME CLUSTER

Solid technical skills and knowledge are prerequisites for effective design, installation, commissioning, operation, and maintenance of renewable energy plants. This is especially true for embryonic renewable energy options such as biodiesel and gasification, which have few successful scaled-up operations in Africa to refer to as verifiable demonstrations for replication. The choice of renewables for dissemination and development in Africa should consider the existing technical knowledge and local industries. In the short term, renewable

Table 2 Action Plan adopted by the International Conference on Renewable Energy

Programs	Timeline	Lead Players	Proposed Key Players	Estimated Budget (Million €)	Possible Funding Source
1. Policies	Year 1 to Year 2	Governments, sub-regional and international agencies	National and international	30.1	IDB, GEF, AfDB, EU, RECS, National Governments
2. Capacity Building	Year 1 to Year 5	Academic institution, civil society and private sector	National, sub-regional, regional and international	20.6	GEF, AfDB, EU, RECS, National Governments, private sector
3. Financing options	Year 1 to Year 5	Financial institutions, regional development banks, Governments, international agencies, project developers and private sector	National, regional and international	25.3	GEF, AfDB, EU, RECS, National Governments, private sector, National and Sub-regional banks
4. Enterprise development & industrialisation	Year 2 to Year 5	Private sector and international agencies	National and international	26.5	GEF, AfDB, EU, RECS, National Governments, private sector
5. Crosscutting	Year 1 to Year 5	Government academic institutions, sub-regional agencies and civil society	National, sub-regional, regional and international	9.0	GEF, AfDB, EU, RECS, National Governments
Total budget over 5 years				111.5	

Source UNIDO 2008⁹

Figure 3 Summarised policy programme for scaling up renewables





Figure 4 Summarised capacity building program for scaling up renewable in Africa

Existing gaps	Actions and estimated costs (million €)	Activities/Outputs	Key Actors and Roles
• Absence of a critical mass of skilled personnel with specialised expertise in renewables • Limited number of successful renewables demonstration projects • Too often, training, capacity building and skills building not integrated in project implementation • Limited long term technical and capacity building programs on renewable energy • Inadequate research and development on renewable energy technologies	P1: Strengthen and expand existing regional networks that bring together national, sub-regional and regional institutions working on renewable energy to promote exchange and sharing of experiences and skills. (4.1)	• Support for regional networks to organize training workshops and study tours on renewable energy, to promote south–south exchange of experiences.	• Government and Non-Governmental national and sub-regional energy organisations/networks to spearhead long term capacity building in implementation of existing planned renewable energy. • Government and Non-Governmental sub-regional and regional agencies/networks to take a lead in identifying and integrating capacity building in implementation of existing planned renewable energy initiatives. • National and sub-regional institutions to take a lead in implementing R&D renewable energy programs. • Regional and sub-regional networks/institutions and international organizations to utilize their continental and global networks of experts and specialised expert institutions, to coordinate the exchange of skills and know-how within African countries as well as promote south–south and south–north exchange and sharing of experiences, technologies and expertise.
	P2: Integration training capacity building skills/experience in actual development, implementation, and maintenance of renewable energy investment. (3.0)	• Identification of key regional and sub-regional renewable energy initiatives with the objective of adding key training and capacity building elements.	
	P3: R&D on renewables, technology transfer, and adaptation of renewable energy technologies and systems to local needs. (8.5)	• Support national, sub-regional and regional R&D programs on renewable energy • Support African governments in formulating policies and legislation that ensure effective implementation of pre-determined tariffs and standard PPAs.	
	P4: Capacity and training to improve skills necessary for local design and manufacture of renewable energy technologies. (5.0)	• Support development of long term training and capacity building programs based on national/sub-regional/regional renewable energy priorities.	
Total (million €)	20.6		

Source UNDO 2008²

Figure 5 Guiding Principle for Scaling Up Renewable Action Plan

energy options that build on already established industries are likely to be successfully implemented. Activities under this programme cluster are geared towards building on the existing skills base to mobilise existing capacity on renewable energy in Africa, as well as creating an environment for capacity building to support newer embryonic renewable energy options.

Essentially the action plan was guided by a set of principles which included, among others, equity and gender, comparative advantage of the regions in renewable technologies, subsidiary concept; need to generate energy, sustainability indicators and the level playing field (See figure 6). The guiding principles were based on factors that have underlined key successful renewable energy initiatives in Africa.

In a nutshell the overall cost implications for scaling up renewable in Africa was estimated to be €111.5million.²⁹ Major funding sources include

IDB, GEF, EU, AfDB, RECs, and national governments. Above all, the essential programmes as shown on table 2 include policies, capacity building, financing options, enterprise development and other cross cutting issues. The later includes issues around establishing reliable datasets on renewable energy, understanding the risk associated and the potential of renewable energy in climate change adaptation.

The African Union has also worked in conjunction with NEPAD to promote a framework for regional integration in energy in Africa. In 2009 the African Union/NEPAD endorsed the Programme on Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) and identified some five key energy objectives which include: promotion of intra-African trade in energy at the regional and continental levels, with special attention to using regional power pools to leverage economic and social development of the regions and the Africa continent; promote use of clean energy by developing access to the different forms of modern energy; promote regional cooperation in energy by seeking to ensure security of regional and continental energy through trade and regional integration; promote global exports in energy by developing energy resources; and promote efficiency in energy infrastructure.

AFRICA-EU ENERGY PARTNERSHIP

The Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP) was launched in Lisbon, Portugal, in December 2007, during the second Africa-EU Summit. Establishment of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership was part of the EU-Africa Joint Strategy and its First Action Plan (2008–2010) adopted on the Lisbon Summit. This partnership underscored the need to address the energy priorities included in the first action plan. The road map developed included the following key areas:

- Promotion of regional integration of electricity markets in Africa: A launch of preparatory work to set up an Electricity Master-Plan for Africa, aiming inter-alia at improving regional interconnections between all regions of the African continent, and to define the Capacity Building Programme to support the African Power Pools
- Promoting an enabling environment to enhance private investment
- Developing energy interconnections between Africa and Europe
- Launching a Renewable Energy Cooperation programme
- Mobilising additional resources for investment in the energy sector both on supply and demand side, notably to improve access to energy services
- Making progress in implementing existing EC support to enhance the institutional and technical capacity of the AUC.³⁰

In 2008, high-level discussions between the African Union Commission (AU) and the European Commission (EC) on the implementation of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This was a partial fulfilment of the Lisbon agreement to create 'An Africa-EU Energy Partnership bi-annual Forum with experts, involving civil society, research institutes and private sectors in both continents, with the aim to increase awareness amongst decision makers and civil society of the challenges and opportunities of sustainable energy and attract investment to support new activities in Africa'³¹ In 2010, African Union Commission, in collaboration with the European Commission (EC); Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, Austria; Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Germany; and government of Mauritius, held the first High-Level Meeting (HLM) of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP) in Vienna, Austria, to discuss energy access, energy security and renewable energy. This was preceded by the formation of the International Renewable Agency (IRENA) which was created in 2009 and ratified into existence as an international organisation. Its primary objective was to provide an international institutional framework to consolidate policy efforts and facilitate information sharing to catalyse the transition to renewable energy. The HLM meeting had 21 European and 23 African countries, and commissioners from the AU and the EU, as well as academics, business leaders and members of civil society from across Africa and Europe. The HLM Declaration endorsed the AEEP Road Map, outlining the AEEP's 2011–2013 programme of work, and launched the Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme RECP), aimed at enhancing industrial and business cooperation in the energy sector between the two continents.

THE ROLE OF OTHER NON-STATE ACTORS

SADC POLICY INITIATIVE

The role of other non-state actors has been more prominent. In 2005 the Southern African Development commission (SADC) developed a biofuel strategy which stresses the need for exploring the potential of implementing Biofuels initiatives in SADC countries. Subsequently a task force on Biofuels was established in 2008. This had the mandate to develop sustainable biofuel industry in Southern Africa. The Biofuels were used as a platform for sustainable development, energy security and renewable energy contributing to tackling climate change. The task force's role was to resolve conflicts on crops for food vs. crops for energy. Through its technical advisor the task force developed a policy development support tool known

as Crop Decision Making Tool. In 2010, the SADC Biofuel State of Play Study was published with the support of GTZ under the programme for Basic Energy Cooperation (ProBEC).

WEST AFRICAN INITIATIVE

Commissioned by the Economic Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA), and the rural Hub of West Africa the sustainable bioenergy report in UEMOA member countries concluded that donor and host country investments in bio-energy can reduce the exposure of West African countries to oil and food process and open new economic opportunities (UEMOA 2008). With regards to finance, the Finance African Biofuels Renewable Energy Fund (ABREF) was established to overcome barriers and facilitate flows of investment into African Biofuel Renewable Energy Project. In 2006, 15 countries united to exchange experiences, technologies and knowledge for the development of biofuels industry. The Pays Africains Non Producteurs de Petrole (PANPP), was geared to create institutional, financial instruments to promote large scale introduction of biofuels to the world. On the other hand integration of policies for land use agriculture, and energy aligned with policies of rural development was recognised as key for ensuring sustainable energy generation.

NEPAD'S INITIATIVES

NEPAD through its Office of Science and Technology provides overall technical and intellectual leadership for the implementation of a Consolidated Plan of Action. Its specific roles will include: (a) mobilising and directing technical expertise, including networks of centers of excellence, to implement the programmes and projects (b) convening meetings of the Science and Technology Steering Committee of AMCOST (c) providing technical leadership for the establishment of the proposed African Science and Innovation Facility (d) providing technical support to AU Commission's policy processes and activities (e) monitoring international trends in science and technology and ensuring that the necessary adjustments are made to this Consolidated Plan of Action to respond to the trends, and (f) monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the programmes and projects.³²

NEPAD has attained collaborative support from the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) the need to establish and promote programmes, partnerships and initiatives to support Africa's efforts to implement NEPAD objectives on energy, which seek to (a) 'secure access for at least 35% of the African population within 20 years, especially in rural areas and (b) 'support to implement other initiatives on energy, including the

promotion of cleaner and more efficient use of natural gas and increased use of renewable energy, and to improve energy efficiency and access to advanced energy technologies, including cleaner fossil fuel technologies, particularly in rural and peri-urban areas'.³³ Core activities of the flagship programme of NEPAD includes: African Databank of Energy Research and Technologies which seeks to improve Africa's access to and use of environmentally sound energy sources and technologies; a continental databank or information base will be created; research on and development of bio-energy technologies and other renewable energy sources.

AFRICA'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PLAN OF ACTION 21

The Steering Committee for Science and Technology was constituted with membership at the level of directors-general, permanent secretaries or officials of equivalent rank, two representing each of the five geographic regions of Africa. The steering committee oversees the development and implementation of programme activities, including the formulation of the business plans. It will be responsible for reviewing progress of implementation of the Consolidated Plan for Collective Action. The aim of the project area will be to enlarge the range of renewable energy technologies. Emphasis is placed on sustainable use of the continent's bio-resources (such as wood and solid wood residues). The project uses local resources to build capacity for combined heat and electricity production (CHP). Designated African centres shall spearhead research and development in fluidised bed gasification of biomass or recovered fuel; integrated harvesting techniques for forest fuels; and pyrolysis to generate liquid biofuels. The above and related projects will be further developed and implemented by a proposed African Energy Research and Innovation (AERI) Network. The AERI will be configured as a network of designated centres of excellence in scientific research and technological innovation in energy.³⁴

SOME OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO SUCCESS

The various ministerial conferences on energy being organised by different institutions on an ad-hoc basis without a clear pattern and focus on the issues discussed, decisions taken and follow-up mechanisms run the risk of dissipating energies and sowing confusion with the same ministers sometimes taking varying positions on the same issues.³⁵ Lack of coordination could result in mixing up priorities and sending unclear signs to the people and development partners. Ministers as personalities with the highest responsibility at sectoral level need to be provided with a streamlined

and well-facilitated avenue of communication for developing and expressing their national positions in a consistent manner. The African Energy Commission (AFREC) is the sectoral technical body that is expected to provide the much-needed technical assistance in the development and implementation of harmonious policies, strategies, programmes, regulations and standards in the energy sector at national, regional and continental levels. However, ratification of its convention is proceeding at an alarmingly slow pace and there is a real danger of eroding the credibility of the organisation as an effective development tool for the energy industry on the continent. There is a need, therefore, to pursue with more vigour sensitisation of member states on the merits of speeding up the operationalisation of AFREC.

The commitment from investors on renewable energy is not consistent and largely influenced by global dynamics and perceptions beyond Africa's control. Internationally, various carbon financing mechanisms are emerging, including both the Kyoto protocol and non-Kyoto protocol mechanisms. However, except for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), few have targeted Africa in any significant manner. This is largely attributable to the market-based nature of these carbon financing mechanisms. The CDM is one Kyoto Protocol mechanisms that can be used to finance renewable energy. However, Africa has the least number of CDM projects, with only 2.6% of the global total. Only eight out of the 25 CDM projects in Africa are renewable energy projects. Renewable energy projects generally compete for CDM investment with other projects that generate much higher volumes of emissions reductions (and therefore Certified Emission Reductions) for smaller project investment. Although the overall share of renewable energy projects in the global CDM portfolio has increased over the last two years, the extent to which CDM can be relied upon as a mechanism for financing renewable energy in Africa is limited. The 2008 Dakar declaration identified some of the challenges and developed an action plan to address some of these as discussed in the next session.

CONCLUSION

Scaling up renewable energy in Africa is inevitable given the combined effects of climate change, the continued volatility of fuel prices, and the recent food crisis. However, despite of the various efforts made so far to disseminate renewable energy in Africa, there is a growing consensus among policy makers that these have fallen short of expectations. The African Union under the Commission's infrastructure and energy portfolio, the specialised technical committees meant to address sectoral issues at ministerial level, in particular the Committee on Industry, Science

and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment had an array of events and activities in the realm of energy. The first half of the decade since 2000 saw the establishment of Africa Energy Commission (AFREC), convening of heads of states in Maputo 2003, followed by the African Ministers Meeting in Nairobi. However, the second half of the decade witnessed some huge milestones which saw the renaissance of Africa-EU Partnership (AEEP) in 2007, and the 2008 Dakar declaration which provided an in-depth action plan for scaling up renewable energy in Africa. The year 2009 witnessed the endorsement of the Programme on Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) by the African Union/NEPAD. Lastly the first High Level Meeting between the AU and EU on Energy Partnership was held in Vienna Austria which developed a road map for outlining the AEEP's 2011–2013 programme of work, and launch of the Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (RECP). Apart from the African Union, there are non-state actors such as RECs, in particular SADC Policy Initiative, West African Initiative, NEPAD and Africa's Science and Technology Action 21 which have played a significant role in driving the transition to renewable energy in Africa over the last decade. Notwithstanding these efforts, there are a number of challenges which include, among others, lack of coordination which saw various ministerial conferences on energy being organised by different institutions on an ad-hoc basis without clear pattern and focus, as well as inconsistency in commitment from investors who are largely influenced by the global dynamics and perceptions beyond Africa's control.

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The African Union's Position on Organic Agriculture

What Are the Benefits of Governance at Continental Level?

Nedson Pophiwa

INTRODUCTION

Organic Agriculture (OA) has grown in prominence as an alternative to conventional agriculture especially suitable for small holder farmers on the African continent. Many leaders of organic agricultural movements on the African continent are seen lobbying for the formalised recognition of organic farming in their countries through enactment of policies that support the sector. However, most of the organic movements developed in the 1990s operated with little, if any, support from their own national governments, let alone their regional economic commissions (RECs) and the African Union. The latter high level decision makers are largely biased towards conventional agriculture which is perceived as vital for attaining food security through large scale intensified agriculture. So organic farmers on the continent receive 'rescue' support from international organisations which promote OA like the International Federation for Organic Movements (IFOAM) and some United Nations agencies, which partner with local agro-ecological non-governmental organisations to impart organic farming skills to small scale farmers. The private sector which is interested in securing a constant supply of organic produce has been equally influential in training and extension services for African farmers. All these developments have yielded positive results to the extent that more than 1 million hectares of land in Africa comprise certified organic agriculture.¹

Despite the 'absence' of African governments' and AU's support in the initial phases of OA on the continent, one can applaud the fact that the lever on high level support is beginning to turn. The words of the AU's commissioner for agriculture, Tumusiime Peace, signify the adoption of organic farming in the official agriculture 'policy-scape' of the AU which has largely been shaped by conventional agriculture. In her keynote address she stated:

It gives me great pleasure to be able to address this august gathering at a time when the organic agriculture movement deserves all the support it can garner from a continental perspective. I am particularly encouraged by the enthusiasm of all our stakeholders especially the national organic farming bodies and the partners from the international community for all the efforts being made to get organic farming institutionalised on the continent.²

The institutionalisation of OA in Africa requires such endorsement by the highest decision making body on the continent because it magnifies the gravity of the sector and attracts the much needed financial and technical assistance from the advanced international organic markets. Added to this, the AU's reputation as a leader in development of the continent is boosted by such interventions which also make it easier for member countries through the Conference of African Ministers of Agriculture (CAMA) to mainstream OA in their official agrarian policy instruments.

As the African Union commemorates a decade of existence since taking over from the Organisation of African Unity, questions are raised as to its effectiveness in dealing with a myriad of challenges bedevilling the continent. According to Laporte and Mackie, 'given the complexity of this task, the AU has a heavy and ambitious agenda that includes, amongst others, peace and security, trade liberalisation, food security, the sustainable use of natural resources and energy, climate change and migration.'³ Many scholarly recommendations have come to the fore on how the AU must go about strengthening its role in the development of the continent. Adebayo Olukoshi recommends that 'a strong AU Commission or Authority, endowed with the necessary political clout, capacities and resources, should be able to assume a driving role in the continental integration process.'⁴

The adoption of a decision by the AU on organic farming will be explored in detail in this paper for it offers a platform for OA stakeholders to participate in the continent's agricultural economy and possibly improve food security and rural livelihoods of all farmers involved. On the basis of the AU decision and other related statements and concepts notes on AU's support for OA, this paper will examine the AU's commitments to recognise organic agriculture at a continental level and the governance implications. Whilst making an appraisal of existing efforts of the continental body, examples will be drawn on how the AU has engaged with stakeholders of OA to position the sector higher on the agenda of African governments, policy makers and the international donor community. For now the discussion will unpack the different aspects of this study such as defining organic agriculture and the meaning of governance as well as the governance of agriculture within the AU.

ORGANIC AGRICULTURE, GOVERNANCE AND THE AU CONTEXT

Also known as ecological or biological agriculture, organic agriculture is defined by the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) as a ‘production system that sustains the health of soils, ecosystems and people’.⁵ It relies on ecological processes, biodiversity and cycles adapted to local conditions, rather than the use of inputs with adverse effects. OA combines tradition, innovation and science to benefit the shared environment and promote fair relationships and a good quality of life for all involved.⁶ Added to this definition are four principles of organic agriculture which were put forward by IFOAM. These are:

- *Principle of health:* organic agriculture should sustain and enhance the health of soil, plant, animal, human and planet as one and indivisible
- *Principle of ecology:* organic agriculture should be based on living ecological systems and cycles, work with them, emulate them and help sustain them
- *Principle of fairness:* organic agriculture should build on relationships that ensure fairness with regard to the common environment and life opportunities
- *Principle of care:* organic agriculture should be managed in a precautionary and responsible manner to protect the health and well-being of current and future generations and the environment.⁷ Table 1 shows Africa’s share of the global organic agricultural land.

Table 1 World: Organic agricultural land (including in conversion areas) and regional shares of the global organic agricultural land 2010

Region	Organic agricultural land (hectares)	Region’s share of the global organic agricultural land
Africa	1,075,829	2.9%
Asia	2,778,291	7.5%
Europe	10,002,087	27.0%
Latin America	8,389,459	22.7%
Northern America	2,652,624	7.2%
Oceania	12,144,984	32.8%
Total	37,041,1004	100.0%

Source Willer and Kilcher⁸

Although Africa has the smallest share of land devoted to organic agricultural production, the sector remains important to the continent. Many African farmers already practise organic farming by default and they should be supported to enhance their activities through certification and accessing international markets.

The aim of organic farming is to create integrated, humane, environmentally and economically viable agricultural systems that rely to the greatest extent on: (i) local or on-farm renewable resources, and (ii) the management of ecological and biological processes. Use of external inputs, whether inorganic or organic, is reduced as much as possible.⁹ Certified organic agriculture is a subset of organic agriculture. The production of certified organic products has been objectively assessed as conforming to precise organic production standards, usually by a third party certification body. Many traditional farming systems found in developing countries practise organic techniques without seeking or receiving the premium price given to organic food in some domestic markets. Traditional agriculture includes management practices that have evolved through centuries to create agricultural systems adapted to local environmental and cultural conditions. Owing to their nature, traditional systems do not use synthetic agricultural inputs but apply ecological approaches to enhance agricultural production. Many of these traditional systems may not fully meet the production standards for organic agriculture, but can be considered near-organic.¹⁰

In recent years, organic trade has experienced an outstanding expansion, mainly driven by consumers' concerns for safe food and environmentally friendly production. The boom of organic markets worldwide has created great opportunities and expectations in developing and transition countries for their participation as suppliers. Certified organic produce are seen as an alternative for small-scale farmers to take part in this high-value product market. Premium prices for certified products have been one of the incentives that contribute to the growth of the organic sector while improving the livelihood of smallholder families.¹¹

One of the key challenges to obtaining reliable and up to date statistical information regarding OA is the lack of a recognised system of organic agriculture data collection globally which makes it difficult to obtain reliable information on the extent of organic farming, particularly for Sub-Saharan Africa. As already alluded to, there are slightly more than one million hectares of certified organic agricultural land. This constitutes about 3% of the world's organic agricultural land.¹² There were 500,000 producers reported. The countries with the most organic land are Uganda (226,954 hectares), Tunisia (167,302 hectares), and Ethiopia (122,727 hectares). The highest shares of organic land are in Sao Tome and Prince (6.5%), Sierra

Leone (1.8%), and Uganda (1.7%).¹³ The majority of certified organic produce in Africa is destined for export markets; in Uganda the export value for organic products was 37 million US dollars in 2009/2010. The European Union, as the major recipient of these exports, is Africa's largest market for agricultural produce. Tunisia was accepted under the EU's Third Country List in 2009.¹⁴

GOVERNANCE AND ITS CONTEXT IN THIS STUDY

Governance can be broadly understood as the systems, structures and processes that are related both to self-governing associations and the institutions of government.¹⁵ This includes:

1. the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced
2. the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies
3. the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.¹⁶

Vorley makes a distinction between governance *as an end* and governance *as a means*. In the former case he argues that because of the need for open, democratic and representative government, there are cases where discussions of governance include or focus on a concern about the low-levels of social capital.¹⁷ When 'discussed in this sense, governance is an end in itself whereby for instance, some development interventions aim to ensure that governance is accessible to the poor and effective in meeting their needs'.¹⁸ On the other hand, he further articulates that there are other discussions in which governance is a means to an end:

The improved operation of institutions of governance is sought in order to achieve, for example, better livelihoods, jobs, houses and basic services for the poor. This might be through better government, better partnerships between government and the private sector or community sector, or better self-help schemes by the poor.¹⁹

Governance in this case is best described in the context of three key institutions: government (at state and regional levels), the private sector, and civil society, especially local communities.²⁰ The focus of this study, however, is on the fourth hierarchy of governance which is the supra-national organisations such as RECs and the AU. Closer to the issue of agriculture is the critical

issue of food security governance. The term 'food governance' is used to refer to the institutionalised social, economic and political processes – the formal and informal rules and procedures – that organise and coordinate food production, processing, distribution and consumption among a diverse array of actors. It involves the actions, processes and institutions by which power and authority is exercised and decisions are taken and implemented across the food system.²¹ Organic agriculture is best known for its regulatory systems in comparison with other forms of agriculture. This is well put by McCormack, cited by Rigby and Caceres, that 'organic farming practices are unique, for they are the only ones codified as law. A complete set of certification procedures governs organic farming, from soil to the dining table'.²² Indeed, organic agriculture is the most regulated form of ecological agriculture as it adheres to legally defined standards and norms of production, processing and labelling. In organic agricultural systems, biophysical production factors are intimately linked to socio-economic and institutional factors. In a nutshell, 'organic agriculture represents a continuum from the farm to the consumer table'.²³

The discussion in this chapter will attempt to elevate the notion of governance at a continental level of the African Union Commission and its agriculture wing, the Directorate of Rural Economy and Agriculture. A more applicable theory of governance at this level is the notion of 'multi-level governance' – a concept that has been extensively used in the analysis of the European Union governance system and discussion of how it should change.²⁴ According to Bernauer and Caduff, 'multi-level governance refers to a form of governance in which policy responsibility is distributed among different levels of government and among the public and private sector.'²⁵ It involves a plurality of actors, for example, local, and national governments, international and supra-national organisations, NGOs, trade associations, and firms.²⁶

In a nutshell, multi-level governance is focused on systems and processes of governance involving institutions and actors belonging to different levels (regional, national, supra-national, transnational); it captures institutional relationships under a network perspective, emphasising a negotiating and deliberative order; it takes into account the activity of non-state actors (private or public interest oriented) within the governance process and the variable constellations of coalitions that these groups may form. A contrario, multi-level governance rejects solely inter-governmental relations as the engine of policy-making; it opposes a strictly hierarchical order of governance processes; it does not allow for a narrow understanding of formal rules and delimited jurisdictions, taking also into account the informal character of actor interactions, the flexibility of governance instruments and permeability of arenas.²⁷ Despite its inability to generate predictions on

governance outputs, multi-level governance has the advantage of focusing on the role of the institutional and non-institutional actors and their degree and patterns of participation to the EU policy-making.²⁸ This is similar to the development of OA on the African continent as non-institutional actors have been included in decision making especially the different forums in which they have been invited by the AU to voice their suggestions. Figure 1 illustrates the different stakeholders in the governance structure of OA in Africa and how the AU plays a foundational role in that relationship.

The figure shows the important role that each stakeholder plays in order to shape the outcomes of the OA sector on the continent and how the AU and African governments play a significant role of then embedding them in a firm foundation through their agricultural policies.


GOVERNANCE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE AU

In order to situate the adoption of organic agriculture by the African Union within a context of governance it is important to question how agriculture is governed at the continental level and in particular where organic agriculture fits in the governance regime. The body that is responsible for promoting the development of Africa's rural economy and agriculture is the Directorate of Rural Economy and Agriculture (DREA) of the AU Commission. The important challenge facing the Directorate is 'to initiate, promote and facilitate the implementation of policies, strategies and programmes that can lead to the transformation of the rural economy by increasing agricultural productivity, ensuring food security and reducing the level of poverty'.

As one of eight Departmental Portfolios of the AU, the DREA's core business is to perform, among others, some of the following functions:

- Promote and coordinate initiatives and strategies for the development of the African rural economy among RECs, specialised institutions and other centres involved in this field
- Initiate, propose and coordinate policies and programmes for the development of production capacities (agricultural, livestock and fisheries) so as to ensure food security on the African continent
- Coordinate RECs in their efforts towards the harmonisation of the initiatives to eradicate poverty and alleviation of conditions faced by rural communities, such as pertaining to infrastructure and energy, rural women, and processing of agricultural products
- Ensure effective and constructive participation of the commission in regional and continental efforts towards sustainable development of

Figure 1 Multi-level governance of Organic Agriculture in Africa



the rural economy, as well as uplifting the standards of living and production capacities of rural communities

- Follow up agricultural policies and strategies at RECs' level and to promote their harmonisation
- Organise and ensure the participation of the commission in agricultural research and extension services to African countries.³⁰

From the functions stated above there are possibilities for the successful adoption of OA as one of the strategies to meet sustainable development goals and also the involvement of women in viable economic projects such as processing of agricultural products – something which organic value chains have been able to reward organic farmers with. Also because DREA has the mandate to organise research and extension in agriculture it means there is possibility for harmonisation of OA activities in this regard at a continental level rather than the current fragmented approach that is occurring in most African countries.

Since 2003, AUC-DREA's mandate to address the challenges of developing agriculture and achieving environmental sustainability in Africa is being driven through the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).³² CAADP's main objective is 'to assist African countries accelerate economic growth through agriculture-led development, which eliminates hunger, reduces poverty and enhances food and nutrition security as well as growth in exports'.³³ The following main principles and targets define the CAADP framework:

- i. agriculture-led growth as a main strategy to achieve targets on food security and poverty alleviation,
- ii. pursuit of a 6% average annual sector growth rate at the national level
- iii. allocation of at least 10% of national budgets to the agricultural sector
- iv. exploitation of regional complementarities and cooperation to boost growth
- v. application of principles of policy efficiency, dialogue, review, and accountability, shared by all NEPAD programmes
- vi. use of partnerships and alliances including farmers, agribusiness, and civil society
- vii. assigning roles and responsibility of programme implementation to individual countries, coordination to designated RECs and facilitation to the NEPAD Agency.³⁴ Figure 2 illustrates inter-relationships of AU institutions in the implementation of CAADP.

Within the above governance structure, OA falls under the CAADP with focus on Conservation Agriculture (CA). CA is 'an environmentally friendly


farming system that conserves, improves, and makes efficient use of natural resources through integrated management of available soil, water and biological resources'.³⁵ Its success depends on a thorough knowledge of the area, its characteristics and the local climatic conditions.³⁶

THE AUC'S STAND ON ORGANIC AGRICULTURE

One of the key strengths of the organic movements is their ability to share information regarding best practices in organic farming at both intra-country and inter-country levels. Through conferencing, farmers' organisations representatives, researchers and heads of organic agricultural movements, among other practitioners, present case studies and success stories of organic farming and lobby for policies as well as funding.³⁷ Some of the presentations are scientifically rigorous so as to build a stronger case for organic as a food security and poverty alleviation method of farming for Africa.³⁸ In this way the debates around OA as a viable form have reached the discussion tables of the highest continental decision making entity – the AU. In 2008, a conference on ecological agriculture was hosted by the AU in partnership with Ethiopia's agriculture ministry and UN agencies such as Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and other development agencies. Among its key conclusions was the reiteration of the charge that the implementation and scaling up of ecological agriculture (including OA) faced several constraints such as lack of policy support at local, national, regional and international levels, and resource constraints, among others.³⁹ Recommendations were brought forward that the AU and other RECs should take action to assist African governments in implementing policies and plans on ecological agriculture and more specifically, the AU Commission was called on to develop strategic partnerships with civil society and other actors to promote and implement ecological agriculture on the continent.⁴⁰ The FAO was also called upon to assist the AU in developing an African Action Plan for Ecological Agriculture while institutions of learning and research were called upon to ponder the establishment of an African Centre of Excellence on Ecological Agricultural Research.⁴¹ An interesting outcome of all this deliberation was the establishment of a standing committee on Ecological Agriculture which would comprise representatives from participating African countries and would share experiences and conduct follow-up activities etc in order to implement OA in their respective countries.⁴²

In her address to the CAMA in October 2010, Tumusiime Rhoda Peace, the Commissioner for Rural Economy and Agriculture in the African Union Commission called for continental level support to OA:

Figure 2 Roles of institutional actors in CAADP implementation



Africa continues to be seen as a continent of unparalleled prospects for organic agriculture and, indeed, ecological agriculture which generates both economic value and sustainable development. We believe that promoting it in all of our countries would enable Africa to exploit this niche. I therefore call on this conference to support an AU-led coalition of international partners to provide leadership and guidance on the establishment of an African Organic Farming Platform in ways that embrace CAADP values and principles.⁴³

The commissioner's call was important in that she magnified the importance of OA by putting it on the table before CAMA so that it could be deliberated upon and taken to a higher decision making body – the executive. This did materialise as seen in the inclusion of organic agriculture among the decisions made by the AU executive in January 2011, whereby the executive council adopted a landmark decision based on recognition of the exploitative practices on organic farmers.⁴⁴ The decision called for the commission and its New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) to: (i) initiate and provide guidance for an AU-led coalition of international partners on the establishment of an African organic farming platform based on available best practices, and (ii) provide guidance in support of the development of sustainable organic farming systems and improve seed quality.⁴⁵ The decision also requested development partners to provide the necessary technical and financial support for the implementation of this decision.⁴⁶ The IFOAM welcomed this decision as 'an important step for realising the multi-functional benefits of organic agriculture and growing the capacity for African governments to develop sustainable, resilient and productive farming on the continent'.⁴⁷

In response to the decision, the African Union Commission went further to draft an Ecological Organic Agriculture (EOA) Action Plan for Africa in May 2011.⁴⁸ The overall goal of the action plan is 'to mainstream ecological agriculture into national agricultural production systems by 2020'.⁴⁹ The vision is to establish vibrant ecological organic systems for enhanced food security and sustainable development in Africa, while the mission is 'to scale up ecologically sound strategies and practices among diversified stakeholders through institutional capacity development, scientific innovations, market participation, public policies and programmes, outreach and communication, efficient coordination, networking and partnerships'.⁵⁰ Organic agriculture will be mainstreamed in African countries' agriculture plans by 2020 through six inter-related thematic areas, namely:

- Research, training and extension
- Information and communication

- Value chain
- Market development networking
- Partnerships policy and programme development
- Institutional capacity development.

These six pillars require €44 million to implement in the next five years.⁵¹ The table below shows four of the six pillars, particularly the collaborating organisations and target groups for each intervention.

As seen in Table 2, the EOA action plan identified leading African institutions such as the NOGAMU and TOAM which serve as influential organic movements and have experience of over a decade working in OA. These institutions also have been working for so long with the EU, IFOAM, UNCTAD and FAO among others which means there are likely to be positive results from the collaboration. One tricky situation may be realised in the process of transferring the successes of these pilot projects to other countries on the continent which may not have similar infrastructure and institutional history of organic farming as Uganda and Tanzania. Also the spatial bias of these projects in East Africa may be misread by other African countries if not convincingly justified by the experts behind the EOA. Nevertheless, other positive highlights of the action plan include the spreading of OA knowledge to grassroots levels through youth clubs in schools and agricultural colleges under the Research, Training and Extension pillar. Additionally, value chains which form a crucial aspect in the advancement of OA were identified as one of the EOA's pillars, and what is encouraging is the targeting of raising awareness among consumers for they are the ones with buying power to increase the sale of organic produce. The EOA also received a positive nod from a joint European Commission and AUC workshop on African OA held in July 2011. Participants welcomed the AU action plan as 'a bold step forward for African organic farming'.⁵² The same participants called for the mainstreaming of organic farming into agricultural policies 'as it offers potential to add value to organic products, contributing to the education of the community and linking farming to tourism (e.g. ecotourism)'.⁵³ A call was made that the AU should take the lead on promoting and further developing strategies or frameworks for organic farming policies throughout Africa.

African stakeholders of OA assembled in Kenya late 2011 and resolved a new declaration called 'The Nairobi Declaration for an Ecological Organic Alternative for Africa'.⁵⁴ The declaration took cognisance of the EOA action plan developed by the AUC in response to the Heads of State's Decision on Organic Farming as a way to bring organic agriculture onto the centre stage of agricultural policies in Africa.⁵⁵ It therefore called African governments and regional economic communities to:

Table 2 Focus Areas of the Ecological Organic Agriculture Action Plan

Pillar	Collaborating organisations	Target Groups
Research, Training and Extension	SACDEP, Kenya; University of Ibadan-Nigeria; Sokoine University-Tanzania; University of Zambia-Zambia; Makelle University-Ethiopia; PELUM-Uganda;	■ Researchers in institutions interested in investigating issues to support and expand EOA ■ Small holder family farmers in selected pilot areas ■ Community-based organisations, NGOs and local agricultural (experts and extensionists) working in the field with smallholder family farmers to support improved food security, nutrition, household incomes, and environmental sustainability ■ Youth clubs in schools and agricultural colleges
Enhancing information and communication strategies to promote EOA	Biovision Africa Trust, Kenya	■ Small-scale family farmers in selected pilot districts ■ Community-based organisations and NGOs working with the small-scale farmers to support improved food security, nutrition, household incomes, and environmental sustainability ■ Youth clubs in schools and agricultural colleges
Enhancing value chain and market development of EOA	National Organic Agricultural Movement (NOGAMU)	■ Pro-poor smallholder producer groups and community based organisations working with smallholder farmers in Africa ■ National and international policy makers and certification bodies ■ The consumers, processors, traders both domestic and international traders ■ Supporters of value chain development process at both the meso level, i.e. NGOs, financial institutions and macro level regulators, quality standards and revenue collectors
Promoting networking, partnership in EOA	Tanzania Organic Agriculture Movement (TOAM)	■ Civil society organisations (CSOs), NGOs, agriculture and research institutions, faith-based organisations (FBOs) ■ Farmer organisations and farmer groups, working with the small-scale family farmers to support improved food security, nutrition, household incomes, and environmental sustainability in the selected pilot districts ■ International development agencies including African Union Commission (AUC), European Union (EU), IFOAM, the United Nations Centre for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), FAO etc

- Include the EOA initiative and action plans in national and regional agricultural policies, particularly in the Multiannual National and Regional Indicative Programmes (NPIs)/ (RIPs) which are the main funding vehicles for agriculture in Africa
- Incorporate private sector stakeholders, and especially women, in agriculture policy and programme implementation efforts – related to the implementation of CAADP investment plans and the development of value chains
- Re-double efforts to create an enabling environment for fostering access to finance for deployment in the agricultural sector, especially for smallholders and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
- Develop and promote inclusive economic growth strategies that support the incorporation of small holder farmers into local, regional and international agribusiness value chains
- Encourage and guide bilateral and multilateral development partners to support national and regional related efforts to engage and develop organic agriculture
- Reinforce capacities to build/develop skills, technologies and mind-sets that improve and empower entrepreneurship and productivity of food production, processing and related agro-ecological activities.⁵⁶

The same declaration acknowledged the role of women who constitute 80% of African farmers most of whom are predominantly engaged in ecological organic agricultural practices.

In summary, the section has shown how different forums have led to high level discussions on OA with open calls to the AU to action on elevating OA as a form that is relevant to small-scale family farmers on the continent. Bouagnimbeck applauds the AU's support for OA by saying 'this African Union recognition of organic agriculture is an important step for realising multi-functional benefits of organic agriculture and growing the capacity for African governments to develop sustainable, resilient and productive farming on the continent'.⁵⁷

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated in the chapter, the multi-level governance structures which exist in the AU enable successful growth of organic farming in Africa. Different actors play a significant role through the inclusive nature of governance of agriculture as seen in the roll out of the CAADP since 2003. Therefore, it is important that the AU has taken bold steps in embedding OA in development plans for years to come, particularly

through the Ecological Organic Agriculture Action Plan which has a vision spanning up to 2020. What is more encouraging is the fact that the AU did not just adopt a decision to acknowledge the importance of organic farming but went as far as drafting an action plan which will be supported financially by the international donor community. The collaborating partners are African and have been in the sector for long enough to warrant the required results. It is obviously important to wait and see if African governments will also adopt organic agriculture at the level of policy development.

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Africa and the MDG on Improved Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation

Case of Nigeria and Ghana

Oghenerobor B. Akpor, Maxwell K. Boakye and Mammo Muchie

INTRODUCTION

According to the MDG target 7c, all countries are expected to ‘halve by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to drinking water and basic sanitation’^{1,2}. It is reported that all countries have made some form of commitment, either politically or financially to the realisation of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target for drinking water and sanitation (Target 7c). Although there is report of global impressive gains in meeting this target, most countries are falling short of meeting their national commitments. Available reports suggests that about 70% and 83% of countries seems to be falling remarkably in meeting their national targets for improved drinking water and sanitation, respectively.³

On a global scale, it is reported that in 1990, 77% of the world’s population had access to improved drinking water. Between 1990 and 2002, remarkable progress was made to increase global coverage of people with access to improved drinking water to 83%, thus putting the world on track to achieve the MDG target. On a global scale, the world is expected to reach the drinking water target, but is off track in attaining the sanitation target. In Africa, only 26 countries are on track to meet the MDG target on water and only 9 for sanitation.^{4,5} There is a general awareness in Africa that a large proportion of the population in different countries currently suffers from inadequate and inefficient water supply and sanitation.⁶ Also, improved water coverage in the Africa continent was observed to increase from 56% in 1990 to 64% in 2006, with urban and rural coverage of 85% and 51% respectively in 2006 (Table 1). Reports have also revealed that there was an increase from 61 million to 341 million people who still lack access to improved drinking water. With the current rate of access to improved drinking water, it is opined that about 245 million people will fall short of meeting the MDG target.^{7,8}

In terms of sanitation coverage, as at 2006, improved sanitation coverage was still at 53% and 29% for urban and rural dwellers respectively, indicating

a total increase from 33%–38% (Table 2). Reports available have indicated that since 1990, the African population that lacked access to improved sanitation facility increased by 153 million to 583 million in 2006. To meet the MDG on sanitation, it is estimated that over 400 million were still expected to have access between 2006 and 2015.¹⁰ Similarly, more recent reports have indicated that despite the perceived progress in sanitation, all but four countries in sub-Saharan Africa remain off-track in meeting the MDG on sanitation. In 2008, reports revealed that 584 million people in Africa were yet to have improved sanitation facility, of which about 231 million still practised open defecation.¹¹

In addition reports have indicated that despite about 10 million people gaining access to improved drinking water in sub-Saharan Africa annually from 1990–2004, the population has grown even faster, resulting in approximately 60 million yet to be served. According to the MDG target of 2015, the number of additional people requiring access to improved drinking water annually would need to triple.¹²

Currently in Africa, most especially the sub-Saharan region is reported not to be on track in meeting the MDG requirement on water and sanitation. On the continent, reports have revealed that 38 countries are still to have improved sanitation, while 9 are still to have drinking water coverage. This is less than 50%. The present rate at which Africans gain access to improved drinking water and sanitation is suggested to be insufficient to meeting the MDG target. Some of the obstacles to accelerating the rate of progress meeting the target are reported to be rapid increase in population, political instability, conflict and poor governance.^{14, 15} However, it is still unclear if the provision of sustainable access to improved drinking water and sanitation has been given the necessary political and financial support by policy makers in sub-Saharan Africa and relevant donors.¹⁶ Given the importance of improved drinking water and sanitation to the health of individuals and the need for the acceleration of progress towards meeting the MDG target and achieving the ultimate goal of universal access, this paper was aimed at reviewing the status of water supply and sanitation in Africa, using Nigeria and Ghana as case studies. The paper attempts to address current progress, challenges and suggested recommendations in achieving the MDG targets on improved drinking water provision and sanitation in each case study. The paper does not focus on comparison of the two countries, but rather addresses issues in each country independently.

PROGRESS IN IMPROVED DRINKING WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION

Within the context of this paper, improved water supply and sanitation are based on the description of the WHO/UNICEF.¹⁷ An improved drinking

Table 1 Regional estimates of drinking water coverage in Africa

Region	Year	% Urban		% Rural		% Total	
		A	B	A	B	A	B
Africa	1990	86	14	42	58	56	44
	2006	85	15	51	49	64	36
Sub-Saharan Africa	1990	82	18	35	65	49	51
	2006	81	19	46	54	58	42
Central Africa	1990	76	24	38	72	44	56
	2006	80	20	35	65	53	47
Eastern Africa	1990	85	15	30	70	40	60
	2006	85	15	45	55	54	46
Northern Africa	1990	94	6	76	24	84	16
	2006	93	7	82	18	88	12
Southern Africa	1990	98	2	62	38	80	20
	2006	100	0	81	19	92	8
Western Africa	1990	78	22	38	62	51	49
	2006	75	25	44	56	57	43
A – Total improved, B – unimproved							

Source UN-Water, 2008⁹**Table 2** Regional estimates of sanitation coverage in Africa

Region	Year	% Urban		% Rural		% Total	
		A	B	A	B	A	B
Africa	1990	52	29	23	69	33	55
	2006	53	24	29	61	38	47
Sub-Saharan Africa	1990	40	33	20	71	26	60
	2006	42	27	24	65	31	51
Central Africa	1990	48	*12	4	*37	21	74
	2006	50	*4	24	*27	34	54
Eastern Africa	1990	31	36	24	67	25	62
	2006	37	27	27	63	29	55
Northern Africa	1990	79	15	40	55	57	38
	2006	84	10	51	42	68	25
Southern Africa	1990	64	12	41	43	52	28
	2006	66	9	46	37	57	21
Western Africa	1990	32	41	15	75	21	63
	2006	35	34	18	70	25	54
A – Total improved sanitation access, B – combination of unimproved and open defecation * Open defecation only							

Source UN-Water, 2008⁹

water source is described as that which by nature of its construction or active intervention is protected from outside contamination, particularly faecal contamination.¹⁸ In the description, improved water sources refers to any of the following: piped water into a dwelling, plot or yard, public tap/standpipe, tube well/borehole, protected dug well, protected spring and rain water collection. On the other hand, unimproved water sources refers to unprotected dug wells, unprotected spring, cart with small tank/drum, bottled water, tanker-truck, surface water from river, dam, lake, pond, stream, canal and irrigation channels. In this description, bottled water is only considered an improved water source when the household uses the water from an improved source for personal hygiene and cooking.

With reference to sanitation, an improved facility is defined as one that hygienically separates human excreta from human contact and only include facilities which are neither shared or not public.¹⁹ Improved sources include flush or pour-flush to piped sewer system, septic tank or pit latrine, ventilated improved pit latrine, pit latrine with slab, and composting toilet. Sanitation facilities which are considered unimproved include flush or pour-flush to elsewhere, such as street, yard, plot, open sewer, ditch, drainage way, pit latrine without slab or open pit, bucket, hanging toilet/latrine, absence of facility.²⁰

NIGERIA WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION PROGRESS AT A GLANCE

As at 2008, seven years from the MDG target year of provision of improved water supply to 82% of the population, only about 58% of the population had access to improved water supply. Between 1990 and 2008, the provision of improved water was observed to have increased from 30% to 42% among rural dwellers but decreased from 79% to 75% among urban dwellers (Figure. 1). It is opined that the urban decline may be due to the lack of services in peri/semi urban areas and the increase in rural-urban migration.^{21,22} Based on the 2008 data, it is estimated that as many as 63 million Nigerians lacked access to improved water supply. Although the Nigeria National Water and Sanitation Policy of 2000 stipulates universal access to improved supply by 2011, it is very obvious that the country still lags far behind in meeting the MGD target on improved water supply provision. Estimates have shown that, at the present pace, the country could fall short of the MDG target by as much as 12 percentage points.²³

In the case of sanitation, Nigeria progress in meeting the MDG on improved sanitation provision seems to be worse than what is observed in the water sector. Between 1990 and 2008, improved sanitation coverage only increased from 36%–38 % among rural dwellers and decreased from 39%–34% among urban dwellers. In total, improved sanitation coverage was observed to decrease from 37%–32%. The MDG target for 2015 in respect of

sanitation provision is expected to be 88% of the total population; with 87% rural dwellers and 89% urban dwellers have access to improved sanitation (Figure. 2). From the observed decline in improved sanitation provision, it is obvious that Nigeria has not kept pace with sanitation delivery to its citizens, although this may be attributed to high population growth. The decline in the population of those with access to improved sanitation from 37% in 1990 to 32% in 2008 observed in Figure 3 gives an indication of the fact that if efforts are not accelerated to increase the provision of improved sanitation facilities to the population, the country may not attain the MDG target on sanitation by a wide margin of up to 69% points.^{24,25}

According to the 2006 estimates of sanitation coverage (Figure. 3), of the 70% of the Nigerian population without access to improved sanitation facilities, 26% were found to still use facilities that are shared, 20% used improved facilities and 22% practised open defecation.²⁶ Although there is disparity of figures with respect to water and sanitation, based on the Water Supply and Sanitation Baseline Survey (WSSBS), and the Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) on Water and Sanitation reports, available data indicates that the two sources of data do not differ significantly for water. In the case of sanitation, there is much greater difference, where in 2008, the JMP reports coverage of 32% and the WSSBS report was 65.6%. The difference in the two estimates have been attributed greatly to the difference in definition of improved sanitation by the JMP and the WSSBS. In the WSSBS estimate, shared facilities are considered to be an improved source but are not considered improved by the JMP.²⁷


GHANA WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION PROGRESS AT A GLANCE

In Ghana, the provision of improved water supply is reported to have achieved significant progress over the years. From as low as 37% coverage in 1990, improved water supply to rural dwellers reached 75% coverage in 2008, almost attaining the MDG target of 76%. Although improved water provision among urban dwellers exceeded the MDG target since 1990, remarkable progress was also made to reach 90% coverage in 2008. As of 2008, improved water supply coverage in Ghana is reported to be 82% of the total population, exceeding the MDG target of 77% (Fig. 4). Based on the available reports, it is obvious that Ghana is very well on track to exceed the MDG target of provision of improved water supply. Some reports have indicated that the MDG target figures obtained from sector agencies seem to differ from the JMP. As an example, in the JMP figures, which are based on various surveys, Ghana is reported to have achieved 79% improved water coverage in 2002 but the coverage reported in 2008 for rural and small town water supply by the

Community water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) was 57%, while the Ghana Water Company Ltd (GWCL) reported 58% national coverage.^{36,37}


In the case of sanitation, Ghana is reported to still be lagging behind in meeting the MDG target for improved sanitation coverage. This is attributed

Figure 1 Trend in improved water supply coverage in Nigeria





Source: UNEP, 2010³⁶, 2013³⁷


Figure 2 Trend in improved sanitation coverage in Nigeria



Source: WHO/UNICEF, 2012^{21,32,33}

Figure 3 Profile of sanitation practices in Nigeria**Figure 4** Trend in improved water supply coverage in Ghana

to a lack of local capacity and funding.³⁸ According to the MDG target, the target for improved sanitation coverage is 54% total, broken down into 52% and 56% coverage for rural and urban population, respectively. In 2008, only 7% rural dwellers, 50% urban dwellers and 13% of the total population


Figure 5 Trend in improved sanitation coverage in GhanaSource WHO/UNICEF, 2012^{26,44,45}

were reported to have access to improved sanitation (Figure. 5). Under the then current estimate of 13% improved sanitation coverage in 2008, it was opined that the chance that Ghana can attain the MDG target of 54% coverage is very little. With respect to type of sanitation facility used, as shown in Figure 6, 54% of the population use shared facilities, 20% practise open defecation. It is also alarming that the percentage of people who still practise open defecation increased remarkably between 2006 and 2008.

Although Ghana is reported to have made remarkable progress in improving governance, policy development and instructional frameworks, as well as capacity building in the water sector, there is still much to be done in respect of improved sanitation. Reports have indicated that the country aims to achieve 85% coverage for both improved water supply and sanitation by 2015, which is of course a higher coverage percentage than the MDGs targets. To make this realistic and not mere wishful thinking, it is reported that the country will need a capacity increase of five times in the sanitation sector³⁹ (AMCOW, 2006).

CHALLENGES AND OBSTACLES TO MEETING THE MDG TARGETS ON IMPROVED DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION

Although countries have recognised the vital importance of the development of national drinking water and sanitation policies and frameworks

Figure 6 Profile of sanitation practices in GhanaSource WHO/UNICEF, 2012⁴⁷

with clear objectives, roles, responsibilities and expectations; sustained progress in meeting the MDG targets still seems to be lacking. In an assessment by the WHO and UNICEF, in 2000, financial difficulties, institutional problems, inadequate human resources, lack of sector coordination, lack of political commitment, insufficient community involvement, inadequate operation and maintenance, lack of hygiene education, poor water quality and insufficient information and communication were identified as potential constraints to the development of the water supply and sanitation sector, although they may have varying degrees of effects in different countries.⁴⁸

THE NIGERIA EXPERIENCE

Nigeria has demonstrated clear commitments to ensure water security over the years, through the establishment of appropriate institutions and investment in relevant infrastructure. However, reports indicate that most of the interventions have been centrally driven and that local participation and ownership, which will ensure sustainability, were missing.⁴⁹ Despite the enormous water resources potential and endowment in Nigeria, the country is still faced with the problem of providing safe drinking water to its population. This could be attributed to the pressure of a population growth rate that has not kept pace with infrastructure development, in addition to poor management, which has led to the fast depletion of the available water resources.⁵⁰ According to the Rural Africa Water Development Project⁵¹, in the

Niger Delta region of Nigeria, which can also be attributed to the generality of the country, the sanitation challenges that the country faces include:

- widespread use in most household of unlined Pit latrines and poorly built pour flush latrines and toilets
- unlined wells and poorly constructed, boreholes; in addition to unprotected surface water sources such as rivers and streams that are vulnerable to animal, human and industrial pollution serving as a major source of drinking water
- use of water treatment or filtration technologies for drinking water at the household level is commonly an ignored intervention
- hand washing, particularly after using the latrine was uncommon
- absence of relevant skilled manpower (artisans) working on water and sanitation e.g. small-scale plumbers etc; yet the unemployment amongst the youths was high
- perceived convenience of accessing water from rivers, streams and ditches by households
- open defecation still widespread especially in farmer communities
- problems of chemical contamination through industrial sources
- some improperly developed wells which provide drinking water to thousands of poor households retained large quantities of drilling mud and cuttings from the annular space between the well screen and formation walls
- problem of organic growth introduced during pumping (i.e. intake of O₂) around the inner materials of the well
- majority of boreholes or water points sharing direct proximity with point pollution sources such as pit latrines, septic tanks and solid waste dump sites.

In relation to finance, the main challenge that the water sector faces is inadequate funding, which is largely explained by low tariffs and low utilisation rates. According to Odigie and Fajemirokun,⁵² traditionally most Nigerians view the provision of water supply and service as a social responsibility of the government. Accordingly, the costs of water infrastructure have been met mostly from budgetary allocations and donor contributions rather than from water tariffs and charges, thus creating the public perception of water as a free commodity. The difficulty is made worse by the lack of stakeholders' involvement through annual sub-sector reviews and real autonomy in operational decision making. In addition, there is the lack of operationalised sub-sector investment plans tailored towards meeting the MDGs at both the federal and state levels.⁵³ It is estimated that about US\$500 million of budgeted funds is sunk into the Nigerian water sector

on a yearly basis, although the government argues about US\$2.05 billion yearly is needed in investments to achieve the MDG target. Despite this claim, several experts are of the opinion that the sector's challenges are not that of lack of funds availability but rather mismanagement of resources and poor utilisation of available resources.⁵⁴

Another challenge of the Nigerian water and sanitation sector is the lack of potential for good sector monitoring, this impact on resource allocation at all levels. At national level, government sectoral monitoring systems are reported to be inefficient to properly inform decisions on national sector investments, sub-sector resource allocation, sub-national disbursing, accountability of funds and actual disbursement. Also, the civil society does not have access to user-friendly, relevant information it needs to become a full partner in the sector. This has led to the lack of harmonised data streams, thus the resulting situation is a vicious rather than virtuous circle.⁵⁵ The issue of equity and uptake of services is another serious barrier to water and sanitation provision in the country. Reports have revealed that there seems to be less attention to need when allocating the limited resources for sanitation, than for water supply. Currently, although the policy admits investments in sanitation to be households' responsibilities, the strategy for the encouragement for households uptakes seems lacking, neither is there a well-outlined micro-finance scheme to support households in building their own sanitation facilities.⁵⁶

Despite the above challenges, the Nigerian government has made some concerted efforts in addressing them, although the aspect of implementation remains an issue. In 2000, Nigeria's federal government launched a National Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, which was aimed at encouraging private-sector participation, expansion of rural water supply systems, and reform of urban water service providers. In 2003, the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), was introduced which targets poverty reduction and development and also recognises the low level of sanitation in the country as a critical issue. The same year, the 'Presidential Water Initiative (PWI): Water for People, Water for Life' was introduced. This initiative was aimed at increasing access to water supply and sanitation services to 100%, 75% and 66% to people in the state capitals, other urban/peri-urban areas, and rural areas, respectively. There is also a National Water Supply and Sanitation Programme, which provides a framework for all water supply and sanitation projects in the country.⁵⁷

THE GHANA EXPERIENCE

Several vital arguments have been created on the need to invest in water and sanitation. In an economy study, it was estimated that the impact resulting

from poor sanitation and hygiene could have a huge cost on the Ghanaian economy to the tune of 4.1 trillion Cedi yearly, which is an equivalent of 1.6% of the country's annual Gross Domestic Product. Other benefits include health cost-effectiveness, less water pollution, safety and security, greater dignity and equality between men and women, nutrient re-use, tourism and business.⁵⁸ In Ghana, the water and sanitation sector is reported to receive funding from a number of sources such as the World Bank, UNICEF, the EU, and the Danish International Development Agency. Available figures revealed that about 52 million US dollars is reported to be spent on sanitation yearly, with about 3.5% (1.8 million dollars) contributed by the government. This shows that approximately 50 million dollars per year comes from foreign donors, principally as grants to rural and small town sub-sectors and mixed grant/loan for the financing of the urban water sub-sector. Despite the assistance from donors, reports have shown that the available funds remain inadequate to meet set targets. This is argued to be due to rapid population growth and existing weak institutional capacity, hence addressing water and sanitation needs in the near future will become difficult.^{59,60}

In Ghana, because ground water is limited to only a few areas, the main source of water distribution to urban dwellers is the conventional treatment system where surface water is abstracted from rivers. Historically, it is reported that the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation seems inefficient and ineffective in the provision of water to urban dwellers. This is due to several challenges that the corporation faces. Some of the challenges include, the inability of the supply system to meet rising demand, low rate of bill payment by consumers, illegal connections leading to high operational costs and low returns on revenue, as well as the vandalising of water pipes and other facilities by people who taped water illegally.^{61,62} According to the Ghana Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA), for the projection to provide coverage for 85% of the population in rural and small towns, an estimated US\$756 million will be required over an 11-year (2005-2015) implementation period. Since the current funding level leaves a gap of approximately US\$233 million, to attain the target amounts the country will need to increase its share of investment to 40%. Equally, the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) is reported to be also hard pressed for finance since the majority of their capital is generated internally from its customers and subsidised by the government. It is estimated that only 400,000 Ghanaians nation-wide are connected to GWCL metered system pay water tariffs, hence capital generated internally from customers is low.⁶³

Although much effort has been put in the improvement of water supply, the sanitation effort is yet to receive a similar boost, with sanitation facilities almost non-existent in some case. This may be due to the legacy of under-investment in the sanitation sector. In most cases, sanitation

services are still provided either publicly through the main city-wide sewerage system combined with informal self provision at the local level, or through mixes of public-private partnership that may range from contracting-out delivery and franchising through to joint ventures with companies or co-production with beneficiary communities and user groups. Also, due to reasons relating to the legality of settlement, over-crowding, or lack of recognition of city's development plans, even in informal settlements where they have been provided by communities themselves, local authorities still refuse to extend disposal services. In addition, another reason why the Ghana sanitation sector is yet to receive a boost is attributed to the political implications of changes in modes of provision. It is reported that from the early 1990s, local assemblies have tried to reduce dependence on public latrines and move towards household facilities, mainly by supporting families to construct private latrines in their homes.⁶⁴

Furthermore, according to the Ghana Business News report⁶⁵, although Ghana is currently doing very poorly in achieving its sanitation MDG target with an abysmal national coverage figure of just 12.4% as at 2008, the government does not see the enforcement of sanitation laws which exist in the country's statute books as one of the considered options in overcoming the enormous challenge. Rather, reports indicate that the government has put in place a scheme which will enable communities, individuals and households to raise their level of understanding and appreciate adherence to good sanitation issues/practices. It is envisaged that the strategy will enable the government to be better informed on the appropriate approach to take in handling the country's enormous sanitation challenge. It could also assist government in making meaningful gains in achieving the country's improved sanitation target of 2015.⁶⁶

In the Second Ghana Water Forum Conference report that centred on water and sanitation services delivery in Ghana, the following were identified as challenges facing the water sector: uncoordinated water and sanitation consumer voices that leaves supplier too much freedom to decide on services; inadequate capacity to operate effectively especially in water quality monitoring, documentation and resource allocation; lack of systems for post construction support to ensure that facilities are always functioning. Other challenges include the lack of watchdog agencies in the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector to ensure transparency and accountability in resource allocation, award of contracts, design and installation of facilities etc; and uncoordinated data collection methods to feed the DiMES software and for effective decision-making in general. In the sanitation sector, the identified challenges were the lack of political commitment to sanitation issues at all levels both national and decentralised levels over the years; weak monitoring and evaluation system for environmental sanitation;

low funding for environmental sanitation at all levels; poor operation and maintenance culture for equipment and infrastructure; low capacity of the private sector in environmental sanitation; inability to enforce laws and regulations of environmental sanitation by the relevant authority; outmoded bye-laws on environmental sanitation and weak legal systems; weak sectoral collaboration among key sector players; lack of incentive for segregation/recycling and composting; and the need for behavioural change on sanitation and hygiene issues.⁶⁷

Despite the above challenges to the water and sanitation sectors in Ghana, as mentioned earlier, the country has already exceeded its MDG target of 77% drinking water supply and has enabled over 10 million people to have access to improved drinking water from an improved source between 1995 and 2010. In the case of sanitation, although households are expected to invest in sanitation, without giving clarity on financing the software (demand generation and behavioural changes) the country published a National Environmental Sanitation Action Plan and Investment Plan in 2010, thus adopting a community-led total sanitation strategy. The Ghana success in the area of water could be attributed to its effective implementation arrangements, which are in place in both rural and urban water supply through the CWSA and the GWCL.⁶⁸

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although a number of global drivers are known to put enormous stress on the provision of safe drinking water and sanitation, it is imperative to note that the provision of these services are complex issues of great strategic importance for enhanced sustainable development of a nation. A number of factors, such as population growth, economic development, changes in consumption and production patterns, climate variability and change, ecosystem changes, land-use changes, economic and political globalisation are both reported to put enormous stress on the global water and sanitation. Due to the obstacles posed by these factors, it is vital to adopt an integrated approach in confronting the challenges created by them.⁶⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS AND WAY FORWARD FOR NIGERIA

A number of recommendations have been made for the provision of improved water and sanitation in Nigeria. As an example, in a one day public interest dialogue on water governance that was organised by the Change Managers International Network, the following were highlighted as areas of action for the provision of improved water and sanitation in Nigeria:

- The need for stakeholders to develop strategies to engage with the Ministry of Water Resources and advocate for a unit in the ministry to deal with issues of partnership of CSOs and the ministries
- The need for the Ministry of Water Resources to understudy best practices from other ministries in relation to partnership with CSOs and other stakeholders in delivering on its mandate
- The need for preparatory meetings by the ministries, in partnership with stakeholders, on modalities of attending and reporting at international events
- The need for development partners such as Water Aid to provide technical support to Network on Water and Sanitation in Nigeria (NEWSAN), such as strategies for mobilisation of resources
- The need for the involvement of local communities and NGOs in sensitisation, advocacy, awareness, monitoring and evaluation of water and sanitation projects
- The need for massive education and attitudinal changes in value system to be sponsored by the Ministry of Water Resources
- That policy advocates should link water issues with other development issues such as power and corruption to get the government's and the public's attention
- The need for stakeholders to work together and advocate for policy makers to give legal backing to water and sanitation issues
- That corruption must be tackled for Nigeria to be able to achieve the various development issues including the issue of water and sanitation
- That the media should go against the traditional way of reporting and see themselves as advocates to raise issues of development concerns such as water and sanitation as human rights issues
- The need for CSOs to get involved in the review of budgets at the executive level before it goes to the National Assembly
- The need for the various ministries, particularly the Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development/Water Resources/Environment/Agriculture to link up in planning interventions and mainstreaming gender in their programmes
- It was agreed that a team be set up to develop a framework for CSOs intervention in Water Resources Management, Monitoring and Evaluation.⁷⁰

Also, several priority areas of action have been identified for the enhancement of improved water supply and sanitation in the country. For the combined water and sanitation sector, the identified priority actions to tackle the challenges faced by the sector and ensure finance is efficiently and effectively turned in to services include⁷¹:

- Supporting the completion of the preparation of states' water policies and increasing level of funding for water and sanitation
- Implementing the Water Investments Mobilisation and Application Guidelines to facilitate state-level policy and plan development as well as leverage matching finance for water supply and sanitation
- Clearly identifying an institutional home for sanitation and promoting private sector participation in the provision of goods and services
- Undertaking phased establishment of regulatory commissions in all states (as proposed by the National Water Policy)
- Agreeing on achievable national and state water supply and sanitation targets (with MDG requirements as a minimum) and preparing Strategic Investment Plans to meet state targets
- Clearly indicating budget lines for sanitation for greater visibility and improve financial reporting to be able to track sector investments
- Implementing the framework for monitoring and evaluation which remains on the drawing board
- Institutionalising an annual sector review dedicated to drinking water and sanitation while also preparing annual consolidated reports on sector output.

In the case of rural and urban water supply, the establishment of rural water and sanitation agencies in states where this has not been done and their roles substantially limited to facilitation and capacity building of local government areas is encouraged. Also, increasing the pace of implementation of the framework for rural water and sanitation delivery, emphasising community ownership and management, reviewing edicts of water services to make them consistent with national water policies, weaning urban water utilities off state subsidies for operation and maintenance, thus increasing the pace of utility commercialisation and undertaking regular reviews of tariffs to permit operation and maintenance recovery as minimum cost are suggested priority areas for action by the government. For the sanitation sectors, it is necessary for government in the respective states to prioritise sanitation, through putting in place policies, plans, and budgets for sanitation. Also, it is vital to scale up implementation of community-led total sanitation and regularly review its contribution to improving access and improve awareness through advocacy to mobilise public and private stakeholders on good sanitation and hygiene practices. The need to identify clear leaders for sanitation service delivery in urban areas and the development and implementation of appropriate sanitation approaches in peri-urban and low income communities have been identified as priority areas of action.⁷²

If the above recommendations are properly addressed in conjunction with present government as well as future initiatives, the country should

be able to achieve the MDG target on water and sanitation. In the past few years, the Federal Ministry of Water Resources in Nigeria established the National Task Group on Sanitation (NTGS), the acting national WASH coalition, which brings together ministries and government agencies as well as NGOs, donors and representatives of civil society and the media. The NTGS concentrates on advocacy, policy and strategy development, guidance/capacity building, research, sanitation and hygiene promotion. Several milestones and achievements, such as coordinating, planning, developing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating sector policies on sanitation and hygiene have been attained by the task group. Besides, the country's National Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy under NEEDS recognises water supply and sanitation as central to improvements in so many facets of human life. Hence, it proposes water supply as a priority focus for the Nigerian government.⁷³ Although these efforts by the Nigerian government are laudable, how the country deals with the challenge of implementation remains a concern.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND WAY FORWARD FOR GHANA

Despite the challenges to the provision of improved water and sanitation, some key components of ensuring sustainable water and sanitation have been identified. According to the Ghana Water Forum⁷⁴, some of the components include: development of a clear water and sanitation policy; ensuring of effective financing strategies; planning to address defined targets for sustainability; sector wide approach; effective decentralisation strategy; provision of appropriate institutional frameworks and provision of adequate support at the appropriate time.

Also, a number of priority actions for the strengthening of institutional frameworks, financing and implementation of water supply and sanitation policies, water and sanitation sectors monitoring and evaluation, provision of rural and urban water and sanitation have been reported.⁷⁵ With respect to institutional framework, financing, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, the proposed priority actions are:

- Undertaking assessment of current sector institutional weaknesses and their possible impact on delivery through the sector-wide approach
- Empowering district assemblies to take full ownership of service delivery through capacity building and funding support
- Ensuring greater synergy between the CWSA and GWCL in implementation of projects to benefit from economies of scale and avoid under- or over-laps in service area

- Urgently pursuing the development of comprehensive sector investment plans and ensuring better linkage between sector targets and funding allocations
- Increasing domestic allocations and disbursements to sector institutions and ensure prompt utilisation of funds
- Providing greater visibility for sanitation by further defining and disaggregating sanitation budget lines
- Developing innovative approaches to financing, particularly for sanitation while also undertaking regular monitoring of the equity of access to services
- Agreeing definitions and a set of national indicators coupled with undertaking consolidated annual sector reporting.⁷⁶

In the case of urban water supply and sanitation, the following priority actions have been proposed:

- Bridging the funding gap for rural water supply, coupled with revisiting the implications on sustainability of removing the 5% community contribution to capital costs
- Identifying innovative ways of providing drinking water to challenging hydro-geological areas
- Setting a clear roadmap on actions to be taken after expiry of management contract for urban water supply
- Bringing tariffs in line with full-cost recovery, in parallel with successful achievement of efficiency target, while ensuring greater participation of existing consumers and potential consumers in investment and supply
- Mainstreaming independent value-for-money studies in all loans/grants for urban water supply projects
- Instituting a system of incentives and penalties for management of urban water supply together with giving greater visibility to pro-poor unit within the urban utility
- Preparing of a national sanitation programme to address the rural sanitation deficit if the MDG is to be achieved
- Declaring a clear policy direction on how to deal with the high proportion of shared facilities
- Developing of innovative approaches to sanitation, including micro-finance schemes to support delivery of household schemes
- Developing of clear policies towards peri-urban and low income communities in cities
- strengthening institutional capacity for the management of sewerage treatment system.⁷⁷

In a presentation by the Ghanaian minister of finance on the country's commitment to sanitation and water, several areas of government action to ensure sanitation and hygiene were identified. One of such actions is the need for the continued government commitment to continuing participation in the water and sanitation for all partnership, prioritisation of water and sanitation alongside health and education in dialogue with donors in national development plans and in sector strategies of other sectors, and increasing policy dialogue on sanitation and water at all levels of the economy. Second, there is the need for the government to ensure improved targeting of funds to where they are most needed, by focusing resources and attention on achieving and sustaining progress on equitable delivery of the national and MDG targets for water and sanitation. Furthermore, it is important to develop and apply clear criteria for equitable targeting of resources at national and sub-national level, including indicators and mechanisms for monitoring performance. Also, it is necessary to establish mechanisms for ensuring accountability for progress, including an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism and transparency of resource management, including public expenditure reviews and tracking. In addition, it is vital for the government to mobilise all stakeholders including development partners, civil society and the private sector, to contribute towards national targets for sanitation and water embodied in existing plans and frameworks. It is also vital for the government to implement all national plans and strategies on sanitation and water, including the National Environmental Sanitation Strategy and Action Plan and its investment plan, Water Sector Strategic Development Plan and the accompanying investment plans of the rural, urban and water resources sub sectors, as well as MDG Acceleration Framework for sanitation. It is also important for the government to ensure sustainability and scaling up of sanitation and water services while adopting service delivery approaches that will ensure that facilities continue to deliver a basic level of service for all people. Finally, there is the need to establish a Sector Information System, which government can do, and the establishment of an effective sector management information system which will help to strengthen the role of monitoring and evaluation in sustainable services delivery.⁷⁸ If the above identified areas of actions by the government are put into action, Ghana can be on track to achieving the MDG target on sanitation.

Although this paper cannot be considered to be exhaustive with regards to water and sanitation issues in the two case studies, it is vital to mention that the inclusion of the countries' water and sanitation service development plans as part of the economic development plan of the two case studies discussed in this paper cannot be over emphasised.

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Are Mineral Resources in Africa Enriching Africans?

Trading with the World

Takalani Samuel Mashau and Nomusa Raphesu

INTRODUCTION

Geologically, Africa consists of Precambrian metamorphic and granitic rocks overlain in some areas by a thin cover of sedimentary rocks occupying broad shallow basins. Several cratonic areas (large immobile areas of ancient age) on the continent are separated by major mobile belts (zones that have undergone major tectonic activity).¹

Some of the largest, and richest, mineral deposits in the world have been found in Africa. For much of the last half of the 20th Century little mineral exploration and development work was done in Africa, except for southern Africa, even though there is significant potential for the discovery of new deposits. By the mid 1990's modern exploration started to spread across much of Africa and many new deposits have been discovered and developed and some of the old major deposits are being renovated.

The potential of Africa for the discovery and development of mineral resources is immense. Mineral occurrences are present throughout the continent in all countries. Unfortunately, none of the natural resources Africa is blessed with is under African control. Most of these occurrences will never be anything but isolated areas that contain small amounts of a mineral resource and will never be developed as a modern mine. The reason for that is because most of these occurrences do not contain enough volume of the mineral to make mining economic. However, the use of modern exploration methods in the region where these occurrences are known could result in the discovery of new, and previously unknown, deposits which could be of sufficient quantity and quality to allow for commercial mining.^{1,2}

NATURAL RESOURCES IN AFRICA

Almost all African states have got minerals that were supposed to be helping Africans. Following is the list of countries and their mineral resources:

States	Minerals
Algeria	Petroleum, Natural Gas, Iron Ore, Phosphates, Uranium, Lead, Zinc
Angola	Petroleum, Diamonds, Iron Ore, Phosphates, Copper, Feldspar, Gold, Bauxite, Uranium
Benin	Small Offshore Oil Deposits, Limestone, Marble, Timber
Botswana	Diamonds, Copper, Nickel, Salt, Soda Ash, Potash, Coal, Iron Ore, Silver
Burkina Faso	Manganese, Limestone, Marble, Small Deposits of Gold, Phosphates, Pumice, Salt
Burundi	Nickel, Uranium, Rare Earth Oxides, Peat, Cobalt, Copper, Platinum, Vanadium, Arable Land, Hydropower, Niobium, Tantalum, Gold, Tin, Tungsten, Kaolin, Limestone
Cameroon	Petroleum, Bauxite, Iron Ore, Timber, Hydropower
Cape Verde	Salt, Basalt Rock, Limestone, Kaolin, Fish, Clay, Gypsum
Central African Republic	Diamonds, Uranium, Timber, Gold, Oil, Hydropower
Chad	Petroleum, Uranium, Natron, Kaolin, Fish (Lake Chad), Gold, Limestone, Sand and Gravel, Salt
Congo	Petroleum, Timber, Potash, Lead, Zinc, Uranium, Copper, Phosphates, Gold, Magnesium, Natural Gas, Hydropower
Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	Petroleum, Natural Gas, Diamonds, Manganese, Iron Ore, Cobalt, Bauxite, Copper, Gold, Nickel, Tantalum, Silica Sand, Clay, Cocoa, Beans, Coffee, Palm Oil, Hydropower
Democratic Republic of Congo	Cobalt, Copper, Niobium, Tantalum, Petroleum, Industrial and Gem Diamonds, Gold, Silver, Zinc, Manganese, Tin, Uranium, Coal, Hydropower, Timber, Arable Land, Water
Djibouti	Geothermal, Gold, Clay, Granite, Limestone, Marble, Salt, Diatomite, Gypsum, Pumice, Petroleum
Egypt	Petroleum, Natural Gas, Iron Ore, Phosphates, Manganese, Limestone, Gypsum, Talc, Asbestos, Lead, Zinc
Equatorial Guinea	Petroleum, Natural Gas, Timber, Gold, Bauxite, Diamonds, Tantalum, Sand and Gravel, Clay
Eritrea	Potash, Gold, Zinc, Copper, Salt, Possibly Natural Gas and Oil, Fish
Ethiopia	Small Reserves of Gold, Platinum, Copper, Potash, Natural Gas, Hydropower
Gabon	Petroleum, Natural Gas, Diamonds, Niobium, Manganese, Uranium, Gold, Timber, Iron Ore, Hydropower
Gambia	Titanium (Rutile and Ilmenite), Tin, Zircon, Silica Sand, Clay, Petroleum

States	Minerals
Ghana	Gold, Timber, Industrial Diamonds, Bauxite, Manganese, Fish, Rubber, Hydropower, Petroleum, Silver, Salt, Limestone
Guinea	Bauxite, Iron Ore, Diamonds, Gold, Uranium, Hydropower, Fish, Salt
Guinea-Bissau	Timber, Phosphates, Bauxite, Clay, Granite, Limestone, Petroleum
Kenya	Limestone, Soda Ash, Salt, Gemstones, Fluorspar, Zinc, Diatomite, Gypsum, Wildlife, Hydropower
Lesotho	Water, Agricultural and Grazing Land, Diamonds, Sand, Clay, Building Stone
Liberia	Iron Ore, Timber, Diamonds, Gold, Hydropower; <u>Libya</u> : Petroleum, Natural Gas, Gypsum
Madagascar	Graphite, Chromites, Coal, Bauxite, Salt, Quartz, Tar Sands, Semiprecious Stones, Mica, Fish, Hydropower
Malawi	Limestone, Arable Land, Hydropower, Uranium, Coal, Bauxite
Mali	Gold, Phosphates, Kaolin, Salt, Limestone, Uranium, Gypsum, Granite, Hydropower, Bauxite, Iron Ore, Manganese, Tin, Copper
Mauritania	Iron Ore, Gypsum, Copper, Phosphate, Diamonds, Gold, Oil
Mauritius	Arable Land
Morocco	Phosphates, Iron Ore, Manganese, Lead, Zinc, Fish, Salt
Mozambique	Coal, Titanium, Natural Gas, Hydropower, Tantalum, Graphite
Namibia	Diamonds, Copper, Uranium, Gold, Silver, Lead, Tin, Lithium, Cadmium, Tungsten, Zinc, Salt, Hydropower, Fish, Coal, Oil, Iron Ore
Niger	Uranium, Coal, Iron Ore, Tin, Phosphates, Gold, Molybdenum, Gypsum, Salt, Petroleum
Nigeria	Natural Gas, Petroleum, Tin, Iron Ore, Coal, Limestone, Niobium, Lead, Zinc, Arable Land
Rwanda	Gold, Cassiterite (Tin Ore), Wolframite (Tungsten Ore), Methane, Hydropower, Arable Land
Sao Tome and Principe	Hydropower
Senegal	Phosphates, Iron Ore
Seychelles	Copra, Cinnamon Trees
Sierre Leone	Diamonds, Titanium Ore, Bauxite, Iron Ore, Gold, Chromite
Somalia	Uranium, Iron Ore, Tin, Gypsum, Bauxite, Copper, Salt, Natural Gas, Oil
South Africa	Gold, Chromium, Antimony, Coal, Iron Ore, Manganese, Nickel, Phosphates, Tin, Uranium, Gem Diamonds, Platinum, Copper, Vanadium, Salt, Natural Gas
Sudan	Petroleum, Iron Ore, Copper, Chromium Ore, Zinc, Tungsten, Mica, Silver, Gold, Hydropower

States	Minerals
Swaziland	Asbestos, Coal, Clay, Cassiterite, Hydropower, forests, Gold, Diamonds, Quarry Stone, Talc
Tanzania	Tanzanite, Gemstones, Hydropower, Tin, Phosphates, Iron Ore, Coal, Diamonds, Gold, Natural Gas, Nickel
Togo	Phosphates, Limestone, Marble, Arable Land
Tunisia	Petroleum, Phosphates, Iron Ore, Lead, Zinc, Salt
Uganda	Copper, Cobalt, Hydropower, Limestone, Salt, Arable Land, Gold
Zambia	Copper, Cobalt, Zinc, Lead, Coal, Emeralds, Gold, Silver, Uranium, Hydropower
Zimbabwe	Coal, Chromium Ore, Asbestos, Gold, Nickel, Copper, Iron Ore, Vanadium, Lithium, Tin, Platinum

Source Afriziz²

CONFLICT IN AFRICA

Natural resources have been shown to play a key role in the conflicts that have plagued a number of African countries over the last decade, both motivating and fuelling armed conflicts. Revenues from the exploitation of natural resources are not only used for sustaining armies but also for personal enrichment and building political support. As a result, they can become obstacles to peace as leaders of armed groups involved in exploitation are unwilling to give up control over these resources. Even when conflict gives way to a fragile peace, control over natural resources and their revenues often stays in the hands of a small elite, and is not used for broader development of the country.¹

Of critical importance is the weakness of key state structures in most African states. The first is the weakness of political and corporate governance. The neo-patrimonial nature of most states readily lends itself to weak or poor corporate governance practices in relation to the regulation of the natural resource sector. Also relevant is the weakness of institutional and technical capacity. The major theatres of conflict coincidentally are countries that have poor administrative capacity to regulate the natural resource sector.⁴

Further, closely related to the above is the nature of ownership rights on the continent. Owing to the dysfunctional nature of political systems in many African countries, many private actors, including the private citizenry and ethnic groups who inhabit regions with natural resource deposits, often engage in conflict on the strength of their perceived ownership of such resources. This brings to light the centrality of property right issues in

natural resource politics. The issue of unresolved ownership is also linked to illegal exploitation of natural resources, as evidenced by the huge black marketing of stolen crude in Nigeria's oil-rich delta region, where citizens and ethnic minorities do not feel constrained in tapping resources found on their land, and which by implication belong to them as opposed to the Nigerian state.

The peculiarities of certain natural resources can also predispose them to conflict, due to easy accessibility by non-state actors. These attributes include ease of discovery and extraction, ease of transportation, and less technical ways of conversion (processing) into use. Land is undoubtedly the most important natural resource in Africa. Every society on the continent sees land as a natural resource that is held in trust for future generations. Land is also the 'abode' of most other natural resources.

Most of the conflicts over land can be linked to the inability of African countries to evolve a land tenure system that is acceptable to the population. The difficulties of harmonising land tenure systems that are incompatible and for which the population have varying degrees of recognition and respect, remains a major challenge of many African countries.

Increasingly, agricultural resources are becoming linked to conflicts as they have been used to finance civil wars. Solid minerals have also been at the centre of controversies and conflicts in Africa. Next to solid minerals is oil, whose linkage with conflict has generated much interest and attention in Africa because of its high degree of profitability, the environmental consequences of its exploitation, the international nature of its politics and its role in the ethno-political and socio-economic affairs of the endowed countries.⁴

A close look at conflicts over natural resources in Africa will show a somewhat peculiar regional flavour, both in the nature of their manifestations and the politics of their resolution. Of critical importance here is the Mano River Union, the Great Lakes Region and the Gulf of Guinea, with particular emphasis on Nigeria's Niger Delta.⁴

The 'greed versus grievance' theory of conflict is distorted by an over-emphasis on the impact of resources on rebel group behaviour and insufficient attention to how government mismanagement of resources and revenue fuel conflict and human rights abuses. If the international community is serious about curbing conflict--related abuses in resource-rich countries, it should insist on greater transparency in government revenues and expenditures and on punitive measures against governments that seek to profit from conflict. Too often government control of important resources and the revenues that flow from these resources go hand in hand with a culture of impunity, lack of respect for the rule of law and inequitable distribution of public resources. These factors often lead to governments

with unaccountable power that routinely commit human rights abuse. They can also make prolonged armed conflict more likely. Control over resources gives such governments a strong incentive to maintain power even at the expense of public welfare and the rights of the population.⁴

In Africa, as in other parts of the developing world, the exploitation of natural resources has long been associated with underdevelopment and violent conflict, first under colonialism, and more recently under the impact of global economic liberalisation. Over the last decade, the privatisation of the global market place has been accompanied by a parallel, and not unrelated, privatisation of the forces of war. Armed conflicts have become increasingly self-financing, as rebel groups, criminal networks, mercenaries and predatory elites have increasingly relied on natural resource revenues and more accessible global markets to fund military activity.

Moreover, extractive companies particularly large multi-national enterprises are a key source of capital and technological investment for African countries. Although investors typically prefer stable and predictable environments, extractive companies go wherever lucrative resources are to be found. Increasingly these resources are found in fragile and war-torn parts of Africa.

Most companies, unlike mercenaries and criminal profiteers, do not deliberately seek to profit from violence. However law abiding they may seek to be, extractive companies often find themselves in situations where local rule of law is weak or absent, host government regulatory institutions broken, and economic activity beyond the reach of current international and trans-national frameworks.⁴

In the absence of supplementary regulation, routine extractive activities can fuel conflict dynamics, often in ways that are legally problematic. Efforts to rebuild fragile economies after armed conflict need to do more than create an attractive investment environment. They need to make the private sector active partners in economic recovery and to ensure that their economic activities contribute to peace building.⁴

Conflicts amongst Africans which are caused by foreigners who are exploiting African natural resources cause stress in Africa. These conflicts are mainly caused by weak African governments which allow foreigners to exploit the resources without regarding the benefits which should be enjoyed by the citizens. African leaders should find a mechanism in which their people can benefit out of their wealth.

THE INVOLVEMENT OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA

Chinese involvement in Africa, which began centuries ago, continues to the present day through exploration, trade, and the settlement of Chinese

people in Africa. This includes the ongoing move by the People's Republic of China to secure highly needed natural resources through Chinese-African trade and diplomatic relations.⁶

The quest for key resources in Africa targets areas rich in oil, minerals, timber, and cotton, such as Sudan, Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa. Many African countries are viewed as fast-growing markets and profitable outlets for the immediate export of cheap manufactured goods, and the future export of high-end products and services.

Large scale structural projects, often accompanied by a soft loan, are proposed to African countries rich in natural resources. China commonly funds the construction of infrastructure such as roads and railroads, dams, ports, and airports. These amenities aid the movement of natural resources back to China, and provide China with leverage to obtain exploration and drilling rights. While relations are mainly conducted through diplomacy and trade, military support via the provision of arms and other equipment is also a major component. At the end, the majority of Africans do not benefit out of these loans. Instead tension is created because of armaments which are brought to Africa.

In the diplomatic and economic rush into Africa, Taiwan, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom (UK) are China's main competitors. France and the UK were once the primary commercial partners in Africa, but China recently became the largest trading partner, with trade of US\$90 billion in 2009. The United States ranked 2nd, with \$86 billion. Although Africa has seen economic growth through commodity exports to China, critics argue that Chinese exports to Africa – as well as Chinese business practices – have impeded aspects of African development, but with better than little to no growth coming from the US or Europe. China continues to expand its influence in the region on diplomatic, cultural, and commercial fronts, while working to secure and stabilise the region for long term gains. The garments they send to Africa are of low quality, and this makes Africa to be the loser in this kind of trade.

In Africa, industrialisation started marginally in the early 20th Century in the colonies of the European nations, namely Portugal, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The continent's various wars for independence brought on the violent and disruptive division of Africa. Africa, being a major source of raw materials, saw the colonial powers vie for influence among the newly independent nations, with former colonial powers establishing special relations with their former colonies, often by offering economic aid and alliances for access to the vast resources of their former territories. This is what former colonies are still doing in almost all countries. African leaders are still colonised by their former colonisers to such an extent that they cannot make use of their own

people to develop their own states. Foreigners (colonisers) are still acting as donors in Africa.

Today, the presence of diamonds, gold, silver, uranium, cobalt and large oil reserves have brought Africa to the forefront of industrial development, with many of the world's economic powers building relations with Africa's resource rich nations. The Chinese diaspora in Africa have been actively supported by Chinese embassies, continuously building the 'blood brother' relation between China and Africa as perceived victims of Western imperialism.⁶

African leaders earn legitimacy through Chinese partnerships. They work together with the Chinese to provide Africa with key structural infrastructure – roads, railways, ports, hydroelectric dams, and refineries – fundamentals which will help Africa avoid the 'resource curse'. Success in this endeavour means avoiding the exploitation of their natural wealth and the beginning of fundamental social and economic transformations on the continent.⁶ This kind of relationship always puts Africans at a disadvantage.

African countries partnering with China today are signing with a future world superpower. In Africa, this Chinese alliance provides strong psychological consequences. It provides economic hope and shows African elites an example of success. Writer Harry Broadman commented that if Chinese investments in key sectors of infrastructure, telecommunication, manufacturing, foods, and textiles radically alter the African continent, the main change will have taken place in African minds. With the recent growth and economic improvement, more African students are returning to Africa after studies abroad in order to bring their skills and industry home. With key infrastructure in place, Africa has a future.⁶

Foreign countries enter Africa as people who are bringing aid. The invasion of China in Africa is colonialism in disguise. What are the Chinese bringing that is new to Africa from what the former colonisers brought before? There is nothing that the Chinese are bringing, except that they are taking Africans for a ride. There is opportunity for growth in Africa without involving the Chinese, unfortunately Africans undermine their capabilities. Does that mean Africans are going to be beggars forever? It is obvious that if African leaders keep on suppressing their own people, Africans will be beggars forever. Africa is mainly a supplier of raw materials. African countries, rich in raw materials, try to generate revenues through exports. As a result of this, markets outside Africa determine the perspectives for Africa's economic growth and development.

While, on the other hand, the economic evolution in the Emerging Economies in Asia (and especially in India and China) arouses one's hopes that there will be a sustained and even an increased demand for raw materials in the near future, on the other hand, most unfortunately, the

mechanisms governing the global market in raw materials undermine the interests of countries producing them. In fact, the market in raw materials is characterised by cyclic movements and depends heavily on the law of offer and demand. In the past few years, the market witnessed a so-called 'super-cycle' with an unprecedented rise of raw material prices. However, to an increasing extent, economic power is concentrated in the hands of a limited number of mining and oil companies and the majority of Africans are without economic power, which makes them destitute on their own rich continent. The latter have used the profits of the recent resource boom to buy extractive companies on an unprecedented scale. This has given rise to the emergence of giant enterprises that impose their prices on their customers. In addition to this, raw materials have become instruments of investment. Consequently, speculators have started invading the market. Their activities have stirred up price volatility to their benefit. Industrial countries consuming Africa's raw materials have looked at these developments with Argus' eyes.⁷ In the mean time, they use Africans as cheap labour.

Clapham further states that the positive turnaround is mainly a consequence of the trade with Asia. African exports to Asia since 2003 have increased to 30% a year. The imports from Asia in Africa have increased from 2000 to 2005 with an annual average of 18%. In this trading relationship with Asia, China is the main driver, whereas Africa becomes a passive passenger. In September 2008, Chinese customs said that in the first half of 2008 the bilateral Sino-African trade grew 66% year-on-year to US\$53,14 billion with around US\$23 billion exports to Africa (+40%) and US\$30 billion imports from Africa (+92%). It was expected that bilateral trade would exceed US\$100 billion in 2008. Despite the jump in trade with China, the EU still remains Africa's first trading partner.

ARE MINERAL RESOURCES IN AFRICA A CURSE?

Africa occupies a marginal position in the global economy as a whole. When one compares the volume of Africa's production and trade with that of other regions in the world, it becomes evident that the former is much smaller than the latter. This situation came into existence during colonial times and has become worse ever since. The crisis of the 1970s was an important turning point in Africa's economic history. From that moment on, the prices of raw materials remained low. Developing crisis policies, rich countries in the North started focusing their attention on Asia, relegating Africa to the role of raw material supplier. Things appeared to change for the better around the end of the 20th Century. Suddenly, Africa's figures

of economic growth, trade and investment were showing an upward trend. However, during the last quarter of 2008, the global economic and financial crisis spread from the North to the South, forcing African governments to look for remedies and solutions, in consultation with their foreign partners and foreigners opened up to the advantage presented to them by Africa.

Clapham further indicates that there are many assumptions made regarding Africa and its countries. One hears, for example, that 'Africa remains the most vulnerable to economic disruption' or a slogan like 'Dig a hole in Africa's soil and you'll bump into diamonds or gold', or 'The Congo's natural resources potential is enormous'. Unfortunately, those who dig holes are foreigners and owners of the land look helplessly on.

The famous 'resource curse' is another assumption that has taken almost mythical proportions. It assesses the contradiction that Africa is wealthy in natural resources but that its population is not 'experiencing significant economic gain' from these resources.⁷

Africa plays a marginal role in the global economy. A glance at the shares per country of World Gross Domestic Product (WGDP) makes this clear. While in 2006 WGDP totalled US\$ 58, 6 trillion, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only 2% of the total. This is less than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Mexico and only slightly over that of Australia, respectively the fourteenth and fifteenth economies of the world.

There are 47 countries on the African continent, of which only two (South Africa and Nigeria) can be called 'regional superpowers' on the basis of their GDP. South Africa is ranked 28 and Nigeria is 41 on the list. Algeria and Egypt, from the North-African zone, are ranked 49 and 52. An objective handicap for the development of many of the African countries is that 40% of the African population lives in landlocked countries (against 23% in East and Central Asia).⁷

TRADE

The most important factor underlying the international weakness of African states, and their vulnerability to internal fragmentation and external penetration, was their record economic failure. There was, of course no one-way causal relationship between economic failure and political weakness. The structure of African statehood certainly contributed to the dismal record of African economies.

Trade is another striking indicator of Africa's evolution within the global economy. Africa's share in world trade has decreased for decades, from around 5, 5% in 1970 to 2, 5% in 2002. In 2004, African export values amounted up to US\$149 billion. The vast majority of that export consisted

of raw materials, 42% oil and natural gas (of which 19% was to the US and 11, 7% to Asia) and 20% other minerals and metals (around 7% to the European Union and Asia). According to the World Bank, the decrease of Africa's share in the world economy between 1970 and 1999 has cost the continent US\$70 billion annually in export revenues.

The growing export of oil and some other minerals from Africa has nonetheless produced a positive twist in the curve. In 2006, Africa's exports rose to 21% and the continent's share of the world total export nearly reached 3%. In 2007 Africa's export of commodities and services increased by 15, 2%. Still, these numbers remain considerably lower than the export levels of the 1960's and 1970's. Moreover, the realised growth is mainly due to raw materials, which makes it vulnerable to sudden evolutions and volatility on the world's markets, especially because Africa has a high dependency on resource revenues. Africa accounts for one third of all resource dependent countries; the 'contribution of the 13 oil economies to the GDP rose from 55, 5% in 2006 to 61, 5% in 2007'. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) therefore draws this conclusion: 'The current growth momentum rests on a very fragile foundation. The continent continues to rely on primary commodities whose prices have been major sources of trade shocks'.⁷

In 2006, 40% of African exports were destined for the European Union. Furthermore, in 2006, the North American Free Trade Agreement (US, Canada, Mexico) was the second export destination (24%) while Developing Asia accounted for (16%).⁷ The EU's exports to Africa in 2007 valued 103, 8 billion (8, 4% of EU-exports) and its imports from the continent valued 128, 5 billion (9% of EU imports). Around one fifth of the EU's Africa exports go to South Africa and almost one sixth of its imports from Africa originate from South Africa. However, the EU is losing ground, partly because of the Euro's continued appreciation, which makes imports from the EU more expensive.

Africa produces more than 60 metal and mineral products and is a major producer of several of the world's most important minerals and metals including Gold, Diamonds, Uranium, Manganese, Chromium, Nickel, Bauxite and Cobalt. It is interesting to note that Africa's contribution to the world's major metals (copper, lead and zinc) is less than 7%. As a result silver production is low (less than 3% of the world's production) due to the fact that most silver is produced as a by-product of lead, – zinc and copper mining. Although under-explored, Africa hosts about 30% of the planet's mineral reserves, including 40% of gold, 60% cobalt and 90% of the world's PGM reserves – making it a truly strategic producer of these precious metals¹.

The increase in exploration and mine development in Africa has been primarily focused on gold and diamond exploration. Undoubtedly, there

is still great scope for these commodities, but riding on the back of improving base metal prices, this sector could see an increase in activities. Mozambique, Nigeria and Madagascar are some of the few countries that have tremendous potential for base metal and industrial mineral deposits.

South Africa, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) dominate the African mining industry, whilst countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone, Namibia, Zambia and Botswana rely heavily on the mining industry as a major foreign currency earner. Unfortunately, several African civil wars are funded by (and often caused by) some of these commodities, in particular diamonds.¹

Major new mines opening in Africa or mines under development are distributed between South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Tanzania, and Gabon producing gold, diamonds, niobium products, chrome and base metals. Major discoveries over the last year include the discovery of several potentially diamondiferous kimberlites in Mauritania, and still on diamonds, the potential marine deposits in offshore southern Namibia.¹²

OIL IN AFRICA

African oil takes growing importance, mainly after the 2003 oil crisis and recent oil reserves discoveries. Sudan and Nigeria are two of the main oil producers. China owns 40% of Sudan's oil production. Oil is provided by both continental and offshore productions. Sudan's oil exports in 2010 are estimated by US State Department at US\$9 billion.⁶

Five countries dominate Africa's upstream oil production. Together they account for 85% of the continent's oil production. These are, in order of decreasing output, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Egypt and Angola. Other oil producing countries are Gabon, Congo, Cameroon, Tunisia, Equatorial Guinea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Cote d'Ivoire. Exploration is taking place in a number of other countries that aim to increase their output or become first time producers. Included in this list are Chad, Sudan, Namibia, South Africa and Madagascar while Mozambique and Tanzania are potential gas producers.⁶

SELFISH LEADERSHIP – DEALERSHIP AND CORRUPTION

Africa has a large quantity of natural resources including oil, diamonds, gold, iron, cobalt, uranium, copper, bauxite, silver, petroleum, but also woods and tropical fruits. Much of its natural resources are undiscovered or barely harnessed. Having a low human density, for a long period of time

Africa has been colonised by more dynamic groups who exploited African resources. Some economists have talked about the 'scourge of raw materials', large quantities of rare raw materials putting Africa under heavy pressure and tensions, leading to wars and slow development. Despite this abundance of natural resources, many Western nations like the US, UK, Canada, and France exploit Africa's natural resources today, causing most of the value and money from the natural resources to go to the West rather than Africa, further causing the poverty in Africa.

Also, south of the Sahara is a region with plenty of valuable mineral resources – metals, oil and diamonds. Foreign investments lead the extraction and exploration in many of these places to supply the world markets. This region is also the site of several open conflicts and political instability. Foreign armed forces are present in military bases and in peace-keeping forces.

The effects of the resource curse are painfully clear in Africa. Insiders and profiteers are increasingly using oil revenues to take over service industries. They crowd out entrepreneurs and create their own monopolies. At first glance, countries like Angola look as if they have thriving private sectors, but those firms are really loose cartels run by the oil-rich elite. Some governments are also using resource cash to maintain control. Cronies buy independent media and foreign leaders hear that access to oil depends on turning a blind eye to the brutal silencing of domestic critics.¹

And even good intentions often fail the poor. Africans joke that the animal they see most often these days is the white elephant – high-profile investment projects that serve no purpose. Angola has built 24 new hospitals, but cannot staff them because, although it has 18m people, it has only 1,500 doctors. Although among Africa's richest countries, it is the only one in the world with cases of urban polio. Elsewhere, Africa's rulers have spent billions on their armies. Global defence spending has fallen by 35% since the end of the Cold War: in sub-Saharan Africa it increased by almost a third.¹

THE MISUSED GIFT (MINERALS)

The first responsibility to do something lies with African leaders themselves, in order to avoid a dismal succession of coups and military governments. But concerned outsiders can, and should, help. The International Monetary Fund and some oil majors have made a good start by pressing governments to publish details of their revenues from natural resources. With accounts laid open, local media might put pressure on leaders. For this Africa's press needs financial support and training. Micro-loans and trade links

can help entrepreneurs compete with state-backed monopolists. No place without the institutions to hold powerful men to account can completely escape the temptations of huge resource wealth. But Africa's poor deserve so much better.¹

Unfortunately trust is sorely lacking in Africa. It is the most corrupt continent and as such any native attempt at development stalls amidst demands by the state to buy their protection, licences for production etc. Corruption affects all levels of life costing Africa more than \$148 billion a year, increasing the cost of goods by as much as 20%, and corruption deters investment. If native investment is deterred then there is no way that Africa can develop its own resources.⁹

Former President Mogae of Botswana acknowledges the problems of corruption and poor management of Africa's mineral resources. 'Some of our countries' individual leaders use their access to financial resources from extractive industries to advance their own personal agendas, instead of using them in the best interest of the nation as a whole', he said at the December 2008 African Development Bank meeting.¹⁰

Much of the blame for Africa's spiral of violence belongs to generations of opportunistic and venal African leaders, who have done little to develop their societies and emancipate their peoples. But the expansion of corporate dominance has accentuated the steady descent into near economic strangulation and political chaos. Many transnational corporations (TNCs) have acted as economic predators in Africa, gobbling up national resources, distorting national economic policies, exploiting and changing labour relations, committing environmental despoliation, violating sovereignties, and manipulating governments and the media. In order to ensure uninterrupted access to resources, TNCs have also supported repressive African leaders, warlords, and guerrilla fighters, thus serving as catalysts for lethal conflict and impeding prospects for development and peace.

Khotsa goes further to point that from these blessings, however, much sorrow has flowed. During the colonial era, most Africans did not benefit from the continent's resources. African economies were geared towards cultivating raw materials for export; and roads, health care, and other infrastructure were available only in areas where those materials were produced. The end of colonialism unleashed struggles for political control, social emancipation, and access to resources – struggles that, in turn, have degenerated into conflicts and internecine wars. Retarded in their development, unbridled in their lust for power, steeped in official corruption, chaotic in their political engineering, many African states are now sprinting towards total collapse.¹¹

Khotsa further states that the sheer growth of TNCs in recent decades has had profound consequences for Africa. The average growth rate of TNCs is three times that of the most advanced industrial countries. Of the 100

biggest economies in the world, more than half are corporations. TNCs hold enormous power to transform the world political economy, and Africa's vast resources, cheap labour, huge population, and expanding markets are crucial to their plans.

The globalisation optimists maintain that global capital has served as a dynamic engine of growth, opening the window for diverse opportunities in terms of goods and services, creating employment, and boosting government revenues. This has been true in a few cases. In South Africa and Nigeria, for example, gold mining and oil companies respectively have brought new technology, attracted subsidiary industries, and made it possible for indigenous personnel to acquire skills.

However, any such benefits are far outweighed by activities that deplete local resources, stifle local or indigenous industry, and subvert the fragile democratic process. Africa is still confined to the role it played in the industrial revolution(s) that preceded globalisation. Its raw materials are still being depleted without generating development.¹¹

In addition, the continent's increasing dependence on imported capital and consumer goods and services has left various sectors of the domestic economy comatose. African markets are specially targeted as dumping grounds for new and second-hand goods. Because of stiff competition from these products, infant manufacturing established earlier in Africa has quickly withered away. For example, imports of used clothing from the United States are threatening to destroy Kenya's domestic textile industry.¹¹

Finally, as soon as the TNCs have African economies firmly in their grip, they deploy funds and patronage to manipulate the media and influence government policies. Governments, in turn, grant them *carte blanche* to sidestep labour and environmental laws.

Other global institutions have contributed to the deregulation of African economies. The Generalised Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Trade Organisation, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) all promote increased liberalisation of international trade. The IMF's Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) require African states to freeze wages, devalue currency, remove public subsidies, and impose other austerity measures, which have brought about even greater unemployment and under-utilisation of productive capacity. These policies have caused considerable turmoil in Africa. In the early 1980s, Uganda was rocked by weeks of demonstrations, as industrial workers and students took to the streets to denounce President Milton Obote's IMF-imposed economic programme. In 1990, Matthew Kerokou of the Benin Republic in West Africa was swept out of power in a wave of anti-SAP riots.¹¹

Khotse states that because of the twin problems of rogue leadership and the exploitative tendencies of TNCs, Africa is caught between a rock

and a hard place. As the history of conflicts in Africa shows, the extraction of mineral resources creates and reinforces government corruption, which easily begets repressive societies. As would be expected, poverty, unemployment, and insecurity spread, while social services decay. This leaves the citizens more prone to take up arms and fight in oil, diamond, and copper wars, as the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Liberia, and the Great Lakes Region all attest.

How can Africa wrench itself from itself and curb the rampaging TNCs? In response to corporations' bad behaviour, and their brazen disregard for the political stability and economic viability of the states in which they operate, international human rights organisations have tried to establish mechanisms of accountability.¹³

The key, however, is action by Africans on their own behalf. Their options for ending the circle of violence and economic exploitation are few but practicable. Africa needs a new generation of leaders to define and pursue a dynamic political and economic agenda. The African states must renegotiate their terms of trade in the international marketplace. Diverse groups must achieve a sense of national pride and internal cohesiveness, in order to create an atmosphere conducive to implementing development programmes. As long as the resources have not yet been depleted, there is still hope of rising again for a continent that has tarried for too long in the labyrinth.¹¹

CONCLUSION

Africa needs an economic system that will embrace and benefit all citizens of the continent, not only a few individuals who are in leadership positions. The wealth of this continent must be used to develop people of Africa, and not benefit individual despots and the outsiders. The wealth of Arica should be used to service the dire needs of Africans.

African natural mineral resources are used to disadvantage African people. Very few Africans are benefiting from Africa's natural resources, and the majority are in dire poverty. Allowing foreign forces in Africa contributes immensely to poverty.

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Natural Resources for African Development under Sino-American Geo-strategic Rivalry

Alexis Habiyaemye

INTRODUCTION

The inability of most African countries to use the leverage of their natural resources to generate economic growth and decent living standards for their citizens has been a hotly debated issue in development economics for many decades. Most attempts to explain the paradoxical contrast between Africa's prodigious mineral wealth and its dismal economic performance invariably point to the intricate links between local elites and foreign powers and corporations, who often play a nefarious role in the appropriation of the benefits at the detriment of local development. Indeed, African abundant oil and strategic mineral deposits have often attracted foreign powers that sought to exploit them for their own benefits at the expense of local communities and their livelihoods. While external observers from developed countries have repeatedly claimed that Africa is a continent of poverty doomed to underdevelopment, so often have the Africans replied that theirs is a wealthy continent, if with a poor population, yet sitting on gold, gems and other precious minerals.

The temptation to bet on the wealth of African gold and gems as a source of prosperity is indeed strong, since Africa has the world's richest concentration of mineral ores and gems in its soil. According to US Geological Survey (USGS), Africa is in effect home to 40% of the world's diamond reserves and almost all of the world's chromium reserves, whereas more than 50% of the world's cobalt reserves are found in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) alone.¹ In some regions of the continent, like the Katanga province in the DRC, the mineral wealth is so prodigiously abundant that it has been referred to by the late Belgian geologist Jules Cornet as 'a geological scandal'.² In other regions, countries around the Gulf of Guinea have large oil and natural gas reserves, which provide an attractive source of energy supply to Europe and the United States.

However, instead of enriching African countries, the exploitation of natural resources has often fuelled armed conflicts, provoked civil unrest, and caused environmental degradation and social disruption in many parts of the continent. Decades of export of these resources to rich Western countries since the colonial period have failed to bring prosperity to African populations. Until 2002, when resource-rich African countries started to record strong growth rates as a result of a buoyant demand from China, the abundance of natural resources seemed to have brought a curse rather than being a blessing to African populations, and appeared to validate the ‘resource curse’ thesis.³ The arrival of China on the African resource market, under a trade structure known as the ‘Angola mode’, with its strategy of swapping large infrastructure projects against access to mineral resources, has thus created completely new dynamics in the growth of African economies.⁴

These new dynamics of Sino-African trade and investments have largely contributed to the relatively good growth performance of many African economies in the years that preceded the 2008 global financial crisis.⁵ As a result, some of the principal beneficiaries of these trade arrangements have been growing at spectacular rates over the last decade, with Angola even outpacing China to be the world fastest growing economy over the decennium 2001–2010, according to IMF data. In fact, no less than 6 sub-Saharan

TABLE 1 Fastest growing economies: 2001–2010 estimates and 2011–2015 forecast

World top-10 fastest growing economies* Annual average GDP growth, %			
2001–2010 ^a		2011–2015 ^b	
Angola	11.1	China	9.5
China	10.5	India	8.2
Myanmar	10.3	Ethiopia	8.1
Nigeria	8.9	Mozambique	7.7
Ethiopia	8.4	Tanzania	7.2
Kazakhstan	8.2	Vietnam	7.2
Chad	7.9	Congo	7
Mozambique	7.9	Ghana	7
Cambodia	7.7	Zambia	6.9
Rwanda	7.6	Nigeria	6.8
* Excluding countries with an economy of less than 10 million population (+Iraq and Afghanistan) a 2010 IMF estimates, b IMF forecast			

Source IMF; The Economist

Africa countries trading with China under this form of swap agreements were in the world top ten fastest growing economies over the last decade. For the period 2011–2015, the IMF projections are that seven out of ten fastest growing economies will be from Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 1). China's active involvement in infrastructure financing and construction has therefore revived the hopes of a resource-based industrialisation in oil-rich African countries.

But concurrently, the US interest for African oil and strategic minerals has seen an unprecedented surge under the security concerns of the last decade. This simultaneous interest for African resources has resulted in a geostrategic rivalry, in which the US has responded to the growing Chinese involvement in the African resource market by increasing its military presence on the continent. This new strategic objective culminated in the creation of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), enacted in 2007 and made operational in 2008 to better coordinate and secure US vital interests on the continent. The Sino-American rivalry for the control of African resources has thus taken on serious dimensions.

While this rivalry enhanced the demand for traditional and abundant African exports, and thus strengthened opportunities for development and stronger growth performance in resource-rich African countries, it also raised important concerns about the appropriation of the resource benefits. Under these circumstances, the major question for resource-rich African countries is whether the Sino-American race for the control of natural resources and the current post-crisis commodity price rebound can provide a window of opportunity to structurally transform their economies and put them on the track of sustainable development. If decades of export of its immense wealth of minerals and oil to rich Western countries failed to bring prosperity to African populations, how can the new dynamics created by the infrastructure-for-resources swap arrangements offer new opportunities for a resource-based development? The aim of this chapter is to analyse the role that natural resources can play in African economic development in this geo-political context of rivalry.

The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: the next section looks at the development challenges facing resource-dependent African countries under the threat of a resource curse and poverty traps; section 3 takes an in-depth look at the growing penetration of African resource market by Chinese corporations as well as the American efforts to counterbalance China through increased military involvement in Africa; section 4 discusses the opportunities created by the Sino-American rivalry for African development through a structural transformation. The caveats for Africa to benefit from the ongoing resource boom are summarised in the concluding section.

DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES: FROM RESOURCE DEPENDENCE TO STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION

RESOURCE DEPENDENCE

Foreign powers and multinational corporations that were attracted by African mineral wealth have sought to exploit African resources for their own benefit, in ways which were detrimental to African development. In order to minimise their exploitation costs and avoid bearing the burden of environmental protection standards, foreign companies have often resorted to alliances with autocratic rulers to shift the burden of environment damage to the population around the exploitation sites. Examples of secret payments by foreign oil corporations for land use and blatant dumping of industrial waste as well as corruption and collusion with local security forces to suppress protest are abundant in the Niger delta. According to US-based Essential Action for Global Exchange (EAGE)⁶, the actions of some of these companies, like Shell, directly create, feed or exacerbate conflicts in that region. As a result, natural resource endowments have more often been a liability rather than an advantage for economic growth in many African countries. This pattern of foreign exploitation has created a state of resource addiction, in which mineral-rich African countries depend for the essential of their foreign exchange on supplying their natural resources as strategic raw materials to the dominant countries. This is what usually occurs when the resource endowed but technologically backward country is economically dominated by one or more technologically advanced countries or foreign multinational corporations in the resource exploitation.

In such cases, the natural resources are mainly extracted for exportation to the dominant country in exchange for a political and military support to the local political elites, with repression against local communities as a result. In various instances, the presence of foreign productive powers in the exploitation of natural resources is made acceptable to the local population by vague promises of aid projects for local development, either directly by the involved foreign companies or, as often is the case, indirectly by the governments of their home countries. When such development aid promises are kept, aid is usually channelled directly to support the host government budget, and thus serves to legitimise the political elites and to reinforce their hold on the exploitation of resources.

Such resource dependence creates and reinforces, among many other problems, a state of dual economy, in which the booming resource sector dominates the economic structure and benefits a small elite that enjoys good living standards while leaving the majority of the population under abject poverty. From that perspective, the growing presence of Chinese

firms in the African resource market and the correspondingly increased involvement of US AFRICOM in the control of resource supplies is therefore likely to exacerbate the dualism that characterise many resource-rich SSA countries by reinforcing their resource dependence.

RESOURCE DEPENDENCE AND THE FAILURE TO CATCH UP

While these economic giants are vying for the control of African resources for their geostrategic interests, the development challenges on the continent remain staggering. Notwithstanding the relatively strong growth rates recorded in the years prior the 2008 global financial crisis, Africa's performance in the world economy has been dismal for many decades despite a continuous export of its immense wealth of minerals and oil to rich Western countries. As a result of its failure to emerge from poverty, the continent has remained dependent on resource export and has more often been portrayed in Western academic and political circles as an aid recipient rather than a trade or investment partner. In fact, in various parts of the continent, entire populations live in dire conditions, frequently experiencing violence, civil wars, and social disruption as a result of the presence of natural resources in their regions. Even worse, the abundance of these resources seems to be one of the major causes of this poverty, since the environmental degradation and civil wars that disrupt the livelihoods of local communities are often provoked by the involvement of foreign multinationals in the resource exploitation. Across the continent, innumerable cases of dire poverty and misery have afflicted local communities as a result of recurrent fights for the control of Africa's natural resources.

One of the most salient cases illustrating this point is in Nigeria. Given its abundant oil resources, Nigeria should be one of the wealthiest countries in Africa, but mismanagement of oil revenue has instead led it to be one of the poorest African states, and also one of the lowest ranking in terms of human development indicators. Severe environmental degradation in the Niger Delta, once the country's richest area of biodiversity, has led to a significant deterioration of living conditions for the local communities caused by frequent oil spills, blatant dumping of industrial waste, and the unfulfilled promises of development projects. Foreign oil companies have often played a nefarious role in perpetuating poverty and environmental degradation in all impunity. For example, in a report published in January 2000, EAGE noted that:

...Far from being a positive force, the oil companies act as a destabilising force, pitting one community against another, and acting as a catalyst (together with the military with whom they work closely) to some of the violence racking the region.

Rather than being a blessing, the abundance of natural resources still seems thus to have brought a curse to African economies.⁷ Moreover, dependence on resource export has even been increasing over the period 1995–2006, with almost half of African countries depending heavily on a single export commodity in 2006, while the relative contribution of the manufacturing sector has been declining over the last decade, dropping from 17% of GDP in 2005 to 13% of GDP in 2009.

This trend of continuous commodity dependence is of serious concern for Africa, since the lack of a thriving manufacturing sector forms the principal obstacle to the dynamism of African economies. As most of sub-Saharan African economies depend only on the export of a handful of primary commodities in their trade relationships, the continued low productivity in the corresponding sectors has been at the basis of a general failure to catch up technologically with advanced countries. As a consequence, the income and productivity gap separating sub-Saharan Africa from advanced countries continues to show a widening trend instead of narrowing and African economies remain constantly vulnerable to income fluctuations and poverty traps.

RESOURCE DEPENDENCE AND THE RESOURCE CURSE THESIS

The idea that a continuous pattern of resource export is simply a natural outcome of factor endowment for resource-rich countries stems from the classical trade theories of comparative advantage. From this perspective, countries endowed with natural resources are thus expected to naturally specialise in the export of these resources and cover their needs of other goods and services by importing them from their trade partners, at mutual benefits. From this point of view, being endowed with abundant natural resources is the wish of any country, rich or poor. However, these classical views remain static in their interpretation of comparative advantage since they tend to ignore dynamic comparative advantage of diversification that has been empirically established in growth literature.

Relying on natural resources for export revenues also gives a distorted image of the productive power of the resource-exporting country, because resource exploitation is only a conversion of natural capital into financial capital of the country, with little or no value-added. Rather than being an advantage, this exploitative activity can lead to a pattern of persistent dependence on easy export revenues devoid of any value creation. This situation of a non value-added exploitation of nature given wealth, without any matching human capital and industrial infrastructure to transform it in valuable goods and services, often leads to a paradoxical situation in which natural resources might be more of an economic liability rather

than an advantage for the economic development in backward countries. When resource exploitation remains the main source of export proceeds, the long-term growth prospects of the economy in question are hampered and the economy becomes vulnerable to the 'resource curse', a phenomenon whereby the abundance of resources hinders the country's development and immiserises its population instead of benefiting it.

The symptoms of the resource curse can appear in various forms, but the most important ones are rampant corruption practices that cripple the economy, the risks of violent conflicts and civil wars for the control of resources⁸ and environment degradation, as exemplified by the Niger Delta. By the nature of investment structure in the resource exploitation (capital intensive, foreign investments), it becomes easier for profit maximising foreign investors to seek the cooperation of the host country's elite rather than bear the full burden of cost associated with a scrupulous respect of fair labour conditions and environmental standards. Certainly in the oil industry, where the exploitation technology usually remains in the hands of foreign corporations with a huge financial leverage over the government of host countries, the practice of influencing the government decision is very common. As a result, endemic corruption, large scale environment degradation and recurrent eruptions of civil wars fuelled by natural resource are often intertwined. The experience of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with ongoing violence caused by the trade in gold and coltan, or those of Angola and Sierra Leone with blood diamonds, are unfortunate illustrations of this phenomenon.

The idea that relying on the abundance of natural resources rather than on productive power might be disadvantageous for the country development had been around since the work of Friedrich List back in the 19th Century⁹, but began to re-emerge in the 1980s. In this context, the term resource curse was first used by Richard Auty in 1993¹⁰, to explain why resource-rich countries were unable to use that wealth to boost their economies and how, counter-intuitively, they had lower economic growth rates than resource-scarce ones. Empirical research in this domain has hypothesised several mechanisms through which this negative association between natural resources and economic growth can take place. On the one hand, there are social mechanisms, namely that resource endowment is perceived as an 'easy riches', which makes people lazy and prompts them to neglect education and other productive investments. Such mechanisms have a direct bearing on hindering innovation and investment in productive knowledge. On the other hand, there are purely economic and political economy mechanisms, namely that resource booms, limit structural diversification and delay technology accumulation by creating opportunities for mismanagement, rent-seeking and corruption that undermine effective spending of windfall

gains.¹¹ Purely economic mechanisms such as the volatility of export revenues mentioned above hampers effective economic planning, while price booms may shift production factors from the manufacturing sector and cause the 'Dutch disease', which slows the long term growth.

The Dutch disease is a particularly puzzling economic phenomenon in the resource curse hypothesis, as it characterises a situation in which a totally rational economic behaviour of a country experiencing a resource boom becomes harmful to its long term growth potential. Indeed by pulling production factors into the booming resource sector at the expense of other activities with more economic linkages, the country in questions hinders innovative sectors and makes them less competitive in world markets. As a result, it misses the economies of scale associated with innovative manufacturing, which leads it to experiencing a lower growth rate than would otherwise have been the case without sectoral shifts. Very often, the increased national revenue from the booming resource sector also results in higher government spending, which increases the real exchange rate and raise wages, further contributing to making the economy less competitive. This weakening of the innovative sectors exposed to international competition results in an even greater dependence on natural resource revenue, and leaves the economy even more vulnerable to price changes in the resource sector. This results in a chronically low growth path, because the economy loses the benefits from externalities as well as the advantages of innovation, and learning effects that are usually associated with the manufacturing sector and are often inexistent in the capital-intensive mining sector.¹²

ECONOMIC DUALISM AND THE NEED FOR STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION

Dependence on the export of resources as raw materials has many features that impede development and industrialisation. These include:

- the volatility in export revenues that hampers effective economic planning and investment
- the exchange rate appreciation in periods of price booms that harms trade in others sectors
- the crowding out effects of investment and human capital
- the lack of an employment-intensive, inclusive growth.

Such a perennial dependence on natural resources is therefore highly problematic as it tends to confine resource-dependent countries in the illusion of nature-given wealth, and delays investments in new activities that would help speed up the harnessing of modern production technologies.¹³ This trend of continuous commodity dependence is of serious concern for Africa,

since the lack of a thriving manufacturing sector forms the principal obstacle to the dynamism of African economies, in contrast to the fast growing Asian countries.

The ability for African countries to benefit from the resource boom created by the Sino-American rivalry depends on whether they are committed to using the abundant resource proceeds to transform their backward economies into modern industrial nations. As evoked above, resource dependence creates and reinforces many problems that impede economic development. The continual reliance on natural resources in many African countries can thus be viewed here in the concept of dualism, as the failure of the economy to establish a viable, modern industrial sector, strong and competitive enough to contribute to the country's export revenues. From that perspective, the growing involvement of Chinese firms in the African resource market and the correspondingly increased implication of US AFRICOM in the control of resource supplies are likely to exacerbate the dualism that characterise many resource-rich SSA countries by reinforcing their export bias towards natural resources.

CHINAFRICA, US 'VITAL INTERESTS' AND AFRICOM: AFRICA BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS

GROWING CHINESE PRESENCE ON THE AFRICAN RESOURCE MARKET

In order to feed its spectacular economic growth hungry of energy and key natural resource inputs, China has stepped up its economic involvement in Africa's natural resource market every year for the past decade. In contrast to the American military and diplomatic course for the access to African resources, China has resorted to using the so-called 'soft power approach', combining creative diplomacy of non-interference in internal politics with huge investments in infrastructure for local development.¹⁴ Its successful penetration of African resource markets led some Western observers to see a conquest strategy in the growing Chinese omnipresence, which they called **CHINAFRIQUE**.¹⁵ Even in the absence of a formally dedicated military force¹⁶, China's diplomatic efforts through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and its army of traders and infrastructure workers are likely to be as effective as the American Special Forces to secure the needed access to African oil and minerals.

Parallel to the US renewed interest for African oil, China has also geared up its economic, trade and investment relationships with Africa. As a result, sub-Saharan Africa's natural resource exports to China have grown exponentially from just over US\$3 billion in 2001 to over US\$22 billion in 2006.¹⁷

By 2011, trade volumes between China and Africa were already in excess of US\$160 billion, according to UNCTAD statistics. Crude oil accounts for 80% of total exports by value over this period. Other important natural resources include iron ore and timber (each of which represents 5% of total exports), followed by manganese, cobalt, copper, and chromium. Nevertheless, by far the biggest share of Africa's oil exports continue to go to OECD countries. Over the period from 2001 to 2006, 40% of Africa's oil production was exported to the United States, a further 17% to Western Europe and only 14% to China, according to the World Bank data. In contrast, China has a greater weight as a trading partner in mineral ores, as it accounts for almost 60% of Africa's exports of cobalt, 40% of its exports of iron, and between 25% and 30% of its exports of chromium, copper and manganese. China also accounts for 30% of the region's timber exports¹⁸.

Moreover, by structuring many of its payments to African countries as 'swaps' comprised of loan offers, financial aid, and infrastructure projects in exchange for access to needed resources, China has shown its readiness to pay much more for African resources than traditional Western trade partners, and has succeeded in supplanting many of them.¹⁹ As suggested by the rebound of natural resource prices amid financial upheaval, demand is not likely to decrease any time soon, since many industrialised economies see the acquisition of African resources as an important strategic input in their national goals.²⁰ Along with the exponential boom in trade, China has also entered a new era of investment cooperation with Africa. Through the establishment of the China Africa Development Fund (CAD Fund) with initial funding of US\$1 billion and a pledge of eventual expansion to US\$5 billion, the Chinese government has vowed to stimulate investment in Africa by providing willing Chinese investors with a wide range of incentives. As a result, Chinese FDI into sub-Saharan Africa grew from a cumulative total of US\$64 million in 2000 to more than US\$1 billion in 2007. It continued to grow for both 2008 and 2009 to reach more than US\$2 billion in 2010, according to data from China's Ministry of Commerce. These Chinese direct investments were shown to have significantly contributed to the diversification and strong growth performance of individual sub-Saharan Africa economies, both before and after the global financial crisis.²¹ Expectations are that this contribution will remain positive in the future. Furthermore, in its Africa Policy Document 2006, China pledged to continue its training programmes in applied technologies for African countries, carry out demonstration programmes of technical assistance, and actively help disseminate and utilise Chinese scientific and technological achievements and advanced technologies applicable in Africa. This is a highly important opportunity for African states to harness modern technologies and enter the global economy rather than remain natural-resource suppliers to the world.

CHINA'S INVOLVEMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA


One of Africa's major development challenges is a large infrastructure deficit that hinders an optimal utilisation of its resources and delays the emergence of modern industrial sectors. The financing gaps are estimated at about US\$10 billion a year for minimum investment needs of US\$22 billion required to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).²² In most African countries, poor infrastructure has been identified as the most important bottleneck that prevents them from achieving their development objectives. At the same time, China needs African oil and minerals to fuel its fast growth and has developed one of the world's largest and most competitive infrastructure construction industries with particular expertise in the civil works critical for infrastructure development and has accumulated very substantial financial reserves.²³ The complementarities between mineral rich Africa, faced with infrastructure bottlenecks, and manufacturing giant China, endowed with infrastructure construction resources but confronted with the need for oil and minerals, plays a key role in the dynamics of Sino-African trade. The growing economic ties between China and Africa, including China's emerging role as a major source of infrastructure financing, can thus be understood in terms of these obvious economic complementarities.

The financing of infrastructure projects making use of a deal structure known as 'Angola mode' or 'resources for infrastructure swap', is usually achieved through China Exim Bank, whereby repayment of the loan for infrastructure development extended by Exim Bank is made in terms of natural resources (see figure 2). A recent World Bank study²⁴ documented eight resource-backed deals of this kind worth more than US\$3 billion and covering oil, mineral resources and agricultural products.

The China Exim Bank's terms and conditions are agreed upon on a bilateral basis, with the degree of concessionality depending on the nature of the project. Although precise numbers on the investment values are still very difficult to come by, most observers have tended to agree that China's role in infrastructure finance in Africa is very substantial. The Centre for Global Development has estimated Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa to amount to at least US\$7.5 billion over the period 2004/2005 alone²⁵ (see figure 2), whereas another study reports that more than 800 Chinese construction firms were already active in Africa by the end of 2006.²⁶ The World Bank estimated that all China Exim Bank loans to sub-Saharan Africa in the infrastructure sector alone amounted to more than US\$12.5 billion by mid-2006.

Cumulative value of Chinese financing of infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa have exceeded US\$50 billion and is still growing.²⁷ Although not conclusive, these estimates point to the substantial scale of Chinese financing. In comparison, commitments of official assistance to infrastructure

Figure 1 Infrastructure financing agreements under the 'Angola mode'




Source Foster et al. (2008)

projects in sub-Saharan Africa from OECD countries amounted to around US\$5 billion for 2006²⁸. The financial resource flows of the magnitude provided by Chinese sources are thus large enough to make a material contribution to meeting Africa's infrastructure financing needs.

The power sector has attracted the largest amount of Chinese infrastructure financing, with more than US\$5.3 billion in cumulative committed investments as of 2008. Much of this effort has been concentrated in the construction of hydroelectric power plants. Given the current power supply shortage in Africa and the underdeveloped but identified high hydro potential, these investments are critical for Africa's economic development. As of the end of 2007, the Chinese were involved in financing 10 major dams in 9 African countries, with a combined generating capacity of more than 6,000 MW of electricity. This is a significant augmentation with respect to the existing 17,000 MW of hydropower generating capacity in Africa.²⁹

In recent years, China has also resurged in the African rail and road sector, with financing commitments of US\$4 billion for railways and about US\$550 million for roads construction. Railway projects include rehabilitation of more than 1,350 kilometres of existing railway lines and the construction of more than 1,600 kilometres of new railroad. Chinese companies have also been very active in building paved roads across Africa, the most active Chinese road construction firm being the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC).

Figure 2 Estimated value of Chinese infrastructure financing commitments to sub-Saharan Africa 2001/2007



Source World Bank-PPIAF Chinese Infrastructure Projects Database (2007)

US RESPONSE: AFRICOM

The rising economic involvement of China in Africa, where, according to some reports,³⁰ more than one million Chinese are already living and working, has forced Africa's traditional trade partners in Europe and the United States to rethink their strategic relationships with Africa. As trade volumes between Africa and China were hitting US\$100 billion, the US and Europe, both traditional trade partners of mineral-rich African countries, became increasingly concerned with China's acquisition of multi-billion dollar contracts for Nigerian and Angolan oil, Guinean iron, and Zambian and Congolese copper. For the United States, a reassessment of its trade interests was necessary, particularly with respect to Nigeria, where according to various estimates there are currently more Chinese living and working than there were British residents in colonial times. Nigeria is the main exporter of African oil to the United States and as such, it is of particular importance to the US energy strategy. As early as 2002, in a report titled 'African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development', the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG), identified African oil as being an issue of 'vital interest' for US national security and recommended the Bush administration to undertake strategic actions aimed at ensuring unimpeded access to these resources. According to a report by the Institute

of Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS)³¹, AOPIG considers the Gulf of Guinea oil basin of West Africa as a crucial component to US national security in the post-9/11 context.

Under AOPIG recommendations and in an effort to find an appropriate response to the growing Sino-African relations, the Bush administration proceeded, in 2006, to create AFRICOM, with the objective to ensure unimpeded access to key resources. The formal enactment of AFRICOM in 2007 is a tangible expression of this new US policy with respect to African oil and other strategic natural resources. Although its objectives have been ostensibly presented as being related to security and advancement of stability in Africa, the factual objective for the new US military presence in Africa was stated by the State Department adviser Peter Pham in unequivocal terms in 2007, while justifying AFRICOM's creation before Congress, saying its purpose was:

... to protect access to hydrocarbons and other strategic resources which Africa has in abundance, a task which includes ensuring against the vulnerability of those natural riches and ensuring that no other interested third parties, such as India, China, Japan or Russia obtain monopolies or preferential treatment.³²

As a result of the growing Chinese presence, the Sino-American rivalry for access to African resources has thus turned into a jostling game. In order to support AFRICOM's strategic objectives, considerable attention has been given to the task of addressing structural impediments to foreign investment. As a response to China's economic involvement in Africa, AOPIG has also pushed the administration and urged the private sector for large-scale US capital investment in regional infrastructural projects leading to economic diversification in the agro-business, hydrological, and manufacturing sectors. The administration noted, however, that an increase in investment in Africa would be hampered by widespread corruption, political instability, weak rule of law, and a systemic lack of governmental transparency. As a result of these reservations, American investment commitments in sub-Saharan Africa resource-rich countries have remained relatively limited.

Rather than stimulating investments in Africa, the US seems instead to have actively engaged in curtailing Chinese efforts to use its investment leverage for securing access to resources. For example, in July 2005, the US Congress blocked China National Offshore Oil Corporation's bid to buy UNOCAL Corporation. By so doing, US thwarted Chinese expansion strategy and reminded China and the world that Western governments are prepared to use political, if not military means to defend their country's control over overseas resources of their vital interests.³³ When the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced during the ministerial forum on

China-Africa Cooperation held in Egypt in November 2009 that his country would pursue its programme of investment in Africa despite American opposition, the US also responded through the IMF by threatening to cut off lines of credit to the Democratic Republic of Congo if it did not scale back a Chinese investment plan. While China's pledge to provide US\$10 billion in concessional loans to African countries over the next three years was warmly welcomed by African leaders, within days of the conference's closing, the IMF, a financial institution dominated by the US, by threatening to block financing, showed that it is quite prepared to plunge African countries into financial isolation to protect Western interests. The US remains hostile to Chinese investments in Africa as evidenced by the recent hardly covert warnings by the US Secretary of State during her visit in Dakar in July 2012, urging African leaders to be wary of foreign investors seeking to exploit African resources.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SINO-AMERICAN RIVALRY FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

NEW OPPORTUNITIES, NEW CHALLENGES

The geo-political rivalry created by the increased presence of Chinese companies in Africa's resource market, while threatening to create a new scramble for Africa, has thus also created new development opportunities for resource-endowed African countries. On the one hand, the US policy to use its diplomatic and military leverage to guarantee an undisrupted flow of resources to US and its allies and keep the prices low has traditionally been done at the detriment of African development. On the other hand, China has also received much criticism about its development effects for African populations during much of its period of increasing economic involvement in Africa. Its policy of not interfering with the politics of its partner nations opened it up to accusations of turning a blind eye to human rights abuses and corruption in tyrannical African governments as long as they are willing to do business. China was also accused of engaging in employment practices that discriminate against locals, breaking regulations on minimum wages and on working conditions and flooding African markets with sub-standard goods.

Chinese strategy of swapping large infrastructure project against access to mineral resources has however created new dynamics for African development. By building the much needed infrastructure in Africa, China has the advantage of converting African resources in local development projects, instead of sending oil revenues on Western bank accounts of corrupt rulers.

This increases the industrialisation potential of many African economies, whose main developmental impediment is formed by infrastructure bottlenecks. Many African governments have therefore welcomed China's new role of a trade partner and financier of infrastructure as being a major opportunity for Africa's development.

However, the development optimism has to be tempered by the relative weak spill-over potential of Chinese projects to local African producers. Under Chinese Exim Bank rules, which finances most of the projects, at least 50% of the materials must be sourced from China. This means that aid projects financed by China Exim Bank create few backward linkages in the local African economies. This conditionality that mirrors the practices of Western aid projects does not support an autonomous development of African economies. Nonetheless, since IMF and World Bank loans also come with heavy conditionalities, and since Western governments have so far not fulfilled their pledges of new aid for Africa, borrowing from China Exim Bank is still more attractive for African governments. Some scholars argue that the World Bank sees new lenders such as China Exim Bank not only as potential competitors for the business of low-income countries but also as threats to its financial integrity and political hegemony. The strengthened ties between Africa and China have thus improved the continent's bargaining power with respect to its traditional trade partners in the West. Indeed, China is becoming an important global source of financing. In addition, African leaders see China as a much more cooperating partner and a more flexible source of technology. Being a developing country, China is perceived to understand African problems better than the US and Europe. Moreover, Chinese firms also import a significant amount of non-oil commodities, and have recently began to import some African-manufactured value-added goods, such as processed foods and household consumer goods. This increased demand has driven up the prices of raw materials and other primary commodities in international markets, and by so doing, contributed to the good growth performance that African economies enjoyed before the global financial crisis. However, the tariff levels of China and India on African products other than resources remain very high, which puts a constraint on the potential benefits of the Sino-African trade.³⁴ High Chinese tariffs on agricultural products are of particular concern because higher tariff rates tend to be applied to the products in which African countries have growth potential.

Furthermore, despite the current advantages from competition of the world's two biggest economies for African resources, it is important for resource-rich African countries to keep in mind that ultimately, like the Western countries, China comes to Africa to protect its own strategic interests. The tendency of the US to use its IMF leverage to block sources of

financing for African countries in response to Chinese resource deals also suggests that the Sino-American rivalry is likely to be fought upon the backs of African citizens. To a certain extent, it also demonstrates that the traditional relationship of resource dependency between resource-rich African countries and the industrialised Western powers is still a dominant feature in the new US strategy for Africa. The growing interest of China and US for African resources is thus to be seen with the due degree of circumspection.

Besides, the US and Chinese governments have lately started top-level talks to ease their rivalry and increase cooperation on African issues, which may result in furthering their mutual interest in the resource market at the expense of Africans.³⁵ Both economic giants being the main economic partners of the African continent, with annual trade volumes above US\$100 billion dollars each, China is likely to accept the American proposal of a partnership on African related matters. African leaders are, however, worried that if effective, this new partnership between US and China will be run at their expense.

RESOURCE SURPLUS AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION

While the growth benefits of the booming resource demand seem obvious, the growth dynamics created by resource export are fragile and unlikely to generate sustainable prosperity for African countries in the absence of value-adding activities in the resource exporting countries. For Africa to cease relying on its natural resources as raw materials and enjoy the long-term economic benefits of its resource wealth, it must undergo a process of structural transformation. Clark³⁶ and Kuznets³⁷ had already pointed out that successful economic development goes through a structural transformation that involves the shift of factors and resources from the traditional sector with low productivity, i.e. agriculture or natural resources, to the industry sector, where productivity is much higher and the pace of technical change is more rapid.

The theory of dualism emphasises the predominance of the traditional sector and the importance of the generation of *a surplus* in the emergence and growth of the modern sector. Such a surplus, coming from the accumulated profits of the entrepreneurs in the traditional sector must be seen as the main fuel of the reallocation of labour from the traditional to the modern sector and the source of the financial capital necessary for establishing an industrial sector.³⁸ The existence of the necessary surplus that can be saved to finance the emergence of an industrial sector depends on whether the rate of technological progress in the traditional sector exceeds the rate of exogenous population growth and the effects of (diminishing) returns to scale.³⁹ The failure of an economy to generate this surplus as a result of the

absence of significant technological change within the traditional sector, may lead to an underdevelopment trap. In case of resource-rich countries, the surplus needed to finance the emergence of a modern sector can be generated from export revenues of natural resources. The current commodity price boom that set in during the pre-crisis years has thus the potency of providing the opportunity for this surplus in many African countries.

For a successful structural transformation to take place, the effects of dualism on the economic dynamics of a country must be fully understood before a resource reallocation from the traditional to the modern sector can be initiated. In general, the relatively easy availability of export earnings from natural resource bonanzas can induce a country in an illusory belief that it can avoid the difficult but necessary policy and structural changes required to move the economy from traditional sector dependence to export substitution. Ranis⁴⁰ warned against temptations to skip this mobilisation by importing food and attempting rapid industrialisation, because yielding to such temptation can imply substantial cost in forgone savings, foreign exchange and growth.

Reliance on natural resource bonanza to overcome this problem can also prove ineffective in many cases, as the appreciating exchange rate may have perverse effects on other tradables (Dutch disease), and therefore result in a sluggish growth. A booming market for this natural resource and primary export may lead to an overvalued exchange rate, making it more difficult to mobilise the resources needed to diversify into competitive industrial exports. Without such a mobilisation, however, the economy would find it very difficult to achieve substantial growth rates and favourable income distribution, even in the presence of ample natural resource endowments.

ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY FOR STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION

For the dual economy to be able to reallocate resources and have a strong modern industrial sector resource-rich countries must have the required absorptive capacity to enable the necessary adoption of modern production technologies for a structural transformation. This absorptive capacity for technological learning must include sufficient levels of human capital, public and private investments in physical infrastructure, a strong agricultural (or natural resource) sector to generate the needed financial surplus, and good functioning financial markets to facilitate resource reallocation. Financial intermediation networks must be sufficient in reach and diversity to provide financial assets acceptable to various owners of the surplus generated in the traditional sector. This is what enables the dualistic economy to convert the savings from the traditional sector into productive investments in the modern sector.

For such a resource re-allocation to take place, these African countries at a low stage of economic development and labour productivity levels must first find means to make a significant increase in food production, not only in order to deal with existing food shortages but also to alleviate the pressure caused by the increased prices of the imported foodstuffs. This implies building a dynamic agricultural sector, which requires that a part of the surplus be devoted to building the agricultural sector itself as advocated by Peter Timmer.⁴¹ Human capital stocks are a critical component of this required absorptive capacity because technical progress in the production process cannot occur without using the available knowledge stock.⁴² Indeed, only trained brains produce ideas, while capital stock and labour only contribute to transforming these ideas into new products and services or producing more human capital. The ability of a nation to adopt and implement new technologies from abroad is thus a positive function of its stock of human capital. Human capital plays, therefore, a critical role in structural transformation by making the technological change possible and by subsequently supporting economic growth and poverty reduction.

As for infrastructure provision, one of its most obvious effects is to facilitate private investments by lowering the production costs and opening access to new markets or improving the servicing of existing ones. For developing countries, basic, industrial and technological infrastructure is necessary to support the processing of primary commodities or the initiation and expansion of manufacturing activities. For example, roads, railways and waterways reduce transportation costs while ports and airports increase the exposure to foreign products and force local firms to innovate in response to pressures from international competition. This can result in the creation of new production, trade and profit opportunities. A good provision of public infrastructure is thus indispensable, not only for the necessary structural transformation, but also for sustaining growth once the transformation has taken place. The active involvement of Chinese companies in building the needed infrastructure in Africa constitutes therefore an important input in building the necessary absorptive capacity for a structural transformation to put Africa on a path of long-term development.

CONCLUSION

Africa's idiosyncratic failure to emerge from poverty has been the direct result of its continued reliance on the export of primary resources, which delayed industrialisation and deprived African economies of the dynamic gains of the manufacturing. Surprisingly, African policy makers continue

to bet on the export of natural resources as a solid basis for sustainable development in spite of various problems that are invariably associated with natural resource dependence. Better than natural resources, however, technological knowledge is the real force that eventually creates wealth in the long run. Such knowledge must be geared toward economic diversification into modern industrial activities that will allow African countries to compete in the global market.

In light of the resource curse hypothesis and the Sino-American rivalry for access to African natural resources, one of the biggest development challenges facing resource-rich sub-Saharan Africa remains the severance of African economies from their chronic dependence on natural resources through the accumulation of technological knowledge. Though natural resources represent a potential for wealth creation, they are unlikely to bring real long-term prosperity in the absence of a structural transformation. The essence of development problem for Africa and its dual economies lies therefore in the ability to mobilise the profits from the resource sectors so that they can yield sufficiently large surpluses to be used for investment in the non-resource sector. If resource endowed countries fail to generate this required surplus from resource export revenues to establish modern industrial sectors based on technological knowledge, their prospects of escaping poverty traps may remain wishful thinking.

The arrival of China on the African resource market and the concurrent increase of US interest for African oil and minerals, by keeping a sustained demand and high prices, have created new opportunities for this development, but also new challenges. However, the increased American military presence has hardly had any visible economic benefits for Africa or changed the traditional oil procurement strategy to keep the resources flowing to US and its allies at low prices. The US efforts to thwart Chinese progression on the African resource market have mainly been harmful to African development by blocking access to international financial funds.

China has mostly relied on its many trading companies and an army of infrastructure construction workers across the continent to gain access to the needed oil and minerals. By its intensive use of the 'Angola mode' trade structure, it has brought new dynamics in the resource market, by contributing to removing infrastructure bottlenecks in the power generation and transport sectors. Its financing opportunities for Africa's infrastructure and development projects with less conditionalities than the IMF constitute a real alternative source of funding for development. Chinese lower reluctance (in comparison to traditional Western trade partners) to share technological knowledge with African countries is moreover a crucial element that makes it more likely for African economies to be able to technologically learn from the exchange and benefit from their resources in the long run.

Nonetheless, it is important to recall that the growing presence of Chinese companies represents growth opportunities but also entails risks for Africa. If well managed through a process of learning, the opportunities created China's involvement in African resource market and infrastructure construction could bring real development benefits to Africans by helping African economies achieve a structural transformation and enter the industrialisation era. However, if not properly managed, China's presence in Africa may lead to worsening standards of governance and human rights, more corruption and even a crowd out of Africa's local investment capital. If African economies fail to learn technologically from their Chinese trade partners, they might miss out all potential benefits and lose from the exchange.

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Financing the EU's Economic Partnership Agreements in Africa

Implications of Alternative Funding Initiatives

Martin Kaggwa

INTRODUCTION

The Economic Partnership Agreement being negotiated between EU and its former colonies in the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) is a continuation of the cooperation between the two parties that dates back to the Treaty of Rome of 1957 that established the European Economic Community.¹ The cooperation between the EU and its former colonies has been characterised by the granting of preferential trade arrangement, technical assistance and aid packages by the EU aimed at poverty eradication and fostering of sustainable development in ACP countries.² Economic Partnership Agreements are presented as development tools that will foster sustainable development and poverty eradication in Africa. The Agreements will mark a new phase in the cooperation between Europe and African countries when they come into effect. Underlying the EPAs is a radical departure from the non-reciprocal trade preferences enshrined in the Lome Conventions (1975–2000) to a reciprocal one. Under the Lome Convention, African countries were given concessions to access EU market without requiring them to open their markets in return. The new trade relationship, proposed under the EPAs, will put competitiveness pressure on African economies particularly since little progress towards globally competitiveness has been made by the majority of countries on the continent in the last decade.

The merits and demerits of the EPAs have been widely debated given the fact that the agreements introduce reciprocal preferential trade relationship between unequal parties. Notwithstanding positions taken by different parties on the debate, for African countries to take advantage of the EPAs, they have to undertake costly institution changes and will have to forego revenue that they have hitherto been receiving as import duty on imports from the EU. As such, African countries party to the EPAs will have to find means to fund institutional changes needed to take full advantage of the

EPAs. There should also be ways to compensate for resultant national revenue loss, at least in the short term. Recognising institutional challenges that they will face upon the coming into effect of the EPAs, African countries have been demanding substantive funds to address these. Without this substantive funding, they argue, it will not be possible to successfully implement EPAs and as such the agreements will not serve the envisaged developmental role for the continent.

In the EPA negotiation, the EU has offered to provide funds to meet institutional change costs that will be necessitated by the commencement of the EPAs. The EU proposes to fund these costs and to compensate for revenues losses under the Aid for Trade, EDF, and EU Budget initiatives. For many African countries, however, the EU's offer falls short of their expectations of what is needed to make EPAs functional and viable, and ultimately beneficial to signatory countries.

Against this background, the paper assesses the efficacy of Aid for Trade, European Development Fund (EDF) and EU Budget funding initiatives to meet EPA implementation costs and to compensate for accompanying revenue losses as being proposed by the EU. It also recommends on an appropriate EPAs funding model. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section two deals with challenges likely to be experienced by African countries when the EPAs come into effect; viability and appropriateness of funding EPAs under the three proposed initiatives – Aid for Trade, EDF and EU Budget initiatives are critically assessed in section three; section four concludes with recommendations on the appropriate funding model for EPAs.

CHALLENGES OF THE COMING IN TO EFFECT OF THE FUNDING EPA

The need to fund EPAs ought to be seen in the context of the wider challenges that will be triggered by their coming into effect. The coming into effect of EPAs will pose both institutional and cost challenges that have to be carefully considered and that require remedial measures to be put in place to address or minimise these. This section considers the three main categories of these challenges that will directly emanate from the implementation of EPAs by African countries, that is, competitiveness under a trade regime of reciprocity, adverse structural changes to domestic economies and outright revenues loss.

A) COMPETITIVENESS UNDER A RECIPROCITY TRADE REGIME

Under the Interim EPA signed by a number of Africa countries, signatory countries committed themselves to reduce and finally remove all tariffs applicable on goods and services coming from the EU.

The East African Community (EAC) block, for example, committed itself to gradually open its market to goods from the EU over a period of 25 years in three phases. The first phase was to run from 2008 to 2010, within which period the EAC was to liberalise 64% of its imports from the EU. The products covered at this phase are mainly industrial inputs and capital goods such as machinery and pharmaceuticals. The second phase runs from 2015 to 2023. In this second phase, the EAC is expected to liberalise 16% of its imports from the EU. As such, after 15 years from January 2008, 80% of the exports from the EU will enter the EAC market duty free. Finally in 2020/2033 period, the EAC is expected to liberalise 2% of imports from the EU. Thus, after 25 years from the date that the EPAs enter into force, 82% of imports from the EU will be liberalised, that is, they should be able to enter the EAC market duty free.

For trade reciprocity to be beneficial to African countries against the background of import duty reduction on imports from the EU, signatory African countries need to have a commensurate volume of diversified and high-value goods and service that they can export to EU. Otherwise, benefit from resultant trade will continue to be skewed in the favour to the EU.

To be able to increase the volume of exportable goods and services, African countries have to become competitive in their own right. Competitiveness as the extent to which a nation can, under free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services that meet the test of international markets while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real income of citizens³, requires undertaking of costly changes in the economic operation of a particular country. Central to its attainment is expenditure on technology-related factors. Technology is a key determinant of production efficiency and subsequently for competitiveness. Technological advances, innovation and competitive advantage are connected in multidimensional relationships.⁴

Competitiveness depends on average production costs. Production costs are a function of price and non-price factors, some of which are the ability to adopt and use new technologies. Sustainable competitiveness depends on the ability of a region or production units within a region to offer comparative products to its competitors at lower prices on an open market. It requires that a region or industry is able to lower its production costs without sacrificing quality. Technology innovation offers one of the most practical ways to reduce production costs while at the same time maintaining or even increasing product quality.⁵

Technology determines the actual value of the physical resource endowment.⁶ Through its value adding, technology augments the value of regional resource base and enhances its competitiveness, holding other factors constant. Therefore, there is general agreement that countries

seeking to enhance their international competitiveness, have to engage in domestic Research and Development (R&D) and subsequent innovative activities.⁷

Competitiveness, technology and trade are intertwined. Without competitiveness, trade cannot be sustained, and without technology, long run competitiveness is unlikely. Trade is an implicit indicator of competitiveness, while technological progress is subtle indicator of progress toward competitiveness. Ultimately funds are needed to enable African countries to become competitive or at least to move onto a global competitiveness trajectory if there are to benefit from the EPAs. Tariff reductions as required in the interim EPAs imply, in a subtle way, that Africa countries can no longer hide under the veil of being developing countries for them to access EU market but rather that they have to compete for it.

B) ADVERSE STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO DOMESTIC ECONOMIES

The coming into effect of EPAs will not only lead to new competitiveness pressure for African countries, it will also necessitate the countries to undertake structural changes that will have far reaching socio-economic implications.

A number of studies have been carried out on the potential impact of EPAs and its understated economic liberalisation to African economies.⁸ The most adverse effects according to these studies seem to emanate from EPAs push for investment and financial market liberalisation.

Under the investment and financial liberalisation clauses for example, the EU seeks through the EPAs, to make it legally binding that signatory countries:

- Allow freedom of entry and establishment of investors and their investments within local economies⁹
- Permit investors freedom of exit with their investments and profits at any time of their choice and without any restrictions
- Prohibit performance requirements like use of local raw materials and employment requirements
- Do not give preferential treatment to local investor and their businesses in any way including preference in offer government tenders and procurement
- Do not have regulation pertaining to capital flows.¹⁰

The above conditions basically translate into unlimited opening up of domestic economies as was the case of the unsuccessful Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1990's that the World Bank and IMF forced onto many African countries.

Buffie¹¹ in a study of experiences of several countries on the impact of undertaking economic policy changes as being proposed in the EPAs found that the changes had adverse impact to local economies in form of job losses and unemployment as result closure of some of the local industries, lower capacity utilisation, lower wages, increasing expenditure of scarce foreign exchange on imports, surges in imports and ultimately lower rates of economic growth.

A 2004 Impact Assessment Study of EPAs¹², using Uganda as the case study, found that potential adverse effects to domestic economies of EPA signatory countries were spread across all major sectors. Table 1 summaries these effects per sector:

Extensive liberalisation of local economies is likely to lead to de-industrialisation yet one of the main reasons for many African countries' desire to increase external trade is based on the assumption that this will lead to local industrialisation, create decent jobs and ultimately improve the standards of living of the citizens. EPAs, unless carefully revisited and crafted may end having the opposite effect.

Another structural aspect of concern on the EPAs relates to trade diversion – the potential tendency for EPAs signing countries to substitute imports from other regions with EU imports on which duties are not payable. The effect of this trade diversion is not easy to quantify. Without charging duties on imports coming from the EU, consumers are likely to migrate from the

Table 1 Adverse structural effects to domestic economies that will emanate from EPAs

Sector	Effect
Agriculture	■ Intensified competition for the EU market, as products from various countries will be competing in a large, but limited market. Due to competitiveness and supply constraints, there is a high likelihood local agricultural exporters will lose the EU market to low cost producers who supply quality products. ■ As EU moves away from price to income support of EU farmers, the EU exporters will become more competitive to the extent of dominating the regional and local markets resulting in loss of employment and income.
Local Protected Industries	■ Locally protected industries will face competition from imported duty free products from the EU resulting into loss of employment and de-industrialisation.
Private Sector Development	■ Shrinking of local manufacturing sector due to competition from EU.
Regional Trade	■ Weakened regional trading as members states increase trade relations with EU countries rather than amongst themselves. ■ Trade diversion in favour of cheap EU imports away from low cost producers.

Source: SEATINI (2010)

consuming products emanating from neighbouring countries and regions on which duties will be maintained to the consumption of cheaper EU goods. To the extent that development synergies are created through regional trade, EPAs are likely to undermine the regional development synergies.

C) DIRECT REVENUE LOSSES

One of the immediate effects of implementing EPAs will be the revenue loss due to elimination of tariffs on EU imports and due the substitution of imports from the rest of world on which duty is applicable, with non-duty paying EU imports. The EU is major source of imports for African countries and subsequently a major contributor to respective country revenue pool via custom duties. Extension of the duty free dispensation to a larger share of EU imports will definitely lead to loss of this important revenue source. The potential fiscal losses vary from study to study and

Table 2 Potential Direct Revenue Loss due to EPA Implementation

Country	Revenue Loss in Million USD		
	UNECA (2005)	Busse et al (2004)	Tekere and Ndelda (2003)
Benin	39.5	27.6	
Botswana	5.2		32.4
Burkina Faso	22	17.5	
Ivory Coast	112.2	82.9	
Ghana	193.7	90.8	
Guinea Bissau	2.0	2.2	
Malawi	7.1		24.6
Mali	33.1	16.6	
Mauritius	71.1		209.9
Mozambique	7.6		29.2
Namibia	3.8		285.3
Niger	20.5	6.6	
Nigeria	426.9	487.8	
Tanzania	32.5		146.6
Togo	35.5	12.9	
Zimbabwe	18.4		118.3

Source: Hallaert (2010)

from country to country. What is certain is that the coming into effect of EPAs will lead to revenue losses¹³ whether considered from a static or dynamic point of view.

Despite the general agreement on revenue loss that will accompany EPAs, there seems to be no consensus on the extent of this revenue loss. Moreover, there are wide variations, among studies undertaken, in the value of revenue to be lost as a result of implementing EPAs. Comparative EPA revenue loss for a sample of African countries across the two studies is presented in Table 2.

It is notable that estimated revenue loss varies widely across studies with the extreme case being that of Namibia where UNECA study¹⁴ estimated the potential loss to the country at some US\$3.8 millionUS dollars while the study by Busse et al¹⁵ estimated it at US\$285.3 milliondollars.

On the whole, Milner¹⁶ estimated adjustment cost of African countries' implementation of EPAs up to US\$7.4 billiondollars after taking into account but direct and indirect costs. The biggest percentage of which was under fiscal adjustment (Table 3).

Table 3 Estimated EPAS adjustment cost by African region (million € at 2005 equivalent prices)

	Fiscal Adjustment	Export diversification	Employment Adjustments	Productivity enhancement	Total adjustment costs
CEMAC	270	257	153	200	880
ECOWAS	955	712	422	700	2 789
ESA	825	752	415	695	2 687
SADC	340	261	217	255	1 073
Total for African ACP	2 390	1 982	1 207	1 850	7 429

From Milner et al (2005)

Against this background, Africa countries argue that to address this revenue shortfall and meet cost of adjustment, the EPAs should be accompanied with adequate and readily disbursable funds.

FUNDING EPAS UNDER AID FOR TRADE, EDF AND EU BUDGET INITIATIVES

There is consensus between the EU and ACP countries that the coming into effect of the EPAs will have significant implementation and adjustment costs

on the part of the later. The proposition of a separate funding for EPA is not new. Bilal and Grynberg¹⁷ suggested a creation of an additional EPA financing facility at national and regional levels, which should provide funds for dealing with the loss of fiscal revenues, restructuring of the domestic industries and promoting institutional development required to meet the high costs associated with food and safety standards. They, however, did not address whether the facility should or should not part of the EPA agreement. Moreover, they did not provide guidance of the size of the fund able to compensate for the revenue loss and mitigation of indirect cost of EPAs.

The EU has indicated its willingness to finance these adjustment costs with resources channelled through the European Development Fund (EDF), Aid for Trade and the EU Budget initiatives. Accordingly the EU, financial and technical assistance will be provided to:

- Alleviate supply-side constraints that have up to now hampered trade and development in the ACP
- Upgrade of ACP productive capacities and development of trade-related infrastructure in a way that ACP economies can take advantage of the EPA
- Meet the costs ACP countries will face in adjusting to the new economic conditions introduced by the EPA
- Support ACP governments in the implementation of the EPA rules, the establishment of new institutions, and the enactment or reform of legislation to comply with EPA obligations.¹⁸

The following section critically assesses the suitability and potential effectiveness of these funding channels to adequately mitigate against development challenges that will emanate from the coming into effect of EPAs. This is particularly important because whereas every aspect of the EPAs will become binding on the signatory African countries upon their signing of the agreement, its funding will remain just a promise since the EU does not want it to form part of or be an appendix to the EPA.

AID FOR TRADE

Aid for Trade is a generic term that is often used to describe aid packages that channel financial resources to countries to ease their costs of adjustment due to trade liberalisation, and to increase their capacity to supply goods and services, and to improve their trade-related infrastructure.¹⁹ The Aid for Trade initiative can be traced back to 2001 Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration. The declaration focused on priorities of developing countries

and highlighted challenges of addressing development concerns in multi-lateral trading system. It expressed the need and importance of funding assistance to developing countries to help them strengthen capacity to formulate trade policy, participate in trade negotiations and implement trade agreements, as important prerequisites for these countries to fully benefit from trade liberalisation and the WTO Agreements.²⁰

Initially, there were two views on what Aid for Trade should fund. On the one hand, there was a view that it should only cover adjustment costs of developing countries following implementation of the commitments made under the various WTO rounds. On the other, there was a view that Aid for Trade should be used to help countries reap benefits of integration into the global market in totality. According to this view, activities such as capacity building in order for countries to compete effectively in supplying products to the world markets should also be funded by Aid for Trade.²¹

The view that Aid for Trade should not be limited to only adjustment costs of liberalisation has taken precedent over the former view in recent negotiations. The scope of Aid for Trade has been formally extended to stretch from trade-related technical assistance and capacity building to addressing supply side constraints, through to micro- and macro-economic adjustment costs.²² The 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration agreed that Aid for Trade should aim to help developing countries, particularly LDCs, to build supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement and benefit from WTO agreements and more broadly to expand their trade. The specific objectives of Aid for Trade were stated as follows:²³

1. To formulate and implement a trade development strategy and create an enabling environment for increasing the volume and value-added exports, diversifying export products and markets and increasing foreign investment to generate jobs and trade
2. To stimulate trade by domestic firms and encourage investment in trade-oriented industries
3. To enable countries participate in and benefit from the trade-supporting institutions and trade negotiations.

According to Nelson²⁴ thus far Aid for Trade has been provided under five headings:

- Technical assistance to assist governments and private operators gain knowledge of existing trade opportunities and how to access them
- Capacity building to help increase the capacity of developing countries to deal with international trade policies and related issues

- Assistance to accompany institutional reforms, to help create a framework for sound and well-functioning institutions for trade, including strengthening customs authorities, quality assurance, and tax systems
- Support for infrastructure building to help link the goods produced to regional or international markets, through improving roads and ports
- Adjustment assistance to help the transition costs associated with tariff reductions, preference erosion, or declining terms of trade, through, for instance, fiscal support.

CONCERNS ON FUNDING EPAS VIA AID FOR TRADE

There are concerns pertaining to use of the Aid for Trade initiative to fund EPAs as being proposed by the EU.

First, the Aid for Trade intervention was conceived outside the EPA negotiating framework. Its scope is wider than simply addressing concerns of EPA implementation. It then becomes a challenge to make this 'external' funding initiative with already prescribed rules and procedures to be incorporated into an EPA. Aid for Trade being WTO initiative, its administration protocol cannot be determined by the EU alone. As such, the proposition by the EU to fund EPAs via Aid for Trade is problematic in that neither the EU nor the ACP/ESA has exclusive control over the direction and focus of the initiative. Aid for Trade structural and operation details are determined at WTO level.

Second, despite the initiative being in place for over four years, there is a general lack of clarity on whether the funds channelled to developing countries through the initiative have been effective in achieving the desired outcomes. Most reviews of trade-related technical assistance and capacity building programmes to developing countries conclude that the direct effects of these assistance programmes on export volumes have been rather difficult to substantiate. The most widely cited positive outcomes of trade-related donor assistance include improved understanding of the potential contribution trade can have on development, increased awareness and knowledge of trade policy issues and strengthened national dialogue.²⁵ Such achievements fall short of African countries' expectation from the reciprocal EPAs.

Moreover, there is a weak link between Aid for Trade and long term competitiveness of developing countries. Implicit to the supply side constraints (a key limitation for EAC countries benefiting from EPAs), is the aspect of competitiveness. According to the South Centre Fact Sheet No. 6, 'Supply-side constraints' refers to the physical, human and institutional barriers which affect the competitiveness of a country's domestic production and its ability to trade. Clark and Guy²⁶ defines competitiveness as the degree to

which a nation can, under free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services that meet the test of international markets while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real income of citizens. To the extent that supply-side constraints are intended to support African countries to become competitive, funds to overcome these constraints should be enough to make these countries produce goods and services that can compete equally with the goods produced in the EU. The amount of resources availed to developing countries under the Aid for Trade, and its key areas of focus have thus far had limited effect on putting recipient countries on competitive trajectory. Aid for Trade has hitherto focused on government bureaucracies that deal with trade policy rather than production level challenges. There is a risk therefore that even if more resources were to be channelled through the Aid for Trade Initiative to support the EPA, without re-orienting its focus and operational procedures, competitiveness and subsequently supply side constraints of African countries will not be addressed based on precedent.

There is also lack of clarity as to what funds are included under 'Aid for Trade'. Some figures include support for Regional Trade Arrangements, bilateral and multilateral aid and funds given under concessional loans; and Official Development Assistance (ODA). In recognition of this challenge, developing countries at Hong Kong Ministerial Conference on Trade (2005) had insisted that funds under Aid for Trade should be new, untied, predictable and not debt creating. These demands have not been fulfilled.²⁷

The structures in place to ensure that the Aid for Trade initiative delivers on its objectives are also not clearly spelt out. The Hong Kong WTO Ministerial meeting directed the director general of the WTO to create a task force that shall provide recommendations on how to operationalise Aid for Trade. The director general was also to consult with members as well as with the IMF and World Bank, relevant international organisations and the regional development banks in order to come up with mechanisms to secure additional financial resources for Aid for Trade, where appropriate through grants and concessional loans. These issues have never been concretely addressed.²⁸

Therefore, Aid for Trade is still a very unclear concept lacking clarity as to how much funds it can avail and its operational mechanisms. With its ambiguity, Aid for Trade cannot adequately address the additional challenges that African countries will face after signing the EPAs.

THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND (EDF)

The European Development Fund (EDF) has been the main financial instrument used by the EU to support ACP countries since 1958. Funds for EDF

come from voluntary contribution by EU members, managed by the European Commission. The funding commitments are made in five-year financing cycles. As such, there is certainty regarding available funds within a particular financing cycle beyond which more funds may or may not be available depending on decisions taken by contributing EU countries. It is also important to note that the direction of allocation of EDF funds is provided to EC via the EDF Committee. The EU does not therefore exercise autonomous powers in deciding which area of need the EDF funds should be utilised.

The EDF is not exclusively a trade-related aid facility. It provides funding to a wide range of development programmes. However, it does have provisions related to trade and structural adjustment.²⁹ The extent and focus of funding under the initiative depends on directives by the EDF Committee.

The 10th EDF cycle running from 2008 to 2013 is currently in place, under which the EU has committed 22.6 billion. What is not clear is whether, and if so how much of this allocation will be assigned to EPA-related development support. Moreover, even though a particular amount was specified for EPA support, it could be contested. There is no agreement thus far on the adjustment costs that will be necessitated by the coming into effect of the EPA and the level of support needed by developing countries to address supply-side constraints so as to benefit from the trading opportunities the agreement will provide. Again, the costs of implementing EPA are likely to vary from country to country making it even more complex to allocate EDF funds per country as previously indicated.

CONCERNS ON FUNDING EPAS EDF

Similar to the case of Aid for Trade, there are concerns pertaining to the EU's use of the EDF funding initiatives to address adjustment and supply side constraints of developing countries emanating from the implementation of the EPAs:

- Since the EDF has been critical in funding other non-trade activities critical to services in ACP countries like education and health services, there is a possibility that funding EPAs under the initiatives may lead to a diversion of funds from these essential services to trade. In which case trade will be supported at the cost of existing development programmes already being funded under the EDF.
- Given the five year funding cycles, if EPA scheduled for completion in 2010 was to be funded under the EDF, the relevant 'EPA adjustment funds' should have been already included in the 10th EDF which

commenced in 2008 running up to 2013. This has not been the case. By implication, if the EPA was to come into effect at the end of 2010, for the first three years there will be no funds to support adjustment costs pertaining to its implementation and that have a bearing on the ACP's countries benefit from the Agreement.

- Like the Aid for Trade initiative, the cost of implementation of the EPAs is still contested by parties involved in negotiations. It is also not clear whether the EDF funding will be mutually exclusive to the other proposed funding initiatives.
- Utilisation of EDF has been characterised, previously, by significant difference between funds allocated and actual funds released to countries. In addition, funds being availed to developing countries have been declining in real terms overtime. Hence, there is a risk that the proposed increase in funds availed to developing countries under the EDF to cater for the EPA adjustment costs may simply be a compensation of increasing price bias overtime than a real increase in EDF funds.

THE EUROPEAN BUDGET

Funding EPAs under the European Budget Initiative is the least comprehensible of the three funding proposals being put forward by the EU in the EPA negotiations. The initiative neither has documented structure nor is its conception framework easily understandable. One can gain some insight of its working by considering country specific examples.

For instance in the case of Uganda, an indication is given in the Country-EU Strategy Paper of some to the activities may be funded externally under the European Budget. It specifically mentioned, however, that the funding will be subject to special procedure and availability of funds. The procedures are not stated explicitly.

Activities that may be funded under the dispensation include programmes investing in people and non-state actors in development, environment and sustainable management of natural resources as well as food security for which calls for proposals are to be made annually. By implication, what to fund will have to be pre-defined and a call for proposals sent out. Which party or parties will decide for what aspect funds would be availed under the initiative is not clear. Trade related support is not mentioned yet EPAs fall in the domain of trade. Moreover, the qualifying statement that fund under the initiative will be availed 'subject to special procedure and availability' point to the fact that this funding initiative is a doubtful source for supporting EPA adjustment cost that Africa countries cannot depend on.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON FUNDING EPAS

How EPAs should be funded should be part and parcel of the EPA final agreement. This will create certainty for signatory African countries on compensation for revenue to be lost when EPAs come into effect. It will also guarantee the availability of resources to fund structural changes and national efforts to enhance domestic competitiveness, as key prerequisites for mutual benefit from EPAs, in light of the extensive liberalisation that the EPAs implementation will entail.

The proposed EPAs funding mechanisms, that is, under Aid for Trade, EDF and EU Budget are discretionary initiatives. According to their existing structures and operation protocol, they do not provide guarantees of receipt of funds. Since EPAs will be binding agreements when they come into force, it is imperative that how to fund their non-contested adjustment costs, on the part of the African countries, should be binding too.

Of the three proposed funding initiatives, the EU Budget is least comprehensible yet it provides the best opportunity to introduce funding of costs pertaining to EPAs. If the initiative's provision to support trade related aspects is made unequivocal and its the budgetary support in this regard made explicit and binding in the EPAs, EU Budget initiative could be effective in funding EPAs. The EDF may also be a viable alternative to provide funds for EPA-related adjustment costs as long as these costs can be quantified and mitigating funds budgeted and availed to EPA signatories with minimum conditions. The Aid for Trade is a very long call to support EPAs in that its operation rules are decided outside the EU-ACP negotiating framework.

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A 'Wannabe Attitude'

Africa's New Hurdle to its Transformation and Achieving the MDGs

Eliakim Owino and George Chacha

INTRODUCTION

In an ever modernising and globalising world Africa, like any other continent, cannot afford to lose her identity or to be left behind. Yet, as one travels across the continent of Africa, it is without any doubt that the continent is besieged with 'trans-oceanic' modernity and the pressure to look and feel modern is overwhelming. However, honest answers are needed for these questions: Is Africa on a mad dash to embrace modernity at her own peril? Can Africa look within herself for the transformation of the continent and the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals (MGDs)? Should Africa stick to her traditions or adopt 'trans-oceanic' modernity?

This paper aims to highlight the inter-sectionality of modernity and traditions and why Africa needs to adopt the right mix of modernity and traditions if she is to make any tangible and sustainable progress in the 21st Century – adopting suitable traditional and modernity choices and discarding those that are likely to contribute to stagnation. In addressing the questions above, this paper will first highlight some of the core traditions that are necessary for Africa's transformation, and then evaluate the relevance of modernity to Africa.

Finally, this paper highlights the need for originality which is one of the emerging challenges to the transformation of the continent. Africa is seen as imitating other nations' ideologies (especially the Western ideologies) without any careful consideration resulting in a lopsided acculturation, hence the use of the terms 'wannabe attitude' and 'copy paste society' in this paper. This paper thus proposes the way forward in tackling the *wannabe attitude*, by setting out selection criteria for sieving out retrogressive traditions and modernities.

BACKGROUND

A lot has been documented in the recent times on the progress within the continent of Africa yet at the same time many questions are being raised on this progress. There has been a record of relatively high sustained growth rate since the turn of the century compared to stagnation of previous decades but this has not resulted into the creation of employment, wealth or improved welfare for ordinary Africans or made the integration of Africa more realisable than before.¹ Consequently, the Pan African dream of the founding fathers remains an ideal, though as Adogamhe² rightly points out, it is achievable if supported by the process of socio-economic and political transformation.

Through noble initiatives like the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the continent has had to refocus her priorities to ensure that Africa eradicates extreme poverty and provides a dignified living standard to her citizens.³ Yet ten years after the initiation of the MDGs, statistics still indicate that in parts of Africa, such as Southern Africa, mortality rate has increased from 171 in the 1990 to 381 in 2008 as highlighted by the World Bank Group for the Millennium Development Goal.⁴ If anything, following the MDGs and implementing them in totality should translate into a transformed Africa – where hunger and poverty are eradicated, children have access to primary school education, child mortality is reduced, maternal health improved, gender equality promoted, HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis combated and environmental sustainability is prioritised, as was described by Munoz.⁵ Despite the dedicated African leadership and the enormous efforts channelled to change the African situation by the world partners not much has been achieved hence the question: What is Africa's new hurdle to its transformation and achieving of the MDGs?

From the onset of their formative years many African countries never had the unbridled opportunity to formulate afro-centred policies either because of colonial hangovers or discreet manipulation by the Western nations who have always acted to further their own interests. In the recent past, Africa's situation has been further complicated by the dynamics of globalisation and the generational crossroads she finds herself in. The post-colonial generation that have held the reins of power are now retiring and a new generation who have more affinity to modernity are now the ones holding power. Whereas the post-colonial leaders were coerced into accepting 'trans-oceanic modernity'⁶ as a condition for receiving financial aid through the 'Washington Consensus', or shall we call it 'Washington Orthodoxy', the current generation of African leaders have less prescriptive and less conditional aid sourcing options yet they are most likely to

embrace modernity. More so, in a world where politicians have to be responsive to the masses, it is natural that policies will reflect the face of the masses. It is therefore imperative on those formulating and implementing policies that a right balance between traditions and modernity is achieved; that xenophilia does not unduly influence policies and strategies for the transformation of the continent.

Though the desire to see development in Africa is overwhelming, a lot of soberness is needed in determining the pathway to the continent's transformation. Local solutions are preferential; however, in cases where foreign solutions are valuable, thorough research should be done to establish their workability. Initiatives like NEPAD provide a right mix of local and foreign solutions which, if implemented correctly will lead in transforming Africa. However, such noble ideas like NEPAD need to be legitimised and made credible enough so as to turn them into success stories.⁷ The continent is already awash with prescriptive measures (for instance the 2011 Economic Report on Africa for the structural economic transformation) deemed as the optimal solutions that will spur the desired change in Africa. What Africa requires is the ability to select the best contextualised solutions hence our ultimate desire to research on possible selection criteria for the most suitable and complementary traditional and modernity choices.

HIGHLIGHTS OF AFRICAN CORE TRADITIONS (CULTURE, SYSTEMS, TECHNOLOGY, PROCESSES) THAT ARE NECESSARY FOR HER DESIRED INTEGRATION AND TRANSFORMATION

The need to preserve or restore Africa's core traditions is paramount as these have the capacity of bringing development. First, there is a need to explicitly define Africa's core traditions – culture, systems, technology and processes. In order to achieve this, we have subdivided culture into the following elements: family unit, education, governance and leadership and mind-sets. We have also looked at technology broadly through the prism of mining, agriculture, media sector and art.

Africa is one of the few continents where the family unit is cohesively operational. The family as a fundamental unit of the African society is meant to provide economic, social and psychological security for its members. Through the family unit traditions are preserved and both social and moral norms are defined. The African family unit which is largely an extended unit stands in stark contrast to the Western family which is strictly nuclear. Whereas African and Western families as originally constituted are both besieged, the Western family is at best dysfunctional – this is best amplified in last summer's riots in the United Kingdom which were blamed

on dysfunctional families.⁸ Africa without any doubt has a structural asset – functional family unit – which, she can showcase to the world. However, this can only be achieved if Africa understands and appreciates her traditions' strengths, and weaknesses.

The value of the family unit in the success of any society cannot be overstated. In the traditional African society, the family – usually extended – consisted of several generations plus cousins, aunts etc, and often lived together. As John Lawson Degbey of Africa Rights of Child Foundation puts it, the African family unit offered a structure within which social responsibility was easily inculcated and a support system was in place to ensure holistic functioning of the society. Consequently, the African society was never seen as 'a winner takes it all' society. All people were valued and supported to become responsible members of the society.

The arrival of the colonialists as Ifill⁹ posits, cast a dark shadow on the African family. African family forms were then seen as dysfunctional and the European family structures were projected as the ideal types and any deviation from these were aberrations. Though the foregoing perception was successfully peddled across the continent leading to the devaluation of the African family forms, research done on the African family contradicts such perceptions. The African family structure is not only a cohesive unit providing economic, social and psychological security, but also a structure where marriage has high degree of stability and children learn to be respectful, responsible and supportive extended family members – elements which are lacking in the European or Western models.

Canning et al stresses that the family unit plays an important role in economic development where the unit is seen as central in decisions such as: where to work, how much to save and invest, and what education to acquire etc. However, with the changing face of the African family – where women are also heads of families, where HIV/AIDS or other calamities have forced children to be breadwinners – there is a need to review the family structures and incorporate support systems for such families without subjection to illegitimacy calls or stigma. This is a classic example of cultural dynamism where modernity intersects tradition.

Traditional leadership in Africa is an ancient institution and is more of facilitatory democracy. It focuses on issues other than rigidified processes of modern democracy which focuses mostly on how leadership came to be selected.¹⁰ The traditional African leadership thus sought to fulfil specific social and governance needs of a community. In South Africa for example, the role of the institution of traditional leadership as being political and administrative centre of governance has been identified.¹¹ The institution of traditional leadership was regulated by customary laws and was founded on freedom of speech with laws and judgement being passed by a traditional

leader with consent from traditional council of elders. For centuries Africa had traditional governance in place that served her people. Analysts' interrogation of the legitimacy of failing African states in 1980s and 1990s found that such countries continued to apply the notion of governance and civil society that were based on Western models without paying attention to relevance of traditional political institution.¹²

Exploring learning in the traditional system can be instrumental in helping create education systems appropriate in achieving development. In evaluating the role of the African education system Okoro has pointed that this process was intimately ingrained in the social, cultural, artistic, religious and recreational life of the community.¹³ The traditional system inculcated a sense of responsibility and one of major model used was apprenticeship model where people learned under masters.¹⁴ Initiation rites and other various rituals served as devices to implant the community spirit in youth; and in the same way Western schools Americanised or Europeanised their people so did African ones Africanised their own people.¹⁵ This brings a great sense of togetherness that can help model the desired African integration.

It has been noted that the low cost traditional food processing technique are bedrock of small scale food processing enterprises in West Africa and their contribution to the economy is huge.¹⁶ Traditional technologies have been valued in promotion of small scale food industries involving lower capital investment which results to rural development. Previous reports have indicated that organic agriculture which has had enhanced growth since mid-1990's heavily relies on traditional farming technologies.¹⁷ This is the similar case in the mining industry in Ghana whereby the present day small-scale artisanal miners employ most of the traditional technologies; and small scale mining is a key player in Ghana's mining sector being recorded as the country's largest diamond producer.¹⁸ Technology has a great influence in the media and communication, sectors which have been pointed as critical to developing a prosperous Africa. Through arts, cultural festivals, musicals and dramatic performance emerges national cohesiveness which we in our view is a great factor in realising Africa's integration. It has been highlighted that traditional systems of communication and media remain essential in sustaining information needs of the rural who represent majority of the third world population, despite being seen as primitive.¹⁹

While there is a lot of good stuff stemming from Africa's core traditions, it is necessary to be cautious about any negative aspects some of these traditions might have on development. From our view point, the biggest of all hurdles to Africa's development has more to do with the mindset. It has been emphasised that *Africans need to liberate themselves from themselves*;

while it is agreeable that African-mindset needs liberation from inferiority complex, mental slavery and colonial mentality, it was pointed out that more important was liberation against intolerance, parochialism, and a self-seeking individualism.²⁰ Other research works have shown that elements such as ethnicity are hindrance to development; ethnic-based political mobilisation constitutes a major threat to the national political stability.

SAFARI INTO MODERNITY AND AN EVALUATION OF ITS RELEVANCE IN ACHIEVING AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS

Over the centuries there has been a clear progression and the desire to embrace modernity – the quality of being current or of the present – and societies have benefited from modernity in different ways. However, as discussed below, not every facet of modernity is automatically relevant to every society hence the need for customisation and contextualisation. Jeffrey²¹ argues that there is no such thing as modernity in general. There are only national societies, each of which becomes modern in its' own fashion. Other researchers²² see modernity as the one thing to which every society is inevitably moving, though at different rates of development. Defining modernity is as complex as is the process itself, given that five decades ago the world was clearly demarcated into the 'first world', 'second world' and 'third world'. Modernity was seen as the state of being in the 'first world'.

The world has moved on from the era of the second industrial revolution into the third industrial revolution of digital engineering and connectivity in which the Western world are equal players amongst many.²³ Amidst the shifting global trajectories, Africa has had to juggle between her rich heritage and modernity and her emergence as a notable partner in the global arena depends on how this balance is achieved. At a time when the pluralism of modernity is becoming clear, Africa needs to add a new if not different shade to modernity. This section explores the journey and effects of modernity in Africa, specifically looking at issues relating to governance, education, technology, art and entertainment.

Governance is not only central to the achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) but also to the opening up of a new chapter on social, political and economic renewal in Africa. Conversely, lack of good governance is the main drawback for the continent of Africa: it has stifled growth, created no space for political and social expression and has broadcasted Africa as a retrogressive continent despite her immense natural and human resources. Africa is labelled as a continent struggling with governance frameworks. If good governance is the lifeline to her prosperity, why hasn't Africa with deserved urgency grabbed it?

In pre-colonial Africa there were well defined governance structures that suited the needs of varying communities.²⁴ As expected, there were different models of governance, e.g. centralised and decentralised structures. Communities where kingdoms existed (Buganda in Uganda) practised centralised governance as opposed to many other African communities, where power was not held centrally (like the Ashanti Federation). Decentralisation of government has been pointed to as a key to accountability.²⁵ These pre-colonial structures had instruments for checks and balances that ensured that justice was delivered and that those who had the administrative power never abused it and whenever this happened, there was recourse to justice. At the onset of colonisation of Africa, the colonialists either tried to abolish the traditional structures or used them to their advantage by re-defining their ethos as it suited their machinations. Some scholars attribute to this the genesis of impunity and the corrupt culture that has hampered Africa's development.²⁶

As mentioned earlier, Africa's success in its transformation and realisation of MGDs depends on how well she juggles between her heritage and modernity. This is so because there is no African nation that uses purely traditional governance or purely Western/modern governance structures. Africa not only needs to uphold her heritage while at the same time keeping abreast with modernity but also reach out globally for alternative modernities that are best suited for the African fabric. Good judgement is required in filtering out shades of modernity which are retrogressive. Friends and partners of Africa who are eager to see her develop into a 'modern continent' must understand what works well in the west will not necessarily work in Africa. A classic example is the Structural Adjustments Programmes (SAP) which were introduced to spur economic growth because it was then believed that the lean state would enable a free market environment.

However, there is no discernible evidence SAP helped to achieve the intended goals.²⁷ It was thus prudent that new strategies were adopted. It was identified that 'accountability' was the main missing ingredient in the governance structure in Africa and that this was further aggravated by the existence of informal bureaucracy.²⁸ For the successful implementation of the new initiatives such as NEPAD and the MDGs, the West and Africa's partners must understand that mere exportation of concepts of good governance without considering the indigenous structures and dynamics will not yield the desired results.

Traditionally, rulers derive their legitimacy from their subjects who expect them to be accountable by among other things, making resources available to them. This is an informal expectation ingrained in the African social and political fabric. In pre-colonial unitary tribal environments, such expectations often worked well. However, with the formation of states at

independence, it became hard as many tribes formed the state. The rulers, still faithful to this dogma, found themselves distributing the resources to their tribes at the expense of other tribes. Consequently the excluded tribes felt alienated and this often led to conflicts, and the state was never accountable to all her citizens. After years of ineffective policies, the West now believes that contestability of power is the key to holding African governments accountable.²⁹ Ironically it was their colonial policies of divide and rule, dismantling of traditional structures of governance that led to the breeding of authoritarian models of governance in Africa.

When the Western donors and the World Bank introduced the SAPs which effectively reduced the scope of the state, the result was fewer dispensable resources to the leaders' clientele. Furthermore, after the cold war the West, no longer competing for support base in Africa, was no more ready to wink at some of the malpractices in Africa. They turned low the donor taps and the donor conditions became more stringent and the clientele disenchantment more pronounced. And the pronouncement of Africa as a failed and corrupt continent became louder. What the West did not understand is the African informal dynamics of the leader/clientele relationship. In Africa the leader doubles up as the representative of the people and the state and the state is seen to be personal as opposed to the Western world where the state is impersonal. The World Bank is now asking whether traditional bureaucratic models are appropriate in the cultural and social setting in some African countries.

Modernity is not just a single face – which is the opposite of that which existed before modernity or traditions' – there are 'alternative modernities'. In Asia, modernity is not perceived as synonymous with Westernisation. Asia grappled with this dichotomy and came to the conclusion that modernity and the East are not mutually exclusive and that modernity should not be seen exclusively through the Western prism.³⁰ Consequently, Asia opened up to the idea of alternative modernities. The problem that has bedevilled Africa for decades is the failure to acknowledge that there are alternative modernities and to conceptualise and contextualise governance, for example, to fit the African fabric.

Throughout history all societies have had a system of education by which families and societies transfer beliefs, values and skills. Though such systems were informal in Africa, they had existed in pre-colonial era.³¹ The entry of the missionaries and the subsequent takeover by the colonialists marked the end of African traditional education. The missionaries and colonialists came ready and willing to change existing traditions to meet their own needs and ambitions³², thereby dismissing the culture and replacing it with Western ideologies. The African holistic approach to education was shelved for the European curriculum. Colonisation of Africa brought with it the painful

linguistic imperialism and the continent was balkanised into Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone. The effect of this is seen today in the fact that African languages are not considered academic and so are not learned or used as a medium of learning.³³ This has led to the churning out of graduates who believe that the traditional languages are for the *hoi polloi*.

As mentioned above, the pre-colonial education system in Africa was more of vocational than academic. The aim was to equip people with different skills for the smooth operation of the society. When the colonialist came they introduced a system of education that not only created an elitist society but also a culture of using education as the ticket to plundering the national resources.³⁴ The educated elite, in an endeavour to distinguish themselves from the rest of the society, have cut for themselves the role of being repositories of modernity in Africa – where modernity is synonymous to Westernisation. Consequently, education policies are being formulated without local skillsets and needs wholly factored in. What is evident in these policies is the rush to catch up with the first world which simply reflects the *wannabe attitude* that bedevils Africa.

Technology should be at the forefront of Africa's quest for a respectable position at the global table. If Africa is to shackle off the tag of poverty and backwardness, she must embrace technology and be innovative. Historically, Africa has been on the blunt end of the technology, and for decades has been desperately trying to catch up. Consequently, Africa became the dumping ground for second tier or obsolete technology making it hard to endure the boisterous and competitive global market because she became the custodian of yesterday's technology.³⁵

The slow adoption of technology is partially caused by an elitist class who have insulated themselves from the rest of the society instead of disseminating the knowledge, and this has in some areas led to utter scepticism about technology especially where it challenged traditional norms. This class system has led to slow adoption of technology and in some areas utter scepticism about technology especially where it challenged traditional norms³⁶. This partly explains why farming in Africa is still non-technological, rendering Africa less sufficient on food security. This has probably been so because technology has not been contextualised to fit the African situation. However, with the emergence of the digital technology, Africa appears ready to keep abreast with modernity. Africa has the fastest growing market in mobile connectivity and there are lots of success stories in digital technology such as mobile banking, Ushahidi online mapping tool and many others. This confirms that Africa can be a key player in the digital revolution, but she will need to remain authentic, conceptualise her needs and translate this into digital technology without limiting herself to the abstractions of the Western world.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

It is never easy to draw a line between tradition and modernity. However, in order for Africa to advance to a respectable status in the global arena and to achieve transformation and realisation of the MDG, she must juggle well between her core traditions and modernity. First, we have to admit that Africa as a continent with constituent countries is not traveling in tandem – different countries are at varied developmental stages, for example South Africa is more advanced technologically than, say, South Sudan. The suggestions made here are more generic and principled. However, what is clear is: Africa must understand her situation and seek Afro-centred solutions.

Whereas Africa cannot ignore modernity, she should learn from the success stories of East Asia where tremendous progress has been recorded in the war against the hurdles to development. Africa must consistently apply the concept of 'Glocalisation'³⁷ – whereby global systems are to be tailored to suit the local adaptation. While organisational, institutional and systematic reforms demanded by bodies such as IMF could pose risk of failing or create distortions, such demands if dealt with can be used as means of reform as some countries especially in East Asia captured these opportunities and achieved development.³⁸ It is also important that during the processes of adopting modern systems and policies, the African governments should research on the intended purpose and outcomes and tailor them to their situation. For instance, in the evolution of the development policy of Malaysia there was the discovery that agricultural policy during colonial times was meant to serve the interests of the colonial master³⁹, and such trends have been carrying on to the present day.

Thorough and critical study on the desirable modern system must be done so as to establish the essence of their origin and their implication on the societies where they were developed. Beyond this, the policy makers need to employ strategy tools such as scenario planning and the use of pilot projects before full-fledged implementation for a whole nation. These steps can help avoid misuse of resources and distortion that a modern system may trigger on development. Even in cases of emergency like the shocks of the recent global downturn, great care needs to be employed in adoption of corrective measures. 'Development models may draw on local materials, but they are also very much global products, constructed in the context of transnational culture, networks and organisational fields'.⁴⁰

Africa must understand the shifting global trajectories – social, political, economic etc. – and understand that what is 'trendy' today might not be so in the future. As seen above, Africa has in her custody very successful social institutions and traditions that the world would benefit from. Before

these institutions and traditions are exchanged for modernity, it should be very clear that the replacement is superior and tested and that available alternatives are considered.

The efforts to see a developed Africa will also come with the careful selection, adoption and customisation of appropriate technologies. Citing from the work on influences of technology on small family farms in Brazilian Savannah⁴¹, it is evident that development of such small scale farming cannot solely rely on modern technology, other systems need to be considered too. Technology is transferrable and in some instances there is no need to reinvent the wheel, even though Africa must still remain cautious about how it employs competitors systems. This caution has led India to encourage the domestic auto firms to develop core research and development skills, and Africa too can take a cue.

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Pan-African Unity as a Pre-Requisite for Pro-Active Response to Climate Change

Kasay Sentime

INTRODUCTION

The complexity and magnitude of climate change as portrayed these days by scientists and the media call for renewed thinking aimed at dealing with this threat from its root. A united pan-African front is needed. As a global dilemma, climate change entails anthropogenic activities in one area that directly or indirectly affect in remote places as well as regions, countries and continents. For instance, drought, food, water shortages and flooding as a result of a global rise in sea-level, an increase in the frequency of natural disasters and the escalation of poverty might lead to forced migrations which could escalate from one region to another and subsequently lead to competition over natural resources, and ultimately to systemic conflicts.¹ This is also evident through the recent work of scholars² who state that climate change and variability have the potential to impact negatively on water availability, and access to and demand for water in most countries, particularly in Africa. As demonstrated by the Centre for Naval Analysis,³ it is vital to understand that the risk of violent conflict associated with climate change and the subsequent scarcity of resources, depends largely on the vulnerability of populations, the ecosystems, economic systems and institutions in question.

In Africa, it is predicted that poor communities, more than the affluent ones, will be the more vulnerable and the more likely to have to pay the costs arising from these impacts. This is because Africa is always portrayed as a vulnerable continent from the colonisation to post-colonisation period, suffering the effects of financial instability and the high risk of being adversely affected by climate change and its associated impacts.

As highlighted by Onuoha,⁴ it is evident that Africa is facing a number of climate change shocks that are intensifying, inequality and the disruption of livelihoods. Thus, the best way to respond to climate change and

its associated impacts is to examine its roots and investigate whether it is all related to the power dynamics between the 'have and have-nots'. By exploring key theoretical concepts, this paper draws from the decolonial epistemic perspective, mainly the coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and the coloniality of being as they are intertwined and useful in order to clearly understand the power and epistemic dynamic hidden in current environmental discourses in general and climate change discourse in particular that is linked to modernity and also to the neo-liberal system.⁵

As underlined by the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change⁶ there are a number of regions that are expected to be predominantly subjected to climate change, namely the Arctic, Africa, small islands in the oceans and densely-populated coastal mega-deltas in Asia. With regard to Africa in particular, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has pointed out the likelihood that Africa will be more seriously affected than any other region, because of the continent's limited adaptive capacity; hence scrutinising the response to climate change from a Pan-Africanist perspective and from the decolonial epistemic perspective side of the power debate mainly the coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge, the coloniality of being and coloniality of nature, which should be deemed as vital to a proactive response to climate-change-related strategies at both the regional and national levels.

This debate is divided into four sections. The first section briefly outlines the historical background of climate change and its challenges; the second section briefly shows the power relationship that exists within the proponents of climate change mitigation and strategists; and the third considers the associated impacts of climate change on Africa as a region, and spells out the challenges facing the African people. The last section discusses the need for pan-Africanism as a pre-requisite for responding to climate change in the African context.

BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CLIMATE CHANGE

The emergence of the concept 'climate change' dates back to the 1980's and thereabouts, with key events such as the discovery of the ozone hole in the stratosphere and the publication of the Brundtland Commission Report, 'Our Common Future'.⁷ However, before this year, the wave of this phenomenon was already evident at the Stockholm Conference in 1972 and at the Rio de Janeiro Conference in 1992 where issues of pollution, oil spills and the dumping of hazardous waste at sea, threats of bio-diversity depletion, and increases in the concentrations of greenhouse gases were raised. These issues have constituted the substance and patterns of debates and

summits, as well as mega-events for more than a decade, dating from Rio de Janeiro in 1992 to Cope 17 in Durban, South Africa, in 2011.

Drawing from Luterbacher and Sprinz 'the climate change regime until the conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 can be usefully divided into five periods', as set out below:

- The foundational period characterised by scholars' concern about the evidence leading up to the acknowledgement that climate change is in fact a reality. Although the harm done by greenhouse gases was already put forward more than a century ago by a Swedish chemist, Svante Arrhenius, climate change as such was not recognised as a matter for political debates until the 1990's. With evidence from several experiments and careful measurements taken principally at the well-known site of the volcano, Mauna Loa, in Hawaii in 1960, scientists established that there were increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide, the primary greenhouse gas, in the atmosphere. What is known as the Kelling Curve, showed that this increase was an undeniable fact to support the controversies that climate change was indeed a significant threat to the global environment.
- The second period, extending from 1985 to 1988, focused on promoting the climate change issue to international agenda. The focus of climate change shifted from the perspective of being a scientific phenomenon to being a matter for political debate and management.
- The third period, extending from 1988 to 1990, was marked by the international response to climate change.
- The fourth period encompasses the conciliatory agreements brokered at various conventions, and finally at the post-Rio Janeiro development and negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, which were characterised mainly by the acceptance of treaties and their implementation.

Climate change agreements manifests on disjunctions between theory, formal policy and practice. Even the main ideology of climate change and its associated implications is under contention. The question of the power struggle between poor and rich nations, of financing mitigating measures to combat the effects of climate change, and the major question of signing agreements, and perhaps of identity, lie at the heart of the debate on the supposedly homogenising effect of globalisation, as pointed out by Death.⁸

Global climate change has become a concern covered by the media and in world society's everyday life. While some scholars reject this phenomenon, others bolster up the reality of this scenario. The best way to respond to climate change and its associated impacts is to examine its roots and

investigate whether it is at all related to the power dynamics between ‘the haves’ and the ‘have-nots’.

For Stern⁹, the cost of taking steps to introduce adaptive measures to mitigate climate change today are negligible, as opposed to the costs that would be incurred if nothing were to be done. As regards the future, taking no action could possibly rob the global economy of 20% of its ‘bank balance’ annually. Hence, the underlying principle is that what the world invests in mitigatory and adaptive strategies at present will be repaid with multiple interests in the future.

For Giddens¹⁰ (in Beck):

Now there are no excuses left! But is there really no excuse left? Let’s be clear about this: the economics and politics of climate change presuppose the greening of societies! Without a majority of very different groups of people, who not only talk about but act and vote for the politics of climate change – often against their own personal interest – climate politics is doomed.

For Lindsay,¹¹

...uncertainty about the causes and consequences of global warming greatly shapes the debate over climate change. It is hard to motivate countries to act when no one knows whether the problem is big or small, imminent or distant.

From these insightful quotes, it is important to deduce that from its inception to its development, the main issue behind climate change is more than that it is a scientific phenomenon, but that it is largely associated with politics and has global implications operating through a power hierarchy.

Despite all of the transformations of terms and the modification of words used by the media in their reports on global climate change and its predicted impacts, the reality on the ground remains a serious challenge. As stated by Death the politics of sustainable development in general and climate change in particular have been contradictory concepts and there has been disagreement as to what exactly is to be sustained. Since this is not the main issue to be addressed here, let us go on to examine the associated impacts of climate change in Africa.

DECOLONIAL EPISTEMIC MEDITATION AS A PAN-AFRICANIST’S FRAMEWORK TOWARDS CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION & MITIGATION

Coloniality of Power and Knowledge, and Coloniality of Being are tied to one another and hence are vital in revealing how nature has been

for centuries transformed to natural resources and commoditised, the persistence of consumption of natural resources and the supremacy of universal and rationality of knowledge that is felt through discourses such the current scenarios of climate change and many others.¹² For the sake of this debate, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of nature will be discussed.

COLONIALITY OF KNOWLEDGE

Coloniality of knowledge is the point of departure to this debate as it is the historical backdrop, offering practical ways through which imperial hegemony can be displaced. It also persuades new notions of superiority and inferiority in which knowledge and culture should be conceptualised, to be brought to the fore. As outlined by Linda¹³: 'whilst imperialism is often thought of as a system which draws everything into the centre, it is also a system which distributes materials and ideas outwards'. This means that knowledge is just as important for imperialism and the modernity system as the need is for raw materials and other environmental resources and military force which sustain the entire system.

Indeed, it is not the intention in this section to elaborate upon Western epistemology, but rather for it to draw from the historical perspective, which might show the relationship between knowledge, power and culture, as well as research, that has provided information and suggested subordinate ways of understanding the world and even natural resources, that constitute the basics for the livelihoods of people. Nevertheless, this knowledge has separated people from their natural environment, their spiritual values, and their culture and ethics. While a human being should be considered as an integral part of nature, he/she is 'alienated and marginalised' in (Marxist) terminology as the proletariat and peasantry. Subsequently, this system has led to the disengagement from ownership of the productive process, and the labour power of the individual in this regard has been commoditised. Thus, labour has been exploited as a resource and tool to exploit natural resources to the benefit of the master.

Thus, the generation of new knowledge is absolute; this is in order to transform the old traditional system of knowledge, ideas, identity and culture as well as unity that become types of commodities to the master, as in the case of an abundance of valuable natural resources that were appropriated from the indigenous population in the colonies to establish a colonialist economy. Western knowledge has been gained through the process of Euro-centric colonisation,¹⁴ with pressure being exerted from the colonist's side to exploit the indigenous population and to suppress their knowledge, thereby ultimately colonising even their minds. In addition,

Quijano¹⁵ also highlighted three important points to defend this statement about the manufacture of Euro-centric epistemology:

- First, in the presumption, the subject is a category referring to the isolated individual because it constitutes itself in itself and for itself, in its discourse and its capacity of reflection; the Cartesian *cotigo*, *ergo sum* meaning 'I think therefore I am'. This statement by Rene Descartes claiming to be an object at the centre of rationality and excluding the other subject revealed how knowledge production was made and silenced other knowledge
- Second, the idea of object is incompatible with the results of current scientific research, according to which the proprieties are modes and times of a given field of relations; therefore there is not much room for an idea of identity as ontologically irreducible originality outside the field of relations
- Third, the externality of the relations between the subject and the object, founded on differences of nature, is not only an arbitrary exaggeration of the differences, since current research rather leads to the discovery that there exists a deeper communication in the universe.

With this background in mind, it is crucial to understand how traditional African knowledge and identities have been learned and suppressed and ultimately imposed currently by what pretends to be universal, modern knowledge that is manifested and continue to colonise the world's poor regions through discourses such as 'sustainable development', 'globalisation' and most importantly 'climate change'. As stated by the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez during his speech to the UN in September 2011, 'We have to look directly at the terrifying reality of the world we live in, it is necessary to ask a sequence of questions on the basis of the risks and threats we face'. These questions are:

- Why is the United States the only country that has scattered the planet with military bases? Why has it unleashed so many wars, violating sovereignty of other nations which have the same rights on their own fates?
- How can international law be enforced against its insensible aspiration to military hegemonising the world in order to ensure energy sources to sustain their predatory and consumer model?
- Why does the UN do nothing to stop Washington?

If we answer these questions sincerely we would understand that the empire has awarded itself the role of the judge of the world without being granted

this responsibility. This is some of the evidence showing the way in which the modern knowledge continue to not only control the world but suppress other knowledge through discourses, and ultimately imposing the unique way of seeing the world through the global Euro-American lens rather than through African realities, histories and cultures as well as values. In other words, knowledge/power dynamic here is also very important in order to understand the root and scenario behind the current crisis that appear to be the burden for Africa and other poor countries. Thus, climate change should not be looked at narrowly in its technical aspects such as rain fall patterns, weather, seasonal and temperatures alterations as well as droughts and flooding but most importantly about knowledge/power; which knowledge is produced and which knowledge is consumed by who? This is important in order to understand where power lies. The power/knowledge relationship has been also previously discussed by many scholars, and one of them is the Faucauldien perspective of power/knowledge dynamic.

Drawing from the Faucauldien perspective, climate change lies deeply rooted in Faucauld's conceptualisation of the knowledge-power relationship, rather than in technicalities and daily media reports presenting climate change and its worst associated impacts in developing countries in particular. For Faucauld, power in the first place is not a material, as Karl Death clearly puts it in his recent book on Governing Sustainable Development:

Power is not a substance, power is only a certain type of relation between individuals... The characteristic feature of power is that some men can more or less entirely determine other men's conduct – but not exhaustively or coercively.¹⁶

Power is capability or capacity, of which there is evidence in daily interactions everywhere. Knowledge constitutes a valuable form of useful power and power in turn produces knowledge. This is crucial in order to understand power relations between countries financing mitigatory and adaptive measures to deal with climate change and its impacts, particularly in poor countries (in Africa in particular) that are affected and are least able to deal with climate change issues.

Another scholar¹⁷ is of the opinion that power is multi-faceted, ambiguous and even contradictory when he emphasises that 'power is a set of actions on possible actions, it incites, it includes, it seduces, it makes easier and more difficult – it is the conduct of conduct and management of possibilities'. For Faucauld, power can be found wherever people live and is generated through their relationships and social interactions in their daily lives. Power is vital in this particular context as it is a conceptualisation of knowledge which eventually generates discourses, which shape the world. Faucauld rejects the idea that power operates only through negativity but

is rather of the opinion that it manifests itself through various forms. For instance, modern states use different instruments besides the threat of death to control the size of their populations.

The direct repercussions of the aspects for this debate on climate change are to shed light on the hidden agendas of the climate change discourse and its predicted impacts on developing countries in general and in African countries in particular. The latter are apparently the most vulnerable to *each and every aspect of life* since the solution to their problems must be decided upon in each case by *the head of the metropolitan area*. Furthermore, by applying the Foucauldian perspective, it is possible to also deploy and reveal the hidden agendas and empirical designs which are concealed in the discourses on climate change, the mitigation and adaptations in respect of its impacts, as well as the vulnerability of the states in question. Most importantly, it also enables scholars to study the power hierarchy which extends down from the global to the local level. Uganda President Yoweri Museveni, during the African Union Summit in Kenya in 2007 clearly spoke out about climate change as an act of aggression by the rich world against the poor – and demanded compensation.¹⁸ This statement once again revealed that through discourse such as the current climate change one, there is an agenda on the part of rich nations about Africa's natural resources, and the exploitation of cheap labour. Hence, the urgent need for Pan-African unity to defeat these imperial philosophies presently hidden in this discourse.

Thus, the way in which climate change is presented by various 'actors' and core discourses, as well as by regimes of knowledge, results in its main origins being forgotten. Those responsible for sketching the predicted scenarios associated with climate change blame the South – as if these countries were largely responsible for climate change in the first place. They advocate that these states should take responsibility for the consequences of their own actions and should themselves deal with the effects of climate change, caused in fact to a large extent by the West.

The afore-mentioned discussion demonstrates that power and discourses are interlinked, as perceptible and imperceptible power can be utilised through discourses. As stated by Beck:¹⁹ 'Why have the most pressing issue of our time – climate and ecological crisis – not been met with the same way enthusiasm, energy, optimism, ideals and forward – looking democratic spirit as past tragedies of poverty, tyranny and war?' In other words, through discourses, facts are produced and regimes of knowledge are established. Thus, the discourses on climate change ranging from those in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 to COPE 17 in 2011 in Durban, South Africa, and now, soon to be staged, the Post Mega Events or future climate change summits/agreements, pose important questions in terms of the nature of climate

change across political, economic, social, technological and even the legal divides between the North and the South; the power and the powerless, the vulnerable and those that are not vulnerable.

As highlighted by Lindsay:

Developing countries insist that industrialised countries should bear the burden of cutting emissions. They grew wealthy spewing the gases that now endanger the planet. Making everyone curtail emissions would force developing countries to clean up a mess they didn't create and potentially keep them poor by denying them the right to pollute their way to wealth.

COLONIALITY OF NATURE

Escobar²⁰ indicated that 'the crisis of nature is also the crisis of identity'. This merely implies that the meaning of nature itself might be shifted because of the basic way in which modernity has occupied all spheres of life (from education to religion, from traditional roots to modern society; from original resources to manufactured ones), and equipped people for this mission, embracing not only nature and culture, but also society, politics and the economy. All of these tend to weaken people, making them cross-examine themselves about Mother Nature, from which they originated historically, and try to get new answers.

Another possibility proposed by Escobar²¹, that sums up his message read as follows: 'We have entered an epoch which is defined by the sense of being nature'. This implies that the idea of nature has been separated from people, their cultural values and human roots and the produce through which labour is brought, namely by capitalism and modernity. However, scholars such as Cronon²² is of the opinion that 'nature, as a term, strips such a diverse phenomenon into a flat concept devoid of its original dynamics – the historical processes that [arose out of] both its structure and our understanding of it'. Thus, policy-makers and many of the researchers in the fields of Anthropology, Ecology and Biology, consider nature through centuries of human attachment and regard it, therefore, as 'an important material sense; a product of cultivation or a cultural construct'.²³

For other scholars ²⁴ the nature-culture dichotomy 'is an inadequate or misleading tool' to describe the ways in which people talk about and inter-relate daily with their physical environment. In other words, looking back from the historical perspective of the environment/nature concept and considering the current modern ideology, it would be complicated to separate nature and culture into two separate and discernible spheres.,²⁵ Thus nature is essentially part of human life, the place of human culture, beliefs and ideas as well as a sacred place where ancestral spirit live. In other words,

the transformation of nature to natural resources and its commodification, therefore, is not to be separated as the bourgeoisie are separated from the proletariat and the rich from the poor. This ideology indeed underpins this conceptual research framework in the sense that nature-dependent people and their cultures are components of nature and cannot be separated as commodities, or considered as cheap labour, as a tool to exploit their own resources as they possess creative knowledge about forest resource governance and management.

Linking the above declaration to climate change scenarios, Beck points out that 'there is no longer any doubt that climate change has globalised and radicalised social inequalities inside the national context and on a global scale; so, too, does climate change politics: it separates winners from losers, small groups of supporters from large groups of opponents, and it does so across all divides'.²⁶

The importance of coloniality of nature for pan-Africanism is to understand and to reveal that modernity, and particularly the current capitalist system, is the main core responsible of the current environmental crisis worldwide and more specifically through the use of discourses such as climate change. Thus, they exacerbate existing inequalities between the poor and the rich, between the core and the periphery – but simultaneously dissolve them. The greater the planetary threat, the smaller the possibility that even the wealthiest and most powerful will avoid it. Climate change is both hierarchical and democratic. Climate change is unadulterated ambivalence; it also releases a 'cosmopolitan imperative': cooperate or fail! This could be translated into 'reinventing green politics'.²⁷ In addition, through the decolonial epistemic perspective, particularly coloniality of nature, it is also very important to highlight that within this subjugated world by capitalist system, natural resources are there to be consumed with impunity, natural resources are there to be exploited from the free market and imported with impunity, and climate change is perceived as a weapon to destroy poor countries and extract their fresh and pure natural resources. This is also evident through the work of Bisson²⁸ who states that: 'I cannot think of a more irresponsible project than to invest immense political and financial capital, as well as waste the time of international climate negotiations, in order to place ownership of the world's forests and atmosphere into the hands of the most violent and destructive people in history. The UNFCCC and its parties are literally fighting fire with fire'.

This latest quotation also means that modern state governments and their institutions and leaders operating in the developing countries are not there as a result of brutal force, but rather through discourses on such issues as climate change. Thus, debates between rich and poor countries about emission cuts and funding to mitigate climate change continue to

be not only complicated (a puzzle) but it also appears to be a type of encumbrance where rich countries have the monopoly to decide about the way forward. Thus, there is an urgent need to deal with these problems regionally and at the pan-African level rather than at the national level due to its complexity and uncertainty.

ASSOCIATED IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICA AND ITS CHALLENGES

The impact of climate change, as envisaged by scholars and presented in the media on a daily basis as news, range from drought, food shortages, and floods to migration. Over the next decades, it is predicted that billions of people, specifically poor people from Africa, Latin America and Asia, would be seriously affected at different levels and spatial locations in terms of water and food shortages, as well as health risks, as a result of climate change. Yet, national governments in developing countries in general and in Africa in particular that are supposed to be the key actors in mitigating the impacts of extreme weather conditions appear to be stonewalled by exhaustive taxes, high levels of indebtedness, limited donor assistance, pre-occupied leadership, systemic corruption within their governmental systems, dysfunctional states, as well as by having no future strategic plans of note in place.²⁹ Consequently, they have been unable to deal timeously and systematically with issues of climate change and its associated impacts and have not been able to raise sustainable funds.

As outlined by Wangari,³⁰

...in Africa, natural resources are still being extracted and processed by powers outside the region, with little regard for the long-term health of the population, the conservation of the environment and poverty reduction. Desertification and deforestation, through logging and slash-and-burn agriculture, are decimating species, water supplies, grazing grounds, and farmlands and contributing to recurring food emergencies. To a large extent, these activities are done by multinational corporations exploiting minerals, precious wood and at less extent by local communities that use these resources to maintain their livelihood.

Relating this to the discourse on climate change, it is clear that only soft power would overwhelm poor communities that have limited financial resources to cope with the associated impacts of climate change. The actual target should rather be the elitist groups and leaders in the national government and the upper social classes of society who sign these protocols in the first place after being manipulated by their so-called 'close' foreign friends,

since they are trapped within the pockets of multinational corporations and the European Union.

As highlighted by Mechler *et al*, 'exposed countries often have to rely on donors to bail them out after devastating events'. This implies that poor countries are still caught at the mercy of multinational corporations and international financial institutions. To deal with their problems locally, they tend to import external policies and experts and to use discourses to keep the power in the hands of those who are at the core, and not at the periphery. Nevertheless, evidence from the Structural Adjustment Programmes shows that this aid is empty and not sustainable. Furthermore, according to Wangari 'in the past, people entered Africa by force; these days, they come with similar lethal packages, but they are camouflaged attractively to persuade Africa's leaders and people to cooperate'³¹. This implies that these 'concealed items' or 'wrap ups' are 'eye-catching to many African governments, not the least because they might be free of conditionality in respect of human rights, the protection of the environment, and the promotion of equity'.

For Chabal and Daloz³² 'since aid policies are primarily formulated by Western countries and international organisations dominated by the West, it is this agenda that dictates the debates'. Chabal also highlights the fact that aid has not contributed to development but has instead led to wastage, corruption, a lack of accountability and the maintenance of a system of economic rent rather than of production.

The following questions are posed in the hope of finding answers to some crucial issues:

- Who are the main producers of greenhouses gases?
- Who is responsible for climate change?
- Who is mainly affected by climate change?

If the answer transpires to be both the developed and the developing countries, the next question to be asked would be: Do the developed and developing countries produce greenhouse gases to the same extent? If not, Why should the developing countries be responsible for dealing with this global problem if they were not responsible for causing it?

A CASE STUDY: EAST AFRICA

Because of its spatial location, the Eastern African region (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) including the Horn of Africa, appears to be vulnerable to climate change. This is because this region is located in both arid and semi-arid lands. Rain falls patterns seem to differ considerably spatially and temporally across the region.³³ Since this particular region is already experiencing

water shortages, it might get drier which will cause dissension and conflicts over access to its limited water resources. Furthermore, it is also believed that the overwhelming majority (80%) of the East African region's population make their living from agriculture, which contributes more-or-less 40% to this sub-region's Gross Domestic Product. Thus, climate change will impact negatively on agricultural sectors and will ultimately cause a decline in the yields of subsistence crops, cash crops and even dairy products. In addition, other impacts experienced in this region are associated with the increased prevalence of tropical diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, meningitis and rift valley fever, food security, water availability and migration as well as sea-level rise etc.³⁴ All these indications call for urgent and united attention from the AU, African leaders and local indigenous knowledge and values.

AFRICAN UNION INITIATIVES

There have already been a few initiatives undertaken by the African Union to deal with climate change, such as their creation of the African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC) that aims at providing the member countries with information and also emphasises the necessity of supporting a consultative process in Africa's preparation for effective participation in the international negotiations towards the post-2012 global climate agreements. In addition, the African Union through both the environmental regime and cooperation with international bodies through a range of protocols and treaties signed, made it pro-active in dealing responsibly with the climate change dilemma. Possible collaborations include:³⁵

- Multilateralism: The United Nations Convention on Climate Change political coalition, in which the Africa Union was part despite the fact that there were points of discrepancy within the partnership particularly with regard to their mode of operation and scale of cohesion
- Bilateralism: this cooperation was approved in 1992 and did not take into account Africa in particular. Nevertheless, it sensitised member states to help out poor and vulnerable countries
- Endorsement of the Kyoto protocol in Africa
- Enforcing participation of African countries in negotiations about the future of the United Nation Framework on Climate Change and Kyoto protocol.

Despite the plethora of strategies and pro-active response to this dilemma, at this stage the African Union still appears to be totally dependent on external aid, decisions and ultimately policies which are amongst the root causes of the African predicament. As highlighted by Mueni Wa Muiu,³⁶

'this predicament puts Africa at the lowest level of economic, political and social development in the world'. Consequently, this dilemma causes serious distractions, thus creating the impression that they the AU does not have a coherent plan, strategies, funds and concrete actions to unite the African states in dealing systematically with the African problems such as poverty, regional conflicts and discourse on climate change. All of these aspects make it impossible for Africa to become autonomous.

With regard to the current monster, climate change, it is crucial to remind the African Union that this is not the time for policy reforms or duplications of master policies to address climate issues in Africa. It is time to wake up and raise their own funds, and develop concrete frameworks based on African culture and values to deal with their problems as a whole, and climate change in particular.

Indeed, Africa is still a pristine continent with an abundance of natural resources of which the Africans themselves are unaware and which have not been used by them at all. Instead, the global hegemony continues to plunder African natural resources for their own benefit. Thus poverty and inequality escalate in Africa, which these powers then blame on the African people themselves.

Thus, from the decolonial epistemic meditation, Africa is not poor, as suggested by the modern epistemology, but rather its states are as yet not nation states to represent the African identity. Instead, they are client states, serving the interests of their masters, the former colonisers, but at the expense of the African population. This is evident from the different standpoints of scholars; for instance Mueni Wa Muiu³⁷ underlined that the current state in Africa is not favourable to African people because of its nature and structure (it is 'without Africans' needs at heart'). For Wangari 'Africa is not poor, but she has yet to learn to protect her wealth for herself'.³⁸

In the African Union's quest to implement measures to mitigate climate change, such considerations have, since 2007, been integrated into development plans, strategies and programmes at national and regional levels. The relevant bodies serving to realise this initiative are the African Union Commission (AUC), an economic commission supported by the African Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), as well as other stakeholders. In November 2008, the first Joint Annual Meeting of the African Union Conference of Ministers on the Economy and Finance, and a conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development approved the establishment of the African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC) with the main objective of providing policy guidance to member countries and to urge the United Nation Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to admit the scenarios of climate change as a global challenge that requires urgent and joint shared responsibility to act.

In addition, the African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC) also emphasised the necessity of supporting a consultative process to prepare Africa for effective participation in the international negotiations towards a post-2012 Global Climate Change Agreement. Other selected important strategies that the African Union rely on include:³⁹

- The Addis-Ababa declaration on Climate Change and development that took place in January 2007, where Africa and the European Union concurred to foster consultations
- African states encourage the processes of using renewable energy, electricity access, efficiency and water management
- African states acknowledge the regional dynamic in the Congo basin on sustainable forest management through states and other organisations involved.

However, despite these strategies at this stage, it appears that the AU does not have a coherent plan, strategies and concrete actions uniting it with other bodies to deal systematically with climate change issues and the associated impacts of climate change. Moreover, as stated in their policy recommendations, development plans will be implemented at the national level, but how will the implementation of measures to deal with climate change be assured at national level? Also, does Africa in general and the AU in particular already have any particular stance of its own on the post-2012 Global Climate Change initiatives? Can the AU stand up for itself and present the African position relative to climate change that suits the African context?

THE IMPASSE OF CLIMATE CHANGE DISCOURSE AT PAN-AFRICAN LEVEL

The mission of the African Union was predominantly to conquer the domination of global imperial designs, previously manifested through Apartheid, colonisation and slavery, as well as any other form of authority that abused the public interest to the benefit of few minority groups. Such arrangements, to bolster up the designs of the former colonists in Africa were shifted about and concealed in discourses, conventions and summits, as well as in many other projects involving humanitarian organisations. Despite the few attempts that have been made at conference level, much still remains to be done in key problem areas such as:

- The reliance of Africa on the North/West coalition for total financial support, bringing with this dependence the duplication of North/West policies in respect of African problems

- Systemic corruption within state institutions at the national level, nepotism and a lack of human resources
- Deadlocks between academic institutions and research bodies, the political arena and communities at grassroots level
- A lack of self-determination in the political sphere, and ineffectual governments and ultimately, an insufficiency of local plans and strategies to mitigate the effects of climate change
- Tyranny between African leaders and the financial institutions sponsoring the mitigation of climate change impacts and adaptation strategies to reduce greenhouse gases.

Since all these above-mentioned coalitions are done between African states, elites and the global imperial domination from Europe and America, the present African state as previously discussed 'is inherently autocratic and unable to lead autonomous, self-centred and self-sustainable development'.⁴⁰ Consequently, there is systematic corruption and nepotism within state institutions; participation is a type of oppression where the state funders utilise this concept as a hostage of top-down, centralised imposition on local communities rather than negotiating genuine participation.⁴¹

As outlined by Wangari, 'lack of political will, weak institutions, a shortage of skills, too many ties to former colonial powers, and inadequate infrastructure, transport and communications networks'⁴² are factors that have failed and prevented Africa from developing and becoming autonomous.

For Atteridge *et al.*,⁴³ disagreement between industrialised and developing countries on financing for the mitigation of the effects of climate change and adaptation potentially presents a major stumbling block in reaching the post-2012 Global Climate Change agreement. The main issue behind this agreement is related to the fact that developing countries have requested that industrialised countries should provide an official document agreement showing that they will be sponsoring these scenarios of climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Nevertheless, to date there is still an overlap in terms of policy and practice for financing these activities. This demonstrates the way in which poor countries still remain under a global colonisation process based on discourses and soft power. 'African solutions to African problems' simply remains a pipe dream.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PAN-AFRICANISM IN DEALING WITH AFRICAN PROBLEMS

The most important idea behind pan-Africanism as a prerequisite for dealing with climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies lies at the

core objective of the African Union as a unifying force bringing African people together, regardless of their age, gender, race and origins. More importantly, the AU is a means to systematically counter forces and the power behind discourses and modern epistemology concealed in areas other than the main agenda for climate change scenarios. Pan-African backed institutions are the largest in Africa. They seek to promote and safeguard the integrity of the entire continent. They should have solid and pro-active initiatives in place in response to climate change initiatives, without directly or indirectly expecting aid from the North.

Climate change by nature does not only represent a natural phenomenon as it is understood superficially and described by scientists and the media, but carries with it a colonial matrix of power that has reinforced the North-South divide, and ultimately shown the gap between rich and poor countries. As stated by Crist⁴⁴ 'uncertainties revolve around the timing and degree of anticipated climate change, not whether climate change will occur'. For Crist, 'the intricacies of forecasting climate change and weather patterns, coupled with difficulties of foreseeing how humanity will respond in the next decade and beyond, have generated climate change scenarios from the controllable to the catastrophic'.⁴⁵

Since the sponsorships for projects to mitigate climate change are offered by the European and United Nations based institutions situated in the developed industrialised countries, Africa will not be free to kick off its own decision-making programmes and become independent. Ultimately, policies relative to the reality of African conditions, cultures and values in dealing with climate change and its associated impacts are required.

Thus, it is crucial to rethink the main assignment of the AU as a pre-requisite to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its members against any forms of global hegemony currently hidden within mainstream discourses such as Sustainable Development, the Millennium Development Goals, Global Contracts, Globalisation, REDD, the Clean Development Mechanism, and the current monster, 'climate change'.

Thus, it would be rational to draw inspiration from the previous ideologies of African leaders and predecessors, such as the famous Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, who called through his first speech for African unity in his famous exhortation that '*Ghana's independence count[s] for less unless, and until, the entire continent is liberated*'. This implies that in Nkrumah's opinion, in the absence of forging a common and indivisible union, Africa would not only remain caught up by imperial designs, concealed these days in discourses, but would also be divided in order to be well managed by the modern epistemology.

Moreover, the late Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi's philosophy on the creation of continental institutions and visions without unveiling any

specific 'roadmaps', should be applied in the implementation of programmes to deal with current problems hidden in discourses such as climate change and its associated impacts in Africa. Considering the complexity and magnitude of climate change, as portrayed by the media, and looking at its predicted impacts on developing countries, the developed countries, despite their financial power, appear to be immune to the entire climate change scenario. As pointed out by Beck, 'the Western news media's spectacular visualisation of climate change, presenting dramatic and symbolic scenes collected from around the world, has undoubtedly helped to establish the latter's status as a widely recognised global challenge and serves to illuminate a third generational modernity stage as a global spectacle'. This implies that news media do not only function by focusing on global events. Rather, they adopt a more pragmatic stand by actively embracing certain issues as global risks.

The African states should have their own unique plans and mitigation strategies in place for dealing with climate change issues without necessarily depending on multinational institutions for the following reason: The project of modernity is still alive and seeks to re-colonise the world and exploit rare and valuable raw materials in Africa by using different means such as discourses and knowledge that undermine African leaders, and systematic corruption that favours elitists group within the Africa continent.

CONCLUSION

In the light of what has been discussed above with regard to the climate change discourses, it is important to deal with climate change scenarios for the purpose of pan-African unity and ultimately as a required response to the current global crisis facing Africa. Of particular concern is that the climate change discourses hide a colonial matrix of power that silences African leaders and causes them to be distrustful of the motives of foreign powers. Africa is still a pristine continent and has numerous raw materials and other valuable natural resources that can be rationally used to sponsor and deal with African problems at the continental level.

After celebrating ten years of AU ideology, that started in 2002, African leaders should follow the philosophy of their predecessors, starting from Kwame Nkrumah to Muammar Gaddafi and many others such as a former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, of uniting Africa and looking at the common interests of all African states rather than of serving the interests of the West for its own benefit, at the expense of the poor. Thus, it is vital to understand that currently Africa is still colonised through discourses such as Climate Change, Sustainable Development, the Clean Development

Mechanism, the Millennium Development Goals, as well as many other related projects.

Africa is not poor, as portrayed by the global hegemony and the media. The fact of the matter is that African resources are not used rationally and are not used to develop Africa. Climate change will not exterminate Africa as long as her problems in all their magnitude are examined with wisdom, and soft power forces are used to deal with them accordingly. It is a matter of dealing with Africa as a united continent and not as a single country that will win in the end.

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Humanity and the Environment in Africa

Environmentalism Before the Environmentalists

Kimani S. K. Nehusi

‘Treat the world well.
It was not given to you by your parents.
It was willed to you by your children’ (Saying from Kenya)

INTRODUCTION: DEFINITION AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The idea of environmentalism, often articulated in terms of sustainable development,¹ has come into popular consciousness in recent decades as a consequence of the reckless abuse of the earth in the processes of advancing the ‘modern’, especially Western notions of development. It is normally expressed as a concern for the protection of the earth and its environment, including plant and animal species, their habitats, ecosystems and the atmosphere surrounding the planet. Similar concerns for outer space have extended the idea to encompass that aspect of the universe.²

The idea of an organised and integrated cosmos that must be treated with respect, even reverence, is not new to humanity. It is to be found in Africa from very ancient times and is especially well attested in African indigenous narratives, as far as is known, first in the society of Kemet over five thousand years ago. Its central concern with making adequate use of the present while preserving it for the use of the future announces the very definition of sustainable development.³ This idea has been continued in many beliefs and practices in living Africa, attesting an ancient, culturally distinctive and holistic relationship with the environment over millennia. However, since the *Maaftu* or Great African Holocaust that has been occasioned by these foreign presences, the African way has been submerged, disrupted and often negated by a tide of foreign conceptions and practice of being and existence.

Intellectual violence was a necessary accomplice in the physical violence of conquest and subjugation of Africa.⁴ Imperialism, therefore, attacked

and tried to erase or discredit the traditional (indigenous) African knowledge system, including the African way of relating to the environment. Foreign domination, in their manifestations as enslavement, colonialism and imperialism, and the distortion and destruction they have caused and are still causing to the history, culture and indeed the very identity of Africa, have therefore imposed upon Africans the necessary task of becoming themselves again. The response by Africans has cumulated in a grand objective of African centred scholarship. This, according to the declaration of Carruthers and Karenga, is the Research, Rescue and Restoration⁵ of African social history. This is a necessary direction of African scholarship which has been especially noted in the outstanding work of Cheikh Anta Diop, John Hendrik Clarke, Théophile Obenga, Ivan Van Sertima and others.

Recent scholarship has stressed the critical importance of the role of identity in development.⁶ The fundamental conclusion is that Africans cannot develop themselves and their continent unless and until they repossess their own identity. The principal methodology employed in this essay is taken from African philosophy. In the *Medew Netjer*, the language of ancient Egypt, the term *Wehemu Mesut* connotes the 'repeating of the births', an idea that may be found restated later in Africa's social history as *Sankofa*: to return to one's past to retrieve something valuable for the solution of a current challenge.⁷ Africa must return to itself if it is to regenerate itself and benefit from its full capacities again. The alternative is to contribute, wittingly or unwittingly, to the false and demeaning notion of a primitive and underdeveloped Africa that has been perpetuated by the oppressors of Africa as a necessary 'explanation' of their crimes against humanity.

CREATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT

The creation myth of Kemet is the first known account of how the world came into being. In this story, the Supreme Divinity, called God in some languages, first created two pairs of lesser divinities: Shu (air) and Tefnut (moisture) and Nut (the sky) and Geb (the Earth). In this cosmology everything in the universe derived from the possibilities inherent in the *Nun*⁸, or primordial waters. For the *nun* is the oldest substance in the cosmos. It contains all the possibilities of existence. That is, all reality everywhere that ever was, is and will be; all possible examples of anything. Included here is everything and its opposite as well as every possibility on the continuum between the two.

The philosophical implications of this narrative are profound. The first creations of the Supreme Being are the earth and other natural elements: the sky, air and water (in the form of moisture – rain, rivers, oceans and

so on). Here the fact of being first translates into being primary; the fact that its elements are the first creations in the cosmos announces the great importance of the environment. This importance is further emphasised by the fact that all other beings and things are descended from these primary elements of the environment. The rigorous scientific accuracy of this concept of the cosmos ought to be noted. One aspect of this idea of the cosmos resides in the primacy of water to all life. Water covers approximately 75% of the earth's surface, amounts to about 75% of our bodies, and is indispensable for respiration. The simple truth is that without water all life will perish, quickly. The primary importance of water to all life has been scientifically established millennia after Africans adumbrated this fact in the creation myth of Kemet.

The nature of the cosmos is reflected in the nature of the environment on earth: both are composed of interrelated elements. Each is a living, breathing whole, a sentient being. This is the reason why, in African tradition, land cannot be divided up and owned individually; it is perpetually held in trust by the chief, the temporal authority who must allocate pieces for everyday use.

At the level of ideology this is itself more than a mere echo of the ethics of *Maat*, equally beautifully expressed in the ancient hymns of Akhenaten, which emphasise the Supreme Being who is not only universal and indivisible form nature, but is also devoted to the care and love of all creatures and all nature.⁹ The content of this association is a scientific relationship, an entire science of integrating and harmonising the earth's material existence with human existence while guaranteeing the long term health of both.

MAAT: ORDER AND PLACE IN THE INTEGRATED COSMOS

The grand idea of an integrated earth as part of an interrelated cosmos is found in the notion of *Maat*. *Maat* articulates order and place within every living organism, from the unicellular organism to the more complex life forms, including each individual, family, clan, society, the earth's environment and the cosmos. It was, it is and it will always be necessary to maintain this divine cosmic order, or *Maat*, a concept first encountered and articulated in Kemet, where it was also rendered as the feather and personified as the female divinity of the same name. Like many other ideas from one language and culture sphere, it is either very difficult or not possible to translate *Maat* into other languages and culture spheres with the greatest precision. This difficulty is especially increased because the concept is at once profound, pervasive and multi-faceted. Interpretations therefore vary.

This concept has been variously rendered as truth, justice, righteousness, order, balance, harmony and reciprocity.¹⁰ However, these terms merely describe some of the parameters of the idea, which is elastic and simultaneously inclusive of all of them.¹¹

The opposite of *Maat* is *isfet*. Logically, this is the absence of *Maat*, the lack of truth, balance, justice, righteousness, harmony or reciprocity. Such a condition must mean wrongdoing, evil, disorder and chaos.

Maat has been described as ‘the key idea in the traditional African approach to life’ which today ‘recurs in most African societies as the influence of right and righteousness, justice and harmony, balance, respect and human dignity.’¹² This way of understanding and explaining the world arises directly from and is in fact a part of the creation stories of Kemet, the oldest known explanations of the universe.

James Allen is quite explicit on how the people of Kemet visualised the world:

The ancient Egyptians divided their world into three classes of sentient beings: the gods ..., the akhs and the living ... *The gods were the original forces and elements of nature, whose wills and actions governed all life.* The akhs were the spirits of those who had died and made the successful transition to life after death. They do not live in some heavenly paradise, but in this world, among the living.¹³

We may add here two other categories that were recognised, known and named by the people of Kemet – other animals besides humans, and inanimate things; in short, the physical environment. In this understanding of the cosmos, every being and everything in the universe, including lesser divinities, is brought into being by the Creator, *Atum*, (later variously *Ra*, *Amun*, *Atum-Ra*, *Amun-Ra*, *Ptah*, *Khnum* and the *Aten*), who is thus *nb tm*: the ‘Lord of Totality’, and is at once both male and female.¹⁴ Every being and thing was given a *ka*, a ‘life force’, ‘vital force’ or ‘energy’ emanating from the Creator.¹⁵

It should not surprise us that with some developments and variations, the very same model of the cosmos exists among the contemporary successors of the people of Kemet, both on the continent of the ancestors and in the numerous African communities abroad. Asante and Abarry assert that ‘the ancient African along the Nile River was in contact with the spiritual world of the ancestors in ways that are similar to the expressions of ancestral relations found in African societies throughout the continent.’¹⁶ To this we may add the many African communities abroad where this and other aspects of Africa are lived today. The reason for this tremendous continuity is not difficult to discern. We turn again to Asante and Abarry, who explain that as African culture and society developed and became more complex

and distant, in both space and time, from its ancient sources in the Nile Valley, 'new interpretations, revelations, and permutations occurred,' but that 'in all cases the ideas of [African spirituality] kept the societies close to the fundamental principles of harmony between humans, humans and the environment, and humans and the spirit world.'¹⁷

The details vary among different groups of Africans, but all who retain African culture continue the ancient Egyptian concept of the world, inherited directly from the Nile Valley and/or from a common ancestor, which is clearly the model of John Mbiti's division of the contemporary African world into five categories:

- *God* as the ultimate explanation of the genius and sustenance of both humans and all things
- *Spirits* being made up of superhuman beings and the spirits of humans who died a long time ago
- *Humans* including human beings who are alive and those about to be born
- *Animals and plants*, or the rest of biological life
- *Phenomena and objects without biological life*¹⁸ (i.e. the rest of the physical environment).

Mbiti goes further, telling us that 'in addition to the five categories, there seems to be a force, power or energy permeating the whole universe'. God is the origin and 'ultimate controller' of this force, but the spirits and certain humans also have access to it.¹⁹ Sarpong's explanation of this arrangement is irresistible: 'The divinities and the ancestors exercise executive powers only in as far as he permits them.'²⁰ This 'force, power or energy' that is in everything is the same as the *ka* of Kemet,²¹ the *kra* of the Akans in Ghana and Ivory Coast and most Africans in Suriname, and also the same as the *asé* of the *Orisas* (Orishas) that are propitiated by Africans (and sometimes by non-Africans) in Yorubaland. This very spiritual system, which features the Orishas, is called Orisha in Trinidad, where the same force is also propitiated, as it is among adherents to *Voodoo*, *Candomblé* and *Santería* in Haiti, Cuba, Jamaica, Brazil, the USA, and *Kumina* in Jamaica. It is also the same as the *ike* and *chi* of the Igbo,²² and *ntu* of Africans in central and southern parts of the continent, the so called Bantu, from whom this concept has been translated as 'vital force'.²³ Odudoye provides even further evidence of these connections, showing a linguistic link between this *ka* in the Medew Netjer and *chi* in Igbo, and noting that the likely influence is from the ancient Egyptians to the Igbo, not *vice versa*.²⁴

Clinton Hutton shows us that 'Ase ...is cosmologically the primordial cosmic material, the creative essence, the creative force...'²⁵

Figure 1 The divine cosmic order

The Creator (God)	The Spirit World or The Unseen World (Spiritual Relationships)
Lessor Divinities (or Gods)	
Ancestors and other Spirits	
Humans	
Other Animals	The 'Natural' World or The Seen World (Social and Ecological Relationships)
Inanimate Things	

Robert F. Thompson informs us that *asé* is a 'morally neutral ... spiritual command, the power-to-make-things-happen, God's own enabling light rendered accessible to men and women.'²⁶ Raul Canizares tells us that the ontological meaning of *asé* 'refers to a sense of order and balance in the universe. *Ashé* is the ultimate source of everything.'²⁷ Order and balance are fundamental ideas in the concept of *Maat*, which we have referred to above as good order in the cosmos and which is the objective of all who pour libation, an ancient ritual which is practised throughout the African world.²⁸ Thus the very notions of order and balance which are represented in *Maat* in ancient Egypt are to be found in contemporary Africa. Such ideas represent a deeper meaning of *asé*, *chi*, *ntu* etc., which are therefore conceptually the continuation and restatement of *Maat*. All of these notions are also linked in practice, for libation is about maintaining *Maat* for the people of Kemet as it is about maintaining *asé* for the practitioners of the Way of the Orisas, of good order and proper place in the world also for the devotees of *Voodoo*, *Kumina*, *Candomblé*, *Macumba*, *Mayal* and *Santería*. In African thought and practice, libation is an affirmation of and a path to the divine cosmic order.

In this divine cosmic order, which is shown in Table 1, humans are ranked below the Creator, below other divinities, and below ancestors and other spirits. However, humans are ranked above other animals and above inanimate elements of the physical environment. Spirit animates everything, and when the material person or thing is no more, spirit alone continues, on a higher plane. Spirit is first and foremost; animate and inanimate life, in all its variations, amount to but differing manifestations of spirit. However, the poor vision, understanding and self-centredness of some humans have led them to try to place themselves at the centre,

above all else and therefore outside of the cosmic order. The consequences have often been disastrous. Today the modern scourge of environmental degradation and destruction threatens every living thing on the planet, including humans. The modern notion of environmentalism is but a reaction to this wanton destruction of the earth; the African indigenous tradition is a preventative science which secures the preservation and continuation of the earth's environment.

The being(s) and/or things in each category of things in the cosmos have a specific relationship to the others within that category, and each category also bears a particular relationship to the other categories. For example, humans worship the Supreme Being and lesser divinities, venerate the ancestors, and respect each other and the physical environment. These relationships are respectively spiritual, social and natural ecological relationships, for our relations to our gods or divinities, to our ancestors and to our unborn are spiritual relationships; those among us living are social relationships; those to our environment are ecological or environmental relationships. They are all based upon awareness of this order and the consequences of both acting to maintain it or not acting to maintain it.

THE DIVINITY OF THE EARTH

It is necessary to stress that this awareness of spirituality, this oneness, connectedness and interdependence of everything in the cosmos, compelled Africans to live in respect for and in harmony with the physical environment. Humanity lives in this environment, a habitat that is absolutely necessary for sustaining life through the many indispensable resources it provides. It is therefore necessary for the environment to be recognised as a very precious resource bank which needs to be owned and managed intelligently in order to secure a decent and dignified living for all and for all times.


This is what the ancestors understood and practised. It explains their attitude to the land, which could neither be allowed to be idle while people are land hungry, or be alienated from common ownership to become the property of any individual, which is often a certain step towards land hunger. In the African understanding of things, land is sacred. That is why groups of Africans have always had at least one divinity of the earth.

The instances are legion, from ancient through to modern times. For example, in Kemet there was *Geb* [Old Kingdom Gbb] and *Aker*. The latter was both an earth divinity and the earth itself.²⁹ As is shown in the figure above, in this ancient African country there was also Asaru, a divinity of corn, which was an important staple. The presence of these divinities in Kemet

reinforces the fact that the earth was held to be a sacred being. The same is true of modern Africa, where numerous earth divinities are to be found. Among the Igbo in eastern Nigeria, there is *Ani*, which is also a personal name in Kemet, and its variants: *Ama*, *Ala* and *Ale*. In Twi in Ghana, there is *Asaase Yaa*, (*Adaase Afua* in the Fante dialect), and *Aberewa*: Old Mother, a general name. *Ayi* and *Li* are the names of the earth goddess among the Ewe.³⁰ *Oto* is the earth divinity among the Edo. Other examples of current African earth divinities include *Isong* among the Ibibio and *Dugbo* among the Mende and Kono in Sierra Leone. These are all female earth divinities, whereas in Kemet both of the earth divinities, Geb and Aker, were male. However, there are also male earth divinities in Africa today. *Amakiri* is a male earth divinity among the Ijaw, as is *Spono* among the Yoruba, with the variation *Sapata* among the Fon, Ewe and Eguns.³¹ There are many more earth divinities across Africa.

This divine nature of the earth is also the reason why Africans always pour libation into 'Mother Earth', directly or symbolically. Further, Mother Earth is a living, active entity, possessed of some of the same qualities as beings in the other categories of existence. And, like each of these, the physical environment was also made and given by the Creator. This physical environment is also a manifestation of the Creator and is indeed an aspect of the Creator, inviolable and divine. Therefore it is natural to treat the physical environment as a living, breathing and sacred entity according to the tradition handed down by our ancestors. That is why Africans have always revered nature and treated Mother Earth as a sentient being. Relations to the earth are simultaneously ecological, spiritual and social relations. In the deepest tradition of Africa notions of being and existence

Figure 1 Pouring Libation onto the Body of Asaru, the Corn Divinity



(Source: Charles Finch III, MD (1992); *Echoes of the Old Darkland*, p.182)

are anchored in the overriding necessity to preserve the environment. It is logical for development in Africa to be consistent with this cultural principle and not merely concern itself with the introduction of aspects of European modernity.

This is the idea of Mother Earth that is embedded in African spirituality, which is deeper and bigger than mere religion. This is the basis of what is now termed environmentalism by some arrogant non-African latecomers to history, who, in their tremendous ignorance and pursuit of individualism and materialism, have disregarded the African principle of existing and working in harmony with nature and which recognises humanity to be part of nature and not opposed to nature. The latecomers have tried to conquer nature, and have nearly destroyed the earth. These people now trumpet environmentalism as though it were a recent invention of theirs and try to impose it upon others without regard to the living traditions in these dominated societies.

MAINTAINING THE COSMIC ORDER OR *MAAT*: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LIBATION

But it is possible, indeed necessary, to show that this grand idea of environmentalism in traditional Africa did not remain in the realm of the gods. Here it is imperative that we recognise the holistic nature of African existence; everything was integrated in both conception and practice. Various elements are usually separated for the convenience of scholarship. But it is detrimental to our efforts at understanding Africa if we confuse this academic device with Africa's conception of its own reality.

African tradition did not merely raise the natural environment to critical importance. This tradition specified how humans must interact with this environment and raised this ecological relationship to ritual importance. It also specified the ultimate objective of human relation to the environment to be the nurturing of both humanity and the environment, as well as the preservation of the latter and ensuring that it is preserved and passed on in good condition to succeeding generations.

The libation ritual is widespread in Africa. It represents the ritualisation of principles of African deep thought or philosophy in action. Specifically, it shows how to conduct human relations with the environment and illustrates the Divine Cosmic Order or *Maat* and the oneness of the cosmos in which 'everything is everything' – as is repeatedly affirmed in the conscious African community abroad.

Certain aspects of African culture and social history reveal even more about the traditional African concept and practice of environmentalism. The

maintenance of this order, that is, all these relationships, has always been achieved by a periodic show of this respect – or by making appeasement and restoration when something has gone wrong. And things go wrong usually through some inappropriate action by humans. Respect and appeasement of the divine forces were both achieved through making offerings, by sacrifice and by pouring libation.³² In this ancient but not antique ritual which is still practised throughout the living African world, permission must be sought, and appropriate assurances including offerings of both verbal and material nature given, whenever the proper relationship with the earth is unbalanced, infringed or threatened. Hence special measures are undertaken to redeem the errant ones and repair and restore the fractured or endangered relationship with the earth. This is the ultimate environmental meaning of libation. References in the libation statement to specific features of the environment, such as rivers, mountains and forests, emphasise the sacred nature of the environment and the human desire to live in harmony with it as specified by the African tradition. During libation permission is asked of Mother Earth to bury the dead. The urge to preserve the environment is also implicit in the way African tradition regarded these specific features of the environment. Here again, the ritual of libation illustrates environmentalism as innate to daily life in Africa. The rule is that before a single tree is cut down, or any life form is threatened, damaged or destroyed, including consumption during the normal course of human survival, the proper forms of thanks and appeasement to the appropriate divinity must be enacted. Forgiveness for any infraction of nature is sought whenever necessary.

African tradition therefore recognises the fundamental importance of the elements of the natural environment, considers them to be interrelated and therefore considers the environment as a living, integrated whole which must be preserved. It does more. From at least the time of the ancient Egyptians this tradition inculcated a deep sense of moral obligation to the future, which they recognised to be both the upcoming generations and the environment they will inhabit.³³

On this basis alone it is possible to argue that the people of Kemet constructed a social environment in which certain values, attitudes and ritual behaviours were inculcated, and that these guaranteed the protection of the environment. But the people of Kemet adumbrated this principle of environmentalism at every level of their society in the following ways:

- a. Identifying and recognising the fundamentals of the environment and guaranteeing their protection by elevating them to the realm of divinity, the highest order of beings and things in the universe.
- b. Devising a moral code which reinforced the fundamental importance of the environment. For example, abstentions from eating or

interacting with various animals and plants were widely practised. This cultural behaviour has been continued in later Africa, as is referenced below.

- c. Devising a legal code which buttressed the above, for example in the prohibition against impeding running water in ancient Egypt.³⁴

It is therefore inescapable that the way in which the people of Kemet conceived the earth and other natural elements, as well as the fact that they devised values, attitudes and patterned behaviours (rituals of libation) that are thoroughly consistent with this primary importance of nature, argue the central importance of what is today termed environmentalism in their society. This very conclusion is sustainable for subsequent African societies.

The concept of *Maat* means acting consistently to ensure the optimum existence of the proper balance and relationships within each human individual and group, among all humanity, as well as between humanity and the other categories of beings and things in the cosmos. The preservation of these relationships in good order is a fundamental principle of the cosmic order. It includes proper human and environmental relations, which are achieved through the affirmation and maintenance of these prescribed relations with beings and things in eternity by following the rules of daily life, including the prohibitions mentioned above, some of which are discussed below. Maintaining this order also means making ritual offerings to the divinities. These rituals amount to the periodic reaffirmation of these relationships through conciliatory words and gestures, the performance of these rituals if and when these relationships are threatened, or acting to repair or restore them when they are impaired or severed. Libation may therefore be viewed, somewhat anthropocentrically and therefore somewhat subjectively, as a way for humans to make contact with the spirit world in order to fulfil the human need for order and balance (for *Maat*), both within ourselves individually and collectively and within our world as a whole.

MAINTAINING *MAAT*: TOTEMIC NAMES AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The African awareness of the environment and its importance is reflected in sensitivity to various aspects of the environment and the ways in which humanity interacts with them. One area of African culture which articulates this awareness and importance of the environment is names. From the earliest known details of African culture as represented in the writings of the people of Kemet to contemporary times, African names have reflected and preserved the ideal African relationship with the environment.

This ideal may be identified both in the value Africans placed upon certain qualities which they thought were represented by animals and things in the environment and in their relationship with specific animals and things within the environment.

The following examples are merely indicative of an extensive system of names which illustrate the presence of this ideal and its relationship to the practice of environmentalism in Africa. Totemic names are to be found throughout the African world from the earliest of times, where families and clans are named for a representative ancestor, animal, plant or object. This principle, which is known as totemism in some literatures, is also the basis of prohibitions against killing or eating or interacting in certain other ways, usually specified, with one's representative animal or thing. The prohibition against the specific interaction is referred to as a taboo. This system of representative animals or things and the prohibitions against certain kinds of interaction with them spread a comprehensive form of species protection and preservation, without guns and fences, from community to community throughout Africa.

Thus what is known today as environmentalism is a cultural principle of Africa that was lived daily in prohibitions against killing or eating the representative animal of one's family, clan or community, against cutting down trees needlessly or indeed against the wanton destruction of any life form. Additionally, there was also the compulsion to propitiate the relevant divinity through the ritual of libation whenever nature was to be interfered with in any way, for example, if a single tree were to be cut down.

Totemic/Clan Names therefore indicate totems as another category which gives witness to the scientific relationship of Africans to the environment. The same may be said of names which indicate virtues or qualities held in great esteem by the African people. The Totems as expressions of the African relationship to the environment; they map the system of abstinences in Africa and through this also indicate the ramifications of the system of species protection and preservation distributed throughout the land. Everything in the environment has a spirit and essences or qualities, for everything is alive and belongs to a living, organic whole called Mother Earth.

One way of promoting species preservation is through species conservation. This principle is integrated into the African 'naming system'. If the Totem of a certain clan or tribe was the buffalo then those people did not kill or eat that animal. Therefore the animal survived in their area, for that area was a preservation zone for the buffalo. A careful study of totems and their distribution throughout Africa, taking into account such factors as demography and the sharing of habitats, will show more clearly the vast complexities of this one principle of environmental protection, in which was

implied human protection. So an African totemic name is much more than a name. It is a constant recognition of the way in which African culture dictated the every-day practice of environmentalism in the living reality of the people. A glance at totems will show that our ancestors considered qualities or essences to exist in both people and animals and in both animate and inanimate matter, in both *kintu* and *muntu*. Our ancestors did not therefore make any deep differentiation between us as human beings and other animals, nor between animals and things, for they recognised all to ultimately exist in a single entity, or ecosystem or environment: the earth. Nor did they conceive the relationship to be contradictory. This indicates a deep familiarity with the environment, great foresight and a scientific response to the problem of humanity's relationship with the environment, a response which was subtly integrated into all levels of the social and cultural system, and so touched the daily existence of all. The possession of the totemic system, like the practice of libation, therefore shows that Africans have articulated the principle of environmentalism in their daily lives from uncounted generations ago.

The name *Sobekhotep* demonstrates how names in the ancient African state of Kemet reflect the environment and ultimately articulate the relationship of the people with it. The Nile River has always had a very predominant influence upon the lives of the people of Kemet. During the Twelfth and Thirteenth Dynasties the Nile behaved erratically. As far as can be ascertained, in most years of this period it flooded way above the average. The effects must have been calamitous: dykes and causeways breached, villages washed away, palaces, temples and tombs flooded. Worse, if the flood lasted as long as it did in usual years then it would take longer for the water to subside, farmers would not be able to prepare fields for planting and famine would eventually become a real possibility. Normal habitation was severely threatened. This seems to be told in the strained and anxious face of each of the pharaohs of this time whose likeness has been handed down in statues to posterity.

It is during this time that *Sbk*: *Sobek* and its variants, the name of the crocodile god, became a part of the names of pharaohs and *Sobek* becomes the Ancient Egyptian equivalent of the patron saint of the Thirteenth Dynasty. The cult of Sobek had always been closely interwoven in the lives of many dwellers by the Nile, particularly in the Fayum, for Sobek was fundamentally a god (patron saint) of the water and of vegetation. Now the pharaohs evidently elevated Sobek to greater importance, most probably as a way of pleasing him and so ending the disastrous floods. It is of the greatest significance that this disaster first threatened during the reign of Amonemhet III ('Amon is at the head') and that his daughter's name incorporates Sobek. Hence she is Sobekkare Sobekneferure ('Sobek is

the spirit of Ra'; 'Sobek is the perfect form of Ra'), the last known ruler of the Twelfth Dynasty. This story continues into the succeeding Thirteenth Dynasty, which was even more threatened by the floods. Here the name Sobek predominates as a family name among the rulers of Kemet, with at least six pharaohs named Sobekhotep ('Sobek is satisfied').³⁵ In the end he was. The floods subsided and the normal predictability returned to a land where the elements had always been relatively predictable.

The etymology of the name Sobek shows a clear confirmation with the form and function of names from Kemet and other aspects of the African world. Further, the specific conditions in which it became a popular family name of potentates in Kemet illustrate another law of African names, that African names reflect the environment and articulate concepts which arise from human interaction with it. This particular example shows how ideas comprising environmentalism were articulated in the daily life of Kemet and should not elude us. First, the importance of the crocodile was indicated by the fact that the animal was raised to the level of a divinity. This meant that the people of the area most probably did not eat that animal, which therefore became a protected species. Secondly, the great importance of the animal is also represented in the fact that the pharaohs incorporated it into their names. Again, this must have meant that the animal became the representative animal of the royal family, which in turn meant that they did not eat it and it was therefore under royal protection. This is a specific contribution to the system of animal and plant protection and preservation in Kemet.

In normal circumstances a decision to hunt crocodiles would have necessitated the normal promises and entreaties to the relevant spirits of Mother Earth that one would not kill more than was necessary. However, once the animal was elevated to the status of divinity it is likely that it was no longer hunted. But it is certain that libations would have been poured and other offerings made to this divinity to ensure good floods. These are the implications of the name Sobekhotep.

NAMES WHICH INDICATE VIRTUES OR QUALITIES

A characteristic of this category of names is that many were taken from objects in the environment; from animals, plants and 'things' which symbolised particular qualities for the people of Kemet. Examples include Ebony, from a tree in inner Africa, Shusan, Susan, 'lotus flower'; and Narmer, literally 'striking catfish' but perhaps 'the assertive survivor'. It is the same in other aspects of the African experience right down to the present day. Examples are many, including Apata (Yoruba) for rock and Simba

(Kiswahili) for lion. These names indicate that Africans have traditionally had a very close relationship with the environment, and they also indicate the admiration and respect they always had for qualities they recognised in animals, plants and inanimate objects that are part of the environment.

CONCLUSION

We may be certain that what we have uncovered is an environmental complex: a set of related values, beliefs and practices that is represented at all levels of African culture, is founded upon the recognition of the earth as so important that it is sacred, the basis of an interrelated environment that must be inherited, protected and passed on in good condition to those who come after. This way of life has been elaborated in African tradition for thousands of years in cosmology and cosmogony, rituals, names and other beliefs and practices which instruct patterned ways of interacting with the environment. Today this complex is termed environmentalism.

It is essential to recognise the tension between people and environment, and even the alienation and separation of people from environment, which for some may be implicit in any conceptualisation of existence. In these times when there is so much increasing emphasis upon saving the environment from the destruction caused by the methodology of Europeans, which is often described as 'modern', 'advanced' and even 'scientific', it may be instructive to note that Africans did not encounter this problem because it did not arise in the African practice. Africans evolved a holistic approach which recognised people as part of the environment, worthy of equal consideration along with trees, rivers and streams and Mother Earth as a generality. The Afro-centric approach includes humans in our understanding of the environment; the Euro-centric approach begins with the separation of humans from the environment and excludes and alienates people from the environment. African tradition does not demand that humanity conquer the environment; it instructs that humans live in harmony with the environment of which they are a part.

How did our ancestors work out and implement this system down to the lowest level of society long before the advent of Euro-centricism and its consequences of the very destruction of this system and endangering of the environment, including humanity, that it is designed to protect and perpetuate? We may not know fully the answer but it is obvious that the answer to the problems of environmental destruction, powerlessness, exploitation, cultural genocide and lack of sustainable development in Africa lies in the direction of repairing ourselves, of becoming African again, returning to our culture and our identity without fear or compromise. This

must be accomplished, not in some unimaginative romanticising way but in a creative response to the loss of knowledge, skill and technique associated with the Great Holocaust. It is instructed by the pressing necessity to reconnect, to rejoin the vast scientific process initiated by our ancestors of conceptualising reality, of knowing it and applying that knowledge back to reality in culturally distinctive ways. These are ways which guarantee both the increasing maximisation of our capacity to satisfy human needs and the preservation of the earth in a system which demonstrates that there is no insoluble contradiction between 'development' and 'conservation', between the human world and the natural world, since our tradition recognises humanity as a part of the natural world, between the fundamental principles which dictate our existence and the necessity to elaborate them in daily life at all levels.

The traditional African world view articulates a holistic vision and practice of life, one which places emphasis on harmony with the universe. These relations are recognised to be so important that they are represented in every level of African society – raised to the level of divinity and inculcated to the daily mundane existence of anyone who would cut down a single tree, or hunt a humble animal. The current global preoccupation with environmentalism is therefore a validation of African tradition.

Placing humanity first cannot avoid the centuries of genocide, cultural and otherwise, against humanity in black skin. Nor can Africans avoid our own responsibility to research, rescue and restore our own traditions, since liberation is something only a people can do for themselves. These common inheritances, and this common history, are aspects of the only secure basis for African unity and sustainable development of our continent for the benefit of its people.

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- 2 Ibid, Chapter 10, pp.56–80.
- 3 See Note 1 above.
- 4 Nehusi, K., 2011a. 'Introduction: The Strategic intellectual importance of Kemet' In Karen Exell, (ed.), *Egypt in its African Context*, pp.12–13. Oxford: Archaeopress.
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 - 8 Hunter Adams' definition of this term is instructive: 'The concept of *Nun* (incessant oscillation or fluctuation) also embodies notions of darkness (*Kuk*), formlessness (*Huh*), inscrutability or hiddenness (*Amon*), and implicitly boundlessness and timelessness (*neheh* or *djer*). *Nun* attempts to describe the 'that which is not yet', the pre-creation state where even conflict had no existence.' See Adams, H., 'Ma'at: Returning to Virtue – Returning to Self'.
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Decolonial Epistemic Perspective and Pan-African Unity in the 21st Century

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INTRODUCTION

The main challenge facing the ex-colonised peoples is how to transcend the abyssal line which divided human population into zones of beings and zones of non-beings.¹ Race was used as a central organising principle in this bifurcation process. The Euro-American world became the zone of beings, whereas areas outside this zone became an abode of non-beings. Non-beings were excluded from protection of law and ethics. Non-beings were available for enslavement, colonisation, and other abuses. This is why African struggles must be understood as premised on how to transcend the zone of non-beings. This reality also explains why African people have been at cross roads since the time of colonial encounters in the 15th Century. Crossing the global imperial designs of domination, exploitation, and racism, has proven to be a lifetime struggle for Africans.

The essence of the African struggles has been to forge new categories of thought, construction of new subjectivities and creation of new modes of being and becoming.² Such a vast struggle cannot be fought in one site (political theatre only) but in various domains and realms simultaneously, simply because global imperial designs and colonial matrices of power have permeated and infiltrated every institution and every social, political, economic, spiritual, aesthetic, and cognitive arena of African life. At one major level, the African struggles involve challenging Euro-American epistemology which Frantz Fanon saw as involving leaving 'this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their streets, in all the corners of the globe ... So, my brothers, how is it that we do not understand that we have better things to do than to follow that same Europe? Come, then, comrades, the European game has finally ended; we must find something different.'³

Conceptually and theoretically, this chapter is about epistemology as mode of knowing that liberates, and pan-Africanism as a discursive terrain of struggle for a new humanism. At the epistemological level, it focuses on understanding how Euro-American epistemology which inaugurated rationality, progress, development, freedom and equality in the Western world, unleashed imperial technologies of subjectivation and enabled mercantilism, slavery, imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and apartheid on Africa as dark side of modernity.⁴

This reality has provoked the rise of the decolonial epistemic perspective as a counter-hegemonic intellectual thought questioning and challenging Euro-American epistemology's pretensions and claims to be the only mode of knowing that is neutral, objective, disembodied, truthful and universal.⁵ Decolonial epistemic perspective not only reveals epistemicides committed by the darker and underside of Euro-American epistemology, but also operates as an indispensable liberatory epistemology.

At the socio-political level, the chapter focuses on pan-Africanism as counter force to the hegemonic global imperial designs in place since conquest. As noted by Boaventura de Sousa Santos the global imperial designs in place since the 15th Century have 'many facets and assumed many names: discoveries, colonialism, evangelisation, slavery, imperialism, development and underdevelopment, modernisation and finally, globalisation.'⁶ In concrete terms, this chapter examines three important issues that impinge on the pan-African agenda today. First is what is described as global imperial designs that unfolded in the 15th Century. The point of departure is that modernity defined as a process of submitting the entire world to the absolute control of Euro-American human reason, human knowledge, and human-made institutions assumed two contrasting trajectories as it expanded out of Europe into other parts of the world.⁷ One trajectory was positive and enabled Europe and America to develop very fast. The other became negative and impeded Africa's development and unity. This description of modernity is amplified by Santiago Castro-Gomez:

We can thus state that modernity is a project of governing the social world which emerged in the sixteenth century. Its constructions of power/knowledge are anchored in a double coloniality: one directed *inward* by European and American nation-states in their effort to establish homogenous identities through politics of subjectification, the other directed *outward* by the hegemonic powers of the modern/colonial world-system in their attempt to ensure the flow of primary materials from the periphery to the centre. Both processes are part of the same structural dynamic (emphasis in the original text).⁸

The second task of this chapter is to introduce decolonial epistemic perspective as critical theory aimed at revealing epistemicides and injustices created by the operations of global imperial designs and colonial matrices of power. The decolonial epistemic perspective is by no means a singular body of thought as it houses evolving nationalist and pan-African thinking of various forms informed by antinomies of black liberation thought and various strategies of resisting global imperial designs. But its decolonial epistemic perspective is presented as a survival kit for pan-Africanists because it confronts, critiques, and opens up the invisible global imperial designs embodied by modernity and the colonial matrices of power that sustain and reproduces asymmetrical global power relations. It exposes how through Euro-American epistemology the West has been able to displace, if not kill, any initiative from Africa that questioned the unnaturalness of current global power imbalances. Decolonial epistemic perspective contributes towards imaginations of a different future where Africa would not be a problem to be solved but a voice to be heard and Africans would take charge of their destiny.

The third task is to revisit the 1960's 'Kwame Nkrumah-Julius Nyerere curse' that raised issues of incompatibility between nationalism and pan-Africanism at one level and complementarities on the other. It is important to visit these debates not only because they fragmented early post-colonial leaders into Casablanca, Monrovia and Brazzaville camps but also due to the fact that it helps today's pan-Africanists to appreciate some of the nuanced and subtle issues that continue to hinder the full realisation of pan-African unity. While previous scholars read and interpreted the Nkrumah-Nyerere debates over the methodologies to be used to realise pan-African unity as a case of radicals versus moderates, idealists versus pragmatists, and 'immediatists' versus 'gradualists,' they missed the crucial role of global imperial designs in causing all this confusion.

Revelation of how imperial global designs enabled the decolonisation of Africa to proceed without serious questioning of the Westphalian nation-state template that in turn enabled territorial nationalism that was antagonistic to pan-Africanism is crucial. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja argued that African founding fathers had three choices: build post-colonial African states on basis of pre-colonial 'ethnic nation' whose development was arrested by colonialism; colonially-created 'territorial nation' that served global imperial designs; and 'pan-African nation' that had to be created from scratch.⁹ Leaders like Chief Obafemi Awolowo defended the idea of building post-colonial Africa into multi-national states based on a federation of pre-colonial ethnic nations.¹⁰ Nkrumah advocated a pan-African entity and proposed the creation of a United States of Africa.¹¹ But these two options had no strong social forces to advance them and the majority

of petit-bourgeoisie reneged on pan-Africanism and embraced the colonial template for the post-colonial state.¹²

The analysis cannot be complete without looking at the current state of the pan-African agenda where it is taking long to transcend the Nkrumah-Nyerere curse of the 1960's. It is a curse because it diluted and dampened the spirit of pan-Africanism and opened the gates for rehabilitation of imperialism in the 1970's. Africa is today finding it very difficult to re-emerge from the snares of neo-colonialism and neo-liberalism. But the ongoing crisis exposing and revealing the limits of neo-liberal capitalist system is giving some space for Africa to intensify the institutionalisation of pan-Africanism as a way of survival within a world dominated by phenomenology of uncertainty. What is discomfoting though is that this crisis seems to be pushing the Euro-American world to resort to military means and military invasions of resource-endowed countries of the global South as part of its strategy to survive the capitalist financial crisis.

GLOBAL IMPERIAL DESIGNS AND TECHNOLOGIES OF SUBJECTIVATION

Global imperial designs refer to the core technologies of modernity that underpinned its expansion into the non-Western parts of the world from the 15th Century onwards. Race and Euro-American epistemology particularly its techno-scientific knowledge claims were used to classify and name the world according to Euro-Christian-Modernist imaginary. African peoples and others whose cultures and ways of life were not informed by imperatives of Euro-Christian modernity, were deemed to be barbarians – a people who did not belong to history and had no history. Following Christian cosmology the cartography of the world into continents had to be followed by the assigning of each part to one of the three sons of Noah: Europe to Japheth; Africa to Ham; and Asia to Shem in some of the early maps like that from Isidore.¹³ Besides this mapping of the global geo-cultural identities into continents, a conception of humanity according race resulted into its differentiation into inferior and superior, irrational and rational, primitive and civilised, traditional and modern.¹⁴

The idea of race was deployed to justify such inimical processes as the slave trade, mercantilism, imperialism, colonialism, apartheid as well as authoritarian and brutal colonial governance systems and styles. This constituted the ugly and dangerous face of modernity and these inimical processes were unleashed on the non-Western world. Race was also used as fundamental criteria for distribution of world population into ranks, places, and roles. Boaventura de Sousa Santos depicted the bifurcated face of modernity as informed by 'abyssal thinking'.¹⁵

This thinking was constituted by 'visible and invisible distinctions, the invisible ones being the foundation of the visible ones'.¹⁶ Abyssal thinking's invisible distinctions culminated in the division of global social reality into two realms – the realm of 'this side of the line' (Euro-America world) and realm of 'the other side of the line' (Africa and other non-Western parts of the world). Ramon Grosfoguel clearly expressed how the logic of superiority-inferiority that informed 'this side' and the 'other side' informed a particular rendition of human global human experience:

We went from the sixteenth century characterisation of 'people without writing' to the eighteenth and nineteenth century characterisation of 'people without history,' to the twentieth century characterisation of 'people without development' and more recently, to the early twenty-first century of 'people without democracy'.¹⁷

This was a presentation of how the human trajectories on the 'other side' (the colonial zone) was assumed to have unfolded since the dawn of modernity. On 'this side of the line' (Euro-American zone), the trajectory was rendered this way:

We went from the sixteenth century 'rights of people' [...], to the eighteenth century 'rights of man' [...] and to the late 20th Century 'human rights'.¹⁸

The 'other side of the line' was imagined as incomprehensible and impossible to coexist harmoniously with 'this side of the line'. In short, the two sides, were produced as characterised by 'impossibility of the co-presence'.¹⁹ This conception and division of the world into this side and that side authorised those from 'this side' to assume superiority and to arrogate order, civility, law and rights, to themselves, while denying the existence of the same on the 'other side'. Violence, lawlessness, primitivism, superstition, strange beliefs, and retrogressive knowledges distinguished the 'other side'.²⁰ This became the colonial zone where canons of ethics, law, rights, civility and others forms that underpinned human comfort in the Euro-American world were suspended, and war, violence, and appropriation constituted colonial governance.²¹

Global imperial designs are shorthand for how 'it was from the West that the rest of the world is described, conceptualised, and ranked: that is, modernity is the self-description of Europe's role in history rather than an ontological historical process'.²² Simply put, global imperial designs are those processes that drove the making of a Capitalist, Patriarchal, Euro-American-centric, Christian-centric, Imperial, Colonial, Hetero-normative and Modern-world system.²³ A catalogue of identifiable historical processes

that produced the current unequal world order includes the European Renaissance and Christianisation in the 15/16th Century.

This was followed by the Enlightenment, Mercantilism and Maritime Trade in the 16/17th Century. Industrialism, Imperialism and Colonialism in the 18/19th Century commenced. This was followed by Modernisation and Developmentalism in the mid-20th Century. Neo-colonialism, Neo-liberalism, Washington Consensus and the Structural Adjustment Programmes dominated in the late-20th Century. Today it is the US super-power imperialism and NATO driven imperial designs hidden behind the mantras of humanitarian interventions, fighting global terrorism; and discourses of exporting democracy and human rights dominate at the beginning of the 21st Century.²⁴

The key problem in Africa is that there is an illusion of freedom and myth of decolonisation. There can be no freedom and decolonisation as long as global imperial designs in place since conquest still shape and inform the character of the modern world system. This point is well captured by Grosfoguel who argues that:

One of the most powerful myths of twentieth century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonisation of the world. This led to the myth of a 'post-colonial' world. The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonisation of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the same 'colonial power matrix'. With juridical-political decolonisation we moved from a period of 'global colonialism' to the current period of 'global coloniality'.²⁵

This critique of decolonisation is in no way meant to down play the sacrifices they made towards achievement of decolonisation. While the decolonisation period as articulated by Paul Tiyambe Zeleza as constituting the 'proudest moment' of African nationalism, Africans must not therefore relax and think that the struggle is over.²⁶ The post-colonial states have remained operating like colonial states, unleashing violence on African people. African people are still often treated like subjects rather than citizens by their leaders. Juridical freedom had not been translated into popular freedom. Territorial nationalism informed by colonial matrices of power is proving difficult to convert into pan-Africanism and pan-African unity.²⁷

Ngugi wa Thiong'o not only identified that colonisation of the mind remained the most successful realm where colonialism deeply inscribed itself, but also that colonialism is a vast process requiring decolonisation to assume the character of an equally vast process to respond and fight colonialism in its multi-faceted forms.²⁸ Decolonisation has to assume global

proportions for it to deal effectively with global imperial designs. Ngugi wa Thiong'o emphasised that imperialism is not just a slogan 'It is real, it is palpable in content and form and in its methods and effects ... Imperialism is total: it has economic, political, military, cultural and psychological consequences for people of the world. It could even lead to holocaust.'²⁹

This is necessary because there are several forms of colonisation such as colonisation of consciousness, colonisation of sexuality; colonisation of gender, colonisation of language, colonisation of aesthetics, colonisation of epistemology and other forms.³⁰ Decolonisation must respond to all these forms of colonisation if Africa is to be free. Decolonial epistemic perspective is therefore a necessary survival kit for continuation of the decolonisation project in the present age of global coloniality that is informed and underpinned by invisible colonial matrices of power. Decolonisation process of the 21st Century must thrust out to deal with the problem of predatory post-colonial states and authoritarian leaders in Africa at one level and at another pushing for democratisation of global power structures.

Today global imperial designs have assumed the form of neo-liberal imperialism with latent discourses of re-colonisation of Africa. At the centre of this neo-imperialism is the idea that such 'beneficent nations' like Britain, American and others should recruit local African leaders and guide them to embrace free markets, rule of law, and liberal democracy to avoid the problem of them affecting the smooth functioning of the global economic system.³¹ These ideas were expressed openly by Robert Cooper, a British diplomat, former adviser to Prime Minister Tony Blair, current adviser EU Foreign Affairs Chief Baroness Catherine Ashton and strong advocate in new neo-liberal imperialism. This is how he put it:

What is needed then is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values. We already discern its outline: an imperialism which, like all imperialism, aims to bring order and organisation but which rests today on voluntary principle.³²

Hillary Clinton the US secretary of state also emphasised the preference for use of 'smart power' that include deployment of democracy and human rights to disguise geo-strategic goals.³³ In short, democracy and human rights have been appropriated into levers of global imperial designs, leading some Africans to despise them as part of cultural imperialism. The attempt by the Western powers to use a combination of war and ideology to continue dominating the world is also captured in Tony Blair's 1999 Chicago speech that set out the premises of liberal imperial interventions as part of British foreign policy. With reference to terrorism, Blair said the world was facing an unconventional kind of war which could not be won

in a conventional way. He emphasised the need to win the battle of values – the battle for hearts and minds. This is how he put it:

To succeed, we have to win the battle of values, as much as the battle of arms. We have to show that these are not Western, still less American or Anglo-Saxon values, but values in the common ownership, of humanity, universal values that should be the right of the global citizen.⁵⁴

Blair continued to explain that beyond those like terrorists who according to him ‘truly hate us,’ there are many who were skeptical of the Euro-American world’s ‘motives, our good faith, our even-handedness’, but could be persuaded.⁵⁵ What both Blair and Clinton were simply saying is that Euro-American strategic interests must be articulated in terms of struggles for justice, fairness, human rights, democracy, security and prosperity. But John Pilger saw through this conspiracy, when he said:

‘Democracy’ is now the free market – a concept bereft of freedom. ‘Reform’ is now the denial of reform. ‘Economics’ is the relegation of most human endeavour to material value, a bottom line. Alternative models that relate to the needs of the majority of humanity end up in the memory hole. And ‘governance’ – so fashionable these days, means an economic approval in Washington, Brussels and Davos. ‘Foreign policy’ is service to dominant power. Conquest is ‘humanitarian intervention.’ Invasion is ‘nation-building.’ Every day, we breathe the hot air of these pseudo ideas with their pseudo truths and pseudo experts.⁵⁶

These are the invisible realities that the decolonial epistemic perspective seeks to make visible as part of equipping pan-Africanists with knowledge to deal with global issues.

DECOLONIAL EPISTEMIC PERSPECTIVE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR PAN-AFRICAN UNITY

The decolonial epistemic perspective stands on four concepts. The first concept is coloniality of power which is a description of how the current modern global Euro-American-centric and capitalist structure was organised, configured, and articulated according to imperatives of global imperial designs. Coloniality of power unpacks coloniality as that broad but specific and constitutive element of global model of capitalist order that continues to underpin global coloniality after the end of direct colonialism.³⁷

Coloniality of power describes modern global power as a network of relations of exploitation, domination, and control of labour, nature and its productive resources, gender and its reproductive species, subjectivity and its material and inter-subjective products, as well as knowledge and authority.³⁸ At the centre of coloniality of power are technologies of domination, exploitation and violence known as 'colonial matrix of power' that affects all dimensions of social existence ranging from sexuality, authority, subjectivity, politics, economy, spirituality, language and race.³⁹ As articulated by Castro-Gomez:

The concept of the 'coloniality of power' broadens and corrects the Foucauldian concept of 'disciplinary power' by demonstrating that the panoptic constructions erected by the modern state are inscribed in a wider structure of power/knowledge. This global structure is configured by the colonial relation between centre and periphery that is at the root of European expansion.⁴⁰

The importance of the concept of coloniality of power for present-day pan-Africanists is that it enables them to gain a deeper understanding of two crucial realities. The first is that achievement of political independence and the withdrawal of direct colonial administrations, while having enabled post-colonial nation-states to emerge and to exercise a modicum of juridical freedom, African people still live under global Euro-American domination and exploitation. Coloniality of power, therefore, allows pan-Africanists to understand the continuity of colonial forms of domination after the end of direct colonial administrations.⁴¹ The second is that it enables pan-Africanists to notice the strong hierarchies of present modern global power structure, whereby at the apex are the USA and NATO partners and at the subaltern bottom is Africa and its people. This structure can only be changed if Africans fully embrace pan-Africanism not only as an ideological shield but also as enabler of economic freedom.

The second concept on which decolonial epistemic perspective is built is called coloniality of knowledge. It is intimately tied to coloniality of power as power and knowledge operate as inseparable twins within global imperial designs. But coloniality of knowledge speaks directly to epistemological colonisation whereby Euro-American techno-scientific knowledge managed to displace, discipline, destroy alternative knowledges it found outside the Euro-American zones (colonies) while at the same time appropriating what it considered useful to global imperial designs. Combinations of natural and human sciences were used to back up racist theories and to rank and organise people according to binaries of inferior-superior relations.⁴² Santos elaborated that in the name of introducing modern science, alternative knowledges and sciences found in Africa were destroyed and

the social groups that relied on these systems to support their own autonomous path of development have been humiliated as epistemicides were being committed.⁴³

Schools, churches, and universities, contributed towards the invention of the 'other' as they operated as epistemic sites as well as technologies of subjectivation that naturalised Euro-American epistemology as universal. On the other hand, the same institutions became nurseries for the production of African educated elites and African nationalists who exposed hypocrisy and double standards hidden within global imperial designs.⁴⁴ While not totally opposed to Euro-American values, the African educated elites and nationalists railed against exploitative and repressive aspects contained within Western order of knowledge. But what ensued as a darkest aspect of coloniality of knowledge were 'epistemicides' which manifested in various ways: first is academic mimetism/intellectual mimicry dominant in African scholarship; destruction of indigenous African knowledges; and a plethora of crises plaguing universities in Africa (crisis of identity, crisis of legitimacy, crisis of relevance, crisis of authority, epistemological crisis, crisis of student politics and crisis of historical mission).⁴⁵

Coloniality of knowledge is very important because it speaks directly to the dilemmas of invasion of imagination and colonisation of the minds of Africans, which constitutes epistemological colonisation. This colonisation of consciousness and modes of knowing is pervasive in discourses of development, technologies of organising people into nations and states, as well as imaginations of the future.

How coloniality of knowledge unfolded is well articulated by Anibal Quijano who argued that in the beginning colonialism assumed the form of systematic repression of the specific beliefs, ideas, images, symbols, and knowledges that were considered not useful for the global imperial designs and the colonial process.⁴⁶ This same process involved appropriating from the colonised their knowledge, especially in mining and agriculture as well as their products and work.

But the important form of colonial invasion and repression is that which targeted modes of knowing, of producing knowledge, and of producing perspectives. This was followed by imposition of the coloniser's own Euro-American epistemology, own patterns of expression, and their own beliefs and images.⁴⁷ This analysis speaks to the core issues of colonisation of imaginations and minds of Africans that needs the decolonial epistemic perspective as a therapy.

The third pillar of the decolonial epistemic perspective is coloniality of being. It directly addresses the physical and psychological predicament of colonised beings. It enables appreciation of the impact of colonial technologies of subjectivation on the life, body, and mind of the colonised people.

It speaks to the lived experiences of colonised which can be described as phenomenology of subjectivity.⁴⁸ Drawing on scientific racism thinking, colonialists doubted the very humanity of colonised people and doubted whether they had souls. This racist thinking informed politics of 'othering' of the colonised people which culminated in what Nelson Maldonado-Torres termed 'imperial Manichean misanthropic skepticism' as a form of 'questioning the very humanity of colonised peoples'.⁴⁹ The being of the colonised became that of a 'racialised self' open to all sorts of abuses and living a hellish life.

Slavery, war, conquest, violence, rape and even genocide constituted the way the colonial conquerors related to the colonised. Ethics that governed human relations in Europe were suspended in Africa where Africans were designated as 'those outside the human ocumene'.⁵⁰ Death itself was never an extraordinary affair among the colonised and those racialised into non-beings, but a constitutive feature of their life. In short, the concept of coloniality of being is very useful because it links with the Fanonian concept of 'the wretched of the earth' and the damned – the idea of black people as condemned people whose being amounts to 'nothingness'. Maldonado-Torres wrote that: *'Indeed, coloniality of Being primarily refers to normalisation of the extraordinary events that take place in war'* (emphasis in the original).⁵¹ The list of 'extraordinary events' that have been normalised in Africa is endless, ranging from hunger, epidemics like HIV/AIDS, living in shacks (*imikhukhu* in South Africa and other parts of Africa), homelessness, political violence, communal violence, rape, to being killed by lightning every rainy season.

The last concept is that of coloniality of nature. This one is not yet fully developed but it seeks to address the pertinent issues of ecology, environment and climate. How did modernity and the capitalist system impact on human relations with environment? What can be gained by pan-Africanists if they thought about ecological and environmental problems from 'colonial difference' as a privileged epistemological and political space for social transformation rather than merely imbibing discourses from the global metropolitan centres? What emerges from such an approach is how modernity and its epistemology suppressed non-Euro-American thought, histories and forms of knowledge that had enabled Africans to coexist harmoniously with the environment. The underside of modernity that includes mercantilism, the slave trade, imperialism, colonialism and apartheid, had a debilitating impact on ecology and environment.⁵²

Modernity's push for subordination of body and nature to mind opened floodgates to reduction of the products of nature to products of labour as well as opening nature to human-driven markets. The result has been an epistemic rift between local people's episteme and modern episteme on

understanding of nature and its preservation.⁵³ Nature, body, mind and spirit's relationship was ruptured with serious consequences for the environment, and what is needed is to restore the linkages. This can only be done if African peoples' own understanding and knowledge of environment is taken seriously in the context of the current threat of environmental catastrophe rooted in Euro-American ways of exploiting nature informed by the exploitative capitalist thought.

The decolonial epistemic perspective carries the totality of the above four concepts in its agenda to critique Euro-American epistemology that is currently in crisis. It inaugurates thinking that calls for opening up of plurality of epistemologies to enrich human experience from different vantage points. The decolonial epistemic perspective is a critical social theory encompassing the totality of critical thoughts emerging from the ex-colonised world informed by imperatives of resisting colonialism and imperialism in their multi-faceted forms. It contributes towards imagination and construction of a different future.⁵⁴

Like all critical social theories of society, decolonial epistemic perspective aims to critique and possibly overcome the epistemological injustices put in place by imperial global designs, and questions and challenges the long standing claims of Euro-American epistemology to be universal, neutral, objective, disembodied, as well as being the only mode of knowing.⁵⁵ It is 'an-other thought' that seeks to inaugurate 'an-other logic,' 'an-other language,' and 'an-other thinking' that has the potential to liberate ex-colonised people's minds from Euro-American hegemony.⁵⁶

What distinguishes the decolonial epistemic perspective is its clear African and global South locus of enunciation. A locus of enunciation is a reference to a particular location from which human beings speak within in the power structures. Its importance lies in capturing that there is absolutely nobody who is able to escape the class, sexual, gender, spiritual, linguistic, geographical and racial hierarchies fashioned by the modern world system.⁵⁷ Unlike the Euro-American epistemology, it is not fundamentalist in its outlook as it concedes space for other knowledges emerging from different geo-historical sites and different human experiences. It does not even attempt to claim universality, neutrality, and singular truthfulness. It is decidedly and deliberately situated in Africa and privileges decolonial thinking as a form of liberation.

Decolonial epistemic perspective helps in unveiling epistemic silences, conspiracies, and epistemic violence hidden within Euro-American epistemology and to affirm the epistemic rights of the African people that enable them to transcend global imperial designs. Unless coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge, coloniality of being, and coloniality of nature are clearly understood as enabling intellectual unveiling of colonial matrices of

power and technologies of subjectivation that underpin the continued sub-alternisation of Africa and its people since the time of colonial encounters, the pan-African agenda would not be pushed as vigorously and as urgently as it deserves.

Read from decolonial epistemic perspective, pan-Africanism forms part of decolonial horizons involving Africans taking charge of their destiny and search for new humanism. In this context pan-Africanism becomes a singular connector of a diversity of ex-colonised African people. This must begin with epistemic and cognitive freedom. It has become clear in recent years and months that the whole Euro-American structure of power in place since the 15th Century has been undergoing a profound crisis. The Euro-American epistemology is undergoing a profound crisis of confidence. It failed even to predict the current financial crisis that is rocking the world. It has also become clear that what was universalised by global imperial designs as a universal science is infact a Western particularism, which assumed power to define all rival forms of knowledge as particular, local, contextual and situational, while claiming universality.⁵⁸

The decolonial epistemic perspective builds on this realisation to inaugurate and push forward a 'decolonial turn' that calls for recognition of alternative knowledges and alternative ways of knowing, as part of re-opening vistas of liberation from global imperial designs and colonial matrices of power. The world in general, and Africa in particular, finds itself in a phase of paradigmatic shift that necessitates re-invention of the decolonial liberation agenda within a context in which Euro-American civilisation is devouring not only its promises of progress, liberty, equality, non-discrimination and rationality, but is repudiating and criminalising the very idea of struggle for these objectives.⁵⁹ Having mapped out the concepts that can assist in the continuing struggles for liberation, it is imperative to proceed to analyse how the founding fathers of post-colonial Africa have pushed forward the pan-African agenda as well as how they have messed it up along the way.

THE CURSE OF A DIVIDED AFRICAN HOUSE: KWAME NKRUMAH VS. JULIUS NYERERE

Ideally, the pan-Africanist movement was a redemptive project that embodied ideals of freedom from slavery; freedom from racism; freedom from colonialism; equality of human beings, right of black races to unite under a pan-African nation, right of black races to own resources in Africa, self-determination of black races and the building of Africa into an economic and political giant capable of rivalling Europe and America. Pan-Africanism

rose not only as part of humankind's quest for liberty, freedom, justice and liberation but also as a direct response to the historical reality of enslavement of black races.⁶⁰

Of direct relevance to Africa is the fact that the Pan-African Congress held on 15 October 1945 in Manchester brought together prominent black leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, Peter Abrahams and many others. It also brought together Anglophone and Francophone African leaders, besides bringing together continental Africans and those from the diaspora. The involvement of continental Africans heralded the beginnings of the migration of hosting of the Pan-African Congress to the African soil. But it was not until 1958 that the Fifth Pan-African Congress was held in Ghana. This congress marked the handing over of the leadership of the movement from William E. B. DuBois to Nkrumah.⁶¹ But soon the pan-African movement under Nkrumah became affected by differing ideas on the best route and pace it should take to arrive at continental political unity. The problem began with Ghana pushing for a political union of Africa and Nigeria resisting such an approach. But later the disagreements took the form of a Nkrumah vs. Nyerere format, with ripple effects on other leaders who had to choose sides.

Global imperial designs' tentacles and influence was becoming a hindrance to the realisation of pan-African unity as early as 1960. Such newly independent countries as Nigeria, Tunisia, Kenya, Tanzania and the Francophone states, preferred to maintain closer links with the West. Francophone states with the exception of Guinea under Sekou Toure had voted to remain within the tutelage of France.⁶² Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, and Mali pushed for a political union of African states. They justified this move as a necessary shield against neo-colonialism.⁶³ But other African leaders saw maintenance of close ranks with the West as a redeeming move and a counter to infiltration of communism. But the danger of neo-colonialism soon took a concrete form in Congo under Patrice Lumumba. The Congo crisis became a complex mixture of Belgian interference to oust the pan-Africanist Lumumba, secession by Katanga under Moise Tshombe and eventual assassination of Lumumba.⁶⁴

The Congo crisis of 1960 just like the Libyan crisis of 2011 split African countries into rival camps of conflicting alliances. Some supported the founding father of Congo Lumumba (first Prime Minister of Congo) who was facing secession and Western infiltration, others supported Kasavubu (the first President of Congo), and others the secessionist leader Tshombe. The divisions were exacerbated by Western interference in support of secessionist leader Moise Tshombe and Kasavubu who was considered to be pro-West. The pan-Africanist and pro-East Lumumba had to be isolated and then physically destroyed according to the logic of global imperial designs.

Ghana, Mali, Guinea and Morocco formed the Casablanca bloc and vehemently denounced Western intervention in Congo. Those African states that assumed a moderate stance in the eyes of the West, supported Kasavubu. They later met in Abidjan in October 1960 to form the Brazzaville bloc. A third grouping called the Monrovia bloc consisting of Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia and Senegal emerged which tried to harmonise relations between the belligerent groups, but failed.⁶⁵

The early founding fathers of Africa's divisions symbolised a divided house whose fate was destruction. The launch of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 came within a context of divisions among African leaders over what kind of union was to be formed. Nkrumah's book *Africa Must Unite* which he distributed widely to African leaders before the historic founding of OAU did not unite the divided African house. Nkrumah's book carried the message:

We need the strength of our combined numbers and resources to protect ourselves from the very positive dangers of returning colonialism in disguised forms. We need it to combat the entrenched forces dividing our continent and still holding back millions of our brothers. We need it to secure total African liberation ... At present most of the independent states are moving in directions which expose us to dangers of imperialism and neo-colonialism.⁶⁶

Julius Nyerere can best be characterised as a reluctant pan-Africanist who emphasised dilemmas and problems that hindered pan-African unity while ignoring those positive factors that could be used to quicken the pace of realisation of political continental unity. He criticised Nkrumah and all those who were pushing for political union of Africa as using this pan-African idea for the purpose of propaganda. He became concerned about the prospects of individual states surrendering their sovereignty. In 1966, he argued that:

Indeed I believe that a real dilemma faces the pan-Africanist. One is the fact that pan-Africanism demands an African consciousness and an African loyalty; on the other hand is the fact that each pan-Africanist must also concern himself with the freedom and development of one of the nations of Africa. These things can conflict. Let us be honest and admit that they have already conflicted.⁶⁷

While Nyerere was seen by others as a realist and pragmatist, he introduced a discourse of impossibility (rooted in Afro-pessimism) that culminated in criticism of Kwame Nkrumah who wanted a quickened pace towards political continental unity as a survival kit in the context of vicious neo-colonial forces that worked against African progress.⁶⁸ The irony in

Nyerere's thinking on development in Africa is that he urged Africans as 'late, late comers' to 'run while others walked' so as to catch up with the rest of the world. But when it came to the issue of pan-African unity, he suggested 'walking' (gradualism) and opposed Nkrumah who suggested 'running'.⁶⁹ The debates that ensued between Nkrumah and Nyerere over the pace to be taken towards realisation of pan-African unity constituted 'a curse' because they have continued to haunt new generations of pan-Africanists in the 21st Century, in their attempts to push forward Nkrumah's project of establishing political continental unity as an answer to threats of neo-colonialism.

Broadly speaking, Nkrumah and Nyerere's thoughts on nationalism and pan-Africanism provide a unique entry point into understanding the complexities of implementing the national projects while pushing forward the pan-African agenda. Even when Nkrumah made efforts to explain how the structures and institutions of a political union will look like, Nyerere remained in a dismissive mood saying: 'To rule out a step by step progress towards African Unity is to hope that the Almighty will one day say "Let there be unity in Africa," and there shall be unity.' He even tried to dismiss the interference of imperialists when he charged that 'to say that step by step method was invented by the imperialists is to reach the limits of absurdity.'⁷⁰

Despite Nyerere's attempt to dampen Nkrumah's spirit, he continued at the 1965 OAU Conference to urge his fellow African leaders to realise that the political and economic crises bedeviling Africa were a clear testimony of the dangers of neo-colonialism and pan-African unity.⁷¹ There is no doubt that Nkrumah and Nyerere operated within a complex post-colonial terrain that exacerbated tensions among African leaders. The immediate post-colonial period was dominated by popular expectations that needed to be fulfilled and political turmoil emanating from outside that needed to be avoided. The question of regime survival in the midst of the Cold War impinged on national and social transformational agendas of the world's youngest states.⁷²

But Julius Ihonvbere has roundly blamed African founding fathers, for numerous betrayals of the national project(s). He blamed them for failure to restructure the state; to empower Africans; to challenge foreign domination and exploitation of Africans; and to challenge the cultural bastardisation in the continent.⁷³ But Nkrumah's national project embodied both a nationalist and a pan-African vision. To him, there were complementarities rather than tensions between nationalism and pan-Africanism. This vision was clearly expressed in three of his widely quoted statements: 'Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added unto it.'⁷⁴ He also made it clear that 'The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless linked to the total

liberation of the African continent.' He elaborated that 'The independence of Ghana was the first crack in the seemingly impregnable armour of imperialism in Africa. It created and furnished the bridgehead for organised assaults upon colonialism.'⁷⁵

Nkrumah interpreted the attainment of political independence by African states as a beginning of a political trajectory to real freedom predicated on pan-African unity. Territorial nationalism was to him a means to pan-Africanism. This is why he placed the independence of Ghana at the centre of the pan-African project, linking its sovereignty to the total liberation of the continent. Nkrumah identified two core problems that faced post-colonial Africa. The first was lack of pan-African unity. The second was the danger of neo-colonialism. His analysis of these problems was that no African country stood a chance of pursuing an independent national project without inviting the wrath of neo-colonialism.⁷⁶

To Nkrumah pan-African unity was a nationalist survival shield rather than a threat to sovereignty as Nyerere insinuated when he said: 'It is some curious animal to which our individual states do not surrender sovereignty, and yet somehow becomes the strong instrument which we require to fulfill the purposes of modern states' (Nyerere 1967: p.303). To Nkrumah pan-African unity was the only real African protection from vulnerability to neo-colonialism. Pan-African unity was also an enabling factor for Africans to own their natural resources and pursue independent economic policies. Nkrumah concluded that 'the socio-economic development and progress of Africa will come only within the political kingdom not the other way round.'⁷⁷

Unfortunately in 1966, Nkrumah had to prematurely exit the political stage as a consequence of a military coup. He was toppled just four months after the publication of his *Neo-Colonialism* (October 1965). Its publication had elicited an immediate protest from the US government, which promptly cancelled US\$35 million aid to Ghana.⁷⁸ One of the architects of the coup, Colonel A. A. Afrifa wrote a revealing book about the coup, vilifying Nkrumah's pan-Africanism and support for the liberation movements. He stated that:

At the attainment of independence, the British handed over to us a decent system of government in which everyone had a say. ...Organisation of African unity or no Organisation of African unity, I will claim my citizenship of Ghana and the Commonwealth in any part of the world. I have been trained in the United Kingdom as a soldier, and I am ever prepared to fight alongside my friends in the United Kingdom in the same way as Canadians and Australians will do.⁷⁹

This was a clear case of embracing the former colonial power as a friend rather than a neo-colonialist formation. By 1966 Nkrumah's dream of

continental political unity had not materialised. His vision of turning Ghana into an economic paradise had not succeeded too. The coup removed from power a committed pan-Africanist who had even predicted his political demise at the historic founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. He told his fellow African leaders that:

If we do not come together, if we do not unite, we shall all be thrown out, all of us one by one – and I also will go. ... The OAU must face a choice now – we can either move forward to progress through our effective African Union or step backward into stagnation, instability and confusion – an easy prey for foreign intervention, interference and subversion.⁸⁰

Nkrumah's foresight was confirmed by the fact that the second decade of independence became the age of military coups in Africa as well as rehabilitation of imperialism.

While Nyerere claimed that like Nkrumah he believed in the pan-Africanist project as the ultimate end of the African struggle for freedom, he did not push the pan-African agenda with the same zeal he pushed forward his Tanzanian national socialist project predicated on Ujamaa villages.⁸¹ He emphasised tensions between territorial nationalism and pan-Africanism, while in principle agreeing with Nkrumah that realisation of an African continental government was 'our greatest dream of all'. He explained that:

For it was as Africans that we dreamed of freedom; and we thought of it for Africa. Our real ambition was African freedom and African government. The fact that we fought area by area was merely a tactical necessity. We organised ourselves into Convention People's Party, the Tanganyika African National Union, the United National Independence Party, and so on, simply because each local colonial government had to be dealt with separately. The question we now have to answer is whether Africa shall maintain this internal separation as we defeat colonialism, or whether our earlier proud boast – 'I am an African' – shall become a reality.⁸²

Nyerere interpreted the dilemma of the pan-Africanist as that of how to deal with territorial nationalisms that were diverging and moving away from pan-Africanism. The divergences were motivated by local realities such as promotion of nationhood to contain imperatives of disunity, economic imperatives that dictated inter-country competition over attracting foreign capital and investments, and promises to the people that needed to be fulfilled. He concluded that:

And the truth is that as each of us develops his own state we raise more and more barriers between ourselves. We entrench differences which we have

inherited from the colonial periods and develop new ones. Most of all, we develop a national pride which could easily be inimical to the development of a pride in Africa.⁸³

Unlike Nkrumah, Nyerere privileged the agenda of 'grappling with serious and urgent problems within our states' and dangers from outside over 'serious thinking about the way forward to pan-Africanism' partly because 'we are always assailed for "wasting money on conferences," or being "unrealistic" in our determination to build roads or railways to link our nations'.⁸⁴

Nyerere became one of the most eloquent exponents of the gradualist approach to continental political unity. He pushed forward for step by step progress towards pan-African unity, beginning with strengthening individual states' sovereignties and building of regional economic communities.⁸⁵ His gradualist approach informed the formation of the OAU with a limited mandate of ensuring the total decolonisation of Africa as the first step towards achievement of continental political unity.

It would seem that unlike Nkrumah, Nyerere underestimated the colonial matrices of power that made it impossible for him to achieve self-reliance in one country. Nyerere had to live with a tenuous relationship with the Bretton Wood institutions, critiquing their conditionalities and prescriptions, while seeking their funding. In 1997 at the 7th Pan African Congress that coincided with the 40th anniversary of Ghana's independence, Nyerere confessed that:

Kwame Nkrumah was the state crusader for African unity. He wanted the Accra summit of 1965 to establish Union Government for the whole of independent Africa. But we failed. The one minor reason is that Kwame, like all great believers, underestimated the degree of suspicion and animosity, which his crusading passion had created among a substantial number of his fellow Heads of State. The major reason was linked to the first: already too many of us had a vested interest in keeping Africa divided.⁸⁶

Nyerere added that after Nkrumah, 'we of the first generation leaders of independent Africa have not pursued the objective of African Unity with vigour, commitment and sincerity that it deserves. Yet that does not mean that unity is now irrelevant.'⁸⁷ At retirement, Nyerere admitted his mistakes including regretting even why he embarked on a nationalisation programme which destroyed thriving enterprises and urged his successors to adopt a free market economy.

The Nkrumah-Nyerere disagreements highlight the difficulties of pushing forward the pan-African agenda without consensus at the political level of leadership. It also magnifies in the case of Nyerere how those leaders

who did not put pan-African unity first could torpedo the efforts of committed pan-Africanists and derail the whole project. Instead of present day pan-Africanists degenerating into another Nkrumah-Nyerere curse, they must learn from it what not to do.

CONCLUSION: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PAN-AFRICAN PROJECT

There is no doubt that advances have been made on institutionalisation of the pan-African agenda at the beginning of the new millennium. Since the launch of the African Union (AU) in July 2002, Africa seemed to be awakening from the crisis of pan-African ideas that dominated the period from the 1970s to the 1990s. During the crisis years, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) under the leadership of Adebayo Adedeji filled the gap and begun to produce plans that embodied pan-African thought. The case in point being the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 which unfortunately was never implemented, partly because the realities on the ground were dominated by neo-liberal Structural Adjustment Programmes that were hostile to pan-Africanism.⁸⁸ Credit must be given to the late Colonel Murmur Gaddafi of Libya, former presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika of Algeria, and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal – the ‘African Renaissance coalition’ – for reviving the pan-African agenda at the beginning of the 2000’s. Gilbert Khadiagala noted that this coalition emerged ‘at a vital historical juncture when a leadership vacuum had developed on continental issues’.⁸⁹

Taking advantage of the new millenarian optimism, the ‘African Renaissance coalition’, despite its differences particularly with Gaddafi who wanted a United States of Africa to be declared immediately, initiated and shepherded an impressive process of building of pan-African institutions and formulation of plans for Africa. The cases in point being the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the controversial New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and most recently the launch of the Pan-African University (PAU) in December 2011.

The launch of PAU in particular is an interesting development that is aimed at dealing with epistemological issues raised in this paper that are very important as an underpinning of the pan-African agenda in the 21st Century. A realisation seems to be emerging that recognises that the new pan-African agenda cannot be informed and predicated on hostile and imperialistic Euro-American epistemology that underpins global imperial designs. The realm of knowledge production and cultures that influence those institutions that produce knowledge cannot be ignored in the new struggles to deepen pan-African unity. Since decolonisation, Africa continued to rely

on universities in Africa rather than building African universities imbued with pan-Africanist ideas. The end product has been production of confused graduates that hate Africa which produced them and loved Europe and America that rejected them.

What must be noted though is that despite the fact that members of the 'African Renaissance coalition' had chequered domestic democratic credentials, they tried to bring into the new pan-African initiatives the importance of democracy and good governance. APRM is a case in point. Despite its lack of popularity among other African leaders who have snubbed the initiative, it was an innovative way of implementing 'African solutions to African problems'. The challenge facing these pan-Africanists had been how to circumvent the long shadow of global imperial designs whose agents continue to mingle into African issues and initiatives, disciplining and channelling these to serve Western interests. NEPAD is a typical example of an initiative that indicated how colonial matrices of power were still active in shaping fake partnerships that do not work practically. What is most disappointing though is the failure by proponents of NEPAD to learn any lesson from Nkrumah's long standing argument about neo-colonialism as a major threat to Africa's struggles to take charge of its destiny. If Nkrumah's ideas were taken seriously, he never believed in a partnership between Africa and the Euro-American world as long as global imperial designs informed the current world order.⁹⁰

This policy mistake that rehabilitates global imperial designs could have been averted if current pan-Africanists had armed themselves with the armour of the decolonial epistemic perspective that is consistently alert to the snares of colonial matrices of power. More worrisome, is the return of the Nkrumah-Nyerere curse in the 21st Century. Wade and Gaddafi appropriated the Nkrumah position and pushed for fast-tracked Union government that would be a precursor to the United States of Africa. Khadiagala categorised their position as that of 'unionists/continentalists' as opposed to Mbeki, Obasanjo and others who can be correctly labelled as disciples of Nyerere's gradualism.⁹¹ The return of this curse in the 21st Century is a reminder that perhaps the graduation of nationalism into pan-Africanism is taking time to materialise, in the process dictating the necessity for caution and gradualism, and it is not known when it will create a conducive atmosphere for a Union government.

Finally, the politics that developed around the question of invasion of Libya by NATO in 2011 that eventually culminated in the violent death of Gaddafi revealed another vacuum in pan-African leadership. The AU was just ignored by the Euro-America world. Two of the sober-minded members of the 'African Renaissance coalition' namely Mbeki and Obasanjo are no longer in office. Since their departure, again the crescendo of a

new pan-African unity predicated on African Renaissance has gone silent. There is need for another committed leadership to take over from where they left.

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Fanonian Thought and Implications for Pan-African Unity

Tendayi Sithole

INTRODUCTION

This chapter seeks to situate Fanonian thought to understand the implication of pan-African unity in so far as the post-colonial Africa is concerned. It is in post-colonial Africa where pan-African unity is seen as impractical. This is because pan-African unity has been and continues to be reduced to mere rhetoric in the geo-political location where borders, are the inheritance from the colonial order. The advocates of pan-African unity are dismissed as imagining the impossible, and also being caught in the nostalgia of the African past or the unreachable future. Pan-African unity is not impossible to realise and it is necessary to navigate through some of the warning that Fanon provided. This chapter begins by examining Fanon's prophecy within the realm of pan-African unity, based on the view that he provided a warning against problems that will feature in post-colonial Africa which will make pan-African unity impossible to imagine and to realise. It then engages the politics of possibility, and this is the condition which will make pan-African unity possible. The chapter proceeds to problematise the notion of emancipation and offers the argument that emancipation is not similar to liberation. Emancipation is what has pervaded the post-colonial Africa and liberation is yet to be born, the necessary condition for pan-African unity. The chapter also then argues that post-colonial Africa is entrapped in repetition without difference, and it concludes that the African Union (AU) is trapped in the very anti-thesis of pan-African unity.

ON PROPHECY AND THE POST-COLONIAL CONUNDRUM

Fanonian thought indicates that for pan-African unity to come into being, Africa has to be given birth again, and this means Africa must be

thoroughly decolonised. This is on the basis that pan-African unity cannot be realised in the absence of the conscious effort of bringing together the fractured imagination and narratives of liberation which must be brought together to realise decolonisation that is due to Africa. Since the call for pan-African unity has been bandied around, it has lost legitimacy and also to some extent, relevancy. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni points out, celebrations, memorialisations, commemorations and jubilees which are authorised by the post-colonial African state are mainly elite centred and do not point to the fact that the pan-African dream is abandoned.¹ For Ndlovu-Gatsheni, the African post-colonial conundrum is that of the murky present and mysterious future which hides the myth of decolonisation and the mysterious future. The post-colonial conundrum has reduced pan-African unity to irrelevancy. The irrelevancy of pan-African unity is no more apparent than in the post-colonial moment, where all the efforts of realising the goals of pan-Africanism were just 'mission suspended'.

The consolidation and unification of the people – the oppressed in particular, is of capital importance.² This allows them to push for change in that they are the ones that should belong to the world they sense reality in and their expression should not just be in vain. Pan-African unity must be a new expression of new beings in the world, and as such, such new beings must be their own political directors who should not be spoken for, and acted upon. Fanon argues that change as effecting from liberation is not a back-and-forth emergence of the ambivalence, but it is a 'dialectical progression'.³ This is not romanticism of the African past and culture, but new language articulated to pursue the very basis that will speak directly to pan-African unity.

What the presence of this then implies for pan-African unity is that it will be a form of consciousness that is bottom up.⁴ Fanon would have been betrayed by the post-colonial Africa's conception of pan-African unity, as it is still-born. It is still-born since it is not imagined on the basis that there is no thorough decolonisation that exists. For pan-African unity to exist there needs to be a thorough decolonisation. The re-awakening of the African being from the political lull which has given a fatalistic view of the world perpetuates absence of power and agency to take pan-Africanism as a counter-hegemonic discourse.

Fanon did not engage in the notion of pan-African unity directly but envisioned a human society where consciousness is *a priori*. It is consciousness that provides pointers to what Fanon would have engaged pan-African unity. This is what Fanon said:

As for the people, they join in the new rhythm of the nation, in their mud huts and in their dreams. Under their breath and from their hearts' core they sing endless songs of praise to the glorious fighters.⁵

Political change is that which comes from below, which is the true source to ferment and concretise pan-African unity. In other words, for there to be a fundamental change there needs to be a people driven social change, not the one which is managed to perpetuate historical exclusions, which are in a way, finding themselves legitimated in the contemporary post-colonial African condition. Shivji posits that 'the potential bottom-up people's organisations for pan-Africanism were thus suppressed under the weight of African statism'.⁶ This statism came into being as a result of the nature of the African post-colonial state being the oppressive apparatus. The African post-colonial state is 'an institution of dominance *par excellence*'.⁷ The consolidation of state power and the exercise of coercion and force through its apparatus was the basis through which the interests of the Africa post-colonial state were found. As such, this is the anti-thesis of pan-African unity.

Most post-colonial African states soon after independence rushed to join the United Nations as they bought into the idea of sovereignty and non-interference.⁸ Instead of rethinking their own political and institutional arrangements, most African post-colonial states made pan-Africa unity aspirations to be postponed to the future. As Fanon says, the rest of the events were postponed to the future.⁹ In other words, the importance of pan-African unity was just a rhetorical device and not necessarily the part of reality since only solidarity and cooperation were emphasised.¹⁰

Pan-African unity is informed by liberation, it cannot be reduced to Africans being acted upon – that is, not being the agents of their own to initiate this unity. Fanon showed how the notion of liberation conferred as a gift will fail on the African continent.¹¹ It is impossible for the African continent to unite on the basis that Africa is still in bondage. That which is in bondage cannot imagine or think for itself, but it is that which will be acted upon. The freedom that is celebrated in Africa is not freedom. This is the freedom that has not been declared from the impulse of pan-African unity, but the bourgeoisie consensus of replacing their former colonial masters. The freedom that they deceitfully celebrate is devoid of any content that fosters pan-African unity in concrete terms.

However, it needs to be spelled out that Fanon had the same exactness of what Africa would become and this should not be seen as the prophecy of doom and gloom, but a warning. The politics of possibility are informed by political imagination in which the advocates of pan-African unity will 'clarify their ideas and strengthen their determination'.¹² For this to happen, awakening is essential where people will not be lulled into sleep. It is in the post-colonial conundrum where pan-African unity is called; in the absence of full decolonisation. This creates a situation where the post-colonial Africa is reduced into a mere lethargy.

RETHINKING PAN-AFRICANISM, UNITY AND POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY

The imagination of pan-African unity should be infused with political imagination which fuels the aspirations of the politics of possibility. Audacity to transform and expand political imagination which is the driver of the quest for liberation should not be a glass ceiling. As such, oppression will be censored in that people during the struggle towards liberation will have one common goal of attaining liberation. Fanon stated that, 'now it must be said that the masses show themselves totally incapable of appreciating the long way they have come'.¹³ For Fanon, it was not only important to fight oppression and advance liberation. It was also important to forge ahead to fight in the post-liberation phase against liberators who might oppress their own people. The pan-Africanist slogans will have no meaning if they are not backed-up by a concrete actionable political project of African unity.

As Fanon states, 'there is no programme, there are no speeches or resolutions, and no political trends'.¹⁴ Fanon here calls for political imagination which comes from spontaneity – that is, politics of possibility where there is deepening of a dialectic since pan-African unity is an ongoing process rather than an event. This is the state of making sure that political imagination is such that it thinks beyond the state of liberation. In other words, the state of liberation is not achieved, but rather, it is worked on continuously since liberation itself will have its own challenges.

The process of building pan-African unity is rooted in the view that an Africa which is thoroughly decolonised is still yet to be born.¹⁵ It is in this state of affairs that a call for pan-African unity can be regarded as important as never before based on the challenges that the African continent finds itself. The formation of pan-African unity can only come into being when there is enough basis and willingness for unity on the continent. 'What is missing in the post-colonial Africa is an African state that is deeply rooted and embedded in African society, is thoroughly decolonised, and imbued with African values'.¹⁶

The nature of the leader and the possibility to imagine should come with the will power to make pan-African unity a possibility which will then result in reality. Fanon penned that:

This is why we must understand that African unity can only be achieved through upward thrust of the people, and under the leadership of the people, that is to say, in defiance of the interests of the bourgeoisie.¹⁷

Africa has been fraught with the politics of impossibility, pan-African unity being one as it is seen as a pipe-dream. The politics of impossibility blocks the imagination of the politics of possibility whereby pan-African unity can

come into being. Politics of possibility can be realised if there is political imagination that seeks to apply the thinking of Africa along the lines of pan-African unity which is often frowned upon as impossible. For there to be such political imagination, there needs to be audacity and thinking outside the colonial box of pragmatic politics or real politik. Pan-African unity has been engaged with for more than five decades and it is celebrated, but there is indeed no reason to celebrate.

The politics of possibility cannot be realised in the celebration of the illusion of decolonisation.¹⁸ In the imagination of Fanon lies the re-engagement of African society's direction to realise genuine liberation where the conviction will be that of creating a new being. As Fanon states, 'neither stubborn courage nor fine slogans are enough'.¹⁹ It is here where the additional agent is needed to make pan-African unity possible. Fanon went further to state that:

They must not imagine that the end is already won. When the real objectives of the fight are shown to them, they must not think that they are impossible to attain. Once again; things must be explained to them; the people must see where they are going, and how they are to get there.²⁰

The politics of possibility are the ones which should chart a way to realise pan-African unity. The absence of will power, which is negated by the African leadership and trickled down to the masses who see the conditions as their fate, calls for serious attention to deepen the dialectic.²¹ The post-colonial situation is that which is characterised by complexity. Fanon acknowledges this complexity by stating that 'there is war, there are defeats, truces and victories'.²²

For Fanon, the struggle for liberation undergoes modifications, something which does not follow a doctrine or dogma.²³ This is because the struggle is based on reality that is overarching. In the quest for liberation, there should be a concerted effort to break the status quo, something which needs political imagination. Fanon argues that risking life is not the only method to obtain freedom, but rather, going beyond life towards the invention of the 'new self' and living for the other.²⁴

THE PROBLEMATIC OF EMANCIPATION AND LIBERATION

Pan-African unity in the Fanonian sense means that it should be embedded in the politics of possibility – that is, the politics which are 'actional' and not rhetorical. These are politics of liberation, the necessary condition for pan-African unity. The post-colonial state was not brought into existence

by liberation but emancipation. For Fanon, emancipation is a mere conferring of judicial independence – the very defiance of pan-African unity.²⁵ The post-independence period did not bring a decolonised African being, and a decolonised Africa. It is in this post-colonial conundrum that pan-Africanism is a dream that is unrealisable and also absent in the popular imagination of liberation. This paper calls for pan-African unity, and this is done against the problematic of the post-colonial African condition which is not decolonised.

The struggle for freedom and national liberation is dialectically linked to the struggle against colonialism.²⁶ In Fanon's thinking, this is the reconversion of the colonial oppression. Liberation is informed by action and this is brought to being by what Fanon refers to as 'the dialectics of liberation'.²⁷ Solidarity or agitation towards the realisation of pan-African unity should not be a rhetorical device – a mere voice devoid of action.

But rather, as Fanon argues, there should be a 'knocking down of the system and breaking the treaties'.²⁸ This is because liberation must be taken and defended as it is not something given.²⁹ The ethical reform of the world is something that Fanon calls for in that the black subject must be liberated from the yoke of oppression and its effects in the post-colonial condition. Emancipation is a gift of freedom, the freedom which is that of mere concessions. Emancipation inaugurates cosmetic freedoms for that it does not liberate, but co-opts and creates elite consensus. Emancipation is the liberation of the few, it is the bourgeoisie affair in the exclusion of the majority. Pan-African unity cannot emerge in the condition of emancipation, because pan-African unity requires a people-centred approach. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni amplifies, 'emancipation is always informed by the spirit of reformist rather than revolutionary change'.³⁰

Fanon had emancipation in mind when he articulated the notion of flag freedom – that is, pseudo liberation *par excellence*.³¹ The pseudo-liberation that Fanon found unsettling is that 'the black man was acted upon', and it is in this that there is no fundamental change in the post-colonial African condition.³² What prevailed in the African post-colonial condition is a mere transfer of power from the colonial masters to their junior partners, the African nationalist bourgeoisie. It is this bourgeoisie who hijack the pan-African unity idea and reduced it to a mere emancipation project. 'The black native bourgeois that spearheaded the decolonisation project stirred in the direction of emancipation rather than liberation'.³³ Emancipation was seen as a short cut as the nationalist bourgeoisie saw it as impossible to meet the aspiration and demands of the African people.

'Ideally, true liberation is supposed to lead to decolonisation, social justice and birth of new humanity divorced from colonial modernity'.³⁴ For there to be that fundamental change there needs to be a concerted effort

in which the masses effect change. In this manner, such a change should speak directly to their condition. Since change signifies the invention of the new self, there should be a modification of the problem(s) that are encountered by the masses.³⁵

In putting Fanon's thoughts into the context of national liberation, consciousness and freedom, Wright argues that the pre-colonial nation is liberated and the creation of the 'new' is the result of the national struggle.³⁶ The discourses of decolonisation, nationalism and the problem of freedom are disrupted by colonialism and the complicity of the black compradors who are still fond of colonial residue which they reproduce. This situation reproduces black suffering with the complicity and will of the black 'comprador class'; as Fanon says 'oppression would wear a black face'. For the new society to be created, the colonial paradigm should be eliminated and destroyed.

True liberation is the politics of renewal, where there is a (re)construction of the oppressed who were deprived of humanity and subjectivity. Wright argues that 'this new order must eradicate the inequalities that are an integral part of the colonial society'.³⁷ This reflects genuine liberation in which the new personhood emerges in the new order in which blacks enjoy the fruits of liberation. Though in support of the revolution, Wright supports the liberation struggle as it is necessary for construction and deconstruction of the new order.

According to Wright, 'the elimination of the colonial paradigm is a vital part of the (re)construction of the new social reality'.³⁸ Wright sees such elimination through the prism of the national liberation struggle and social revolution, both which can happen in isolation or in tandem and at the personal and national level. Such a (re)construction is necessary in that the colonial society is in constant movement and it creates its own structures that militate against the oppressed. The oppressed need to take into account the fact that colonisation is about domination and exploitation that dehumanises and objectifies blacks. The lines of the national liberation struggle and social revolution are the atomised machinery of blacks who Fanon dubbed as the site where leadership of the national liberation struggle and social revolution is contested. It will be argued that the colonialist institution still remains intact, hence the psychological bondage of blacks.

REPETITION WITHOUT DIFFERENCE

The bourgeois-imagined liberation that does not possess the capacity to imagine the total overhauling of structures militates against pan-African unity. Repetition without difference results in the aspiration of liberation

being an illusion since the intention is only to reform the colonial infrastructure instead of dismantling it. This repetition signals and brings to the fore the betrayal of liberation which is managed by the black comprador bourgeoisie whose sole aspiration is to capture state power, manage it and fail to fundamentally change it in line with the aspirations of liberation.

The African bourgeoisie's choice of the easy path of decolonisation – the one conferred to them, made then to think of the popular option of the single party.³⁹ It is important to ask how pan-African unity can come into being whereas the leaders have interests which allow them to extract and plunder in the name of liberation, whereas in fact there is no liberation. It is puzzling to really think about the breakthrough that will lead to the realisation of African unity where there is a failure of the post-colonial leadership to stop the division within the countries they are ruling and even the one existing in the AU.

The basis for fermenting pan-African unity as an urgent task was crowded out by a gradualist and cautionary front which eschewed radicalism in its form and content. This is the legacy that has been haunting the AU even in the present as its members are accountable to their various colonial masters. The legitimacy of the AU has been null in the eyes of the imperial forces. The AU cannot speak for Africans, the same as pan-Africanism. What the AU has done has been to propagate the notion of African solutions for Africa problems. The problems that are on the continent may not be African problems and solutions that are proposed might prove inadequate. The legitimacy of the AU indeed is not that which renders approval. Such legitimacy exists on the basis that the beneficiaries of the colonial crumbs seek to stand for the whole formerly oppressed and they become aggravated when they are reminded that they are not in service of the nation as Fanon states.

Repetition without difference dramatises the post-colonial African state in relation to its state machinery being used to suppress the masses and protect the state rather than the citizens themselves. This is the violence inherited from the colonial administration and it is perpetuated by those who are administering the post-colonial African state. It is this mimicry which confirms the dictum that exploitation has worn a black face.⁴⁰ Instead of the black face being the one that fundamentally brings colonial structures to an ultimate end, it is this very black face which creates the neo-colonial hellish existence for the people. The mimicry is the one that makes the effect of change to be non-existent because the post-colonial state is the repetition of the colonial *commandement par excellence*.⁴¹ 'Paradoxically, the national government in its dealings with the people as a whole is reminiscent of certain features of the former colonial power'.⁴²

For Fanon, this repletion is brought by pitfall of consciousness. This is where the values of liberation are betrayed and all forms of consciousness, if they antagonise the status quo, are suppressed. Fanon argued thus:

They finally come to understand that the change-over will not be a reform, nor a bettering of things. They come to understand, with a sort of bewilderment that will from hence forth never quite leave them, that political action in the towns will always be powerless to modify or overthrow the colonial regime.⁴³

Even after the struggle for national freedom has succeeded, the same mistakes are made and such mistakes make for the maintenance of decentralising and autonomist tendencies.⁴⁴ Repetition without difference shows the reluctance to imagine the alternatives and repeating the tendencies that are keeping the status quo intact. Repetition without difference is indeed that which makes pan-African unity to be mere rhetoric – a botched liberation.

ON THE CENTRE OF POWER

The AU is seen as the vehicle to realise the pan-African unity. It will be argued here, however, that besides the policy, structural, capacity and logistical constraints, the dimension of the AU to be closely looked at is the divisions among member states. Being divided, the AU is in some quarters referred to as an example of regional integration.⁴⁵ Okhonmina then adds that the AU is a product that was being fermented for many years to realise pan-African unity aspirations. Since it is now a decade, it should be asked what are those aspirations and what initiatives did the AU take to realise those aspirations.

It is indeed true that the AU exists in challenging conditions where in the realm of power it is in the margins. The flaw in the AU's articulation of pan-African unity is that it fails to take power dynamics into account.⁴⁶ The real and apparent national interests cemented by the fiction of sovereignty as post-colonial African leaders continue to hold onto inherited colonial institutions and their arrangements prevent the imagination of understanding the manner in which power is constituted. Such a condition makes it difficult for them to give birth to pan-African unity.

Looking at the age long aspiration of pan-African unity, Okhonmina states that there is lack of consensus in the AU on when and where should pan-African unity begin and how it should be administered. This makes the conception of pan-African unity to be flawed. These are some of the issues Okhonmina identifies which show the need to rethink and redefine pan-African unity: articulating hierarchical power relations; the absence of regional superpowers; the lack of legitimacy and respect among African

leaders themselves; pan-African unity being fixated in the past; and Africa being in the periphery of the process of globalisation.

The AU hosts member states which are divergent and who hold contradictory national interests, and this even includes structural arrangements which will render any initiative that calls for pan-African unity impossible. Africa is in the middle of differences and divisions, and it is important to ask what impact this has on pan-African unity. The AU has seen the challenges of imagining and trying to build pan-African unity through building continental unity and development in the globalised world⁴⁷. The AU was conceived and largely popularised as the initiative that is building a united pan-African front.

The underlying point here is that the present-day African states and peoples do not share a common heritage in terms of culture, socio-political struggles and history. This would be a decisive weakness bearing in mind the already formidable obstacles to African integration in terms of socio-economic structures inherited from the colonial era and Africa's position in the present global capitalist economy.⁴⁸

It is evident that this view is trapped in the snares of colonial matrices of power. This does not mean that the view is discounted, but it would be interesting to delve deeper in what will make pan-African unity to be realised outside the grips of policy analysis entrapped in the logic of thinking within the 'hierarchised' world order which should indeed be configured and re-imagined. The same applies to the imagination that has trapped most of the African leaders who seem not to have a choice, as they cannot think outside the limits of their willingness and perceptions of what African could become. Pan-African unity in the AU understanding is fuelled by the principles and values of making Africa to realise its destiny which is decolonisation. If there is pan-African unity, there will be unity and total liberation of the continent.⁴⁹

Africa did not decolonise fifty years ago based on its own terms, but in those of the coloniser who knew that they would continue to dictate the interests and destiny of the African continent's liberation. The sovereignty of the colonial metropolis and the liquidating of the African traditional state formation through new political networks validate the existence of imperial power structures. Colonialism was explicit in form, and it made clear by erasing and inserting what is Africa in the Western imagination. This erasing and inserting is the one that gave colonial power an upper hand, where the colonial power liquidated the traditional political networks.⁵⁰ Such liquidation took the form of suspending political resistance and consciousness, hence the application of the divide and rule strategy.

Coloniality of power truly validates the operation of snares of matrices of power which should indeed be taken into account when thinking on the

path to realise pan-African unity. The AU is seen as the vehicle to realise this unity, but it has proven deficient for that it is a ground where divide and rule colonial tactics finds existence. The AU exists in the hierarchised colonial matrices of power, and it accounts to them. Since these matrices of power are the anti-thesis of pan-African unity, it is logical to argue that the AU cannot achieve such unity if it does not change its setting in the entrapment of the arrangements of the global imperial designs. These are the designs which create the situation of the indirect government where the AU is an auxiliary puppet with a radical face and rhetoric.

The AU's dependency syndrome on the West will always render it a junior partner – an auxiliary puppet. 'The African states themselves depended on these Western and industrial nations for loans to finance their economic development programmes'.⁵¹ The AU's locus of enunciation is problematic in that it is physically located in Africa, but it is ideologically located in the West. In this situation, Africa is not thought and spoken to in its epistemic and ideological self, but that of the empire. The AU should indeed clarify and make bold its locus of enunciation, and it has to be highlighted that being in Africa does not actually means thinking from Africa. The AU should be in Africa and think from Africa and with Africans. Fanon evokes the notion of geography of reason, which indeed just like the locus of enunciation calls for political imagination and action to be embedded in Africa and from Africa.

With the AU leadership still of the intermediary type and still accountable to the Euro-American metropolis, there are valid grounds to harshly criticise such a subjective position.⁵² Pan-African unity cannot emerge from such conditions if the destination of full decolonisation is not in the African hands. There is a tendency of post-colonial African leadership to become friendly to colonial powers. The AU has lost its humane face, and no way will it gain respect if it continues to pander to the whims of colonial matrices of power. It will be continuously reduced to a junior partner and also the insignificant other. Its role will continue to be that of the intermediary type.

If the AU advocates pan-African unity it should not be a pawn where the politics of divide and rule strategy are played. The AU should not play into the hands of global matrices of power which operate on the basis of laying a moral code and yet the conditions in Africa are still the same. For there to be pan-African unity, the AU should not surrender and account to the global imperial designs. The global imperial designs operate in such a way that they will ensure that the post-colonial leadership will keep the status quo intact, hence repetition without difference. This is how Fanon puts it: 'the leader, because he refuses to break up the national bourgeoisie, asks the people to fall back into the past and to become drunk on the remembrance of the epoch which led them to independence'.⁵³

The AU as a strand of pan-African thought needs to revisit its principles and standing. It should not hold on to the borders, and other colonially created institutions. It should apply its mind to how these will be dismantled, and re-create anew what is of benefit to the African continent. The AU should shed itself of embourgeoisment. The programme and content of pan-African unity, in the Fanonian light, should not only have humanist content, but it should be people-centered.

CONCLUSION

Pan-African unity is necessary as Fanon has highlighted. Pan-African unity should have been a priority in the inauguration of Africa's independence. The fact that Africa was acted upon through the conferring of judicial independence – what Fanon refers to as flag freedoms – was the fault which made pan-African unity impossible.⁵⁴ The politics of possibility which imagine and are directed at bringing pan-African unity are relevant as more than ever before. The notions and imaginations of freedoms which are prevalent in Africa should be demystified to open way for liberation, which is the necessary condition for pan-African unity.

There cannot be pan-African unity if there is emancipation. Therefore liberation, which means thorough decolonisation and bringing to life the new African being, is necessary. Pan-African unity needs willingness and re-imagination, not repetition without difference. Repetition without difference creates a situation where structures which are militating against pan-African unity are kept in place and they are re-fashioned in such a way that they make pan-African unity not to be realised.

Pan-African unity, as Fanon warns, should not be a bourgeoisie affair but an initiative of the people.⁵⁵ Africa is its people, and they must chart a terrain through which pan-African unity can be realised. The popular imaginations of freedom should be actualised to reality, and pan-African unity should de-link from the colonial matrices of power. African people have nothing to lose but everything to gain.⁵⁶ Pan-African unity is therefore a necessity, and for it to be actualised, political imagination that takes Fanon's warning into account is imperative.

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21st Century Pan-Africanism

Legitimising the African Diaspora 6th Region

David L. Horne

INTRODUCTION

The AEC (African Economic Community) and its two major corollaries, the African Union (AU) and the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), have embarked on an enormous paradigm-altering mission for the 21st Century: the internal and external operational unity of Africa, and the transformation of that geo-physical territory into a world power with the structural ability and capacity to fundamentally improve the quality of life of the majority of its citizens. A pipe dream to some (including some current members of the AU), this quest depends on the successful coordination and blending of many different components over a sustained period of time.

As stated at the end of a recent student debate in an advanced university class in pan-Africanism, '21st Century pan-Africanism (i.e., the Union of African States) can and will only be achieved by a balanced combination of governmental action, consistent, even relentless community-based organising, mass political mobilisation, international networking, and technological expertise by Africans, with the timely and relevant assistance of specific allies for particular issues.'³

Piece-meal and seemingly haphazard though it has frequently been thus far, the AU represents the dominant collective government response to the objectives of 21st Century pan-Africanism.⁴ In evaluating the success, remaining potential, and missteps of the African Union during its first ten years of operations, 2002/2012, the issue of the African Diaspora and its integration into the AU still looms large, as part of the community-based organising and international networking aspects, and can include technological expertise, political mobilisation, and financial engagements. So, how has that AU-African Diaspora partnership grown, fared and matured between 2002 and 2012? Is it even possible for the wildly scattered,

essentially non-governmental African Diaspora to actively become a viable 6th Region of Africa?

To answer those questions to some degree, this paper will focus on the twin issues of legitimacy and credibility of the African Diaspora project. In any serious endeavour, more particularly one that is as potentially transformative to fundamental African relations as the 21st Century Pan-African Movement is, the consistent legitimacy and credibility of the participants (organised and individual) are a reliable barometer of the dynamic status of the overall effort at any given time. Little to low credibility and/or legitimacy, for example, of the African Union Commission (the AU's Secretariat) at any particular time equals virtually no respect for the AU as a whole.⁵ So, as part of the assessment of the maturation of the AU-AD project and whether the probability of an actual African Diaspora 6th Region occurring should even be within the range of discussion, what are the significant challenges of legitimacy and credibility faced by the African Diaspora as part of the AU's thrust forward, and how are those challenges being addressed?

The first issue of credibility and legitimacy for the African Diaspora project is Article 3(q) itself. Although passed into existence by a solid majority of the AU attendees at the June, 2003 meeting, the amendment to the AU Constitutive Act remains unratified by the required 2/3 of the membership (36 member states).⁶ Even after constant references to the African Diaspora relationship in hundreds of AU documents and meetings since 2003, including the May 25, 2012 Global African Diaspora Summit, this remains the case.⁷ For those inside the AU who oppose the AU-AD relationship (and there are several countries), this is a consistent bone in the throat they use when discussions arise about broadening and solidifying that AU-African Diaspora relationship.

In specific ways, although clearly it is important to obtain ratification of the Article 3(q) amendment, that is a specious argument against the legitimacy of the AU-AD project. Principally, this is the case since there were several other items also passed along with and at the same time as Article 3(q), and those items have become fully integrated into AU operations without ratification.⁸ They, like Article 3(q), have become 'past practice' and 'regular use acceptable' components of the AU. Essentially, there are simply too many integral parts of the AU in which the African Diaspora has been included, at least on paper, in published documentation, in summits and meetings, and ultimately, in the grandiose Global African Diaspora Summit in May, 2012, for lack of ratification to cause marginalisation of the AU-AD relationship. Credibility and legitimacy via the 'letter of the AU law' can and will certainly be enhanced by ratification, but the AD's 'credit worthiness' so to speak, has already been established through the torrent of AU words, speeches, technical workshop drafts, Executive Council decisions,

Assembly mandates, and general declarations to the point of embedding the African Diaspora as an indispensable part of the fabric of the AU.

Lack of ratification of the Article 3(q) amendment thus does not negate the legitimacy of the AU-AD project, but that lack does render the credibility of that relationship ephemeral, semantic and paper-related only. There must be more value-added dimensions to that AU-AD relationship in order for that status to be elevated beyond the mediocre and for the African Diaspora to become serious international participants in the chess game of paradigmatic change for Africa.

The second major legitimacy/credibility issue is that of inclusion: the African Diaspora is not a legitimate or credible part of the AU unless its members are physically on-site, attending, debating and voting in meetings, drafting recommendations, *inter alia*. As of the May 25, 2012 Global African Diaspora Summit in South Africa, the 20 delegate seats designated for the African Diaspora as voting members of ECOSOCC (Economic, Social and Cultural Commission), one of the permanent units of the AU, have simply not been filled, even though the permanent ECOSOCC Commission morphed from the 2005–2007 Interim ECOSOCC Commission in September, 2008.⁹ The AU has said the ECOSOCC must be the African Diaspora's first formal participation in the AU.¹⁰

The problem has been twofold. Number one, the AU, through CIDO, the AUC's agency assigned to bring the Diaspora into the AU, has not approved a viable method of electing the 20 African Diasporan delegates, as required by the AU-mandated statutes of ECOSOCC.¹¹ This remains the case in spite of the consistent requests made by both individual and coalition organisations for such a method.¹² The AU even mandated one of the two Diasporan ex-officio members appointed to ECOSOCC by CIDO in 2008 to coordinate the necessary international gatherings in 2011 to determine an acceptable standard method, but the order was not carried out and the Global Diaspora Summit of 2012 came and went without that issue being resolved.¹³ It is a crucial deficit that has to be corrected in relationship to September, 2012, when ECOSOCC's first 4-year mandate expires and there is a major turnover of ECOSOCC membership and leadership (there are 130 members from the African continent), and there are already serious requests on the table for CIDO and the AUC to address this issue definitively.¹⁴

Part two of this issue is the perpetual confusion within the African Diaspora itself. There currently exists an estimated 5,000 plus pan-African oriented organisations across the Diaspora.¹⁵ The AU is not, should not, and will not admit 5,000 individual African Diaspora organisations into its fold. The AD must organise itself into inclusive regional collectives based on approved rules and standards. That process is currently on-going. There is presently a North American Region African Diaspora Unity Council, created

in January, 2012, which consists of Canada, the Virgin Islands and the USA. There is also a Central American Region African Diaspora Unity Council, formed in March, 2012, that includes Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, Belize, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Mexico, and a Middle East Region African Diaspora Unity Council (Afro-Bedouins, Afro-Hebrews, Afro-Jordanians, etc.), with two European Regions on the way. The Diaspora is addressing its own need for internal organisation, as it should.¹⁶ This process has created its own legitimacy/credibility progress. For instance, it has been only through these regional groupings that formal acceptance has been sent to the AU regarding the new AU definition of the African Diaspora, and it will be through the regional networks that legitimate elections of AD representatives to the AU will occur, as required by the Statutes of ECOSOCC.

This collectivising effort should result in getting ECOSOCC-compliant delegates elected and certified in 2012/2013 to join the AU, with several other elected folk from Diaspora communities available for participation in the remaining non-Assembly and non-Executive Council AU commissions and committees.¹⁷

Solving this issue of Diaspora inclusion will be merely one major step for legitimising the African Diaspora as the 6th Region of the AU, but currently it is a credibility problem of the first order. After 9 years of proclamations and verbal intentions, there is no practical African Diaspora official membership in the AU, and the sentiment is ever growing among those who have kept themselves informed that that status will not change.¹⁸ Even though the AU's ECOSOCC is and will remain an advisory, recommending body only, it is a permanent commission of the AU and it is the designated first AU entity to include African Diasporans as voting members. So inclusion in ECOSOCC will mean the acquisition of advanced opportunities for the African Diaspora members to gain valuable diplomatic experience and to ready themselves for eventual participation in other areas of the African Union, including the Pan-African Parliament. Each day this issue is not decisively addressed is another day disbelief and disregard are allowed to grow concerning the AU-AD project. There already exists a large critical mass among the African Diaspora who continue to disparage the seriousness of this AU-AD relationship,¹⁹ and with the lack of practical action – physical participation in voting by Diasporans inside the AU as promised – this has been taken and promulgated as *a priori* evidence that the AU-AD project and relationship are bogus, and having another large ceremony with brilliant speeches proclaiming the glory of the marriage between the AU and the African Diaspora is no viable defence.

The third issue of legitimacy and credibility involves the new AU definition of the African Diaspora as, 'people of African origin living outside of the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the (African) continent and the

building of the African Union'.²⁰ Traditionally, African Diaspora has had the connotation of the descendants of mainly enslaved Africans involuntarily transported to different parts of the globe to adjust and adapt inside others' societies. Former OAU Executive Secretary Salim Salim recently stated that that was the population intended when the AU promulgated its new definition of the Diaspora.²¹ However, that is not precisely how the definition has been interpreted. Thus, the relatively new population of African voluntary migrants in North America, Central America, South America, Europe and Asia – e.g., Ghanaians living and working in the US or London as permanent residents or citizens – or what has been called the Modern Diaspora (as opposed to the Historical Diaspora), has become the currently favoured real Diaspora by AU staff and administrators. That is not an insurmountable challenge, but it is a perplexing one. Establishing and maintaining a consistent and substantive dialogue between members of the Modern and Historical Diaspora, particularly among the youth, can reduce, if not entirely eliminate, this problem.

Much more formidable is the hostility, confusion and frustration of a large population of folk who assumed they were members of the African Diaspora by skin-colour and historical antecedents, and who repatriated to Africa in a 'return to the source' migration. These include populations of Afro-Jamaicans, especially Rastas, who migrated to the Shashemane village project in Ethiopia over 45 years ago and who are still not citizens of Ethiopia,²² and the approximately 10,000 African-Americans, Afro-Europeans, Afro-Canadians and others who have migrated to Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea-Conakry, South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia and other African countries.²³ The vast majority of them are not citizens in those African nations, some have renounced their American or European citizenship, and by the new AU definition of the African Diaspora, by living on the continent, they are not members of the African Diaspora either. In essence, by returning to Africa, they have become de-Africanised and caught in a no man's land of non-legitimacy. Those well-informed among those populations have expressed a hope that African Diasporans certified to the AU as voting members would lobby inside to change and broaden the AU's definition of the African Diaspora so that they would be included, rather than excluded, but that has not happened.²⁴ As a result, there has thus been a widening loss of faith in the whole process among that population, and they are not alone.

The new AU definition also excludes those who have shown no commitment to the development of Africa nor any tangible connection to the work of the African Union. Thus, the cliché regarding Brazil's 80 million African descendant citizens (being the largest African population outside the continent itself) means little when it is realised that most of them have no clue of there even being an African Union with a roadmap for the unification

of the continent, and in their country they have no incentive, resources or rationale to 'contribute to the development of the African continent', thus negating their African Diaspora status until major circumstances change (e.g., massive public education, grass roots organising, songs, plays, religious pronouncements, etc).

The legitimacy and credibility of the AU-AD project inside the African Diaspora requires major surgery, i.e., the appearance of a generation of champions willing to take the AU-AD message 'to the streets' of the African Diaspora. For that to occur, however, there must first be some tangible signs that the effort is worth it and that the African Diaspora will be accepted as a fully engaged partner in Africa's future unification.

The recent Global African Diaspora Summit in South Africa was supposed to contribute positively in that regard. It was a bright, fresh, impressive ceremony that involved over 1,200 participants from across the African continent and the African Diaspora. However, the AU Programme of Action document that resulted from the affair at best was a guideline for commitment and action, rather than a strategic plan forward. There were no time-lines included, no methods of evaluation for the validity of the Programme of Action's components, and no designation of who is responsible for getting the promised actions accomplished. Moreover, there was virtually nothing in the Programme of Action document to inspire, motivate or entice the interest of African Diasporans worldwide. Everything implementable in the document was left to the creativity and staying power of a very small handful of Diasporans – not even considered to be the critical core necessary for the task – to take back to and to educate a critical mass of skeptical African descendants on the sustained value of the AU-AD relationship and project.²⁵

In evaluating the AU-AD relationship through the legitimacy-credibility perspectives, the conclusion must be that those twin issues remain burdensome and bothersome, and they require some spirited effort to resolve them. The linchpin is clearly bringing in the 20 elected AD delegates as soon as possible, and there is still a waning, but possible, opportunity to accomplish that by the end of 2012. Enough resourceful elements within the AD have reported themselves ready to accomplish that task, and the only missing element is the sustained attention and will of the AUC/CIDO/ECOSOCC constituency and staff to get at least one standard method approved to elect those delegates, and then to get out of the way so the AD can get the job done.

Of course, a fourth issue of legitimacy and credibility is the relatively easy retreat to the historical rationale of the African Slave Trade's (aka the Maafa, or the Triangular Trade) dispersal of millions of Africans to countless global locations. Secondarily presenting the case of the longer term Arabic Trans Saharan slave Trade bolsters the historical argument.²⁶ Africans captured and sold other Africans into enslavement, or fought

against it and failed, or stood by and watched as slave coffles were marched seaward. Based on the historical argument, succeeding generations of continental Africans owe a debt to those Africans captured, sold and dispersed. Thus, there is this legitimacy claim from the debt owed.²⁷

Further strengthening this argument is the historical demonstration by several generations of dispersed Africans of their binding linkage to Africa as their original homeland. Dispersed Africans created the concept and first definition of pan-Africanism, they fought both physical and legal skirmishes to return to the continent, they named many of their new world organisations African names, and tried consistently to emigrate back through a command of new world resources, and participation in fierce debates about the wisdom of supporting the slave-owner sponsored schemes to send African-Americans to colonise the west coast of Africa for the newly formed American imperialism. But even in this seemingly comfortable and accepted argument, there are many nuances, mis-directions and outright myths perpetuated, so one has to be careful and to assume no guaranteed leverage from using it. One myth, for example, is that Africans came into colonial America first and foremost as slaves. Another is that most captured Africans brought to the Western hemisphere came immediately to the American colonies, and that after 1680, all Blacks in the American colonies were slaves. In fact, at no time during colonial or ante-bellum slavery in America were all Africans in America slaves. Many owned land, more than a handful voted, some shipped in voluntarily, paying their own passage, and several were free and wealthy.²⁸ The historical argument is actually pretty complex and is no easy victory for the legitimacy or credibility of the African Diaspora.

Finally, all of the above discussion has been about the legitimacy and credibility necessary to get the AU-AD project off GO and to sustain its forward movement. But ultimately, the legitimacy and credibility of the AU-AD relationship, internal and external, will be determined by whether in fact the African Diaspora can become a viable 6th Region REC, equal in status and operational sustainability to ECOWAS, SADC, EAC and/or COMESA. That will neither be easy, short-term nor unopposed. Currently, it has not even been seriously contemplated by most people, and not considered possible by most of the few people inside and outside the African Diaspora who have. What are the prospects of achieving that luminescence?

THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, THE AFRICAN UNION AND AFRICAN RECS

Conventional mythology says that former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi brow-beat and cajoled other African heads of state during the Sirte Summit

in 2000, to accept the death knell of the Organisation of African Union (OAU) and to replace it with the current African Union as the continental voice for the future of Africa.²⁹ Though clearly Colonel Gaddafi was a leading spokesperson for the process, as was Senegal's President Wade, the reality is not so neat.

In fact, the 1991 Abuja, Nigeria Treaty, which established the collective, signed commitment of African heads of state to form effective economic integration along a strategic path called the African Economic Community (AEC), galvanised the already-existing sentiments that led to the formation of the African Union and to its effective launching in South Africa in 2002.³⁰ The AEC became operational in 1994 once the required number of African states formally ratified the Abuja Treaty. Upon that launching, according to the Treaty, African economic integration, through the dynamic development and growth of pre-existing and to-be-formed African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), would be established collectively within 40 years, or by approximately 2034. Thus, in evaluating the progress of the AU after its first 10 years, part of that assessment needs to be within the framework of where it is according to the development of African RECs.³¹

It is to be noted that part of the continuing fundamental flaw in those two developments – the AEC and the AU – is a failure to differentiate or to properly interface the will towards political integration of the African continent and its Diaspora, and the will towards the economic integration of Africa. It should not be assumed that achieving one necessarily guarantees accomplishing the other – Africa's political economic history since 1956 should be strong evidence of that. Not laying out the proper protocols, treaties and legal relationships between those co-existing processes in development, can undermine and subvert both.³²

Currently, the African Union recognises 8 Regional Economic Communities, and in 2007, at the Assembly Heads of State Summit, it reiterated that achieving the desired unification of Africa – the Union of African States/United States of Africa – would occur through melding the processes of those 8 RECs as they developed to the level of establishing an African Common Market, common currency, continental Customs Union, free trade zones and independent movement across borders, and a Pan-African Parliament government.³³

The recognised African RECs are:

1. CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States), with 18 member states, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, The Gambia, Libya, Mali, Kingdom of Morocco (although not a member of the AU), Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia;

2. COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), with 23 members, including Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe;
3. EAC (East African Community), with 5 members, including Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda;
4. ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), with 11 members, including Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe;
5. ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), with 16 members, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo;
6. IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), with 7 members, including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda;
7. SADC (Southern African Development Community), with 14 members, including Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe;
8. UMA (Arab Maghreb Union), with 5 members, including Libya, Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.

The degree of redundancy or overlapping membership is to be noted. It remains a significant organisational problem for the current African RECs.

In order to be integrated as seamlessly as possible into the African Union, based on 2003's Article 3(q) of the Constitutive Act, the African Diaspora must fully participate in this dynamic economic development process from its own territories and vantage points up to and beyond becoming an African 6th Region Economic Community. Forming an African Diaspora Regional Economic Community will be unique and it will have original problems and issues not seen in the 8 currently recognised African RECs. However, there are and will be some commonalities, so what are the African REC success stories the African Diaspora can learn from?

LESSONS OF SUCCESS FROM CURRENT AFRICAN RECS

A recent study of African RECs identified the common problems listed below, and successes.³⁴ Currently, the biggest success story, once it is fully

implemented, is the Africa Free Trade Zone (AFTZ) established between SADC, the EAC and COMESA. Announced in the fall of 2008, it merges the economic operations of 26 of the AU's 54 member countries, and represents the first ever Cape to Cairo joint economic agreement. It already exists as a key building block for African unification under the AU's roadmap for integration, and, on paper, brings together vast resources, land, production-distribution processes, population and technical knowhow to the equation of economically organising Africa into a stronger player in the world market. It is presently the brightest star among the African RECs.³⁵

In moving slowly, sometimes at glacier speed, towards African regional integration, the results from the 2009 evaluation were called at best mixed, with several major gaps still remaining in both process and implementation. While SADC and the EAC have made noticeable progress towards establishing and operating both free trade zones and solid Customs Unions, most others have not. Further, the integration of sub-regional and informal markets remains tepid, and the free flow of African citizens from one country to another without passports and visas is still an elusive goal. In terms of scales of economic operation and leverage in decision-making, the more developed countries such as South Africa and Nigeria still dominate the less developed ones in their sub-regions and have not been able thus far to pull everyone else's economic boat upwards, while most African trade yet benefits European and American markets far more than Africa's own. The report also mentions persistent intra-state conflicts which have a chilling effect on country-to-country cooperation; painfully slow progress in the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade and investment; failure to properly mainstream gender into the integration efforts; the persistence of widespread structural underdevelopment in too many of the countries which continues to cause high expense and low efficiency in business and commercial ventures, and the persistent and deep seated distrust that remains among and between many member states.

For establishing the unique African 6th Region Economic Community, which will involve a process of collectivising the resources, personnel and economic integration of a critical mass of the 250-300 million African descendants scattered over 90 or more countries and territories so that an operational commercial and business network is established and maintained, the following lessons represent the principal wisdom to incorporate in moving forward, as culled from the current African RECs:

1. Credibility, diplomacy and integrity in negotiations and communications are crucial aspects of the process of REC development and must be established, nurtured and maintained.
2. The legitimacy of the African RECs has been established through treaties, protocols, amendments and agreements. The legitimacy of

the African Diaspora 6th Region Economic Community should follow that same pattern.

3. The African 6th Region Economic Community will start, as has the African RECs, with sub-regional groupings, specifically, the North American African Diaspora Economic Community, the Central American African Diaspora Economic Community, the Caribbean African Diaspora Economic Community (either as an outgrowth or appendage of CARICOM), the South American African Diaspora Economic Community, the European ADEC, and the Middle East ADEC. The African 6th Region Economic Community must avoid overlapping memberships, given the major problems that issue has caused in the harmonisation, growth and development of the current African RECs.
4. Financial dynamism, through on-going remittances to Africa, and the consistent annual coordination of development projects on the continent by Diasporans, already exists. Harnessing, cataloguing, coordinating and focusing all of that effort into relevant financial instruments and institutions in the Diaspora and networked throughout Africa are crucial.
5. All processes must be transparent, open and inclusive, rather than exclusive. Gender must be mainstreamed, and religion downplayed. Effective, logical structures must be developed, implemented in timely fashion, and credibly maintained and monitored.
6. Well-trained youth must be included from the outset and kept in the loop, so they will be ready to take the reins and continue all of the processes begun through to their completion.

THE FUNDAMENTAL STEPS IN BUILDING THE AFRICAN DIASPORA 6TH REGION REC

In order to get on and stay on the appropriate pathway towards 6th Region economic integration, the African Diaspora must have at least one credible and consistent champion to advocate, and organise, facilitate and move the Diaspora forward. Currently, that African Diaspora champion is PADU – the Pan-African Diaspora Union. PADU is an international organisation of coalition organisations based entirely on partnership agreements between those membership bodies. The idea of creating such an umbrella international entity came from Sixth Region Diaspora Caucus (SRDC) facilitators (in the US and Europe) and Baba Dudley Thompson, a legendary pan-Africanist and the-then president of the World African Diaspora Union (WADU), in the aftermath of attending meetings in South Africa, Barbados, Paris and other

locales where the AU's invitation to the African Diaspora was discussed. SRDC and WADU are currently the largest African Diaspora organisations in the Western hemisphere working towards accepting the AU's invitation for African descendants to join the African Union.

Seeking large African-centred organisations with several chapters and/or affiliates doing positive things for Africa and the African Diaspora, and which have some understanding of fundamental 21st Century pan-Africanism, in 2010 the SRDC signed Memoranda of Understanding agreements (MOUs) with Marcus Garvey's 96-year old 'government as organisation', the Universal Negro Improvement Association-African Communities League (UNIA-ACL) and 14 other qualified organisations, including the African Union African Descendants Caucus-Europe (AUADS-Europe), to create PADU as an operational international umbrella organisation. Even though Dudley Thompson remained an ardent supporter of PADU until his recent death at 95 years of age in January, 2012, and had accepted a role as the head of PADU's Elders' Council, his primary organisation – WADU – never joined PADU. WADU's executive board members recanted their original promise to do so.³⁶

The MOUs which were the original partnership agreements for joint action and economic capacity building between the member organisations of PADU, are the first step to full treaties and full protocols towards establishing the 6th Region Economic Community, and will continue being used during this initial phase.

In contrast to WADU's recalcitrance, the SRDC membership, in plenary sessions at its 2009 annual conference, heard, discussed and approved PADU as an organisation and the Atlanta-Seattle Declaration as its operating charter. PADU was thus born in Seattle, Washington in September, 2009.³⁷ Two months later, PADU-Europe was established as the model political-economic partnership for organising the African Diaspora in that part of the world.³⁸

PADU's primary mission is to help organise the African Diaspora into a tangible Sixth Region; to educate the African Descendant masses about the importance of African re-engagement; to help the African Diaspora do its part in achieving the unification of Africa for the benefit of all African people; and to become an African Regional Economic Community to legitimise the African Diaspora as a full African economic partner and participant.³⁹

To achieve that multi-faceted mission, PADU recognises the Decade of the African Diaspora effort currently being promoted all over the Diaspora (the African Diaspora has essentially ten years to raise itself to the needed level of growth and preparation to be integrated into the African Union, January, 2010 to December, 2020), and within that period plans

to substantially accomplish a variety of collective projects, including the development of a dynamic and accurate database of African descendant scientists, engineers, architects, media and technology experts, teachers and other skilled positions that will be part of an ongoing network of Diasporans collectivising their efforts to assist in African unification. There is not now, nor will there be in the future, an international government of the African Diaspora (although CARICOM does provide some governments in the African Diaspora), so establishing tariff rules, customs unions, internal taxes, and other typical processes of RECs will not occur. However, PADU will organise an economic region of proactive business, trade and commerce linking the African Diaspora, including internationally linked credit unions, pan-African banks and other financial institutions. PADU will help produce, develop, distribute and support educational and training activities throughout the African Diaspora that will advance the idea of Africa and African descendants as valuable, indispensable contributors to humankind's evolution and growth. PADU will promote 21st Century cultural advancements and serious cross-ethnic dialogue inside and outside of the African Diaspora. PADU will establish and maintain an international diplomatic process to engage CARICOM and other political-economic entities important to the development of the 6th Region. PADU will be instrumental in achieving dual citizenship opportunities for African descendants on the continent and in the countries they currently reside in as citizens, among other activities.⁴⁰

PADU's first joint meeting was in Charleston, South Carolina in August, 2010. There, PADU members reiterated that the essence of the MOU partnerships was and is 'unity without uniformity'. Each organisation retains its own sovereignty, character, style and practice as they share resources, networks, support, common vision, etc. Because of the nature of PADU's operational creation, there are some organisations larger than others – some even regional – and some organisations, because of their sheer breadth and range, that seemingly should have more clout and more voting influence than others. However, as part of each MOU, it was clearly stated that every PADU member organisation would have one vote only. Currently, there are 17 PADU member organisations (representing 300 independent organisations and chapters), with three of them clearly in the heavy-duty area of membership and scope (SRDC, AUADS-Europe, and the UNIA-ACL) and it is expected that each of these three will get even larger. Each member organisation has one vote on all issues. New member organisations must be sponsored by an existing member organisation and voted on by a majority of other members. Each organisation's membership is to be renewed every three years by a request to remain in PADU and an affirmative vote by a majority of PADU members.⁴¹

THE PADU PLAN FOR CRAFTING AN AFRICAN DIASPORA REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

At its first major development retreat in South Carolina (the MEDISSAGE Centre) in April, 2010, PADU debated and approved the following 20 Standing Committee building blocks out of which a strategic plan for the next 10 years will be crafted.⁴²

APPROVED PADU STANDING COMMITTEES/COMMISSIONS

1. Financial Banking, Investment, Business and Trade Committee (out of which will come the Pan-African Business and Trade Centre, the link between African Diaspora Chambers of Commerce, and the establishment of an African Diaspora Banking entity, etc.)
2. Media Networking and Communications Committee (to build, develop, and maintain an international network of AD media outlets and communications entities through websites and other devices; to establish and maintain a General African Diaspora Global Communications and Networking System, etc.)
3. Publications and Information Products (including the production and publication of relevant African Diaspora educational material for public dissemination, and the production, publication and distribution of a 'How to Do Business in Africa' booklet, etc.)
4. Pan-African Diplomatic Corps Committee (the establishment and maintenance of dynamic and standardised training in international discussions, debate and decision-making, etc.)
5. African Diaspora Skills Database Committee.
6. African Diaspora Nation-building and Project Development Committee (to build, establish and oversee a Pan-African Development and Investment Fund administered by PADU, and do an annual compilation of all AD projects on the continent seeking to assist African citizens and governmental entities, etc.)
7. African Diaspora Knowledge Committee (to build, establish and maintain a Research and Analysis process that can explore and report on important lessons from the African RECs, Caribbean economic-political efforts, etc.)
8. Pan-African Union Committee (to specifically deal with all things related to the African Union, including securing AD delegate seats in ECOSOC, participation in the PAP, etc.)
9. African Diaspora Education Committee (to develop and implement real 21st century Pan-African education projects everywhere possible, including lecture series, DVDs, symposia, seminars, etc.)

10. African Diaspora Global Marketing and Public Relations Committee (to build, develop and maintain initiatives to publicise PADU work and to combat negative media attacks on positive pan-African efforts, etc.)
11. African Diaspora Global Youth Committee (to provide a solid and consistent reference point for the recruitment, positive engagement, inspiration and training of Pan-African youth to be successful and productive in assisting African unification and in other related activities, etc.)
12. Pan-African Leadership Training Committee Specialising in Expanding AD Women's Leadership Roles and Opportunities Globally, etc.
13. Global Sixth Region Events Coordination Committee (to seek out collaborative efforts with other pan-African groups on projects that help to build the legitimacy and credibility for the AD 6th Region, etc.)
14. PADU Speaker's Bureau and Public Presentation Committee.
15. PADU Disaster, Relief and Emergency Response Committee (to help the AD coordinate efforts to assist each other during crises, etc.)
16. Pan-African Arts and Cultural Committee (to establish an advocacy for the greater usage and appreciation of AD creative efforts to bridge the gaps in knowledge relationships within and throughout the African Diaspora and the continent, etc.)
17. Banking, Business and Financial Resources Committee of Experts and Advisors for the African Diaspora.
18. PADU Expanded Secretariat and Headquarters Establishment Committee (to explore options and make solid recommendations for the implementation of administrative aspects of PADU relevant to its growth and development as an international umbrella organisation of organisations, etc.)
19. Reparations and Repatriation Committee (to maintain these issues within the vision of PADU's work in organising the African Diaspora, etc.)
20. Dual Citizenship Committee (will be responsible for the research necessary to write the compelling arguments required to achieve this goal, etc.)

Based on the above, there was an approved PADU commitment within the next 5–7 years to create a Pan-African Development and Investment Fund to coordinate Global Diaspora Capacity Building and Project Development. Tied to this idea is the establishment of a PADU Commodity Trading Bank for Investment and Development as a holding company for commodities contracts that can be leveraged to obtain investment and growth funding for African Diaspora public and private sector programmes and projects.

The bank will need to be staffed by a chief economist and supportive staff with the knowledge and expertise to establish and manage the fund. One outcome of the creation of this Fund will be the establishment of a series of African Diaspora Credit Unions, a Pan-African Banking and Finance entity, and a series of Pan-African Business and Trade Institutions.

PADU STRATEGIC PLAN: PHASE ONE (2011–2014):

1. PADU is currently compiling three primary documents, 2011–2013:
 - (1) An up-to-date database of scientists, engineers, architects, university faculty, economists, builders, media experts, writers, artists and others throughout the Diaspora, and a cataloguing of their skill sets.
 - (2) An up-to-date database of all of the African Diaspora projects currently on-going in Africa not primarily funded by US government, World Bank and IMF sources. It is believed that there are over 500 such projects started or renewed annually, but they remain individual efforts that are regularly redundant because of a lack of communication with each other and a lack of collectivity in their efforts for more efficient accomplishment.
 - (3) A series of up-to-date pamphlets and DVDs on how members of the African Diaspora can successfully do business in selective African countries, including Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Angola, Central African Republic, Rwanda and Burundi, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, and South Africa.
2. PADU has begun establishing Pan-African Business and Trade Centres (PABTC) in selective parts of the Diaspora, with the original entities already begun in Los Angeles, California and Accra, Ghana in 2011/2012 as the reference models. The aim is to have at least one branch of such PABTCs in every region of the African Diaspora, including Central America, the Caribbean, North America, Western and Northern Europe, the Middle East, and Oceania by at least 2016. The PABTCs will annually host an international conference, they will provide non-exploitative network contacts between producers, farmers, and artisans from Uganda to Nicaragua to Los Angeles to Suriname, for example, and utilising the opportunities provided by the US Agricultural Growth and Investment Act (AGOA) and other such legislation throughout the Diaspora, link actual products with lines of credit and movement from one trade area to another. The PABTCs will work with pre-existing lines of communications, e.g., CARICOM, EAC, ECOWAS, etc., but will create new ones when it is necessary.

3. Several African countries have recently established government portfolios for African Diaspora liaison positions, including Ethiopia and Tanzania. PADU, through its Diplomatic Corps, will work to establish strong and credible ties to such ministers, and will encourage other African countries to establish similar portfolios. This communications link is vital to future development.
4. Based on the lessons from Kwame Nkrumah's Young Pioneers, and also from the International Boy Scouts, PADU is already creating a Pan-African Youth Corps, whose members will be trained to see the world through collective pan-African eyes, who will be educated in Kiswahili (the future African lingua franca according to the AU), who will learn mobile African farming techniques, international trade and marketing skills, and become part of a broad, interactive and global Pan-African communications and exchange network.

CONCLUSION

Achieving the United States of Africa is the prime directive of 21st Century pan-Africanism. In order to make that a reality, a lot of African people in different parts of the globe will have to work tirelessly and logically through multi-layered phases of evolving strategic plans. The African Diaspora, in all of its complexity and contradictions, must be a permanent part of that on-going process. This paper has identified how a significant portion of that Diasporan involvement will unfurl. Forward ever.

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Reframing Trans-Atlantic Slavery as *Humanicide*

Resolving Hidden Wounds and Prioritising a New Vision of African Humanity

Hunter Havlin Adams, III

INTRODUCTION

Three hours away from Johannesburg, in a remote area of South Africa's Mpumalanga Province, a mixture of grassland and wetland environments, an amazing civilization existed – 75,000 years before Portuguese adventurers initiated the reprehensible international human commerce enterprise along Africa's Western shores. Over seven years, a team of South Africans led by Michael Tellinger and Johan Heine¹ discovered ancient roads, agricultural terraces, gold mines, and circular stone ruins, visible only from the air. This community covered more than 1500 square miles! These resourceful people constructed the 'oldest man-made structure on Earth' – an astronomical observatory, now named *Adam's Calendar*!

Tellinger notes: 'These discoveries are so staggering that they will not be easily digested by the mainstream historical and archaeological fraternity, as we have already experienced. It will require a complete paradigm shift in how we view our human history.' These ruins rebuke popular historical notions, assigned by Europeans, that, a) The Cradle of Humanity existed 6000 years ago between the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers in Ancient Sumer (Iraq today) and not Africa; and b) the origins of civilisation begins in Ancient Greece – effectively restricting civilisation's developmental trajectory, in order to be first, and exclusively, localised in Western Europe. This is called framing.

'...the present for so many of us is an abyss of fragmented, false meaning, when hopes are as windblown sand in a desert of despair, where a dreaded darkness of a post-modern world debases our dreamings of a better world.' (Wole Soyinka)

FRAMING

We have been framed! We have been set up – not in a criminal sense but, in terms of how we understand and interpret reality and history, how we relate and create, how we engage and navigate the world, and expect it to work. Much of human experience depends on the mental models, representations, narratives or frames we use to understand and shape reality. But, what exactly is a ‘frame’?

Three perspectives on frames – cognitive, shared social construction, and rhetorical and legalistic stand out. Cognitive frames ‘...structure our ideas and concepts, they shape how we reason, and they even impact how we perceive and how we act. For the most part, our use of frames is unconscious and automatic – we use them without realising it’, according to linguist, George Lakoff². As a shared social construction ‘frames are organising principles that are socially shared and persist over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world’ notes media strategist Stephen Reece³. Philosopher, Judith Butler⁴ illuminates the rhetorical and legalistic persuasive potency of frames wherein, ‘some power manipulates the terms of appearance and one cannot break out of the frame; one is framed, which means one is accused, but also judged in advance, without valid evidence and without any obvious means of redress’.

Depending on context, these three perspectives are often entangled, overlap and form networks of unconscious frames in our brains. Cognitive frames set boundaries and determine how some phenomena are seen or not. Butler⁵ observes:

The frame does not simply exhibit reality, but actively participates in a strategy of containment, selectively producing and enforcing what will count as reality.... This means the frame is always throwing something away, always keeping something out, always de-realising and de-legitimizing alternative versions of reality, discarded negatives of the official version.

Political psychologist, Drew Westen⁶ elaborates: ‘Frames influence not only what people think and feel about an issue but what they *don’t* think about.’ This is a ‘framing bias’ or ‘framing effect’ – the tendency to draw conclusions based on how data are presented. Results from a study of frames, biases and decision-making by de Martino⁷, B; Kumaran, D; Seymour, B; and Dolan, RJ revealed that:

Human choices are remarkably susceptible to the manner in which options are presented. This so-called ‘framing effect’ represents a striking violation

of standard economic accounts of human rationality, although its underlying neurobiology is not understood...This finding highlights the importance of incorporating emotional processes within models of human choice and suggests how the brain may modulate the effect of these biasing influences to approximate rationality.

While frames are everywhere, with every point of view, most people never think about them – until elections⁸ when candidates for public office:

1. 'frame' issues according to voter demographics sympathetic to their own and their funders
2. 'frame' their opponents' positions and personality (in a negative, weak and/or harmful light)
3. 'frame' themselves (in the best light).

Frames always contest, compete or complement with one another, and appear as a narrative's back-story giving it coherency and consistency. This is how candidates exploit framing.

THE BIRTH DEFECT FRAME

This essay began by stating, 'We have been framed.'The 'We' refers to the multiple generations of Africans who were captured and caught up in the multi-century, multinational human commodity/commerce scheme – *Trans-Atlantic Slavery* or *Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade*. We – each of us – are being subject to an elaborate rhetorical ruse about Trans-Atlantic 'Slavery'/'slave' trade. Malcolm X noted, '[We've] been hoodwinked. [We've] have been led astray. [We've] been bamboozled.'

Consider the word 'trade', which implies legitimate transactions among consenting partners, who agree to the trade's terms. Captured Africans never agreed to be *commodities*, nor were permitted to be *partners* in this so-called 'trade'. They could not conceptualise being bound by unknown pan-European 'laws' that made it 'legal' to capture, forcibly, people for the purpose of exploitation, unpaid labour, and rape. The word 'trade' misdirects the magnitude of the devastation and desolation African people experienced.

Trans-Atlantic slavery is a disturbing and divisive story that invites shame and excites blame. In an interview with editors for the *Washington Times*, former United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, musing on race relations in America, outlined the idea of a national 'birth defect' in the Nation's founding. Krale⁹ notes:

America doesn't have an easy time dealing with race; obviously, when this country was founded, the words that were enshrined in all of our great documents that have been such an inspiration to people around the world didn't have me [sic] for an overwhelming element of our founding population. And Black Americans were a founding population. Africans and Europeans came here and founded this country together – Europeans by choice and Africans in chains. [As a result] ...descendants of slaves did not get much of a head start, and I think you continue to see some of the effects of that... That's not a very pretty reality of our founding. I think that particular birth defect makes it hard for us to confront it, hard for us to talk about it, and hard for us to realise that it has continuing relevance for who we are today.

Secretary Rice, inadvertently, created a new frame – the constitutional 'birth defect'. However, it did not stick and was forgotten. The standard story of slavery is still strong – it remains embedded in hearts, minds, school curricula, churches, courts, and in fact throughout society's social fabric, notably the arts. Film classics, such as *The Birth of a Nation* and *Gone with the Wind* use Confederate (Southern) frames to exult the 'authorized' slave story. Hence, some people believe, like 18th Century pro-slavery advocates¹⁰ that in spite of the 'difficulty' of *slavery*, its victims were better off than being in Africa or living like poor *whites* in Europe. 2012 Republican presidential candidates, right-wing conservatives and media personalities use these Southern frames as covert cues (dog whistles) to reach their cohorts – other right wing conservatives.

Trans-Atlantic slavery is a flagrantly flawed frame that continues to evolve, leaving the truth yet to be fully elucidated. Hence, a corrective, an alternative frame, is crucial: The storyteller is as important as the story itself. Pollster Frank Luntz¹¹ insists: 'When you use the words of your opponents, you are accepting their definitions, and by extensions their conclusions'. An African (Ghana-Togo) proverb echoes Luntz:

'Gnatola ma no kpon sia, eyenabe adelan to kpo mi sena.' (Ewe-mina, Ghana, Togo) (Until the lion has his or her own storyteller, the hunter will always tell the story.)

HEGEMONY AND INTELLECTUAL WARFARE

It should not be surprising that the slavery narrative reflects the interests of powerful and wealthy European elites. Sociologist, Clovis E. Semmes¹² explores this in depth in his book, *Cultural Hegemony*:

We live in an (extreme) hegemonic society..... Hegemonic structures and ideologies cannot acknowledge or respect our traditions in education/socialisation.... Moreover they shape the beliefs and the behaviours that guide mis-education, while blaming victims...We see the denial of African culture, the denial of the significance of African culture, the assertion of the supremacy of western culture and the containment of teaching about African culture, even the distortion and destruction of African history and cultures....Purely and simply we must emancipate ourselves from hegemonic structures, including especially the foundation beliefs that support those structures. We must challenge these things at every turn. We must pose and construct alternatives to them.

Imagine: *Slavery as a natural feature of Africa, and that Africans sold each other every day*. Sure. Nowhere in Africa were there plantations or factories that needed millions of subjugated labourers. Such skewed statements were a moral cover, serving to 'justify' business-related brutality of Africans, while undermining their social, political and economic systems and/or slaughtering them¹⁵. Deceitful and disparaging accounts of African peoples, societies, cultures, and histories, are still flaunted with fanfare by some European/Euro-American scholars and institutions, who also wage ferocious polemics on Africana voices who dare challenge them.

This is 'intellectual warfare' declared political scientist Jacob Carruthers¹⁴. Carruthers, Semmes, John Henrik Clarke¹⁵, Jean Phillppe Omotunde¹⁶, Charles Mills¹⁷, Asa Hilliard¹⁸, Chinweizu Ibekwe¹⁹ and others have been contesting, critiquing, and revealing the contradictions, fabrications, and inconsistencies in Western hegemonic discourse from historical, political, sociological, philosophical and psychological perspectives. They reveal constructs and rebut claims that are anti-African and pro-European. They have renounced viewing centuries of exploitation, degradation and atrocities as merely side effects of commercial enterprise – 'trade'.

The following sections briefly review various alternative concepts to Trans-Atlantic slavery, and consider their explanatory power of the truth of *what really happened*. The last section formulates a theory of *humanicide*, the author's term offered to reframe Trans-Atlantic slavery/slave trade.

GENOCIDE AND RELATED CONCEPTS DEFINED

In a 1933 essay, before the United Nations was formed, human rights activist/lawyer, Raphael Lemkin²⁰ conceptualised the idea of international 'crimes of barbarity', based on the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire's systematic slaughter of its Armenian population from 1915-1920. Ten years later Lemkin²¹ combining the Greek word – (*genos*–γένος) for small kinship group, clan or

tribe with the Latin word *cide* (to kill), introduced the term –*genocide*. This became the operational idea to examine possible criminality of World War II atrocities. After two years of acrimonious debate over the definition of genocide, the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948 passed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It came into effect in January 1951 after twenty countries ratified it. Yet, the United States refused, arguing it could prove detrimental to American citizenry²². Four decades later, February 19, 1986, the US Senate ratified the Convention, after Senator William Proxmire delivered 3,211 speeches, over 17 years, persuading President Ronald Reagan, in 1987, to sign the Genocide Convention Implementation Act, also known as the Proxmire Act.²³

In Article II, the Convention defined crimes of genocide as:

the intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group by: (a) killing members of the group, (b) causing serious bodily harm to members of the group, (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to other groups.

In a revealing review of the Genocide Convention dynamics, sociologist, Siswo Pramono²⁴ contends:

The United Nations Genocide Convention²⁵ is best described as ‘paralysis by design’. As states devoured their own subjects, others, who attempted to stop the frenzy, designed a consensus to prevent and punish genocide. But the designers had left open many loopholes which allow an exit strategy for those planning a future policy of genocide.... At the outset, the discourse of genocide was within the domain of international lawyers who argued for genocide that includes politicide; in its later development, diplomats and policy makers nurtured the concept in the spirit of realist politics. The drafting of the Genocide Convention was then a subject of political compromise, developed by legal conferences, and hence, formatted in legal realism.... To save the world from the peril of genocide was then a noble endeavour pursued by these diplomats; underneath, however, their mission was clear: ‘to insulate political leaders from scrutiny and liability’. One way of doing this was by defining the term ‘genocide’ to have a narrow meaning that excludes almost everything.

Despite decades of debate on genocide’s parameters²⁶, such as inclusive or exclusive determinants, prerequisites, cultural, motivational and precipitating factors, intentionality, state terror versus genocide, and war crimes versus genocide, there is not a theory of genocide²⁷. Unsurprisingly, state

actors seek to ensure there are loopholes to avoid being accountable in some future genocide-like scenario. This is why it took so long for the slaughter in Darfur, Sudan, to be declared genocide.

Conceptions of genocide have limited application to Trans-Atlantic slavery, where the objective was *not* mass killing: Keeping chattel-captives alive was economically incentivised, they were crucially necessary to sustain a sociopathic system.

POLITICIDE

Politicide is defined by Harff & Gurr²⁸ as: 'the promotion, execution or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal or political communal group.' People were killed because of their political opposition to a regime and/or dominant groups.²⁹

DEMOCIDE

Democide is public murder, including terror, intentionally done by government agents acting authoritatively. Rummel³⁰ offers the concept of *democide* (from Greek *demos* or people).³¹

CULTURAL GENOCIDE/ETHNOCIDE

Lemkin³² originally envisioned genocide as: 'an intentional crime that demonstrates a coordinated plan of diverse actions aiming at the deliberate destruction of a group's essential foundations of life, or depriving them of their cultural heritage, with the aim of annihilating the group itself.' He argued that such a plan's purpose would be the disintegration of the group's political and social institutions, culture, language, national feelings, religion, morality, and its economic existence, with the destruction of individual group members' personal security, liberty, health, and dignity. Lemkin called such a program, *cultural genocide* or *ethnocide*.

Israel W Charny³³, executive director of the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem, describes five categories of ethnocide: *Biological and physical* – mass slavery, torture, rape, murder; *Economic* – disrupting or destroying a community's economy; *Linguisticide* – forbidding the use of or intentional destruction of a particular ethnic people's language; *Religious and Spiritual* – forbidding or severely disrupting the traditional practices of

a religion, or forced conversion to the dominator's faith; and *Social* – forbidding or censoring, celebration of traditions and continuity of historical memory of an ethnic, national, religious or other group, fostering a cultural milieu to debasement an ethnic, national, religious or other group. Though well rounded, Charny's definitional matrix³⁴ for ethnocide does not capture the depth or duration of Africans' enslavement, neo-slavery reprisals like peonage, Jim Crow laws and mass incarceration.

THE MAAFA

Noticing problems with genocide, anthropologist, Marimba Ani (Richards)³⁵ introduced an East African, Kiswahili word – *Maaafa* – meaning disaster, terrible occurrence or great tragedy, to capture the catastrophic suffering experienced by millions of African people. Ani understands the *Maaafa* as a conscientious, criminal, and incessant system of human negation and nullification. She maintains that the *Maaafa* has global significance and reflects the aggregate population losses over multiple centuries, in multiple geographies, and encompasses the profound disruption to continental African settlement patterns, exacerbation of ethnic conflict and the stagnation of African peoples' socio-economic development potential via colonisation and neo-colonisation. Toyin Agbetu³⁶, writer/filmmaker and Founder of Ligali, a London-based, Pan-African Human Rights Organisation, condenses *Maaafa* as 'The Enslavement of (Mama) Africa' by invading Arabs and Europeans.

MAANGAMIZI: THE AFRICAN HOLOCAUST

Ethicist Maulana Karenga³⁷ appreciates Ani's term *Maaafa*, but discerns limitations, making a case that *Maaafa* does not address intentionality and could be (mis)interpreted as an accident, calamity, or ill luck. Karenga believes the terms *Afrikan Holocaust* or *Holocaust of Enslavement of African People* are more accurate:

By holocaust means a morally monstrous act of genocide that is not only against the people themselves, but also is a crime against humanity. The Holocaust of Enslavement expresses itself in three basic ways: the morally monstrous destruction of human life, human culture and human possibility.

In terms of the destruction of human life, estimates run as high as ten to a hundred million persons killed individually and collectively in various brutal and vicious ways. The destruction of culture includes the destruction

of centres, products and producers of culture: cities, towns, villages, libraries, great literature (written and oral), and works of art and other cultural creations as well as the creative and skilled persons who produced them.

And finally, the morally monstrous destruction of human possibility involved re-defining African humanity to the world, poisoning past, present and future relations with others who only know us through this stereotyping thus damaging the truly human relations among peoples.

Karenga interchanges Holocaust with another Kiswahili term, *Maangamizi*, which may refer to some natural disaster or a deadly highway accident. *Maangamizi* presents problems too: First, the immensity of the human trauma and tragedy that captive and colonised Africans experienced over centuries is beyond any indigenous meaning of *Maangamizi* (or *Maqfa*). Second, *Maangamizi* can refer to a shaman/spiritual teacher, who seeks justice through destruction, revealed in filmmaker, Queenae Taylor Mulvihill's³⁸ film, *Maangamizi – The Ancient One*. Nonetheless, both terms are culturally and politically distinct from 'holocaust' and distinguish African domestic servitude from European and Arab commercial adventures in the 'trade' of captive Africans.

Both etymologically and conceptually, 'holocaust' is inapplicable to Africans' experiences: 1) holocaust is a Greek word, referring to a person being 'completely burnt' – (ολος – *holos*) (καυστός – *kaustos*); and 2) it is used as a frame, referring to the World War II Nazi genocide of Jews, Gypsies and others. When holocaust is mentioned, no one immediately thinks of slavery. Captive Africans were not systematically incinerated – their humanity was eviscerated.

CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the positive restating of aspects of Charny's ethnocide matrix. As a conceptual breakthrough, The Durban Resolution³⁹, issued at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Race in Durban, South Africa, called the *Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade* a 'Crime Against Humanity'. Whatever those crimes perpetrated on African people over 500 years, though 'legal' at the time of commission, in the interest of truth and transparency, need a forensic analysis.

BLACK CHATTELIZATION WAR

'Slave Trade' – What Slave Trade? Author Chinweizu⁴⁰ maintains: '...terms like "slave trade" and "colonialism" are not only Euro-centric; they are no

more accurate in describing what happened than “molestation” would be in describing mass murder. In fact, they are insidiously hostile to our interests. What is at stake in retaining or rectifying such orthodox terminology is this: *Which version of reality shall we work from, that imposed by our enemies or our own, that which serves the interests of our enemies or our own?*

Chinweizu sees the ‘slave trade’ in terms of a war system, a ‘Black Chattelization War’, which has three main features – interminable wars, forced labour and **terrorism**, targeting the Black/African race. This theatre of war was organised by Europeans, who were its prime beneficiaries, and operated on four continents, in four zones: Africa, the Diaspora, and the United States and Europe, from where the entire scheme was masterminded, coordinated, armed and financed. While Chinweizu offers numerous insights into Black Chattelization as war, chattelization, being part of a larger process (which he acknowledges), is inadequate.

On a structural level, what happened during Trans-Atlantic slavery was the same process, with the same protocols and propaganda that was, and is still used in systems of oppression and exploitation, globally. The South African Apartheid system is a recent example. Many methods of social control using terror and torture on captive Africans were first tried and tested on criminals, prisoners of war, heretics, and women during Medieval Europe as well as The Inquisition. Trans-Atlantic slavery differs dramatically in scale, scope, severity, duration, location, and emancipation possibility.

TRANS-ATLANTIC AFRICAN SLAVERY AMOUNTED TO A SINGULARITY OF SITUATIONAL SUBJUGATION

Never before in human history has an equivalent system of exploitation occurred so comprehensively that it is beyond belief. This multi-century, trans-national process began with abductions (kidnapping with no ransom), disappearances, the long march through perilous rain forests to desolate dungeons (coastal castles), the ‘Middle Passage’ journey on floating prisons (so-called ‘slave ships’) to the ‘new world’, auctioning, seasoning (brain-washing), torture, whippings, civic and social death, chattel captivity – 14 hour workdays, legitimate rape, cultural molestation and misappropriation, Post-Slavery structured economic and social injustice or Jim Crow⁴¹, examples include: lynchings, legalised inequity, political marginalisation, pervasive micro-insults, and late 20th Century mass incarceration⁴² of Blacks and Latinos in the United States. Non-compliance could cause ‘all manner of torment possible’. The ominous outcome was ‘complete defeat’ – the denial of people’s ability to survive on their own terms, loss of control over their children’s custody and socialisation, and ultimately, loss of control over

the future. This is a snippet of *what really happened*. Is *this the* classical *slavery* known in ancient Greece, Rome, Medieval Europe, and even parts of Africa?

TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMANICIDE

Words like 'slave', 'slavery', and 'slave trade' operate as disinformation, and pretexts to de-signify what the bondage experiences of Africans entailed. Ever evolving legalistic definitions of genocide⁴³, and other terms like crimes against humanity, *Maafa*, Afrikan Holocaust are inadequate and inaccurate. Considering all this led to the conceptualisation of a new framework – 'HUMANICIDE' as detailed in the author's book, *We Were Never Slaves*.⁴⁴

Humanicide transcends Lemkin's original intent of the meaning of genocide, extends Charny's five categories of ethnocide, and considers the politics of recognition, grievability, and significance. It addresses, decisively and specifically the *slavery experiences* of captive and 'free' Africans. It exposes the process of *killing* of a people's/person's identity, culture, history, language, religion, socialisation, family relations, as well as punitive killing of colonised people to enforce compliance with the odiously oppressive system. Moreover, it details tactics used to create conditions and mindsets that continue to batter Africans, notably in the Diaspora, with unearned shame and suspicion, bedevil race relations, foster unwholesome ways of living, relating, and consuming, sub-consciously fulfilling the slave narrative. Humanicide is not the equivalent to racism, discrimination, Jim Crow or Apartheid – it encompasses and eclipses them while, simultaneously, preserving that which was of value to the captors, i.e., 'African labour'.

Presently humanicide is configured and characterised by multiple interfacing categories and inseparable attributes: philosophical, psychological, physical, cultural, biological, health, economic, educational, linguistic, religious/spiritual, social, historical, legal, regulatory/managerial and temporal:

A. Physical

- 1 Mass subjugation, disappearances, dislocation, displacement, torture, and death
- 2 Civic Death – denial, contraction and/or suspension of basic human rights.

B. Psychological

Developing/implementing psychological operations for creating chronically stressful and toxic mental environments and experiences through sophisticated coercive persuasion, covert/overt intimidation, and cultural

destruction, to break a group's mind, to reduce their self-worth by targeting an individual's mind. This was the six month plantation seasoning process to turn a human being into a slave; psychologist, Bobby E. Wright⁴⁵ called this *mentacide* – symptoms include alienation from Black culture and history, loss sense of purpose and direction, and unconsciously or willingly thinking and acting out of an oppressor's interpretation or frame of reality for their benefit, and the victims' detriment. This echoes *Stephen Bantu Biko*, 'The most potent weapon of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed.'

C. Philosophical

Ontological:

1. Affirming a false and/or flagrantly flawed social identity of an ethnic, national, religious or other group, e.g. 'savage', 'beast', 'soulless animal' or sub-human/sub-person⁴⁶. The origins of the word 'slave' are traceable to Eastern European Slavic peoples.
2. Effective erasure/censure of an ethnic group(s) personhood and possibility, history, heritage, culture, community, and family, to render them anonymous.
3. Replacing an ethnic group's name for themselves with a generic and offensive construct that dehumanises them. For example, a 1942 German magazine, *The Subhuman*, edited by Himmler (of the SS) describes Jews as beasts and a vector of infection; the most insidious and egregious misrepresentation is 'slave' – which dehumanises not a specific ethnic group (Slavs), but an entire 'race' – Africans: '...slave is a profoundly corrosive psycho-social construct with deep negative trans-generational emotional resonances.'⁴⁷
4. Fostering false and maladaptive divisive, antagonistic, attitudes and concepts of self and history, language and behaviour, culture and conscience, such as 'master/slave consciousness'. In succeeding generations, such identity deformation dynamics are re-learned through social-neuro-psychological mirroring.⁴⁸
5. Fabricating false memories via mystified phylogenetic archetypes, and moulding them into a spectrum of specious stereotypes, like skin color myths – 'if you are white you are all right, if you are brown, stick around, if you are black, get back.' This myth forms the existential core of the political ideology of 'white supremacy' and its corollary, 'black inferiority': supporting myths include ideas of the naturally lascivious, docile, bitchy Black woman, complimented by the sex-craving, criminal, angry, Black man.

Axiological (morality):

Creating a value system of an ethnic, national, religious or other group that (irrationally) 'justifies' their degradation and diminution for

subjugation or assimilation, while simultaneously universalising the moral and philosophical supremacy of the domineering group.

Epistemological

1. killing indigenous peoples' knowledge and/or fabricating non-knowledge claims
2. excluding or marginalising knowledge, achievements and contributions of the victimised
3. appropriating (stealing) victims' knowledge and claiming its origins for one's own ethnic group.

D. Cultural

1. Intentional and systematic destruction of an ethnic group's lifeways, particularly their cultural record – libraries, archives, artifacts and material culture including clothing, cemeteries, religious monuments, historic buildings and signs, which act as a powerful and potent nexus fusing collective and individual memories.
2. Using a foreign or fake material culture in an attempt to 'de-structure' or radically disengage a specific group, e.g., captive Africans, from their previous ethnic groups' cultural identity and history. Riedlmayer⁴⁹ notes, 'The killing of a person destroys an individual memory. The destruction of cultural heritage erases the memory of a people. It is as if they were never there.'

E. Biological

1. Manipulating the birth rate of an ethnic, national, religious or other group; for example, a) forced separation of men and women under captivity; b) reproductive exploitation via forced sex by male impregnators (plantation owners, their sons, overseers and selected-male captives) for breeding babies for profit and pleasure.
2. Rape and sex trafficking, and general sexual abuse (of men as well as women) – the resultant effects were emotional deprivation, and physical and mental torture, which historian, Nell Irvin Painter⁵⁰ calls *Soul Murder*.
3. Forced nursing by female captives of plantation owners' babies of their wives and mistresses, and even dogs.

F. Health

Harming, depleting or endangering the health of an ethnic, national, religious or other population; unethical, non-consensual medical experimentation.

G. Economic

Destroying or corrupting the foundations of the economic existence of an ethnic, national, religious or other group; forced uncompensated labour,

share-cropping; dispossession or delimiting of wealth through targeted policies.

H. Educational

Making education of captives illegal. Mis-education: teaching a deceptive pedagogy – *only* European/American history in 'slave colonial' schools; deliberate presentation of Africans and African descendants as intellectually inferior to Europeans and other 'races'. Promotion of an ethnic exclusion curricula by, '...failing to acknowledge important contributions of African Americans, White Americans could more easily justify the inequities that Black people suffered in American society.'⁵¹

I. Linguistic

Forbidding the use of, or intentional destruction of the language of a particular ethnic people; exploiting polarising word attributes in Indo-European languages, that is, negative connotations for the colour black and positive for the colour white, this lends credence to notions of white superiority/black inferiority.

J. Religious/Spiritual

Forbidding the traditional practices of a religion, or coerced conversion to the dominator's faith; displaying images of white 'gods', developing hermeneutical (mistranslation) strategies supporting (false) claims of 'god' – deemed inferiority and subservience of Africans to Europeans – '*Slaves, obey your earthly masters...*': Christian Holy Bible (NRSV): Ephesians 6:5–9, Colossians 3:22–25; religion was used to buttress moral assertions of Africans being natural *slaves*, Genesis 9:20–27 – The Curse of Ham Myth.

K. Social

1. Denial/delimiting of slaves' agency and autonomy; *sporadically breaking up 'enslaved' families; on a whim, selling or renting individuals, especially young women and children. So-called slave husbands or man-friends sometimes defensively watched, their 'wives', daughters, or female friends, raped 'legally' by plantation owners, their associates and overseers.*
2. Forbidding, censoring, or effectively barring celebration of traditions and continuity of historical memory of an ethnic, national, religious or other group. Historian John W. Blassingame⁵² points out, 'Slave marriages were illegal in southern states...' and '*Two parent [slave] households did not exist.*
3. Fostering a cultural milieu that normalises degradation and debasement of an ethnic, national, religious or other group, encourages alcohol and drug abuse, illiteracy, poverty, criminality, and violence. Sociologist Orlando

Patterson⁵⁵ calls this social death, for example, 'white only', 'coloured only' signs in public places during US Segregation or South Africa's Apartheid.

L. Historical

1. Omitting or falsifying facts, or selectively editing historical narratives/ events of a specific group to demean them. '...lifting Africans out of their own history making them a footnote and forgotten casualty in European history and thus limiting and denying their ability to speak their own special cultural truth to the world and make their own unique contribution to the forward flow of human history.'⁵⁴
2. Consolidation of the victor's or oppressor's version of history to be learned by the victims (captive Africans) as well the victor's society.

M. Legal

Creating bogus 'laws' to decriminalise, universally recognised crimes (kidnapping, murder, rape), and 2) corollary 'laws' that criminalise behaviours resulting from imposed situations (Black Codes)⁵⁵. Between 1865 and the 1950s Post-Slavery laws were passed that governed every aspect of daily life – education, public transportation, health care and housing, use of public facilities, disenfranchisement of women's and children's inheritance or legal rights, prevention of racial interbreeding (marriage and co-habitation)⁵⁶ coupled with, unjust prosecutions, fabricated evidence and testimony to convict the innocent. Similarly, Pass Laws existed during South Africa's Apartheid regime.

N. Regulatory/Managerial)

Development and implementation of protocols and control measures to impel loyalty and deference to agendas and agents of authority ('white people'), and cultivate cowardice and distrust, among oppressed Africans to make self-doubt and self-loathing self-perpetuating; exploit bureaucratic systems to develop, implement, and maintain protocols, policies and procedures to limit employment opportunities, and/or foster hostile work environments.

O. Temporal

Destruction of the temporal references, that is, a particular group's own cosmic and geographical space-time references/calendar(s).

In relation to these categories, humanicide acts as heuristic lens that brings into focus the massive damage done to Africans' matrix of being – minds, bodies, souls and societies, both locally and globally⁵⁷⁵⁸⁵⁹⁶⁰⁶¹; It moreover considers and values survival strategies, modes of resistance, creative countermeasures – legal, moral, cultural, artistic, civil disobedience, political and so forth, that the beleaguered people used to 'fight the power'⁶².

Humanicide takes into account the perpetrators' motivation and mindset to understand *why*. Pope Nicholas V⁶³ issued two papal bulls (edicts): the *Dum Diversas*, June 18, 1452 and *Romanus Pontifex*, January 5, 1455 authorising King Alfonso V of Portugal to reduce any 'Saracens (Muslims) and pagans and non-Christian peoples in Africa, and any other unbelievers' to perpetual slavery:

We weighing all and singular, the premises with due meditation, and noting that since we had formerly by other letters of ours granted among other things free and ample faculty to the aforesaid King Alfonso – to invade, search out, capture, vanquish, and subdue all Saracens (Muslims) and pagans whatsoever, and other enemies of Christ wheresoever placed...and to reduce their persons to perpetual slavery, and to apply and appropriate to himself and his successors ... use and profit....

This was a 'declaration of war' that Africans never were aware. These proclamations facilitated the Portuguese's and other European's West African human trafficking/terrorism (trade). Following the 1885 Berlin Conference, this mindset masterminded the colonisation of Africa⁶⁴. Later Popes tried to invalidate these Papal Bulls, but it was too late. Five hundred years later, humanicide plays out in propaganda campaigns promoting and normalising self-loathing, self-degradation, and dependency to the point where some take solace in being subservient – a slave.

POLITICS OF RECOGNITION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT

One of the most contemptuous contrivances used by the multinational European perpetrators of humanicide is the pervasive disrecognition of African peoples' humanity. Political Scientist, Patchen Markell⁶⁵ (after Taylor) argued that:

Since we are socially situated creatures, we are profoundly vulnerable to the ways in which we are perceived and characterised by others. The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others...and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.

Markell offers an alternative diagnosis of relations of social and political subordination, and sees them not as systematic failures by some people to recognise others' identities, but as ways of patterning and arranging the

world that allows some people and groups to enjoy a semblance of sovereign agency at others' expense. He calls this the 'politics of acknowledgment'.

POLITICS OF SIGNIFICANCE

All human life is legitimate and has intrinsic self-worth with a vital need for validation, which is a precondition of effective agency. Consequently, beyond a politics of acknowledgment of tens of millions of Africans lives lost in the Humanicide, a politics of significance is obligatory. In *The Racial Contract*, philosopher Charles Mills⁶⁶ asks:

What does it require for a sub-person to assert himself or herself politically? To begin with, it simply means, or not so simply, claiming the moral status of personhood. So it means challenging the white-constructed ontology that has deemed one a 'body-impolitic', an entity not entitled to assert personhood in the first place. In a sense, one has to fight an internal battle before even advancing onto the ground of external combat. One has to overcome the internalisation of sub-personhood prescribed by the Racial Contract and recognise one's own humanity, resisting the official category of despised aboriginal, natural slave, colonial ward. Linked with this personal struggle will be an epistemic dimension, cognitive resistance to the racially mystificatory aspects of white theory, the painstaking reconstruction of past and present necessary to fill in the crucial gaps and erase the slanders of the globally dominant European worldview. One has to trust one's own cognitive powers, to develop one's own concepts, insights, modes of explanation, overarching theories, and to oppose the epistemic hegemony of conceptual frameworks designing in part to thwart and suppress exploration of such matters; one has to think *against the grain*.

GRIEVABLE LIVES

Below the surface waters of the politics of recognition, acknowledgment, and significance is the precarity of life, to which religious writer, Albert Raboteau⁶⁷ invites reflection:

We, black and white, suffer a form of partial amnesia, which distorts our perceptions because we have not adequately remembered and mourned what we have suffered. I am talking about a mourning that is not an episode, but an attitude, a state of awareness.... Our nation has need of tears, tears for all those lynched, maimed, whipped, shamed, and debased by our history of race hatred. Our country has need of tears for those who suffered and for those at

whose hands they suffered. For they, by denying the humanity of others, denied their own. We remain connected to the past by memory, and the nation, like individuals, must come to terms with the past.

For Africans, centuries of grief beyond expression, which, with every passing generation become more emotionally and psychically distant leaves those millions of lost lives effectively, ‘ungrievable’. Judith Butler⁶⁸ stresses:

Ungrievable lives are those that cannot be lost, and cannot be destroyed, because they already inhabit a lost and destroyed zone, they are, ontologically lost, and from the start, already lost and destroyed... Without grievability, there is no life, or rather, there is something living that is other than life. Instead, ‘there is a life that will have never have lived, sustained by no regard, no testimony, and ungrieved when lost.’

Ungrievable lives pose disquieting questions: Philosopher David Smith⁶⁹ asks: ‘What does it mean to think of someone as a human being, and what is it, exactly, that dehumanised people are supposed to lack?...What is it about the human mind that enables us to conceive of people as less than human? Is it the “otherness”, the “not-like-me-ness” as seen in the movie, *Avatar*? How could people delight in and dance to others suffering?’

In an interview, Nobel-prize winning author, Toni Morrison⁷⁰ provides a clue: ‘...people who do this thing, who practise racism, are bereft – there is something distorted about the psyche, it is a huge waste, and it is a corruption and a distortion. It’s like it is a profound neurosis that nobody examines for what it is...it is just as much a deleterious effect on white people and possibly equally on black people – What are you (white people) without racism? Are you any good? Are you smart? Do you like yourself?’ These questions are beyond the scope of this essay, but are dealt with in the author’s book.⁷¹

Humiliating socio-political and economic inequities, born from the humanicide’s chronic stressful living conditions, often beginning in utero, following the oppressed ‘from the cradle to the grave’, create clouds of suspicion and wealth, health and happiness disparities that disproportionately afflict Africans in the Diaspora and elsewhere as compared to other, principally non-African social groups. Psychiatrist, P. A. Newton⁷² calls these trans-generational after effects, ‘Post Traumatic Slavery Disorder’.

AFRICANA HUMANISM

Philosopher Lewis Gordon⁷³ discerns a defining feature of oppressive relations of the New West, (US and Europe), as ‘a pervasive ethos against

humanistic solutions to racism, classism, and sexism'. Africans all over the world remain influenced by hegemonic language, impulses and structures. Technology, music, movies, and globalisation are driving the clash of three distinctive streams of perception, socialisation practices, cognitive styles, values, and worldviews – Africana, Asian and European. However, the permeability of the global cultural membrane allows privileged passage of European ethos into streams of intellectual interaction. By necessity, people 'code-switch' between cultures and social contexts, and forms of reasoning.

In global discourse, Africana *frames of meaning* of humanity, morality, ethics, spirituality, science, law, economics, etc. are occluded or excluded, and rarely operationalised, except among a very small circle of scholars. How can authentic Africana values find extensive expression space before a world audience in context of vulgar and violent stereotypes extolled in popular media? Against our capacity for generating goodness, evil has gallantly gained ground, pathologising African people. How can we restore, promote and protect our well-being, wisdom, and authentic life? How do Africana people lift themselves up without saviours, but with propitious partners? We must return to our ancient root-ethos.

An Africana sensibility understands an inseparable unity between the absolute and its creative activity and human actualisations. This understanding is shored up by evidence medical anthropologist, Alondra Yvette Oubré⁷⁴ offers in her book, *Instinct and Revelation: Reflections on the Origins of Numinous Perception*. Oubré traces 500,000 years of human social, moral and spiritual development beginning in Africa. Her data, show how certain capacities, competencies coalesced and spurred emergence of specialists, seers/sages/saints/shamans, both women and men, who helped their communities manage contingencies, conflicts and the certainty of death.

Examples are found in the deep thought lifeways among the ancient Kemetiu people of Pharonic Egypt as *Maât*. Contemporary visions of these humanistic practices are *Ubuntu* among South African ethnic groups, *Haloi* among the Sidama of Ethiopia, and in the legacy of 500 years of struggle against all forms of oppression by diverse people, particularly women, worldwide.

MAÂT

Briefly, *Maât*⁷⁵ was a 5000-year-old ancient African concept that inspired the development of the first nation-state, Kemet (Ancient Egypt), and the building of the pyramids. As a practice-driven moral and social philosophy, *Maât* became the guiding ideal of living, governance, and fostered integration into an 'unbroken wholeness' all aspects of human existence – the

divine and human, woman and man, state and society, between what is individually appropriate and socially beneficial, and between order and chaos. Women could own property and divorce. *Maât* embodied foundational values of love, life, creativity, and awareness that worked to inhibit or isolate *isfet*, (life's entropic tendencies) by an inner matrix of virtues – order, balance, harmony, compassion, reciprocity, justice and truth. *Maât* cannot (easily) translate into European languages.

UBUNTU

As explained by Bishop Desmond Tutu,⁷⁶ '*Ubuntu* is the essence of being a person. It means that we are people through other people. We cannot be fully human alone. We are made for inter-dependence, we are made for family – (I am because we are). When you have *ubuntu*, you embrace others. You are generous, compassionate. If the world had more *ubuntu*, we would not have war. We would not have this huge gap between the rich and the poor. You are rich so that you can make up what is lacking for others. You are powerful so that you can help the weak, just as a mother or father helps their children.'

HUMANICIDE: ITS LIMITATIONS

It could be argued that *humanicide* is inaccurate and inadequate, as the suffix '*cide*' implies killing. The oppressors' objective was to make money and assert power, which depended on keeping their captives/subjects alive at the most minimal level. It could be said that humanicide ironically, is synonymous with dehumanisation. Such objections were contemplated, but an enlarged explanatory capacity for '*cide*' was envisioned when coupled with '*human*' forming *humanicide* that connects the dots, and details with greater precision, processes by which the human spirit is maimed, mutilated or *killed* – for pleasure, profit and power. Ultimately, language itself is the limiting factor: No single concept – including humanicide, can capture the magnitude of phenomenology of Africans experiences during and after 'Trans-Atlantic slavery'. Humanicide is another effort to provoke deeper deliberation.

CONCLUSION

The words, 'slave', 'slavery' and 'slave trade' are sores on our souls, and are employed cavalierly or uncritically, in for example, generalising particular

people as *wage-slaves* or *sex-slaves*. They continue to legitimise and normalise insensitive dialogues of anonymity, dehumanisation and domination. As Chinweizu⁷⁷ reminds us '...there is danger for a people who live in a dangerous world which has been described innocuously or neutrally or euphemistically by their enemies.'

This essay argued that 'We have been framed' – our *learned* system of beliefs, frames, and status make it difficult to grasp and grapple with the complex reality of *humanicide* (Trans-Atlantic slavery). Lewis Gordon⁷⁸ suggests, 'Incantative forces need to be renewed and expanded in our humanistic search for our humanity. Many a thinker has called upon us to create new concepts, to set afoot new humanities, to engage the human struggle for significance.' Perhaps, out of the humanicide frame, prosecutorial potential for reparations or restorative justice can be realised and new strategies for peace psychology could be developed. Putting African humanity first demands reasserting what humanity means beyond 'human rights'. It means practising truth and transparency, and putting forth alternative narratives for healing hidden wounds, enabling an African renaissance.

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Breaking the Cycle of Colonialism and Dependency in Africa

The Role of the African Diaspora

Oscar Brathwaite

INTRODUCTION

A century ago the renowned pan-Africanist Marcus Garvey declared: *'Wake up, Africa! Let us work toward the one glorious end of a free, and re-deemed mighty nation. Let Africa be a bright star among the constellation of nations'* (Garvey, 1969). This was an appeal to Continental Africans and Africans in the Diaspora to develop strategies that would propel Africa forward. Garvey realised that a collaborative effort was essential to enable Africa to deal with the challenges of that time. For more than a century pan-Africanists have championed the call for collective action by Africans globally to counter the dominance of colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism. They encouraged Africans in the Diaspora to contribute their skills, talents and resources to the empowerment of Africa. Planning for the future without a clear understanding of the past is a formula for confusion and failure. It is imperative that Africans worldwide understand and place history in its right perspective. This will enable them to be in a better position to conceptualise and contextualise the impact that the European slave trade, colonisation and neo-colonisation inflicted on the African continent and on Africans worldwide. This background knowledge would enable Africans to design and implement the type of roadmap that cannot be easily derailed, and would enable Africa to overcome the challenges of the 21st Century.

After centuries of enslavement and colonisation, Africa and Africans globally are still suffering from the seismic shocks of the devastation that was perpetrated against Africa and its people. In his book *How Europe Under Developed Africa*, Rodney argues that the slave trade and colonialism benefited Europe's industrial and economic development, and set conditions in motion for the underdevelopment of Africa's

² (Rodney, 1972). Forty years after Rodney's book was published, and

over one hundred years between the Berlin Conference and the Economic Partnership Agreement a comparison is made to show how Europe continues to stifle Africa's development. In an Article 'From Berlin to Brussels,' the Economist Chukwuma Soludo declares that, 'Africa is in trouble. Its future is once again on the table and it is Europe that holds the aces. Although it is not the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, which balkanised Africa among 13 European powers to guarantee a source of raw materials and markets, the current ambitions under the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) spearhead by the European Union, are the modern-day equivalent... Behind the scenes Europe is tying the hands of Africa and condemning it to perpetual underdevelopment via the EPAs.'³ The slave trade also left indelible scars on the psyche of Diaspora Africans and this may be one of the principal reasons for their apparent disconnectedness to the mother land (Africa). Another factor that can be attributed to their feeling of detachment from Africa is centuries of Euro-centric indoctrination of their minds. Scholars have argued that if we can control people's mind, then we can control their behaviour and action.

There are many obstacles to Africa's stability and progress including the legacy of the infamous European colonisation of the continent at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. In addition there is the impact of globalisation as manifest in bodies like the World Trade Organisation. When we analyse the method of carving up Africa, and put that history in its in true perspective, we will come to the realisation that it was conducted with complete disregard for the historical ethnicities and allegiances of the different population groups. In reality the borders were moved around with impunity like the proverbial chess pieces on a chess board by players who did not know where the chess board was, and who neither knew nor cared about the game. In the process, some European countries were allocated African territory several times larger than their own countries⁴ (Meredith, 2005). However, Africans are an innovative and resilient people who collectively will, eventually, triumph over those travesties, and in due course Africa's unity will come to fruition. Many initiatives were put in place by African leaders over the last fifty years to correct problems emanating from the European rampage of Africa over the centuries. For example, convening the conference the 'African Renaissance', the excerpt from Thabo Mbeki's article tells us that the African leadership was always seeking solutions to the problems that beset the continent: 'It is a matter of great inspiration to see the intelligentsia of our continent come together, not as observers seeking to out-compete one another in an orgy of criticism and denunciation of others, but with the serious intention to add to the strengthening of the movement for Africa's renaissance'⁵ (Mbeki, 1999). This indicates African leaders resolve to break the chains of colonial dependency.

THE PAPER PURPOSE, BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE

The primary purpose of this paper is to energise the discourse of how we can break the colonised dependency that has entrapped Africa and Africans for centuries. One of the principal tenets of this paper is the role that Africans in the Diaspora can play in assisting Africa to achieve the goal of total liberation and continental unity, which will enable the continent to be in a stronger position to meet the needs of its people, and to determine its own destiny without being intimidated by outside entities. The paper argues that, at this juncture in history, Africans cannot continue to tolerate the machination of Africa's subjugation, exploitation and marginalisation by other nations and international entities. It argues that African leaders should not be intimidated by the apparent omnipotence of those powerful international entities that have the propensity to dominate and use weak developing nations, as the proverbial pawns on a chess board, to further their own greed and interest. The paper argues that progressive African leaders, who are working to develop their countries, must be allowed to work uninhibited by threats, intimidation and interference from those powerful outside entities. The international entities include the World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and International Criminal Court (ICC).

The paper postulates further that only when Africa is united, empowered and free that progressive African leadership will feel secure enough to truly work towards the development and advancement of Africa unencumbered from outside interferences. In reality, the only way that African countries will be able to break the umbilical cord of dependency upon the former colonial powers and their cohorts is when the continent becomes a free and united Africa. The legacy of enslavement, colonisation and unbridled exploitation has entrapped Africa and Africans into a cauldron of dependency. Successful disentanglement from this dilemma demands a complete transformation of how we view the world; the policies we accept or reject; and the type of roadmap that we design to chart a viable course for Africa's future.

It is essential to put this paper in perspective by providing some background information on why Africa is in this perceived marginalised position when it has so much potential wealth. The paper emphasises that there are two principal sources to Africa's problem. First, Africa is still perceived and treated as a fragmented weak entity in today's global arena. This perception and/or reality make Africa vulnerable to an assortment of global predators that are ready to take advantages of any perceived weakness. Second, Africa's apparent inability to control the rampant exploitation of

its natural resources will continue to hinder its development. The abundant wealth from Africa's natural resources should be used for its own development, and to meet the needs of its people. If the wealth that Africa produces were used to improve the standard of living for its people, perhaps there would be less outward brain drain on the continent. It is on these two fundamental premises that the paper predicates the argument for African unity in the near future. The paper arguably supports the commonly held assumption that if the disparate entities in Africa could find some common ground to unite around, this would enhance collaboration on many fronts, and it would significantly strengthen Africa's position in the global arena. The pejorative perception that overshadows Africa would diminish and the continent will be treated as an equal partner among the powerful nations of the world.

Since the conclusion of the Berlin Conference in 1885, Africans leaders, globally, have been agitating for, and articulating a vision for Africa's redemption, or in the newly coined term 'an African renaissance', self-determination and freedom from all forms of colonial domination, exploitation and outside interferences. For more than a century, pan-Africanists have made Africa's unification and liberation from foreign domination the clarion call to mobilise and organise Africans worldwide.

Africa's unity and total liberation is constantly being challenged and obstructed with different machination by outside hegemonic influences, which come in different disguises of helping Africa with its development. In reality, those Machiavellian tactics and disguises tend to navigate Africa to become deeper entrapped in a cauldron of dependency, which impacts Africa's advancement, development and self-determination. A case in point, John Perkins in his book, *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man*, describes the unsavoury tactics use by international consultants to entrap leaders of developing countries into a web of dependency. He said that 'Economic hit men (EHMs) are highly paid professionals who cheat countries around the globe out of trillions of dollars...Their tools include fraudulent financial reports, rigged elections, payoffs, extortion, sex and murder. They play a game as old as the empire, but one that has taken on new and terrifying dimensions during this time of globalisation' ⁶ (Perkins, 2006).

Over the last fifty years, continental African leaders have articulated the vision of a united and prosperous continent, and they have worked toward those goals. Roadmaps to guide Africa in that direction were presented and discussed over the last half century. At the time of Ghana's political independence in 1957, President Kwame Nkrumah, articulated a vision that 'Africa must unite' so that it would be in a stronger position to assist other oppressed countries in Africa to achieve their independence. Unity is strength, and if the continent is united it would have more leverage

to break the colonial dependency syndrome. It would be in a stronger position to determine its own destiny in the best interest of its people. President Nkrumah was on the right course in his writings, when he argued that, *'Ghana's independence would be meaningless if it was not tied to the total liberation of Africa'*⁷ (Nkrumah, 1963). What he meant is that one country success is not sustainable, because its fragile structure may not withstand outside pressure.

At this critical juncture in the 21st Century, outside entities are still able to control, dominate and exploit Africa's resources, and simultaneously marginalising Africans worldwide with virtual impunity. These actions are detrimental to Africa's image, development and advancement. These anomalies are allowed to continue because over the last four centuries, not only have Europeans dominated and controlled the physical and mineral resources of Africa, but they are able to dominate and control Africans' cosmology globally. They have successfully monopolised the media and manipulate Africans to view the world through a Euro-centric prism. Consequently, we continue to accept the course that they chart for Africa, including development policies, structural adjustment programs, and its global political allegiance. This type of control is allowed to continue under the pretext that it is in Africa's and Africans' best interest⁸ (Nugent, 2004). This skewed perception has thrown Africans off their equilibrium, and allowed outsiders to determine Africans' reality. These Machiavellian schemes continue to constrain Africa's development, advancement and unity, because, essentially Africans are not allowed to determine Africa's destiny. It is on this premise that the paper argues that Africans, worldwide, must establish the type of roadmap that will navigate the continent out of the quagmire of colonial dependency. This can be accomplished when Africans worldwide collaborate and take collective action to work toward what is best for the continent.

Is it possible to theorise how the Euro-centric dogma was able to permeate and control the African world view? The scope of this paper does not permit a comprehensive analysis, but a cursory overview will suffice. We can postulate that in the 15th Century when the Europeans came in contact with Africans they used their military might and imposed their beliefs on Africans, and indoctrinated them into accepting the Euro-centric dogma of European superiority and African inferiority. This warp point of view was used by Europeans as the pretext for enslavement, colonialism, neo-colonialism, exploitation and racism with impunity for centuries. Afro-centric scholarship has continued to challenge that Euro-centric dogma, and has become more vociferous in its argument that Euro-centrism is debilitating Africans' thinking globally, and tend to put them into a state of amnesia about who they are. The Afro-centric scholar, Molefi Asante

puts forward an argument for an Afro-centric ideology that will counteract Euro-centric influence that seems to have blown Africans off course and out of symmetry with reality. The crucial fact is that we need to move away from and demystify the Euro-centric doctrine that has enslaved the African mind for centuries.⁹ (Asante, 2009). Euro-centric indoctrination continues and it has lulled Africans worldwide into accepting a value system that is not in the best interest of Africa or Africans. Chukwuokolo in a paper on 'Afro-centrism or Euro-centrism' discusses the dilemma for African leaders in choosing the preferred pathway for Africa's development. He said:

Africa has not remained the same since the rape of its continent by the West who pretended to be on a 'civilising mission'. There was a total distortion of all the values of the African to the advantage of the West. For over two centuries now Africa is not certain as to the path of civilisation to follow: Afro-centric or Euro-centric? ¹⁰

An effective method of controlling thinking and behaviour is to control the individual's mind. This trend of argument was put in perspective and articulated by Afro-centric thinkers. The pan-Africanist Marcus Garvey implores Black people to emancipate their minds from mental slavery in these words: '*Other people may free us from physical slavery, but only us can free ourselves from mental slavery*'¹¹ (Garvey, 1969). The reggae icon, Bob Marley, dramatised Garvey's words into the popular musical lyric 'Redemption Song': '*Emancipate our minds from mental slavery...none but ourselves can free our minds*' (Marley, 1980).¹²

In the 1930s the renowned African-American educator, Carter G Woodson discussed the result of indoctrination in his influential book, *The Mis-Education of the Negro*. He postulates that if we allow our minds to be controlled, then our actions can be determined. Woodson supports his argument in these words: '*If you can control a man's thinking, you don't have to worry about his actions...and if you can determine what a man thinks, you do not have to worry about what he will do*' ¹³ (Woodson, 1933). In the latter half of the 20th Century the South African pan-Africanist Steve Biko, in the struggles against the repugnant apartheid policies of his country, commented on how the oppressors tried to manipulate the minds of the oppressed South Africans. He states, '*The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed*'¹⁴ (Biko, 1978). In the first half of the 19th Century, the American anti-slavery icon, Harriet Tubman expressed her disgust and frustration over the ambivalence of some enslaved Africans in America who seem not to be able to distinguish between slavery and freedom. She said, '*I freed thousands of slaves; I could have freed thousands more, if they had known they were slaves*'¹⁵ (Bradford, 1886).

It is on this premise that the paper predicates its arguments, that there is urgency at this critical juncture for Africans to start viewing the world through Afro-centric lenses. One of the fundamental problems is that we continue to depend on other racial groups to define our reality and problems, and in turn we depend on them to find solutions to effectively solve those problems, which they have created. When Garvey said that we must emancipate ourselves from mental slavery, he meant that if we really want to repair the damage and calamities caused by enslavement, colonisation and racism, then it is imperative that we transform our thinking, and examine the lenses that we use to see and interpret the world. To move Africa's agenda forward in this era of globalisation, it is essential to promote an ideology of pan-Africanism that counteracts the humiliation and contempt that Euro-centrism continues to inflict on Africa and Africans globally.

Africa's fragmentation, with its individualistic approach to solving each country's individual problem, creates a fertile environment for outside entities to sabotage their development efforts. This individualistic modality exposes Africa's vulnerability, and allows Machiavellian entities to continue their unsavoury tactics that are detrimental to Africa's advancement. One of the critical issues that must be dealt with at this juncture is to find the right roadmap that would extricate Africa out of the dilemma. The paper argues that it is crucial at this point in time for African leaders worldwide, from across the socio-political, ethnic and religious divide, to collaborate and bring to fruition the vision of Nkrumah and Garvey. The final imperative in the paper is closing the chasm between Continental Africans and the 'historic' Diaspora Africans. This will enhance the opportunities to harness, exchange, and transfer the expertise and resources of Africans in the Diaspora, which can be used for the development and advancement of Africa.

For over forty years the African leadership has established regional political and economic alliances as a strategy to strengthen Africa's position in the globalise arena. For instance, the East African Community (EAC) 1967, and the Common Market for East Africa (CMEA) 1994; the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 1980; the Lagos Plan of Action (1980); the African Economic Community (AEC) 1991 (the Abuja Treaty); and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD 2001). These are some of the initiatives that were established between the periods of establishing the OAU in 1963 and its transformation to the new AU in 2002. The primary objectives of these regional alliances were to move Africa towards socio-economic integration, and eventually to a political union of the continent.

When the OAU was established in 1963, there were 32 independent African states, and when the OAU was transformed to the AU in 2002, there were 53 independent states. The new state of Southern Sudan, which

attained independence in 2011, brings the total to 54 countries on the continent. As the global situation changed during this period, discussions evolved around the issue of broadening the scope and mandate of the OAU to meet the many challenges of globalisation that were impacting African countries. In 1999 the heads of states discussed the formation of an African union with a mandate broad enough, that supposedly would place Africa in a better position to meet the many challenges emanating from globalisation in the 21st Century. The African Union was inaugurated with much fanfare on July 9, 2002 in South Africa. There was great expectations that the new continental organisation would be in a stronger position to move Africa's position forward in the global arena.

The African Union was inaugurated with much hope and expectations of transforming the agenda, and set Africa on a trajectory away from the Western media portrayed pejoratives, which include endemic corruption; unmanageable diseases and sickness; pervasive poverty; and the perceive burden on the international community. This is how the Western media portray Africa, which is extremely unflattering and embarrassing to Africans worldwide. I believe that the 'judges' are still tallying up the numbers on the evaluation sheets to determine whether the AU will be given a passing grade for its achievement of improving Africa's profile over the last decade. However, that will be determined by the criteria, and the objectivity or subjectivity of the evaluators. Irrespective of the rating the UN Human Development Index (UNHDI), reports show Africa at below the global average¹⁶ (UNHDI, 1990–2010).

Our expectation of the AU is not only a change of name, but to show that there is substantial improvement in the lives of African people in comparison to the period of the OAU. Over the last forty-nine years since the establishment of the OAU' many things have changed in the global arena that could impact Africa at different levels. The scope and mandate of the AU were conceived to enable Africa to meet the many challenges in a rapidly globalised world, where the powerful nations tend to impose their will on weaker countries. Colonisation, dislocation of Africa's population and enslavement, over the centuries, has placed African countries at a distinct disadvantage in comparison to many other nations. One crucial question that must be dealt with is how are we going to reverse that disadvantaged position, and put Africa on the fast track to catch up and keep up with the other powerful nations?

Is there an accurate measuring instrument to determine how well Africa is succeeding in this globalised arena over the decades? All of the countries in Africa have achieved political independence with much exuberance. However, there is an essential question in this discourse that must be dealt with, and that is whether there have been fundamental changes in relation

to Africa's sovereignty, and the control of the continent's resources? The two principal objectives in Article II of the Charter of the OAU in 1963, state that the organisation aims: 'To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; and to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa'.¹⁷ We can agree on the fact that political independence has been accomplished, but we definitely cannot agree that colonialism has been eradicated from Africa. If we extrapolate on this issue further, can we definitely say that all forms of colonialism have been eradicated from Africa, or they are still present in more insidious disguises? From this basic premise, does Africa control the vast amount of wealth that comes from its abundant natural resources, and who are the beneficiaries of this vast amount of wealth that is extracted out of Africa? The answer to these fundamental questions will determine if Africa is still colonised, what form that colonisation takes, and how do we extricate Africa from that dilemma.

There are optimists who believe that the AU will be more successful than the OAU in moving Africa's agenda forward. 'The African Union is an organisation with ambitious objectives and principles of integrating Africa. Its creation in 2002 was a reaction to global challenges...to improve the livelihood of African people through the promotion of peace, good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and gender equality'¹⁸ (Makinda & Okumu, 2008). Comparatively, the OAU was established as a bulwark for decolonisation, and to break the European strangle hold on Africa. The AU was conceived to expand that mandate of the OAU, with the primary objective to strengthen Africa's position in the global arena. The pessimists have the tendency to view Africa's future with a certain level of cynicism. Paul Nugent in his book *Africa Since Independence* states that 'the African Union which replaced the OAU was founded on the promotion of closer integration between states...Whether the AU will prove more imaginative than the OAU remains to be seen'¹⁹ (Nugent, 2005). The change will enable the AU to better meet the many challenges of the 21st century including globalisation. For example, the OAU charter states the following:

Some of the objectives of the OAU were to rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of colonisation and apartheid; to promote unity and solidarity among African States; to coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States and to promote international cooperation within the framework of the United Nations.²⁰

Among the objectives of the AU's leading institutions are: to work toward the socio-economic and political integration of the continent; to promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples; to achieve peace and security in Africa; and to promote

democratic institutions, good governance. One important objective of the AU is the Constitutive Act which declares that it shall: 'Invite and encourage the full participation of the African Diaspora as an important part of our continent, in the building of the African Union'²¹. I believe that the AU's invitation to the hundreds of millions of Africans in the Diaspora to become an integral part of the AU is a progressive step forward. This strategic step is one of many that will propel Africa forward at an accelerated rate and brings it closer to continental unity with more influence on the world stage.

AFRICAN DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

As a preamble to this part of the paper on African Diaspora engagement of helping Africa to break the cycle of dependency, it is essential to address two fundamental issues. Firstly, the issue of motivating and organising Africans in the Diaspora to expend their time and resources in assisting in Africa's development and secondly, there some probable obstacles that may require careful navigation to ensure that the objectives are achievable. Nearly a century ago, in a more complex situation than today, the revered pan-Africanist Marcus Garvey was able to provoke, motivate and inspire millions of Africans in the Diaspora to view Africa as their ancestral homeland, and they have a responsibility to always assist in its endeavours. He was able to convince millions of Africans in the Diaspora that they collective involvement could make a difference in Africa, and it would enhance their image in the Americas and beyond. His reasoning was that if Africa were free and powerful it would be portrayed in a more positive light, and Africans worldwide would be accorded more respect by Europeans who are the power brokers in the world. His clarion call during that era was, 'Africa for the Africans at home and abroad...Until Africa is free, Africans (Negroes) will always be disrespected'. This was an era when Africans in the Americas were experiencing overt racist oppression, and they envisioned a free and strong Africa as a pathway out of their marginalise status. Even though invasion, enslavement and dispersal have caused a major emotional disconnect between the 'traditional African Diaspora' and the continent of Africa history shows that they always heed the call and reached out to assist Africa on different occasions.

It would be unrealistic to expect that there wouldn't be any opposition to the idea, and opposition may come from both Continental Africans and Diaspora African. Therefore, plans should be put in place to navigate around those obstacles. The important strategy is to be flexible and adjust the road map to meet emerging situations, because it is very easy to be blown off course into uncharted waters. For instance, at this juncture of our

history, it is not uncommon to hear unnecessary disparaging remarks between Continental Africans and Diaspora Africans about who is an African and who is not an African. This type of short sightedness does not bode well for collaboration, cooperation and collective efforts towards achieving specific goals. It is important that Africans have a global view of the world, and be aware that in this era of globalisation countries that are perceived to be weak and divided become easy targets for domination and exploitation by powerful countries. Therefore, if the African continent is seen as a divided and weak entity then it becomes an easy target for continuing domination and exploitation by other nations, and Africans globally will continue to experience humiliation, discrimination and marginalisation, because their skin colour associates them with Africa. If Africans in the Diaspora can be convinced that their expertise, skills, talents and resources are valuable assets that can help empower the continent, and enhance their image and esteem, this may motivate them to broaden their perception and involvement. From this point of view there are additional incentives including, monetary compensation for their expertise and resources; a feeling of worthiness that their expertise is recognised as valuable and is being used to bring about important social, economic and political changes; and that they are now reconnected to Africa.

In 2002, the AU, in its restructuring process, decided that the African Diaspora could constitute a significant factor that would enable it to overcome some of the pending challenges of the 21st Century. The AU realised that Africans in the Diaspora are important stakeholders in Africa's development, and they could become involved in a variety of activities to assist the content accelerate forward. Certain factors in both the Diaspora and the continent will determine the kind of involvement that would best meet the objectives and goals of Africa at this juncture. Perhaps Diaspora involvement could be in the areas of economic infusions, entrepreneurial ventures, infrastructure development and/or capacity building. The AU governing body devised a collective strategy for engaging the African Diaspora by inviting them to actively take part in Africa's development. Over a three-year period, the AU conducted intensive consultations with the African Diaspora in different countries including the Caribbean, Paris and London to establish a framework for Diaspora involvement in the structure of the AU. The discussions focused on how the African Diaspora could assist and effectively contribute to Africa's overall economic development strategies. At the governance level, the Diaspora involvement includes incremental steps starting with the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), then the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).

The impact of globalisation on Africa demands a paradigm shift for Africans worldwide. It is estimated that there are approximately 185 million

people of African descent living outside of Africa. Among this demographic, there is a significant percentage that has the political and ideological awareness to understand that until Africa is powerful and free, the exploitation of Africa will continue, and Africans, all over the world, will continue to be despised, disrespected and marginalised. Therefore, African collaboration across chasms is an imperative that should be examined, and Diaspora Africans must make their contribution to empowering Africa's development, advancement and unification. It is essential at this juncture that the skills, knowledge, talents and resources of Diaspora Africans be harnessed so that these can be effectively used to enable and empower Africa and Africans. It is important to examine models of involvement that are being used by other Diasporas including Asians, Chinese and Jews.

The nature of this paper does not require lengthy dialectics of who constitutes the African Diaspora, because the AU Government, through a consultative process, arrived at an acceptable definition. However, it is necessary for clarification to define and contextualise the term Diaspora by putting it in perspective. The literature on the topic, though very extensive, does not give a fixed criterion for the definitions. One of the authors, in trying to unravel its complexities, put it thus: 'At times the definitions proposed by some authors are so flexible that the term seems to apply virtually to any population that originated in a land other than in that which it resides'²² (Koser, 2009). In the discourse on the Diaspora, the term takes on more than one discernible meanings, especially as it relates to the African Diaspora. Originally, the term Diaspora referred to the Jews' historical forced dispersal from their homeland to other geographical areas, but very little importance was ever placed on the historical dispersal of tens of millions Africans who were forcibly removed from their homeland over a period of approximately three hundred years. This omission could be the result of the usual overt biases against African people, and the traditional paradigm of placing Africans on the periphery of historical events in comparison to other racial population groups. However, in recent times, as a significant percentage of Diaspora Africans become more empowered and aware of their historical connectedness to Africa, the term African Diaspora has taken greater importance in the literature on the topic. Those two imperatives, namely empowerment and awareness, have inspired Diaspora Africans to agitate for and also against policy that could impact Africa²³ (Manning, 2009).

In academic discourse lies the perennial irritating question that continues to linger, as to who constitutes the African Diaspora. This question is neither trivial nor facetious, because it has been generating much controversy and divisiveness for decades between the disparate entities. Initially, the literature on the African Diaspora was synonymous with the 'historic

Diaspora', that is, the descendants whose ancestors were taken out of Africa forcibly centuries ago, enslaved and scattered around the world to enrich the colonial powers. It was generally assumed that this group has lost most of its African culture and has become disconnected from the Motherland, and also lost its interest in Africa and Africa's affairs. The recent arrivals of continental Africans emigrating over the last few decades are classified as the 'new African Diaspora', because it is generally assumed that this population group still has direct connection to the motherland through family ties and culture.

The recent discourse on the term African Diaspora is coming to grips with the controversy, but emphasis is being placed on an acceptable definition. Some authors in the discourse use the term 'new African Diaspora,' which, in this context, means those Africans who immigrated out of Africa post independence. Within this context of who constitute the African Diaspora, we tend to, once again, introduce that divisive factor in the discourse of those recent arrivals from Africa referred to as the 'New Africans Diaspora', and the hundreds of millions of those whose ancestors were scattered outside the continent of Africa centuries ago²⁴ (Koser, 2009). To put the term in historical context, the term Diaspora derives from the Greek word 'speiro' meaning scatter. The enslaved Africans were forcibly scattered in different parts of the world and, therefore, they meet the classified definition. This controversy and confusion around the issue of who constitute the African Diaspora has the tendency to further divide 'new Diaspora Africans' and 'historic Diaspora Africans.' If this controversy continues, it will get in the way of collaboration and cooperation between these two entities, and cause a distraction from working towards common goals. Does this malady plague the Indian Diaspora, Chinese Diaspora or the Jewish Diaspora? In these critical times, this type of distraction is detrimental to Africa, and we need to focus on what can be accomplished if there are collective efforts to achieve specific goals for Africa's development. I believe that the African Union has settled the controversy satisfactorily by clarifying the issue in its comprehensive definition of who constitutes the African Diaspora. The AU, through an independent continental meeting of experts, concluded with an acceptable definition that the African Diaspora is one,

Consisting of people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality, and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union²⁵ (AU Experts, April 2005).

On that premise, the AU Constitutive Act declares that it shall 'invite and encourage the full participation of the African Diaspora as an important part of our continent, in the building of the African Union'²⁶ (AU Experts, April 2005).

FRAMEWORK FOR ENGAGEMENT

This section of the paper focuses specifically on the African Diaspora and its involvement and potential contribution to Africa's development. It is difficult to find out the exact total number of Diaspora Africans, because of incomplete data, but there is a rough approximation of about 185 million scattered in different regions of the world. The four largest groups are in Brazil, US, Columbia and the Caribbean²⁷ (Wikipedia, Feb. 2010). Some of the Diaspora resides in countries classified as prosperous, developed countries, and others reside in the developing world. Irrespective of their geographical location or material wealth, whether it is in the developed or developing world, what is of paramount importance is their feeling of connectedness to Africa's, and identifying with the goals of Africa's development, advancement and unification. Those who reside in developing countries may be contending with their own socio-economic challenges, therefore, tangible involvement may be restricted to moral support to the ideals of pan-Africanism and the development and unity of Africa.

It is generally assumed that there are advantages and disadvantages to the recent large exodus of highly skilled professionals out of Africa to the developed countries. The 'new Diaspora Africans' are attracted to the developed countries, because there is a perception that there are better opportunities and life chances in those countries. They emigrate assuming that financial opportunities will be better for them, and their loved ones in the new country, and that they will be in a better position to financially assist loved ones in their home country. President Mandela succinctly expressed his concern about that perceived problem in these words: 'To this day we continue to lose the best among ourselves because the lights in the developed world shine brighter'. I believe that the statement by President Mandela voices the concerns of leaders in the developing world in this era of globalisation and unbridled competition for material resources, human resources and markets, which drive the economic engines of all countries. African countries, like other developing countries, are at a distinct disadvantage from the scourge of the brain drain from the developing countries to the developed countries. The loss of highly qualified human resources is becoming very critical and it reduces the developing countries' competitiveness in the global market place. The African Diaspora has been strategising and putting mechanisms in place to level the terrain so that Africa could get some benefits out of its loss of human resource to the developed countries.

There is constant haemorrhaging of Africa through one of its main arteries, that is, the precipitous brain drain to the powerful, rich industrialised Western countries. It may appear that there is very little recourse for Africa to rectify the problem at this stage. However, mechanisms are being

put in place to help Africa recoup some benefits from its valuable loss to those countries. These mechanisms are in different structures, including remittance sent back to Africa by the 'new Diaspora'; knowledge and skills exchange transference between the Diaspora and Africa; entrepreneurial-business ventures in and between the Diaspora and Africa; equalising the existing trade imbalance by opening markets for African products in the developed countries; developing capacity building through infrastructure and human resources; and strategic political networking in the developed countries on behalf of Africa. As Diaspora Africans continue to gain access to influential positions in those powerful 'developed countries', they will be able to influence policies and decisions that are favourable to Africa.

Indicators show that Africans in the Diaspora are important stakeholders in Africa's development. It has been estimated that the annual remittance to the continent is in billions of dollars and growing at an exponential rate. 'According to the World Bank, annual remittance flows to the continent are in excess of US\$40 billion and are growing at 10–15% year on year. In addition, there is an estimated US\$35 billion of annual savings held by the African Diaspora'²⁸ (Kamu 2012). Recently, the USAID in collaboration with Western Union launched a programme titled the African Market Place, which focuses on sustainable economic growth and employment that supports US based African Diaspora entrepreneurs with innovative and high-impact ideas for start-up and established businesses in Africa²⁹ (Kamu, 2012). Some Diaspora Africans are making significant contributions to the continent through financial commitments, for instance, it is estimated that, 'The majority of Eritrean in the UK and Germany pay to the Eritrean state an annual contribution amounting to two per cent of their incomes. Somali communities in the USA and Europe send home the equivalent of over US\$120 million per year – these remittances regularly doubling the average household income in parts of Somalia'³⁰ (Koser, 2009).

Research shows that there is an abundance of potential resources, including professional skills and talents among the African Diaspora. If these resources are effectively harnessed, they could be used for the development of Africa. As previously stated, there are organisations in the Diaspora that have put mechanisms in place to collect, collate and harness those resources, so that they can be put to use for Africa's development. Diaspora Africans are becoming more engaged and are collaborating at different levels to build and develop Africa, which would eventually enable the continent to be in a position to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. There are a number of organisations that have been established to compensate for the brain drain out of Africa. For instance, included are the Digital Diaspora Network Africa (DDNA); The South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) and the African Scientific Institute (ASI). There are also individuals who have

made connections in Africa, and are making important contributions in capacity building to expand Africa's development.

In July 2002 the Digital Diaspora Network Africa was launched as an initiative. The principal objective is to reverse the African brain drain that is slowing down Africa's development because of that human resource deficit, at the same time as the developed world is benefiting from those available skilled human resources. The organisation's target is high level skilled professionals that are in short supply in Africa, including: scientists, medical doctors, engineers, university lecturers, economists and information technologists. It is estimated that tens of thousands of highly skilled professional Africans emigrate out of Africa every year and go to developed countries including the USA, UK, Canada, etc. The South African Network of Skills Abroad was founded in 2007. The primary objective of the organisation is to provide Diaspora South Africans with the opportunity to assist in South Africa's development. The organisation seeks to create a mechanism that would link a variety of highly skilled professionals who are interested in contributing to the country's socio-economic and cultural development by sharing their expertise with local counterparts.³¹

Another supportive professional network is the African Scientific Institute (ASI), which was established in 1967 as an African American professional organisation, which is based in the US. Over the last forty-five years, it has evolved into an international network of approximately 15,000 professionals, which includes approximately 8,000 scientists who are primarily of African descent. It has 488 'super stars' in science and technology who are ASI Fellows from 36 countries. The (ASI) has moved forward over the past forty-five years to engage Black people in the world of science and technology. The organisation's database is global and extensive. It has been successfully engaged in activities and projects in Africa and in the African Diaspora.³² It has participated in conferences and symposiums on Africa development. The organisation contributes its expertise in the development of Africa by partnering on projects and programmes.

There are also individual Diaspora Africans who have used their fame and notoriety to finance educational infrastructure, projects and programmes that assist Africa's development through capacity building. As Diaspora Africans become more politically aware and accepting of their historical, cultural and spiritual connection that tie them to Africa, there may be more individual engagements and outreaches. Perhaps it is the latent belief in Garvey's doctrine that 'until Africa is free and strong, no African anywhere in the world will be respected.' In 2008 the internationally renowned talk show hostess, Oprah Winfrey, used her fame and wealth to finance and build an educational and training institution, the Leadership Academy for Girls in South Africa. In 2009 the famous internationally known tennis star,

Serena Williams, through her charity work, financed and built the Serena Williams Secondary School in Kenya.

There are also many other Diaspora Africans, who have neither fame nor name recognition, but have made their contribution to help Africa in its march forward, by supplying learning materials, computers and scholarships, and their teaching and training in Africa's time of need. Since the independence of South Africa in 1994, a significant number of Diaspora Africans, especially African-Americans entrepreneurs and business people, have established business ventures in South Africa. Over the last thirty-five years, a significant number of Diaspora Africans professionals and skilled personnel from the US, England, Canada and the Caribbean went on contract to independent Southern African countries including Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe to assist those countries in capacity building.

CONCLUSION

The paper is predicated on a known premise that for approximately five centuries, the continent of Africa has been on a turbulent journey, and it has encountered numerous obstacles and diversions on its course. For instance, mass population displacement and genocides resulting from enslavement, colonisation, domination and exploitation on a horrendous scale have thrown the continent off its equilibrium, and stagnated progress, development and unity. At this juncture, Africa is still perceived and classified as a continent in a state of perpetual distress, and begging its former colonisers for assistance. Despite Africa's vast natural resources, it is still portrayed in the western controlled media as fragmented, impoverished and weak, and unable to meet many of the basic needs of its people. This image is indeed tragic, because it tarnishes the image of Africa and Africans worldwide. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the African leadership globally to find the right roadmap to successfully navigate Africa out of the quagmire, so that it can determine its own destiny as an equal partner among the powerful nations of the world.

We must envision the first half of the 21st Century as the period when Africans globally collaborate across the divides and make Africa a powerful, free and united continent that cannot be manipulated and dominated by any outside entity. This goal is achievable, if the African leadership worldwide develop the right roadmap to harness and strategically use the many resources of both Africa and Africans worldwide to develop and free Africa from its colonized dependency. The critical factor in this equation is collaboration among and across the many chasm that have manoeuvred Africans into this disadvantaged position, which allowed outside entities

to control the continent for centuries. Only through global collaboration between Africans that we will be able to redeem Africa to its past glory, and make it a model that the world will admire in the first half of the 21st Century. The African Union's strategic move to include the African Diaspora in Africa's affairs is an important step in empowering Africa and Africans worldwide. The vision of departed pan-Africanists Marcus Garvey and Kwame Nkrumah must come to fruition, and that is: 'Africa must unite'.

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Making a Case for the Utilisation of African Diaspora in Promoting Economic Development of the Continent

Almaz Negash

INTRODUCTION

With almost one billion people and vast natural resources, Africa has tremendous opportunity to enhance its social, political, and economic development. Regrettably, these opportunities come with enormous challenges. Africa is the second largest continent and holds some of the world's most valuable resources, yet Africa is responsible for only 2% of global trade¹ and sub-Saharan Africa remains the most poverty stricken developing region in the world; over half the population lives below the international poverty line of \$1.25 per day.²

Recent events have not helped sub-Saharan Africa's development. The global recession resulted in a significant decrease in global trade and Africa's commodity exports have significantly shrunk. This has slowed down economic growth in the continent, reduced government and household incomes, increased unemployment, and decreased remittances.³ In 2009, South Africa went into recession after nearly twenty years of economic growth.⁴ Additionally, there are numerous ongoing conflicts in Africa including the East Africa food crisis, Nigeria oil crisis, Cote d'Ivoire civil war, and Ethiopia and Eritrea's ongoing border disputes.

Africa continues to face many other challenges. Much of the continent is in need of basic infrastructure, lacks government stability, and suffers from extreme poverty resulting in a lack of access to education, healthcare, and clean water among others. As a major source of many of the world's commodity exports, Africa lacks the technology, logistics, and expertise to get its products to international markets in the most productive and efficient manner possible. It also lacks policies that promote women's economic equality. According to the UNDP Human Development Report, women in Africa represent 52% of the total population, contribute approximately 75% of the agricultural work, and produce 60 to 80% of the food. Yet women

earn only 10% of African incomes and own just 1% of the continent's assets.⁵ These numbers indicate that Africa's women are an enormous resource for achieving economic development yet still face tremendous barriers on the path to achieving gender equality.

Despite these challenges, the opportunities for a fruitful Africa are there. Progress requires targeted and strategic investment in human capital. These challenges, however, are about far more than providing funding. They cannot be met by any one government or entity, or even by dealing with one issue at a time. These issues are systemic and intertwined with societal, institutional, geographic, and global economic forces that require equally systemic responses. Utilising the knowledge and resources of members of the African Diaspora can be an important step in combating these challenges and advancing the opportunities.

AFRICA'S EMERGING ECONOMIES

Despite the global recession, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been showing signs of economic progress and in the coming years are expected to grow at a rate faster than all other regions except developing Asia.⁶ According to The World Economic Forum, 'Africa is on the brink of a major transformation...and the outlook for the region remains bright at a time when the rest of the world is facing major political and economic challenges.'⁷ Similarly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that 'growth has remained strong in the region in recent years, and most low-income countries in Africa weathered the global economic slowdown well.'⁸

Over the past decade, six of the world's ten fastest growing countries have been in Africa (see Table 1) and the IMF projects that the growth rate of sub-Saharan African economies will increase to nearly 6% in 2012.⁹ In addition, Table 2 shows impressive projections for Africa's future growth potential over the next decade.¹⁰ According to the IMF, in 2010, GDP in sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to have increased by 4.7%, up from 1.7% in 2009.¹¹ The trajectory for Africa's economic growth is overwhelmingly positive and clearly demonstrates that the continent of Africa is an important emerging economy.

While Africa is home to increasingly important emerging economies, each of these articles discussing Africa's potential includes follow up comments and warnings for the need for African economic and social policy reform. While such challenges require a massive amount of collective innovation from governmental and business sectors, sustainable solutions can be better achieved through active participation from the African Diaspora. Utilising the knowledge and resources of the Diaspora can offer African

nations additional much needed assistance to combat extreme poverty and encouraging business investment and economic growth.

BRAIN DRAIN AS A STUMBLING BLOCK TO AFRICAN PROSPERITY

Brain drain is a serious hindrance to capitalising on Africa's opportunities; overcoming this challenge requires the involvement of the African Diaspora. Due to political, social, and economic challenges, many Africans in the seventies, eighties, and nineties left their home countries to begin a new life in the United States and other nations outside the continent. By 2009 there were nearly 1.5 million Africans living just in the US.¹² The contribution of African immigrants to the global economy varies by expertise and country of origin. In many industries there is a disproportionate amount of Africans practicing abroad and the resulting loss of their talent and expertise in the African continent is a major economic and social threat to Africa.

Healthcare is one such industry. The World Bank found that African countries have about 20 times fewer physicians and 10 times fewer nurses than developed countries.¹³ Part of this can be attributed to the fact that many physicians from sub-Saharan Africa choose to practice abroad in places like the United States. The Human Resource for Health research found that the number of physicians from sub-Saharan Africa practicing in the United States represents more than 6% of the physicians practicing in sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁴ Other telling statistics have found that there are more Ethiopian doctors practising in the city of Chicago, Illinois than in Ethiopia¹⁵ and of the 120 to 150 doctors Ghana trains each year, the country loses an equal number to migration.¹⁶

In addition to the healthcare industry, areas that have been adversely impacted Africa by brain drain include the technology, sciences, and higher education sectors. In professions in the medical, scientific research, and engineering fields, there are more professional groups represented outside of their home countries. In 2003, 30% of all highly educated Ghanaians and Sierra Leoneans lived abroad.¹⁷ This loss of talent is a major economic and social threat to Africa. In fact, in recognition of this problem and in an effort to eradicate poverty, in 2000 African leaders established the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is now an integral part of the African Union and is commissioned to address poverty and underdevelopment throughout the continent. NEPAD aims to facilitate the region's socio-economic and political progress, with keen interest in finding ways to reverse the brain drain. This recognition among African leaders underscores the magnitude of the problem and shows why addressing it is crucial to the continent's development.

Africans in the Diaspora continue to be somewhat absent from the dialogue and action when it comes to the social entrepreneurship and social innovation phenomenon that is taking place in the United States and other parts of the world. Africans in the Diaspora continue to be somewhat absent from the dialogue and action when it comes to the social entrepreneurship and social innovation phenomenon that is taking place in the United States and other parts of the world. The AU now has an opportunity to provide a platform for the Diaspora to engage directly with African governments by effectively African Diaspora legacy projects which include:

- The production of a Skills Database of African Professionals in the Diaspora
- The establishment of the African Diaspora Volunteers Corps
- The African Diaspora Investment Fund
- A programme on the Development Marketplace for the Diaspora, as a framework for facilitating innovation and entrepreneurship among African and Diaspora
- The African Remittances Institute.

The above five AU legacy projects have the potential to shift the focus of development in Africa from poverty reduction to skilled labour creation and investment. Engaging Africans on the continent and in the Diaspora to take part in the social innovation phenomenon and work towards finding solutions to the problems plaguing Africa is an important step in fostering change. Now is the time for Africans in the Diaspora to spread positive social and economic change in the continent by leveraging their resources, widespread knowledge, and entrepreneurial skills.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICANS IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States there is a significant amount of intelligent and skilled sub-Saharan Africans. In 2009, about 1.5 million African immigrants resided in the United States and there were 3.5 million self-identified members of the African Diaspora. African immigrants made up 3.9% of all immigrants in 2009¹⁸ (see Table 3). Interestingly, according to the US Census, Africans have the highest educational attainment rates of any immigrant group in the United States and contribute to the economy at the highest level:

African Diasporans are also more highly educated than any other native-born ethnic group, including white Americans. Some 48.9% of all African immigrants

hold a college diploma. This is slightly less than the percentage of Asian immigrants to the US, nearly double the rate of native-born white Americans, and nearly four times the rate of native-born African Americans.¹⁹

Unfortunately for Africa this loss of highly skilled professionals has resulted in a severe brain drain. It has never been easy to calculate the value of the economic loss and/or human capital loss when Africans leave their home country. The World Bank estimates that Africans in the Diaspora save about US\$53 billion per year and, in 2010, recorded remittances reached US\$40 billion.²⁰ This figure shows the magnitude by which Africans in the Diaspora are participating in economic development of the continent. However, what is also evident is that government leaders in Africa have yet to create long-term, sustainable partnership programmes with the Diaspora. Although the ultimate extent of partnership may differ from country to country, there has yet to be an intentional partnership for the good of the continent with Africans living abroad – thus the continuing loss of knowledge and talent.

POINTERS OF UTILISING THE DIASPORA

‘It has always been clear that the destiny of the continental African is intricately interwoven with the destiny of the Diaspora African,’ says Chike Nwoffiah, Founder of The Silicon Valley African Film Festival.²¹ In recent years this relationship has continued to be recognised. The African Union has been encouraging the Diaspora to play a key role in the development of the continent. In 2007, the African Union partnered with the World Bank to launch the African Diaspora Programme (ADP). The purpose of the ADP is to support the African Union in its Diaspora global program and projects. The President of IFAD, Kanayo F. Nwanze, recently said that ‘Diaspora communities from developing nations save a total of US\$400 billion every year. Many would like to support their home countries through investment. Money is not the problem. Good opportunities and clear mechanisms for making those investments are what is required.’²²

The African Diaspora has vested interest in leveraging their knowledge to support the continent. The dire poverty, unemployment, conflicts, and diseases that afflict millions of people in the continent affect Diasporans as well. They are their brothers, sisters, neighbours, and friends. These problems, therefore, demand that governments engage the Diaspora in strategic areas of economic development. Harnessing the African Diaspora’s collective knowledge is not an easy proposition. It is a challenge for both the governments and the individuals. It requires effort, creativity, transparency,

and collective innovation from governments and individuals working together to develop long-term sustainable solutions.

In September 2000, the international community under the leadership of the United Nations agreed to adopt eight dire global challenges in order to create sustainable development in countries where people live on less than a dollar a day. The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015. These goals are unique in that they are backed by a consensus of governments throughout the world.²³

Unfortunately, the African Diaspora has yet to catch up with the MDGs and/or determined what role to play in it. According to the recent UN and World Bank reports, sub-Saharan Africa has not shown progress in poverty reduction and the number of poor individuals has increased substantially. The healthcare system in most African countries still struggles to provide adequate treatment for those infected with HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other epidemics. Most important, the many episodes of civil unrest and border conflict, including the genocide in Darfur, hinder progress toward lowering child mortality rates and improving maternal health. These challenges present an opportunity for the African Diaspora to play a key role in Africa. Below are some of the ways in which the African Diaspora can be utilised for the development of the continent.

AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS

Governments in Africa ought to rethink how they want to harness the talents and resources of the Diaspora. The new approach will require more than simply receiving remittances, rather, active efforts must be made to identify and facilitate the engagement of highly skilled Africans in the Diaspora in national economic development projects. There are several African governments that have recognised the importance of engaging the Diaspora. These countries are working through their embassies, the World Bank, and other means to find ways to collaborate. For example, in 2007, the Government of South Africa convened a dialogue in Paris with Diaspora Africans from North America, and in 2008, the African Union hosted a high level summit in South Africa on ways to harness the knowledge and economic resource of the Diaspora.²⁴ This trend needs to continue; to do so, African governments need to create an infrastructure that is conducive to mobilising and engaging the Diaspora. These include supporting Millennium Development Goals and creating policies to incentivise entrepreneurial opportunities.

African governments should develop and enforce transparency. It is important that people understand the nature of the governing systems that

have sustained the status quo and also the nature of the systems that will be required to sustain systemic change. Additionally, governments must modify policies and regulations that hinder investment in such areas as real estate. In March 2011, the African Development Bank and the World Bank released a document entitled *Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills, and Investments*. One section addressed policies that African leaders should consider when engaging the Diaspora.²⁵ African governments could also improve their ability to utilise the Diaspora by establishing a cabinet-level Office of Diaspora Affairs with regional offices around the world. It is evident that embassies and consulates do not meet the needs of the Diaspora as they are primarily focused on engaging the host country. Therefore, governments should be more open to facilitating information exchange with the Diaspora.

ENTREPRENEURIAL OPPORTUNITIES

It is estimated that by 2040 Africa will have a larger workforce than China or India.²⁶ This will require targeted new enterprise growth in areas that can enhance food supply, healthcare services, and educational solutions within local communities. This presents a wonderful opportunity for the Diaspora to explore business development in the continent. To do so, African governments need to provide incentives. These can include tax incentives, improved contract laws, and improved access to capital for entrepreneurs.

The needs of locally owned African businesses are largely ignored when African governments create tax and investment incentives intended to grow the economy despite the fact that local entities stand to benefit the most from such incentives. African governments are too focused on the perceived benefits of non-African investors (e.g. US, Europe, Asia) when many African investor options exist on the continent from countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, Kenya, among many others. If leveraged correctly, these domestic African options can be a better investment option than non-African investments.

An important step that African governments could take to improve African Diaspora involvement includes improving contract laws. Many members of the African Diaspora who return to their home country with the intention to invest become frustrated with the inefficiencies. Contract law within African countries should be improved so that should written agreements be violated, there can be a quick and low-cost way to seek redress through the local court system. Such an action would help reduce the perceived risk of investing in African-based bonds, stock markets, companies, and local jurisdictions. In turn, this will help develop locally owned

businesses, which results in increased local employment and an improved ability to compete with foreign firms.

African governments should also improve access to capital for entrepreneurs. Many from the Diaspora have funds to conduct business in the short term, but in the longer term, they require access to funding in order to maintain and grow their businesses. Providing infrastructure, education, and financial and trade support enables individuals, local governments, and small businesses to grow in a more stable manner and do so with higher value-added components to their local enterprises. This could also require educating local banks about the Diaspora and allowing international financial backing to encourage local financial institutions to provide reasonable financing to entrepreneurs. Given an equal opportunity to international entrepreneurs, local African entrepreneurs are capable of identifying the needs of their communities and creating a viable business that is invaluable to their communities.

ONLINE COLLABORATION PLATFORMS

Initiatives such as mentoring, serving on boards, and creating an online and offline platform can help foster relationships between Africans and members of the African Diaspora. Such a platform, which I call the African Diaspora Network (ADN), would allow indigenous Africans from around the world to benefit through collaboration with one another and other individuals and groups interested in Africa's future. By sharing knowledge and forming partnerships through a technological platform, governments can harness the intellectual, financial, philanthropic, and entrepreneurial capacity of Africans and friends of Africa for the greater good of the continent. The African Diaspora constitutes a collective body of people dispersed in many parts of the world through which networks can be developed and individuals mobilised – all with a shared vision of creating economically and socially sustainable communities in Africa.

Sharing between members of the Diaspora would require an active and intentional partnership where governments would allow the Diaspora to serve as an important conduit in order to facilitate dialogue and action. Actions can include human capital, knowledge sharing, financials, and other resources. By bringing together these dramatic new forms of public/private partnerships, this can provide a stronger support network for those in emerging regions.

The African Diaspora Network will be a combination of a social networking site, a database, an educational resource, and a discussion forum. It will be a platform for those interested in development in sub-Saharan Africa including the African Diaspora and friends of Africa. Some of the tools ADN will offer include:

- A searchable repository of the African Diaspora and friends of Africa that can be searchable by location, expertise, enterprise, or organisation type
- Members will have profiles in order to share information and connect with potential partners
- Advice collected from experts on African economic and social development on topics including funding, successful projects in the past will be made available to members
- Educational resources on Africa will be made available
- A forum will allow a global dialogue on sub-Saharan African issues and will serve as the means to share experiences and advice
- Grassroots organisations and local African entrepreneurs can seek support and advice from individuals and organisations outside of Africa
- Volunteers can connect with potential organisations to work with social innovators and entrepreneurs can share their business plans, advice, and seek support
- Potential lenders can access information about ongoing and potential development and investment projects across Africa.

In order to illustrate the above mentioned points, the following three cases show practical examples of how the African Diaspora is using social entrepreneurship to successfully address issues facing Africa.

CASE 1 – VILLAGEREACH

The African Diaspora has a collective knowledge that comprises many different areas of expertise. Individual members are able to start their own ventures, conduct high-level research from IBM to NASA, or teach in higher education. Many have come up with innovative ideas such as the international non-profit VillageReach. However, as in any society, the level of education and source of income varies by individual, by country of origin, and at times by gender. The composition of entrepreneurs from lesser-developed countries is different from that of the indigenous population. The newcomers tend to differ in respect to the bundle of resources – human, financial, social, and cultural capital – at their disposal when compared to their indigenous counterparts.²⁷

Africans are attached to their home country both emotionally and spiritually. The bond to their home continent transcends barriers such as political and social unrest. Africans will do anything they can, including borrowing money and using their life savings, to visit families at home and support their families however possible. One clear example of the connection between a member of the African Diaspora and his home country is Blaise Judja-Sato's creation of VillageReach.

Born in Cameroon, Blaise Judja-Sato was a successful U.S. businessman until a devastating flood in Mozambique prompted his return to Africa. While helping with relief efforts, he saw both the suffering of the rural poor and the frustration of nongovernmental organisations that could not get medicines across the 'last mile' of remote country to those in need. Judja-Sato founded VillageReach (VR) because he recognised that the solution involved building a reliable 'pipeline' infrastructure. He also realised that these last-mile barriers affected industries and others who might be willing to pay into a shared system that benefited everyone. As a result, he founded VillageReach. VillageReach increased immunisation coverage rates for children under age 5 in northern Mozambique from 68% to over 95% with an innovative last-mile logistics system that costs the government less to operate than its previous system. The Mozambique Ministry of Health is now partnering with VR to implement the new system throughout the entire country.²⁸

The Mozambique government saw a committed partner in Blaise and provided him the support he needed to create a social venture for the good of the community. Many more partnerships like VR are needed in order to harness and effectively utilise the knowledge, resources, and commitment of the African Diaspora.

CASE 2 – NIGERIANS IN THE UNITED STATES

According to the American Community Survey, Nigerians represent the largest group of African immigrants in the US. In 2009 there were more than 216,000 Nigerians who emigrated to the US. This was almost 14%²⁹ of the total African population that immigrated to the US in that period. Nigerians in the US are well educated and speak English, which allows them to overcome the language barriers that many other immigrants face. The Nigerian contribution in the United States varies from entrepreneurship to science and technology. Some notable names include: Dr. Ngozi Okonjo Iweala, Prof. Chukwuma Soludo, Dr. Adeniji, Mr. Peter Obi, Prof. Emmanuel Aniebonam, and Prof. Bolaji Aluko. These are Nigerian thought leaders who are contributing to the economic and educational development in the United States. Nigerian immigrants have some of the highest levels of education in the nation, surpassing whites and Asians.³⁰ There is a concerted effort by Nigerian Americans to find strategic ways to 'transfer knowledge to their home country'.³¹ The Nigerian Computer Society (NCS) in 2001 embarked on a major project of re-connecting with Nigerian knowledge resources abroad by mounting the first Nigerian Information Technology Summit at George Washington University in Washington, US.³² This led to the establishment of the Nigerian Diaspora Commission by the Federal Government. Clearly there are many skilled members from other African nations in the

United States, and they can follow the example of the Nigerian Diaspora Commission to develop useful relationships with the governments in their home nations.

Mr. Nwoffiah sums up the importance of the position that members of the African Diaspora are in when he explains:

The Diaspora African is for the most part a transnational with one foot planted in the old country and the other in the new country. The Diaspora African has allegiance to both countries, but it is clear that the Diaspora African is wired to always see home in the old country even though he/she may live in the new country for decades. This natural allegiance to the old country must be nurtured, cultivated and channelled in order to fuel the new African resurgence in the world.⁵³

CASE 3 – JOEL MWALE, KENYA

Social entrepreneurship is not limited to Africans outside of the continent. Joel Mwale is an impressive example of a young social entrepreneur who has worked to address the issue of clean water in Africa. While sick with dysentery as a result of drinking contaminated water, Joel decided to do something about the lack of access to safe drinking water. With his little savings, he and local volunteers built a borehole in his village in Kenya. The success of the borehole in providing clean water to around 500 households, led him to investigate bringing safe and reliable drinking water to people beyond his village. He came up with Skydrop, a company that specialises in capturing falling rain water, purifying it, and bottling it. His start up has brought reliable and cheap drinking water to a wider Kenyan population and created employment to a growing number of people. Joel overcame extreme challenges to create a sustainable and inventive business. Recently named one of 10 Google Zeitgeist Young Minds, Joel has been recognised worldwide for his impressive contributions to Africa and is an important example of what innovation and investment in Africa can achieve.

CONCLUSION


Africa has a bright future and the growing information and communications infrastructure across Africa is providing people access to increased knowledge and resources. Greater numbers of women are participating and playing major roles in business, politics, and social movements than ever before. There is an increased awareness and demand for governments and businesses to be transparent and accountable to the people whom they

represent. If this trajectory continues, there is nothing to stop Africa from becoming a peaceful, just, and prosperous continent.

Fully utilising the members of the African Diaspora is a complex challenge, but the importance of the entire African Diaspora to the development of the Africa is undeniable. This paper discussed many ways in which to harness the intellectual capacity and innovation of members of the African Diaspora in order to promote economic development and foster social entrepreneurship. Hopefully in the years to come we will see many more examples like the African Diaspora Network, VillageReach, and the Nigerian Diaspora Commission, and Joel Mwale’s Skydrop.

TABLES

Table 1 World’s Ten Fastest Growing Economies

World's ten fastest-growing economies*				GDP growth, unweighted annual average, %	
Annual average GDP growth, %					
2001–2010†		2011–2015‡			
Angola	11.1	China	9.5		
China	10.5	India	8.5		
Myanmar	10.3	Ethiopia	8.1		
Nigeria	8.9	Mozambique	7.7		
Ethiopia	8.4	Tanzania	7.2		
Kazakhstan	8.2	Vietnam	7.2		
Chad	7.9	Congo	7.0		
Mozambique	7.9	Ghana	7.0		
Cambodia	7.7	Zambia	6.9		
Rwanda	7.6	Nigeria	6.8		
* Excluding countries with less than 10m population and Iraq and Afghanistan					
† 2010 estimate ‡ Forecast					

Sources The Economist, IMF

Table 2 Current and future growth potential for Africa

Africa 2010	Africa 2020
\$1.6 Trillion Collective GDP	\$2.6 Trillion Collective GDP
\$860 Billion Combined Consumer Spending	\$1.4 Trillion Combined Consumer Spending
316 Million Mobile Phones signed up since 2000	1.1 Billion the number of Africans who are of working age.
60% Africa’s share of World’s total uncultivated Arable Land	128 Million the number of Africans with discretionary income.
52 African Cities with more than 1 million inhabitants.	50% of Africans will live in Cities.

(Source McKinsey & Co. 2011)

Table 3 Total and African Foreign-Born Populations, 1960 to 2009

Year	Total foreign born	African born	
		Number	Share of total foreign born
1960	9,738,091	35,355	0.4%
1970	9,619,302	80,143	0.8%
1980	14,079,906	199,723	1.4%
1990	19,797,316	363,819	1.8%
2000	31,107,889	881,300	2.8%
2009	38,517,104	1,492,785	3.9%

(Source <http://www.census.gov>)

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Beyond Self-Actualisation

Issues and Challenges Experienced by Young Africans Seeking Asylum in London and Building Resilience for a Way Forward

Caroline Marks Madongo

INTRODUCTION

An asylum-seeker is a person who has crossed an international border in search of safety and applies to be given refugee status under the 1951 United Nations Convention which describes a refugee as someone who:

Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it'(UNHCR 1952:8).¹

Asylum seekers in the United Kingdom may have their claims accepted and be granted refugee status or humanitarian protection which can be renewed after a five-year period. Discretionary leave to remain may also be granted for a maximum of three years. If their claims are rejected, they could face being deported back to the countries that they would have fled. In 2011, Eritrea, Libya, Nigeria and Sudan were amongst the top ten asylum producing countries with applications made in the United Kingdom.² Young people seeking asylum often arrive as dependents of asylum seekers or as unaccompanied minors who apply for asylum in their own right and are separated from both parents and are not being cared for by an adult who by law has responsibility to do so (UKBA, 2011).³ They are likely to encounter challenges such as language barriers and insecurities which affect their establishing a sense of belonging during the integration process; including issues that might arise from Home Office decisions on their immigration status that may have a negative effect on their access to basic needs such as housing and education. Elwyn et al, (2012) document the plight of young

asylum seekers who face barriers from Home Office decisions in accessing higher education funding. Some of whom are Africans and would like to return to their countries in future to help rebuild communities or to volunteer in refugee camps which have helped them in the past.⁴

This area of research looking into how refugee drop-in-centres could benefit young people seeking asylum has been chosen following the success of the Supporting and Mentoring in Learning and Education⁵ (SMILE) project run by a leading refugee organisation based in south London over a three year period from 2008 to 2011. Funding for this programme has come to an end and research has shown that many of the children who took part believed that the support given by volunteers and befrienders had a positive effect on their lives. This research is outstanding and contributes very much to our understanding of the needs of young asylum seekers. However, its purpose served to evaluate the outcomes of a three-year long project and it is unclear whether these benefits presented are long or short term. Overall, there appears to be a gap in the literature reviewed where the long term benefits of refugee drop-in-centres is under-researched. Other authors and organisations working with refugee people mainly focus on refugee and asylum seekers' experiences and challenges in relation to government policy on immigration and research is dominated by these themes.⁶

The primary aim of this study is to attempt to fulfil this gap in literature by examining how refugee drop-in-centres could help young refugees and asylum seekers reach self-actualisation. The secondary aim seeks to examine whether the purpose of self-actualisation should mainly serve to aid the integration purpose in the United Kingdom or if it must stretch beyond this to be a foundation upon which young self-actualised African refugees' interests could be geared towards understanding the causes of conflict on the continent and how they can maximise their talents, capabilities and potentialities in a bid to contribute to constricting a stronger African Union. In order to reach a conclusion, this study has investigated how support offered at refugee drop-in-centres and other organisations in London have supported the participants and helped them develop through their journey into adulthood.

The specific questions that this research has discussed thematically and attempted to answer are as follows:

- Is there a link between resilience and self-actualisation in the lives of people who may have experienced a stressful period? If this link exists, how best can it be developed to benefit African refugees?
- How does labelling asylum seekers and refugees affect their reaching self-actualisation?

- How could refugee drop-in-centres help young asylum seekers reach self-actualisation and how can this knowledge be applied to support Africa's refugee population?

SELF-ACTUALISATION

Maslow (1970) carried out research using quantitative methods to investigate character traits of people who have achieved self-actualisation.⁷ Those who took part in his research were reported to be in a good state of health, they felt safe, un-anxious, accepted, loved and loving, worthy of respect and respected at the time of the experiment. Conclusions showed that self-actualised people are driven by the desire to achieve character growth, expression, development and maturation. It can be argued that the findings have made a positive contribution to understanding why some people fulfil their potential while others do not. This is essential as it gives a valuable insight into how meeting basic needs can help people draw a strong sense of identity and confidence that is needed to become self-actualised.

Today, important legislative acts such as the Children's Act (2004)⁸ and the Every Child Matters agenda (2003)⁹ reflect the significance for these basic needs to be met in every child's life. Rights-based approaches to development are also founded upon basic needs reflected in the hierarchy of needs. For example, the capability approach.¹⁰ Refugee drop-in-centres that aim to support young people fulfil these needs in their lives offer a range of facilities and activities.¹¹ Another example is a resource pack¹² that offers guidance on supporting areas of these children's lives in order to fulfil some of their basic needs. In addition, a guidance document produced by the Department for Education and Skills (2004)¹³ provides information for those working with refugee and asylum seeking children in schools on how to work collaboratively with refugee community organisations. The Children's Legal Centre (2009) has also published documents which aim to guide professionals who deal with young separated asylum seeking and refugee children to ensure that their basic needs are met by local authorities.¹⁴

However, Maslow's (1970) findings showed that ordinary people unlike those who are self-actualised, are only motivated to satisfy their basic needs which have not yet been met⁵. These conclusions were made on a group who were not part of the study and therefore his methods of sampling can be questioned. As a result, his research can be criticised for encouraging a generalised view against people in society who fail to fulfil their potential. For example, one could have all their basic needs satisfied but fail to fulfil their potential because of factors beyond their control such as social injustice, rather than lack of motivation.

Nevertheless, Maslow (1970) teaches that if young asylum seekers are to reach self-actualisation, then their basic needs will have to be satisfied. Unlike Maslow's (1970) study, this research has examined self-actualisation from the perspective of young adults who as children may have experienced a period when their needs were not met and underwent different challenges which may have affected their self-concept. Apart from the SMILE research¹ there appears to be a gap in literature where young adults are asked to reflect on how the support they received at refugee drop-in-centres has helped them to satisfy their basic needs. This research has interviewed a group of people to hear first-hand what kind of support they received as young asylum seekers and how they feel this has helped them work towards reaching self-actualisation.

RESILIENCE

Resilience is the ability to bounce back from negative experiences and adapt to changing adverse environmental conditions.¹⁵ Resilience could thus be listed as a contributory factor necessary for positive change in attitude considering some of the challenges young asylum seekers face while living in the United Kingdom. Rhodes and Brown (1991) state that overcoming the difficulties children face or succumbing to them depends on certain factors.¹⁶ These are as follows: the situation and how they perceive it, family experiences, personal characteristics and environmental circumstances. Atfield et al, (2007) report that it is generally accepted that young asylum seekers experience culture shock on arrival in Britain.¹⁷ Therefore, whether they perceive the process of asylum to be daunting or as an opportunity to start a new life away from persecution they have fled, plays a major part in determining how they will overcome their stress.

Phan (2006) reports that children of Vietnamese refugees in a study carried out in Canada have had their developing resilience and achieving academic success linked to stable family environments.¹⁸ However, Phan (2006) reports in his study that some children did not achieve academic success despite their families' hard work. Other children felt pressurised by family to hold onto Vietnamese values, which were no longer a matter of interest to them. As a result, they yearned to break free, which shows that individuals can indeed interpret the influence that family and environmental circumstances have on them differently.

Environmental circumstances may include conditions at school and extra-curricular activities. Instead of being helpful, a number of factors such as bullying, racism and labelling could create problems that could lead to asylum seeking children behaving in ways that are challenging. A gap has

been identified in the literature reviewed, where little has been researched into the link between resilience and self-actualisation, especially in the field of young asylum seekers. This study has investigated how the support received helped the participants develop resilience.

Another area that this study has investigated is the role character type played in promoting resilience for the participants. Kobasa (1977) has stated that hardiness is about experiencing a stressful event and not becoming physically or psychologically ill as a result.¹⁹ Kobasa (1977) distinguishes between an authentic person who possesses the hardiness character trait and inauthentic person, stating that the former:

Recognises that life is always changing and is responsible for the direction. This person is ever open to change and the unknown and has a balance between biological, psychological and sociological functionalism. When faced by a stressful situation, the authentic person will see it as a challenge and overcome it, whereas, an inauthentic person will become ill when faced by the unknown (Kobasa 1977:39).¹⁸

Kobasa's (1977) research has largely contributed to understanding why some people are overcome by stressful life events and others are not. It also gives credit to Rhodes and Brown's (1991) argument, that depending on how one perceives their situation, overcoming it could depend on personal characteristics which include character type. There appears to be a gap in literature where little has been written on asylum seekers being self-motivated to pursue their aspirations on their own without help from refugee and other organisations.

In addition, it can be argued that Kobasa's (1977) hardiness character trait leaves Maslow's (1970) findings which indicate that basic needs have to be fulfilled in order to desire personal growth and achievement, discussed earlier, open to criticism. As a result, this study has examined whether or not the participants reached self-actualisation despite experiencing the challenges associated with the asylum process and if resilience played a part.

LABELLING

Labelling is defining a person or group in a certain way.²⁰ Asylum seekers and refugees suffer negative labelling in society and many writers discuss the stigma that is associated with refugees.²¹ For example, Crawley (2010) reports that refugees are often mistaken for economic migrants who unlike people seeking asylum have emigrated in search of employment or improved financial position. As a result, they have been wrongly labelled as

such. Additionally, Crawley (2010) confirms that these negative views held by the public are also shared by policy makers and politicians.²² Friedman and Klein (2008) also report that the public has a negative impression on refugees that has been fuelled by anti-asylum stories published in both tabloids and well reputed broadsheets.²³ McKenna (2005) states that they are prone to racial attacks due to the negative labels associated with the term 'refugee'.²⁴ As a consequence of being labelled, ICAR (2004) report that the inaccurate images about refugees promoted by the media have the potential to 'increase community tension and in some cases lead to some refugees being harassed'.²⁵

Schools are not immune to labelling. Rutter (2006) demonstrates this in a discourse analysis carried out to investigate how teachers talk about refugee children at school.²⁶ A sample of thirty-two children, teachers and school support staff were asked to describe refugee children's main needs. Findings showed that similar attributes were used by teachers to describe refugee children, yet Hek (2005)² reports that their experiences are different and that they should be treated as individuals with diverse needs. Refugee children at the school were commonly labelled as being traumatised, having behaviour and emotional problems. For example,

Somali boys were seen to be traumatised and aggressive, therefore could not be expected to learn. Somali girls were seen as passive and oppressed Muslim women whose parents did not want them to progress into further and higher education (Rutter 2006:190).²⁵

Rutter (2006) has managed to reveal the negative experiences some refugee children come across in schools. She also brings to light the consequences of teachers focusing on stereotypes, rather than on children's differences and strengths and raises the question on how negative labelling in an environment where refugee children are expected to learn and develop intellectually at school affects their self-actualisation. However, Rutter (2006) has failed to give children's own views as to why they were labelled as such and if labelling mainly contributed to their challenging behaviour. As a result, it could be argued that the teachers' professionalism appears to be slightly undermined and where these findings are used for generalisation, positive outlooks of other teachers in different schools could be missed. For example, Bolloten and Spafford (2001)²⁷ and Lodge (2001)²⁸ write about how some teachers and EAL coordinators in London schools have been supportive towards refugee children. By understanding their individual needs and trying to meet them, the teachers are reported to have worked successfully with the children.

Nevertheless, a gap has been identified in the research where Rutter (2006) has not asked the children how stereotypes associated with refugees

affected their self-image. Obtaining their views would have helped to understand why some children were obedient and focused on learning despite the stereotypical views held by society as described earlier. Whether contradicting negative labelling is largely dependent on other sources of support such as strong family ties to act as anchors, or individual determination is open to question.

In drawing a conclusion, it can be gathered that the area of young asylum seekers is very current and well documented. However, there appears to be a gap in the literature reviewed where young adults' reflections on the support they received as children seeking asylum is under documented. These reflections are important as firstly, they could help us understand the factors that contribute to the success and failure of young asylum seekers. Secondly, they could offer valuable insight into how the support given at refugee drop-in-centres promotes resilience which could contribute to reaching self-actualisation. The link between resilience and self-actualisation could be used to explain how people whose basic needs have not been satisfied can still be motivated to acquire personal growth and development. The questions raised also provide a deeper understanding into the negative effects labelling could have on refugees as shown by Rutter (2006). Where others have contradicted the labels, this research has sought answers as to what factors could contribute to this positive outcome.

METHODOLOGY

While researching the area of refugees and asylum seekers, researchers need to ground all their statements in evidence rather than make assumptions.²⁹ For this reason, an interpretivist paradigm was used for data collection through which qualitative methods were applied. Data was collected from four participants of whom three were known to the researcher through work and educational connections. The fourth was referred to the researcher by an ex-health visitor who mentored the participant as a child. Data collection took place at the participants' homes in an environment they were comfortable in and lasted between thirty and fifty minutes. No translators were needed as the participants were happy to be interviewed in English.

Using qualitative methods to gather information allows the researcher to explore perspectives, shared meanings and to develop insights and deeper understanding of phenomena occurring in the social world.³⁰ A case study was used to examine the lives of two young refugees who have used refugee drop-in-centres to understand how the support they received while seeking asylum has helped in reaching self-actualisation. Their experiences were compared with two others who did not come into contact with refugee

drop-in-centres. Semi-structured interview questions were designed around the key themes, making it possible to ask further questions where in-depth information was needed. This also allowed the participants to elaborate on their experiences where detail was crucial.

British Educational Research Association (2011)³¹ ethical guidelines for educational research were implemented to ensure that the methodology used to conduct the research was ethical, hence minimising threats to validity, respect and the participants' and researcher's well-being. The research questions did not enquire about past personal experiences regarding their claims to asylum which may have been distressful. Rather, they were advised to only talk about issues they felt comfortable with disclosing for the purpose of the research. The most important benefit of carrying out this research to the participants is that they felt that they were being given a chance to reflect upon growing up as young asylum seekers. Their experiences were no longer ordinary accounts of a time in their lives but had become very important and had contributed to research. One risk identified concerns the nature of the research which could have exposed the participants and the researcher to the risk of becoming overwhelmed by the issues discussed. This risk was overcome by establishing respect and trust as well as offering reassurance that after care could be sought if emotional issues should arise as a result of the interviews. The research was supervised by a senior lecturer at a London university.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The first question presented in the literature review looking at how drop-in-centres could help young asylum seekers reach self-actualisation enquires about the participants' basic needs as stated by Maslow (1970) and asks how refugee drop-in-centres may have helped satisfy them in order to build self-actualisation. The findings have shown that all the participants had physiological, safety, social and esteem needs. These needs appear to have resulted from a number of factors. For example, all participants were affected by labelling, their integration process was challenging and they experienced difficulties at school, limited support or restraining family relationships including financial hardships. They also needed to have close relationships with other people.³²

Participant One and Two used drop-in-centres and these needs appear to have been fulfilled by being made to feel welcome; having friends and being allowed the chance to participate in activities they enjoyed doing; being given a sense of security, belonging, self-esteem; they were also fed and supported with learning English. Participant One states the following in her

account: 'Today I work in a salon (sense of achievement). I was shown love and made friends at the refugee centre. I felt alone at home and they (refugee drop-in-centre) helped me a lot'.²⁸ This indicates the possibility that she has high regard for the support she received at the drop-in-centre and gives credit to the drop-in-centre for her success in life. Participant Two states: 'Away from the centre, I had no confidence'.²⁸ His account indicates that the drop-in-centre may have become an important place in his life where he mostly felt confident.

Overall, the question is raised on whether labelling refugees may have the negative effect of making them feel separated from other people in society and how this psychological boundary affects their integration. Participant Two brings this to light in his account. He also shows that his inability to challenge labelling is contributory to hindering his developing resilience, hence reaching self-actualisation. He states:

It helped having friends who are also refugees. They know your problem. It's also hard to be young and then not fit in in society. It's a beautiful country but look, today I have a British passport but look at my life. I've been to rehab for crack-cocaine and I have not recovered fully yet'.²⁸

Although Participant Four did not use drop-in-centres, she relates that her allocated health visitor made a difference to her life by supporting her social, safety and esteem needs. It appears as though Participant Three's main needs were social and survival needs. He states the following: 'People are wrong about refugees. We are normal people, look I have gone back to college and I started university'.²⁸ He appears to have reached self-actualisation bearing in mind that he has not used a drop-in-centre. Nevertheless, he states that having used one may have helped with his emotional needs. Judging from Kobasa's (1977) concept on the hardiness character trait, it appears as though his personal characteristics may have helped him overcome his emotional needs and kept him determined and positive. For example, he states:

It wasn't enough. I wanted more. I looked for work and I had to run away from one job to another when they would ask for papers. Sometimes without being paid. I continued to try to work and when I made friends at work, I had to pretend all was normal'.²⁸

Additionally, it can be argued that Participant Three may have chosen to have a positive outlook on his situation although this involved pretending that his immigration status was different. He states: 'I had two identities in my head. Sometimes I was the person I wanted to become and I tried hard in life'.²⁸

It can be gathered from the data analysed and the literature reviewed that refugee drop-in-centres' capabilities of providing an environment necessary to support basic needs cannot be ruled out. The participants who were interviewed on the SMILE project¹, Participant One and Two appear to have had positive experiences at the drop-in-centres they visited. Support with basic needs is very crucial in reaching self-actualisation as reflected by Participant One and Four who experienced a period where through the support they received they were able to bounce back from stressful periods in their lives. Participant Three remained determined, whereas Participant Two does not appear to have reached self-actualisation despite using a drop-in-centre. His account indicates that he has been unsuccessful in achieving the attributes displayed by the others such as determination and being able to bounce back from stressful conditions. Therefore, Participant Two's account, reflects Rhodes and Brown's (1991) argument¹⁵ on individual characteristics hence, receiving support with basic needs may not always be enough to reach self-actualisation.

The findings discussed above show a possibility that resilience could play a role in reaching self-actualisation in people's lives who have experienced stressful conditions in the past. This link needs to be explored further. Nevertheless, there appears to be a strong link between resilience and self-actualisation in the four participants' lives judging by the role it has or has not played in their reaching self-actualisation. If refugee drop-in-centres are to provide long lasting benefits to young asylum seekers, some of their practice may have to involve developing resilience in their lives or at least equip them with the skills necessary to develop resilience. These can be applied whenever they feel the need to overcome stressful events in their lives.

The findings also support Rhodes and Brown's (1991) idea on factors necessary for resilience stated earlier. For example, Participant Three shows signs of the hardiness character trait, whereas Participant One and Four had support from the refugee drop-in-centre and a health worker, creating positive environmental factors in their lives respectively. Overall, it appears as though during the time of developing resilience, these three participants all had established a positive outlook in life, Participant One did not blame herself or family for her refugee situation, Participant Three had aspirations and Participant Four had learnt to forgive and move on with her life. It can be argued that Participant Two does not show signs of having developed resilience.

The discussion within the literature review questions how the participants interpreted their identity as refugees and how these labels affected their self-concept. The questions asked on labelling at the interviews received the most negative answers and where the participants experienced labelling, it had a negative effect on their self-concept. Participant One states: 'I understood

that when I heard the word refugee, they meant me. I felt like something rotten'.²⁸ In addition, Participant Two states: 'Sometimes when we look at the conditions we live under as refugees and hear the labels it makes us feel less human'.²⁸ Participant Three did not use a drop-in-centre and states the following: 'I hated refugees and tried to dissociate myself with the word. I did not get support with these feelings because I was denying it to myself that I was one, yet feeling ashamed to be one, do you understand?'.²⁸ Participant Four who also did not use refugee drop-in-centres experienced being labelled and bullied and states that this affected her school attendance.

In an attempt to answer whether challenging labels is through self-determination or largely dependent on support, a pattern is identified where support received from others has helped them combat emotional hurt associated with being labelled. It appears as though Participant Three was more determined to prevent the negative stigma associated with refugees from affecting him. It could be interpreted that in his own way, he challenged the labels individually, although he states that he had a very lonely experience living in denial. However, Participant Two's account is interesting because although he used a refugee drop-in-centre, from his account, it appears as though he was not able to challenge the labels. For example, he states:

One day at the centre, I can remember, one old white woman said "Oh these poor children". I was not poor. People are good at labelling others. I was weak. I tried to run away from myself. The labels hurt'.²⁸

Therefore, it can be gathered that Participants One and Four received support in challenging labels and this improved their self-concept. While Participant Three managed through self-determination, he still needed emotional support. Participant Two does not appear to have been successful in challenging the labels. For example, he states: 'I say to them (young asylum seekers) don't be like me. Fight against the labels'.²⁸ One is led to question or to understand that trust could play a major role in providing support to young asylum seekers. For example, at the refugee drop-in-centre, Participant Two's trust may have been broken by the volunteer's statement and its biased content. Additionally, Participant One's school may have been willing to support her but they may have failed to establish trust by using the term refugee, which she was aware had negative labels.

CONCLUSION: BEYOND SELF-ACTUALISATION

Consequently, the findings of this research appear to have satisfactorily supported the claims presented and answered the questions raised concerning

the three themes discussed in the literature review. These are as follows: firstly, refugee drop-in-centres are capable of providing support with basic needs to young asylum seekers. Secondly the link between resilience and self-actualisation in the lives of the four participants cannot be ruled out. Thirdly, labelling had a negative effect on the participants' self-concepts and it appears to have risked the self-actualisation process as it affected their esteem needs as shown. Lastly, challenging labels can either be through self-determination or from other sources of support and it would be advantageous if refugee drop-in-centres provide resources to help young asylum seekers in this area. In relation to Africa's growing refugee population, the following important steps to move forward have been identified.

Firstly, research shows that Africa today has a high rate of refugees both on the continent and abroad.³³ Therefore, raising awareness on the positive effects that fulfilling basic needs has on attaining self-actualisation amongst African scholars in universities abroad could develop in them an interest to carryout research that focuses on supporting Africa's growing refugee population. For example, students undertaking Development Studies degrees could link with organisations that work with African refugees and investigate how substantial funding could be sought to meet refugees' needs based on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Education for All (EFA) agenda. Students undertaking Psychology degrees could also carryout research investigating ways in which refugees' psycho-social needs can be met and offer this knowledge voluntarily. Those students undertaking Business Studies or Law degrees could offer advice to refugees who wish to take the entrepreneurial path in order to meet needs arising from financial hardships that prevent self-actualisation. In so doing, long term benefits would include African refugees being inspired to follow academic routes. Equally, those African students studying abroad could maintain a sense of identity, build upon their knowledge of current affairs affecting African people and cultivate an interest and sense of responsibility towards their continent.

Secondly, as the findings have indicated a strong link between resilience and self-actualisation in the participants' lives, the question on how to build resilience where the outcome will create self-actualised scholars whose focus is to challenge unjust systems affecting Africans in the past, at present and in the future is raised. Africa needs to generate a refugee knowledge-based economy, where the continents' current misfortunes are transformed into blessings to develop her future through learning from past mistakes. For example, drawing from their own experiences, refugees could better understand the effects of unjust and undemocratic systems. Furthering education through Lifelong Learning will enable them to engage in debate and challenge systems that continue to oppress other Africans.

They may also be able to take advantage of the sanctuary offered including freedom of speech in host countries and educate other refugees in drop-in-centres about these issues. This knowledge-based economy may also extend to broader areas such as educating refugee traders about Africa's economic challenges and engaging in critical discussion on the history of the continent and the cause of continued oppression despite almost five decades of the OAU and ten years of the African Union. Critical dialogue could lead to conscientisation and this could be one way of involving refugees who are mostly affected by Africa's continued failings.

African refugees today often find themselves living in desolate conditions, both on the continent and abroad. Africans need to work collaboratively to support refugees and to be understanding towards the cause of circumstances that lead to other Africans fleeing their home countries. The practice of labelling refugees should be challenged in hope that people will broaden their outlook on their regard for refugees and that refugees in turn may foster a positive self-conception. Africa Refugee Day is celebrated on 20th June every year. As a third measure, greater awareness of the day must be raised and African schools and communities should be educated about Africa's refugee population and ways to support them further should be discussed amongst Africans. The need to be educated about the contributory factors of wars in Africa such as the involvement of superpowers must be recognised. These issues must be addressed where possible in drop-in-centres, the media and in schools. Africa Refugee Day could be a means to reach out to African refugees as a way to show compassion for their situation and to encourage Africans to stand together as a people.

Nevertheless, the participants' accounts on their experiences on labelling raise two questions in their own right. Firstly, if labelling could pose such detrimental effects on how four young asylum seekers perceive themselves, how many other Africans are affected? Secondly, in the age of political correctness, why is it allowed to continue in British society and possibly in other parts of the world today?

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Beyond State and Geography

Building the African Union with the African People
to Realise the African Renaissance

Mammo Muchie, Phindile Lukhele-Olorunju and Oghenerobor Akpor

When something goes wrong in Somalia, the residents of Dead Man's Creek, Mississippi, do not say 'Something has gone wrong in Somalia', they say, 'Something has gone wrong in Africa.'

(Thabo Mbeki)

'None of (the states), if taken individually, would be able to effectively represent Africa or fully restore its people. Africa's contribution to humanity requires all African people to unite in achieving universal happiness.'

(Ahmed Sekou Toure)

The borders drawn and left from the age of colonialism continue to generate conflict and dislocation, not peace and security. Colonialism, neo-colonialism and coloniality have not ended fully yet. Africa's integration must be a strategic weapon in the realisation of the vision and concept of a free Africa. Inter-African integration is needed to exploit the billion strong African market to transform and develop Africa.

We still have the situation where there is more resources flowing out of Africa than flowing in. What is even more alarming is that to this day, Africans continue to flow to the rest of the world as slaves, conscripts, maids, servants, attendants, soldiers, labourers, refugees and unskilled workers. With a few exceptions, this pattern has not been broken yet.

When other people flow into Africa, they come as explorers, missionaries, slave traders, imperial civilisers, investors, aid workers, consultants, settlers and tourists. This flow into Africa and flow from Africa shows the continent's general status of humiliation and oppression today. The Ethiopiaism that inspired the first liberation movement in Africa, the ANC, by spreading self-worth, dignity, self-reliance, liberty and resistance to injustice remain unrealised. Post-coloniality is still a goal not a reality.

This situation must be changed by the concept of a free Africa that the Ethiopianism of the 18th, 19th and 20th Century brought to guide the African struggle for total liberation.

Africa must reclaim its dignity, thus capturing the agency to have the right to set the African agenda free from all kinds of influences from monetary to political and other pressures. The key is for Africa to capture the power of self-definition. Others' definitions and ideas of Africa must not inform the self-definition of Africans, nor taint it.

The AU must be founded upon the principles and values that Africans are to define who they are now, what they have been and who they wish to become. It is the synthesis of African self-images/subjectivities with African histories, traditions, and values, thoughts and knowledge that the AU should incorporate and be a vehicle for spreading.

The concept of the AU should embody the idea of eradicating Africa's humiliation by composing a free Africa through wide-ranging integration. Continued fragmentation can only mean continuing Africa's humiliation. African integration, on the other hand, is a strategic move to reverse and finally eliminate Africa's humiliation.

Africa cannot solve its humiliation without dealing with its continued fragmentation. Africa can only stand up and grow by deepening the integration process.

First and foremost, the task is to establish an African metaphysics that embodies a shared African project identity for unity and renaissance. Without developing an African identity, it is not easy to sustain the union project with any degree of stability and consistency. A shared African vision – worthy enough to shape, mediate and put in place effective mechanisms for resolving intractable conflicts and stimulate and inspire the capabilities of citizens and communities – is necessary in order to achieve harmony consistent with a shared conception of an African identity.

Such a shared conception is necessary to develop and provide overriding expression to the African identity without giving offence to the numerous other identities Africans wish to express and have. Such a metaphysics that guides the project for the expression of an African identity is essential in order to forge the AU from the various states, racial, religious, language and ethnic groups. This overriding identity can be framed from the historical and social experience of Africans. The first is positive and is anchored on historical achievements of Africans from Ancient Egypt to the colonial encounter of Africa in the 1500's.

The second is the negative history of humiliation that still continues in different guises from the time of Africa's degradation by enslavement. The metaphysics for anchoring the ontology of an African identity is framed

by a renaissance of the positive history, and firm rejection of the negative humiliation.

The most important task is to build in the young generation a strong and positive African identity by adding on any other identity they wish to express or profess. It should provide the focal imagination for building the African citizenship of all those living, working and constructing a future in Africa.

All the members of the African Union need to generate common plans to carry out civic education to foster the African identity across the continent. Afro-phobic notions bequeathed from the years of humiliation must be rejected. An Afro-phone identity or Afro-philia should replace hyphenations such as Anglophone, Lusophone, Arab phone and Francophone! Without adding such an African consciousness, the moral, intellectual, cultural and political minimum to forge a strong African Union will not obtain.

An African consciousness and identity provides the necessary condition to build the Union on a firm foundation, and to sustain it. Thus, Africa's metaphysics embodies the collective and shared will to found the AU on Africa's full liberation and renaissance imagination, vision and mission.

What will make the Union genuinely African is when it is self-sustaining. Africans should try creative ways of raising funds to finance the continent's integration. It is in the interest of Africans to make their own history. They should not allow others to make history for them. No one should colonise Africa's liberation, and Africa should not allow others to distort the African agenda through power over Africa by the money they loan or grant.

When the Africa Commission passed to South Africa under the leadership of Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, one of the challenges reported was how much more funding for projects comes more outside the Africa Union members than from them, as it should have been. This has to change. There should be a reliable resource commitment to open an independent financial structure for building an integrated and free African nation.

The Union must not be dependent at the outset or shackled by onerous conditions. That would be a real shame and a disservice to Africa's aspirations to be free, strong and proud. In particular, each African state should put in its budget an African integration fund. This should be equal to the percentage of national income that each state spends on its own state security apparatus. This money should be invested in stock markets and made to grow in order to yield income to finance the complete integration of the continent.

Africa must beware of gifts from others. Dependency on the kindness of strangers to liberate Africa is not the way to go. Such gifts from donors have helped largely to fatten the elite and impoverish the poor. This experience makes it imperative that the main resources for the African Union must come from Africans themselves. Every state should pass a law

that Africans both inside and outside in the Diaspora should pay tax for unity and the African Union. Africa should seriously consider setting up an African Union Renaissance Fund where all can contribute – governments, businesses, citizens and others through direct tax and other sources including philanthropy. External assistance can be accepted only if it comes with no strings attached and on the basis of solidarity to assist Africa to enter the permanent state of post-coloniality.

There should also be a lottery and other fund raising activities wherever Africans are. Africa is rich. It will be even richer if it invests honestly and purposefully to build the AU. There is hardly any reason to go asking for help. The AU must be an African peoples' renaissance building project through and through, and it is neither necessary nor desirable to involve donors at the early stage. Unless the donors provide funds on the basis of pure solidarity, there is no value in receiving finance from them.

The Africa Union must also develop a vast information and communication system that blends and enriches the values of Africa and informs Africans to join together to transform the well-being of all Africans with freedom of information as a right for all Africans. A pan-African news service to rival the BBC, CNN, CCTV and Al-Jazeera is long overdue for Africa. Relying on outsiders exposes Africans to absorb information about them by others.

African leaders must try to embrace African integration as a strategic priority for bringing about the rapid transformation of their own societies. The contribution they make to the continent's institutions will make it possible to build new institutions and strengthen pan-African institutions. Among the steps the AU selected for implementation from the 11-point programme enunciated by Kwame Nkrumah in 1963 in Addis Ababa are the following:

- First, the Union will have an assembly of heads of states, a council of foreign ministers, a secretariat and a permanent committee of ambassadors
- Second, it will establish an African parliament, an African central bank, a common African currency and a court of justice.

While these aims are laudable, the initiative is entirely top down. There should be an institutional approach to citizen engagement in the formation of the AU. This is crucial to make sure that the Union is for the common African person, not just the elites and foreign corporate power.

There is a problem in the priority of the institutions that need to come first. More than any other issue that affects Africa today is the difficult problem of ensuring stability and security. One of the mistakes of the European Union was to forgo setting up a security structure along with other developments from shallow to deep integration of the EU.

Africa has more reasons than Europe to make a security system as part of an early development of the formation of the Union. Violence is daily disrupting life for most Africans. The violence market has been privatised and security firms, arms dealers, 'blood diamonds' and 'blood oil' are allowing companies to rake in millions over the death of Africans. This must be stopped and only Africans at a union level can do this. The security system for organising the eradication of violence and freeing Africa is one of the top challenges confronting African leadership. This is an area that cannot be postponed or left in the hands of others.

Innovation, learning and imagination have to be embedded in the construction of the AU, as a culture, philosophy and ethics. Deceptions, the use of arbitrary force, copied and borrowed ideologies for purposes of imposing social control and for promoting sectional advantages have to give way to a new union of Africa rooted in a moral sense and identity, persuasion, consent, public policy and public service.

The AU must increase African independence of thought and action. It must make Africa self-reliant. Africa was forced to experience a public policy vacuum for two decades, owing to the policies of structural adjustment from the multi-lateral financial institutions. The AU should insulate African states from experiencing such embarrassment ever again.

It must allow them to stand free and independent to pursue any policy trajectory they deem necessary to build their own society. Unless the AU can resist the invasive policy ideas from the external world, they will turn out to be part of Africa's problem rather than the solution.

The AU must be anchored on the concept of a free Africa, to unite Africa and make it strong, prosperous and a real player in world affairs. The OAU/AU Jubilee must advance the pan-Africanism and African renaissance that was adopted as the slogan for the jubilee. Africans should use the occasion to move Africa out of colonality for ever. The protocols and talks to integrate Africa and make Africa renascent and united must be fully realised. A new dawn of a united and renascent Africa must start from this opportunity that the jubilee celebrations offer today. The vision should be of a post-colonial future for Africans, fully integrated and self-reliant, and making the well-being of all Africans the priority of priorities.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 *The Economist*, 2 September 2000.
- 2 Muchie, M., 2003. *The Making of the Africa-Nation: Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance*. Adonis-Abbey Publishers.

The Second Tshwane Declaration, 2012

PREAMBLE

We, the over 100 researchers from various countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas, having met in Tshwane, South Africa over three days to commemorate Africa Liberation Day and exchanged on ten years of the African Union and the need to put Africa first in order to promote the idea of putting humanity first. The reason is that no people have been subjected to the degradation or commoditisation or thingification as Africans, recovering their humanity can only take place when Africans are put first in order to redeem all spiritually.

RESOLUTION

1. 2012 marking the centenary of the first pan-African national liberation movement that was born in South Africa, the African National Congress.
2. The recognition and acknowledgement that the pan-Africanism that was first coined in 1896 by Sylvester Williams from Trinidad coincided with the year of the Adwa African victory and the emergence of the first African national liberation movement. The synergy, coincidence, and interlink amongst the emergence of Pan-Africanism, resistance victory over empire, and a political liberation movement with Pan-African roots at a time when communication was not easy is indeed a milestone in the annals of African history.
3. The recognition that despite the presence of the ideas of pan-africanism and the African Renaissance, Africans are still divided and they suffer mostly still from the colonial imagination and mentality, and the struggles to bring an irreversible post-colonial era for Africans as a whole.

4. The education system has not been fully appropriate to building free and emancipated Africans. It is still largely based on borrowing from outside, copying and mimicry. It has not been founded on a systematic, full and inspiring appreciation of the Pan-African history, values, civilisation, philosophy, economy, politics, science, technology, engineering and innovation.
5. The recognition that the African national imagination must replace all the colonially contaminated imagination. Fanon's admonition that Africa needs a de-colonising imagination must be put into practice in all the activities Africans do.
6. The realisation that a new pan-African pact that combines the triple helix of African resistance, Pan-African guiding principles and politics that puts African governance that blends African tradition with modernity must guide African development.
7. The recognition that Africans are varied but their similarity comes first, so we put Africa first or being African first to all other identities; Africans must share a unity and renaissance project identity making Africaness to be a means to express self-definition, self-organisation, self-reliance, self-worth, pride, dignity, freedom and self-determination rather than seeing it as a hindrance.
8. Africa Union means a realisation that there can be no room for divide and rule and all Africa states must prioritise the African interest above everything else. Africans must prize their unity above everything else. They must unite with a big bang even if the heavens fall. They must learn to compete without breaking their unity; they must learn to unite to enhance their skills and capabilities to move ahead. Learning to collaborate with competition and learning to compete without breaking collaboration must guide the African leadership knowledge, capability, vision, style and practice. Conflict must be resolved using rehabilitative justice and mobilising the values for conflict resolution from the African tradition and deep philosophy such as *ubuntu*.
9. Africans must learn to deal with problems that come together. They must not invite or team up with former colonial powers to solve problems in Africa by alienating other fellow Africans. They must meet together first and only relate to outsiders after agreeing with each other on the best way to protect the African interest based on a shared African identity and similarity within the differences whatever they are.
10. 'African solutions to African problems'. We should stop talking it and learn to do it in practice. Let Africans solve their own problems. They should stop undermining African unity by inviting outsiders to

help them. The Libyan case should serve as a good lesson. Africans should have tried to unite and address the problem first before others invited themselves and pushed their agenda. Africans must stand up, never again to fall into humiliation. All humiliation must end now; if not now, then when can Africans attain full unity? It is 50 years after the OAU and 10 years after the AU. We must not wait another 50 years to see pan-Africanism and the African renaissance fully realised.

11. We held the conference at a time when the ANC is 100 years. The conference acknowledges the ANC's 100 years anniversary and salutes and congratulates all our ancestors that founded this first ever liberation movement in Africa on clear pan-African roots of Ethiopianism, spiritual roots of resisting racist churches and founding patriotic churches such as the pan-African Ethiopian churches of South Africa in 1892.
12. All African Governments should contribute the resources to build the African Union. There should be less donor money. Citizens should be involved. There should be taxes that all Africans must pay to accelerate the unity of Africa.
13. This year, after the 50 years of the OAU and more than ten years of the AU, should be the year for African unity and renaissance. Vast education from South Africa to East, North, Central and West Africa should be spread. This year is a good time to turn the African liberation Day of 25 May to be a month for education of Africans for unity and renaissance. The South African government should be encouraged to give leadership without fail for this month to be dedicated every year for pan-African education. We ask the South African government to lead and get the Month of May to be the African Liberation for Unity and Renaissance Month.
14. We think the AU should help form a committee of scientists to develop research on pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance. There should be also efforts to develop textbooks for primary education with a complete pan-African history, philosophy and science.
15. There should be efforts by the AU to ease labour mobility amongst Africans including the Diaspora as the sixth region. The AU should support networks from Silicon Valley like the African Diaspora Network and call for South Africa to provide the infrastructure, especially for engineers and scientists to start a local network of silicon valleys, science parks, venture incubators by strengthening R & D.
16. There should be systematic efforts to include citizens to be involved directly by creating an African civil society global observatory. This can be linked to all pan-Africanists and the AU to support

the continuation of the Pan-African Congresses that was started in 1900. The Pan-African Congresses should continue but must involve directly all sections and communities in Africa and the Diaspora. The AU to join us to make sure that this is established by being inclusive, adding both policy and multi-stakeholder activities that include inter-African infrastructure, science, technology, engineering, design, innovation, business and labour synergies.

Fifty years ago Kwame Nkrumah put forward the vision 'Africa Must Unite'. This vision is still waiting to be realised. Today Africa must cultivate and promote the renaissance and unity vision. We call for the African Renaissance and Unity Manifesto to provide the stimulus to spread and diffuse education to reach all Africans so that this 'OAU/AU@50' jubilee is distinguished and highlighted by re-defining Kwame Nkrumah's 'Africa Must Unite' for our time; to move all onwards and forwards and never backwards.

Drafted by Professor Mammo Muchie, DST/NRF Research Chair on Innovation Studies, Tshwane University of Technology, Pretoria, South Africa and approved by the over 100 participants on the Second Scramble for Africa Conference held between 23–25 May, 2012.

The African Union Ten Years After

Solving African Problems with Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance

Edited by Mammo Muchie, Phindile Lukhele-Olorunju and Oghenerobor Akpor

This book looks at the first ten years of the African Union. This is the second in a series of books that will be produced each year from annual conferences held on the multi-faceted issue of African liberation. The key themes of the book explore ways of improving the effectiveness of the African Union, fostering unity amongst African countries through entrenchment of pan-Africanism, and building ownership of the African Union by the African people and their communities. In addition, the thoughts of key figures of pan-Africanism and black emancipation, such as Sylvester Williams and Frantz Fanon, are re-positioned to even greater contemporary relevance.

Through its promotion of Ethiopianism, pan-Africanism and the African renaissance, we trust that this book will add new interest and a fresh perspective to how Africans move forward together into a post-colonial era where policies and actions are determined by the united agency of liberated Africans the world over.

This book provides a wide ranging exposition of the possible ways in which Africans, including the Diaspora, can and should devise their own solutions to the myriad of developmental imperatives and political challenges facing the continent this century. Recognising Africa's common history and destiny, it argues for the reconfiguration and consolidation of the African Union and a revamping of national polities to enable its people to address the sorely needed continental integration towards substantive, internally articulated and self-financed development. The authors identify intellectual, educational and technological transformation, corrupt-free and inclusive governance processes, enhancing the role of women and sustainable agricultural, natural resources and renewable energy development, as critical factors of progressive change. The book essentially broadens the frontier of African philosophy in search of the African Renaissance, through debates grounded in various perspectives on pan-African identity, emancipation and self-actualisation. It is a must read for scholars, students, policy makers and educators across the globe.

– Professor Sam Moyo, *Africa Institute of Agrarian Studies, Harare, Zimbabwe*

At a time when the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Organisation of African Unity, which was later to transmute to the African Union at the beginning of the new millennium, is being commemorated, this book allows for a deep reflection on the quest for an all-round renewal on the continent. The ideas debated within its covers offer much food for thought which readers will find both enriching and stimulating.

– Professor Adebayo Olukoshi, *African Institute for Economic Development and Planning, Dakar, Senegal*

